Reconstruction of war-damaged rural areas of Khuzestan, Iran. by Akbar, Haji Ebrahim Zargar
RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR-DAMAGED RURAL AREAS
OF KHUZESTAN, IRAN
(Two Volumes)
"Volume one"
Akbar, Haji Ebrahim Zargar
A dissertation submitted for the
degree of DPhil in Architecture
University of York
"Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies"
June, 1989
92
94
121
123
TABLE OF CONTENTS
"VOLUME ONE"
Table of Contents	 page
List of Tables	 vii
List of Figures
	 ix
List of Plates
Acknowledgements	 xi
Declaration	 xiii
Abstract	 xv
Foreword	 xvi
CHAPTER I: IRAN, KHUZESTAN, THE WAR AND THE RECONSTRUCTION
Introduction	 page	 1
1-1 Iran	 2
1-2 The Islamic Revolution	 3
1-3 Khuzestan; Traditional rural settlements	 12
1-4 The war; The roots of conflict; Chronology of the
attacks; War damage; Human loss and refugees;
Economic loss; Damage to the settlements;
Mechanism of destruction of rural settlements	 23
1-5 Reconstruction starts; Three phases of 	 41
reconstruction
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE SURVEY, (SOURCES, FRAMEWORK AND
PRE-DISASTER PLANNING)
Introduction	 50
2-1 Identifying the sources of information 	 50
2-2 Looking for a framework	 53
2-3 A review of major issues in disaster and housing;
Definition of disaster; Disaster and
vulnerability; Definition of Risk, Vulnerability,
Elements at risk and Specific risk; Shelter and
disaster damage; Pre-disaster planning; Why
planning for disasters?; Concept of mitigation;
Steps in mitigation; Preparedness; Discussion and
Remark	 65
CHAPTER III: SHELTER AFTER DISASTER (PHASE 1 AND 2)
EMERGENCY SHELTER AND TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION
Introduction
3-1 A review of different approaches; Tents; Plastic
sheets; Lamina and corrugated iron sheets;
Polyurethane for shelter; Salvaged materials;
Wooden huts; Mobile homes, caravans and
Prefabricated houses
3-2 A review of major issues; Remark
3-3 Technical guidelines for selection of temporary
shelter
-
CHAPTER IV: SHELTER AFTER DISASTER (PHASE 3, RECONSTRUCTION)
Introduction	 127
-1-
4-1 Case reports review
	
130
Case 1 - Skopje, Yugoslavia
	
133
Case 2 - Managua, Nicaragua
	
140
Case 3 - Guatemala	 147
Case 4 - Fruili, Italy	 150
Case 5 - Darwin, Australia	 155
Case 6 - Tangshan, China	 159
Case 7 - El'Asnam, Algeria	 161
Case 8 - Honduras	 164
Case 9 - Chimbote, Peru	 167
Case 10- Tabas, Iran	 169
Case 11- Gediz, Turkey	 171
Case 12- Qir-Karzin, Iran	 175
Case 13- Bingol, Turkey	 177
Case 14- Lice, Turkey
	
179
Case 15- Van, Turkey	 181
Case 16- Andhra Pradesh, India	 182
Case 17- Ecuador	 183
Case 18- Dhamar, Yemen	 186
Case 19- Albania
	 187
4-2 A review on major issues of post-disaster
settlement reconstruction; Introduction; Urban
issues; Rural issues and Housing reconstruction
issues	 189
4-3 Technical innovation for building reinforcement 213
4-4 Training and education	 219
Conclusion	 228
CHAPTER V: DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
	
231
5-1 Disasters and the degree of development	 232
5-2 Disaster impact on development	 233
5-3 Reconstruction and development; What is
development; Rural development	 234
5-4 Discussion; Theoretical argument; Practice of
development after disasters and Conclusion	 255
CHAPTER VI: CHANGE AFTER DISASTER
Introduction	 274
6-1 Controversy in literature	 276
6-2 Discussion; Governments; Intervenor agencies;
Planners and engineers; Survivors; Rationality
of victims; Availability of choice; Acceptability
and sustaining changes; Reasons for rejection
in normal times; Psychological effects of
disasters; Role of observation; Stress and higher
acceptability and Conclusion	 283
CHAPTER VII: DISASTERS AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION
Introduction	 300
7-1 The spread of people's participation 	 303
7-2 The historical background	 304
7-3 Towards a definition	 307
7-4 Who are the people?	 314
7-5 Participation and politics	 317
7-6 Advantages of popular participation	 320
7-7 Obstacles to community participation; Theoretical
aspects; Operational obstacles; Remark	 321
7-8 Rural development and people's participation	 331
7-9 Shelter and participation and Remark	 334
7-10 Disasters and people's participation;
Pre-disaster planning; Emergency phase; Emergency
shelter and Reconstruction phase and Conclusion 340
CHAPTER VIII: POST-DISASTER PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL RECOVERY
Introduction	 351
8-1 Psychological aspects of disasters: an overview;
Characteristics of disasters as stressful events
and Psychological profile of victims 	 354
8-2 Association between physical reconstruction and
psychological recovery; Emergency shelter period;
Design Policy; Site selection; Population
integration; Site layout and house design and
Material and technology policy 	 359
Implementation and construction policy; Time of
return home; Completion of the buildings;
Conditions of the emergency shelter; Potential
threat; Psychological recovery of victims
	 368
Participation in the reconstruction;
Participation in decision-making and
Participation in the physical work
	 371
Conclusion	 376
CHAPTER IX: WAR AS A DISASTER
Introduction	 378
9-1 General characteristics of war as a disaster;
The origin; History and magnitude; Hope of
stalemate? and Ignoring the aftermath and Variety
of wars
	 378
9-2 Damage; Casualty; Psychological effects;
Mechanism of physical destruction and
Conventional weapons and Nuclear weapons 	 384
9-3 Civil Defence (precautionary measures); Specific
character of war; Defence and architecture;
Protection against conventional weapons; Shelter
in Iran; Civil defence in Britain; Remark 	 391
Protection against nuclear attack; Remark	 405
Evacuation; Camps; Camps in WW II. and Remark
	 411
9-4 Relief for war victims 	 423
Conclusion	 425
"Volume Two"
CHAPTER X: RECONSTRUCTION AFTER WAR
INTRODUCTION	 427
10-1 Coventry, Britain	 429
10-2 Rotterdam, Holland	 434
10-3 Warsaw, Poland	 439
10-4 Gdansk, Poland	 447
10-5 Molde, Norway	 449
10-6 Basra, Iraq	 451
10-7 German cities	 453
10-8 Village reconstruction; Greek villages; Lebanese
villages; Iranian villages and Remark
	 457
10-9 Planning and reconstruction after WW II in
Britain and Remark	 463
10-10 Discussion; Opportunity and morale; Housing;
City plan; Remark; Phases and time;
Conservation; Economy	 463
Comparison between reconstruction after war and
natural disasters and Damage assessment and
repair	 473
Conclusion	 496
CHAPTER XI: FIELD STUDY REPORT, (METHODOLOGY)
Introduction	 498
11-1 Background; Definition of objectives; Method and
tool for investigation; Method; Design of
questionnaire; Training the interviewers and
Lessons learned in practice	 500
Construction of samples; Introduction to sampling
and Sampling methods; Sample size; Sampling for
the present survey; The zone; Sampling villages
and Selection of householders for interview 	 519
Implementation and data collection;
Transportation; Finding houses; Acceptance of
householders and General points to notice 	 529
CHAPTER XII: SAMPLES PORTRAIT
Introduction
Sample 01 = Sane
Sample 02 = Bardie
Sample 03 = Jelizi
Sample 04 Soveidani
Sample 05 = Sachet Hamoudi
Sample 06 = Motayyer
Sample 07 = Moerez
Sample 08 = Gheisarie
Sample 09 = Choulane
Sample 10 = Seied Naser
Sample 11 = Abarfoush
Lessons learned
Summary of some of the data
532
534
542
548
556
560
563
566
570
573
578
580
583
586
CHAPTER XIII: DATA ANALYSIS, (SECTIONS 1&2)
Introduction	 588
13-1 General characteristics of householders; Age;
Respondents' occupation; Educational attainment;
Number of families in house and summary of
section 1 and remarks 	 590
13-2 Economic, environmental and cultural consequences
of reconstruction and Introduction	 602
Economic effects; Income; Access to work 	 603
Environmental effects; change in the level of
hygiene of the village; Houses hygiene; Toilet
in house; Bathroom and Remarks 	 607
Cultural effects of reconstruction;
The construction of the previous house; material
for a new room and Material for building stables 620
Discussion; The attribute of previous house;
Maintenance of buildings; Learning building
skills during reconstruction period; Ability to
repair their houses; Cooling equipment of house
and expectation for reconstruction in case of
further damage induced by the war	 622
Summary and remark on section 2	 632
CHAPTER XIV: DATA ANALYSIS (SECTIONS 3&4)
Introduction
	
634
14-1 The physical aspects of reconstructed
settlements; Location and land; The reasons for
unsuitability of land; soliciting villagers'
opinion; risk of flood; Experiencing flood in
the past; Discussion; Conjunction with other
villages; Remarks
	
635
Site design; Form and size of the streets and
alleys; Discussion; The size of the plot; The
value of house; Remark 	 640
Houses design and construction; Plan of the
house; Size of the room; Number of rooms; Built
area; Size of the courtyards; Size of windows;
Location of toilet 	 660
Strength of the building; Strength of built
parts during reconstruction; Walling material;
Roofing material; Resistance of building against
bombing; Discussion; Observation of bombing	 672
Further needs to space; More rooms; More
services; Courtyard; Animal space; Remark	 680
14-2 Construction and implementation; Introduction;
Temporary shelter; Observation of justice;
Location of house; Selection of house; Where
would you like your house to be?; Happy with
neighbours; Period of reconstruction; The source
of funding the project; Priority for
reconstruction; Present needs; Remark	 686
Global results; Conclusion of the field survey 702
CHAPTER XV: TOWARDS A PROPOSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR
DAMAGED RURAL AREAS OF KHUZESTAN PROVINCE
Introduction
	
709
15-1 Iran after the ceasfire; Development model;
Ceasefire or peace?; Foreign policy; Economy;
Planning and administration; Remarks 	 710
Reconstruction planning and priorities;
Settlement reconstruction; City or village?
	
724
Guidelines for reconstruction of war damaged rural
areas of Khuzestan; Action plan;
First stage: (few months); Second stage:
(Transitional Phase, two or three years)
	 733
Summary and conclusion	 737
APPENDICES
Appendix I: Questionnaire
	 749
Appendix II: Disasters are Acts of God,
(A spiritual view)	 770
Appendix III: A Bibliography on Settlement
Reconstruction after War 	 782
Main Bibliography	 809
Chapter XII
12-1
12-2
12-3
Chapter XIII
13-1
13-2
1 3-3
13-4
13-5
LIST OF TABLES
Table No.
	 Title	 Page
Demographic information of 11 villages 586
Educational facilities of villages 586
Reconstruction data 587
Age characteristics of the three groups 590
The means and sd of age scores of the 11
Villages 591
Frequency distribution of number of families 599
Number of families in the three groups 600
Income change of the three study groups 604
	
13-6	 Change in access to place of work in 11 villages 606
	
1 3-7
	
Change in the level of hygiene of the three
study groups	 609
	
13-8	 Change in the level of hygiene in the 11 sampled
villages
	 610
	
1 3-9	 Change in the level of hygiene of the three
study groups	 612
	
13-10	 Change in the level of hygiene in houses in
the 11 villages
	 613
	
13-11	 Percentage of houses with toilets before the war 614
	
13-12	 Frequency of houses with a bathroom in the three
study groups	 618
	
13-13	 Villagers' attitudes towards their previous
houses	 624
	
13-14	 Respondents attitude towards their previous
houses in the three study groups 	 624
	
13-15	 Values of the three study groups related to
reconstruction in case of another damage 	 631
Chapter XIV
	
14-1	 Suitability of land used for the groups of
the villages	 639
	
14-2	 Suitability of land used for housing in
11 villages	 637
	
14-3	 Risk of flooding of the 11 villages 	 639
	
14-4	 The experience of flood in the past in the 11
villages	 640
	
14-5	 Villagers idea about conjunction with other
villages	 644
	
14-6	 Selected villages satisfaction of size and
form of streets
	 648
	
14-7	 Satisfaction of the size of streets and alleys
in selected villages 	 649
	
14-8	 Satisfaction of size of the plots in 11 villages 654
	
14-9	 Similarities in values of houses in the 11
villages
	 658
	
14-10
	 Satisfaction with size of the room
	 663
	
14-11	 Satisfaction with built area of houses in the
11 villages	 666
668
671
674
675
676
678
681
689
690
692
695
696
697
698
701
	
14-12	 Satisfaction with size of the courtyards in
11 villages
	
14-13	 Suitability of location of the toilet in 11
villages
	
14-14	 Strength of buildings in 11 villages
	
14-15	 Satisfaction of walling materials in 11 villages
	
14-16	 Satisfaction with roofing materials in 11
villages
	
14-17	 Improvement of buildings' resistance to
bombing in 11 villages
	
14-18	 Peoples needs for more rooms in 11 villages
	
14-19	 Observation of justice for reconstruction in
11 villages
Satisfaction of the present location of house
in 11 villages
Villagers' involvement in selecting location of
their house
Not being aware of financial source of the
reconstruction in the 11 samples
Priorities for reconstruction in the view of
the villagers
	
14-24	 First priority to house reconstruction in
11 villages
	
14-25	 The first three priorities of the 11
villages needs
	
14-26	 Sorted list of global success of the villages
14-20
14-21
14-22
14-23
12
13
17
21
26
27
592
593
594
596
Frequency Distribution of respondents age
Frequency Distribution of age for the three
study groups
The job distribution of the respondents
Frequency distribution of respondents'
educational attainment
Frequency distribution of the number of
families per house
Chapter XIII
13-1
13-2
13-3
13-4
13-5
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure No.	 Title	 Page
Chapter I
1-1
1-2
1-3
1-4
1-5
1-6
Iran and Khuzestan
Average rain fall and temperature of Ahwaz
An example of traditional house
Location of Mozif (guest room) in the house
Iraqi advances September to December 1980
Operations 1981-82
Chapter XI
11-1	 Khuzestan Province and Dasht-e Azadegan
District
Chapter XII
	
12-1	 Location of villages selected as samples
	
12-2	 The site of Sane and the three separate
territories
	
12-3	 The first proposal site design for Sane
	
12-4	 The second site design proposed for Sane
	
12-5	 The actual site of Sane unchanged
	
12-6	 Site of Bardie unchanged after reconstruction
	
12-7	 The present Jelizi and previous location of
the two villages
	
12-8	 The site plan of Jelizi
	
12-9	 House plans of Jelizi
	
12-10
	
The site and house design of Soveidani
	
12-11	 Site and house design of Sachet
	
12-12	 Site design of Motayyer
	
12-13	 The location of previous two villages and
present Moerez
	
12-14
	
The new site of Moerez
	
12-15	 Site design of Gheisarie Sofia
	
12-16
	 Site of Choulane
	
12-17	 Layout of a house before and after
reconstruction
	
12-18	 Site layout of Abarfoush
524
533
535
538
539
541
546
551
553
555
559
561
565
567
569
572
574
576
581
600
Frequency distribution of change in income
	
13-6	 603
Change in access to the work
	
13-7	 605
	
13-8	 Change in the level of hygiene of the villages 608
	
13-9	 Change in the level of houses' hygiene 	 611
1 5
18
35
40
44
46
536
543
545
547
549
555
557
559
562
564
569
571
572
577
577
579
582
LIST OF PLATES
Plate No.
	
Title	 page
Chapter I
1-1
1-2
1-3
1-4
1-5
1-6
Chapter XII
12-1
12-2
12-3
12-4
12-5
12-6
12-7
12-8
12-9
12-10
12-11
12-12
12-13
12-14
12-15
12-16
12-17
Mens' traditional cloth
A bamboo house
The effect of rising damp on mud built walls
A view of a damaged village
A view of the village Bardie (phase I)
A view of village Farsie (phase II)
Centre of Sane after reconstruction
Bardie after reconstruction
Another view of Bardie
A reconstructed house in Bardie
Site of Jelizi
Cement block made houses of Jelizi
Soveidani after reconstruction
Inside a house in Soveidani
Inside a house in Sachet
The new mosque in Motayyer
Central square of Moerez
Site of Gheisarie Sofla
The muddy road to the village Gheisarie
A view of Choulane after reconstruction
Inside a house in Choulane
A reconstructed house in Seied Naser
View of Abarfoush after reconstruction
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
Thanks to Allah, for our efforts are nothing but God's will.
My sincere thanks to my tutor Charles Cockburn, for his continuous
encouragement, comments, criticism and support. For his patience in
reading and editing the texts, reports and even my publications without
allowing me to acknowledge his contribution. And for his efforts to
organise the two York Workshops related to the subject of the present
study.
I would like to thank Professor Wise for his support and
encouragement and particularly for assisting with the Two York
Workshops that took place at the Institute. I am in great debt to Dr
Adrian Leftwich from the Politics Department, University of York, for
his Rural Development course and for his tutorial on the Developmental
aspects of the study.
My gratitude goes to Librarians, Keith parker and Jan Powell
from the Kings Manor Library and to Will Wakeling and Elizabeth Heaps
from 'On Line Search Department' in the Morrell Library for their help
in tracing documents. I would also like to express my gratitude to
the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education of Iran, who provided me
with the scholarship and made this journey to York possible.
The Field survey became possible, thanks to the help of several
people. In the design of the questionnaire, Dr Rob Fletcher from the
Computer Centre and Eileen Sutcliff from the Economic Research Centre
made useful comments. Members of the University of Shahid Beheshti,
in Tehran, Iran including Dr Faramarz Rafipour, from the Department of
Sociology, Lecturers Hassan Miri and Abbas Shaken i and student
Muhammad Saeid Darvish from the School of Architecture, all helped in
preparation of the Field Study. In Khuzestan, 'Jahade Sazandegi
Susangerd', supported the study, by providing transport and also
mandating their members to take part as interviewers, in addition to
accommodation and food. Without their generous help the Field Study
could not have been carried out in time.	 In the data processing and
statistical analysis, I was largely guided by my friend Bahman Najarin,
from the Psychology Department, University of York. 	 Furthermore, he
assisted me by finding the psychological references I needed.	 My
grateful thanks to him.
For nearly three years I have benefited from the help of Mrs
Amanda Odell, who read and corrected the first draft of texts. I
acknowledge her invaluable help. Obviously there are many others,
including my friends at Kings Manor, whose help with this work has been
continous in one way or another. I thank all of them.
DECLARATION:
During the course of this study parts of this and other works
were translated into Farsi, presented at Conferences or Workshops, or
were published. They are listed chronoligically as follows;
1- Some 50 pages of 'Emergency Shelter Study', (UNDRO, 1977?) was
translated into Farsi and circulated in Iran. (1987)
2- A paper entitled 'Reconstruction and Development' was delivered at
the 'Shelter Conference', CARDO, The University, Newcastle Upon Tyne.
3-4 March 1988.
3- A revised version of that paper was published with the same title in
Open House International, Vol. 13 No.2, 1988. (pp. 22-36)
4- A paper entitled 'War as a Disaster' was contributed to the first
'Workshop on Settlement Reconstruction post-war', IoAAS, Kings Manor,
York. 16-17 May 1988.
5- A Report was published from the latter Workshop in 'Disasters',
Volume 12. No. 3. 1988. (pp. 209-211)
6- A paper entitled 'Physical reconstruction and psychological
recovery' was produced in collaboration with Bahman Najarian, from the
Psychology Department, University of York. I presented it to 'The
First European Conference on Traumatic Stress Studies', Lincoln,
England. September 1988.
7- A revised version of that paper has been accepted for publishing as
a Chapter in the 'International Handbook of Traumatic Stress Syndrome',
(Editors: Professor John P. Wilson and Beverly, Raphael). Plenum
Publication , expected publication date 1990.
8- An introduction to the 'Second York Workshop on Settlement
Reconstruction after War' written with Charles Cockburn.
	 February
1989.
9- A contribution was made to the Second York Workshop, entitled 'War
as a Disaster:Facts and Gaps'. 16-18 May 1989.
10- A Bibliography on 'Settlement Reconstruction After War' was
produced in connection with the Second York Workshop, May 1989.
11- A 'Workshop Report' has been prepared from the Second York
Workshop, currently under consideration for publication in 'Disasters'
(possibly 1989).
ABSTRACT: As a result of eight years of war between Iraq and
Iran, (1980-1988) more than 3,800 villages in Iran were damaged or
destroyed. The reconstruction of villages in Khuzestan Province,
south-west Iran, started in 1982 and continued during the war.
Several policies for rebuilding rural settlements were implemented,
including the re-establishment of pre-war norms and the total
modernisation of the village.
This study has attempted to suggest some guidelines for
reconstruction of rural areas of Khuzestan, by the means of examining
the efficiency of different approaches, from the viewpoint of
inhabitants'. After a review of the literature on natural disasters
and war, a Field Survey was carried out, which includes interviews with
132 villagers from 11 sample villages. The analysis of data collected
revealed, that many of the problems found in other post-disaster
reconstructed villages in the Third World, such as unsuitable housing
design, exist also in Khuzestan. It was found that, the more the
inhabitants are directly involved in the decision-making and physical
work of the reconstruction of their settlements, the higher the degree
of satisfaction the end product will give.
After exploring the specific characteristics of 'war as a
disaster' and 'reconstruction after war', suggestions are made relating
to the present economic and social context of Iran for the
reconstruction of rural areas. Basically, the proposal is
characterised by minimising the intervention of the State and outside
professionals and relying more on the active role of villagers and
local institutions and the use of local materials, for quick
re-settlement during the immediate period of reconstruction.
FOREWORD:
The eight long years of war between Iraq and Iran, (1980-1988),
left behind among much else that was damaged, some 3,800 villages and
more than 50 cities devastated or totally razed to the ground. The
focus of the present study, however is on the reconstruction of
settlements in the rural areas of the south that were damaged or
destroyed.
Among the five provinces close to the border which were directly
invaded, Khuzestan province, in the south-west of the country suffered
the most. Vast areas were occupied and the enemy captured and
eventually ruined the cities of Khoramshahr and Hoveize and even
managed to come close to the provincial capital, the city of Ahwaz some
eighty Km from the border. When these areas were recaptured many
villages and some cities were found in ruins, some little more than
hills of rubble.
The reconstruction of these vast areas of Khuzestan were started
quite early in 1982, shortly after their liberation. As a result, by
the end of the war six years later some evidence of settlement
reconstruction could be studied.
From the very early days of reconstruction, the School of
Architecture of the University of Shahid Beheshti Tehran, Iran, where
the author has taught since 1978, organised a research and study group,
composed of voluntary lecturers and students, to study the results of
the various type of initiatives taken. There were two supporting
reasons for carrying out this original work; first, to bring the
theoretical studies of the students closer to practice and thus to
enhance the quality of education. Secondly, as professional citizens
to exercise our social and moral responsibility by making a small
contribution to the recovery of those fellow countrymen far distant
from Tehran.
Among a few other colleagues, the author had the honour to go to
Khuzestan and to help students with their rural studies. This work
continued until 1986, when I came to York. By then, our three years of
observations in the area and the studies made of rebuilt villages
according to different policies, revealed that there are a number of
critical issues and important lessons that have to be faced if
reconstruction is to succeed. The revival of devastated villages was
not as easy as some authorities initially thought and it is important
that they learn from this early experience.
In York, our aim was to look through the literature and other
sources to find out if, what we faced in reconstruction of Khuzestan
villages had been experienced elsewhere. And what possible strategies,
policies and procedures could be usefully applied in Iran. From my
early enquires it became clear that documents conveying the experience
of post-war reconstruction, particularly in rural areas were scarce.
In addition, we concluded that any reconstruction experienced gained in
Europe after World War Two, would have little relevance for the rural
areas of a county like Iran. We were soon persuaded that the work done
on the practice of reconstruction after natural disasters might be
useful, as a result a literature survey was carried out.
Meanwhile, the importance of development studies was identified,
since dealing with reconstruction of rural areas is difficult, if not
impossible to ignore developmental issues. That has encouraged the
author to regularly attend the post graduate Rural Development course
in the Politics Department, under supervision of Dr Adrian Leftwich.
It must be mentioned that one of the most useful steps for
exploring the little studied theme of reconstruction after war, was the
organisation of two York Workshops, in May 1988 and 1989. These two
events brought together different views and experiences and generally
widened my scope and knowledge of the subject. It appears that through
these Workshops the Institute is gradually having its name associated
with post-war reconstruction studies.
From October 1987 until January 1988, during a three month field
trip, a detailed village survey was conducted in Khuzestan, Iran. The
intention was to determine the relative worth of reconstruction
policies, programmes and projects, by interviewing the 'users' and
recipients of public and private aid. For this purpose, from 11
reconstructed villages 132 households were interviewed.
The present study is separated into two volumes and divided into
15 Chapters. The First Volume, starts with a an Introductory Chapter,
that is intended to provide the reader with the background and the
context of the study. Chapters 2 to 4 are studies of the literature on
natural disasters. The following four chapters, (5 to 8) are in depth
studies of some the important issues that emerged from the previous
chapters, such as 'Disasters and development', and 'Disasters and
people's participation'. Chapters, 9 and 10 deal with 'War as a
disaster' and 'Reconstruction after war' respectively.
The Second Volume, on the other hand, starts with Chapter 10 and
mainly contains the Field Study report. This is presented in the form
of four chapters. (Chapters 11 to 14). The last Chapter, the
findings of my literature and field studies are brought together. In
Chapter 15 I attempt to make proposals for reconstruction of war
damaged rural areas in Khuzestan. It ends with a brief conclusion,
which is a summary of my findings and personal views concerning the
most common issues in disaster studies.
As convention dictates, a copy of the Questionnaires used for
the Field Survey are attached as Appendix I. In addition, there is
also a short paper entitled 'Disasters are acts of God: A spiritual
view', which comes as Appendix II. Finally, in 1989 and in connection
with the Second York Workshop, a Bibliography was produced by the
author on the theme of 'Settlement reconstruction after war', which is
Appendix III in the Second Volume.
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CHAPTER I
IRAN, KHUZESTAN, THE WAR AND THE RECONSTRUCTION
Introduction: This Chapter is an introduction to the context of
the study. For this purpose the following subjects will be discussed:
Iran; the Islamic Revolution; Khuzestan; The Iraq Iran war; war damage
and finally the reconstruction of damaged rural areas.
The description of Iran will be short with only a few words
about the geography, surface area and population. But if for centuries
Iran has been known to the outside world for its hand made
non-competitive carpets and more recently as one of the major world oil
exporters, over the last decade world-wide attention has been focused
on its Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the prolonged war with Iraq.
It is believed that the Iraqi invasion must be discussed
alongside other events, as an attempt to uproot the revolution. Any
recommendation on the reconstruction of damaged areas should be
assessed in the context of the present social and economic situation of
the country, thus it is first necessary to review the history of the
Islamic Revolution.
An introduction to Khuzestan Province is relevant since it was
the major battlefield and sustained a major share of the damage.
Furthermore, our field survey, our previous experience and therefore
our examples are from this area. This section will be followed by a
review of the events of the war, damages resulting from it and the
reconstruction programmes carried out from 1982 until August 1988 when
the ceasefire was agreed between the two countries. The reconstruction
of damaged areas has been on a new scale since the ceasefire and it is
1
preferred to underline these recent movements and thoughts in the final
chapter where we discuss various proposals put forward.
1-1- Iran- Iran covers more than 1,648,000 square kilometres
(636,000 sq. m) and extends between latitude 25 and 40 N, and longitude
44 and 63 E. Its area is more than six times the size of Great
Britain. More than half of the country consists of highlands and
wasteland. 'The average elevation is 3,000 feet (915 metres) above sea
level". Only about 10% of the total area is arable.
In 1980 the population of the country was about 38.5 millions.
The figure for 1984 was estimated over 43 millions 2 . At present with a
rapid population growth rate over the last decade, it is estimated that
the population must be over 52 million. (see Amirahmadi, 1988, p.1)
The previous reference also reveals that almost half of the country's
population are rural. This half consists of those who are permanent
settlers, semi-permanent settlers and nomads. Among them a recent
survey revealed that only 1,152,099 people (i.e.
	 2%) are nomads3.
Concerning the ethnicity of the population and religious
affiliations Amirahmadi (1987a), writes;
" Iran is a multi-ethnic country... The majority
of the population, over 60 per cent, are Persians
(the core ethnie) as compared with over 22 per cent
Turks, about 6 per cent Kurds, over 6 per cent
Lurs, about 2.5 per cent Baluchi's and around 2 per
cent Arabs. Shii'te Islam (the core religion),
subscribed to by over 85 per cent of Iranians, [95%
1.Encyclopedia Americana, 1986 p. 369
2.Salname Amari 1363, ( Annual Statistical Report, by Irans' Statistical
Centre, Ministry of Planning and Budget, 1364. (1985). p. 57
3.Keyhan-e Havaei , 8 Februray, 1989. (67/11/19)
2
Muslims] is the official religion of the state and
Farsi (the core language), spoken by less than 50
per cent of the country'sh population, is its
official language" (p. 373).'
These details are important since the 2% Arabs referred to above are
the inhabitants of Khuzestan, the region of our study. This was also
one of the factors which incited the Iraqis to invade Iranian territory
and must be an influential element of policy making by the central
Government about the reconstruction of damaged areas. In fact all the
provinces on the border with Iraq where they fought are the homes of
ethnic groups. However, the most important event of the past decade in
Iran is the Revolution of 1979.
1-2- The Islamic Revolution- Understanding the present situation
of the country after the ceasefire of 1988 is necessary in order to
build an argument on future reconstruction policies. This in turn
requires a review of the revolution in the first place, to sketch out
its economic, social, cultural and political goals.
Several books are written in English on the Islamic Revolution
of Iran. (see for example: Fischer, 1980; Jazani, 1980; Keddie, 1981 &
1983; Nashat, 1983; Afshar, 1985; Bakhash, 1986; Bashiriyeh, 1986
Husain, 1986 and Limbert, 1987) Most of these books attempted to
analyse the recent revolution in the light of the historical background
of the country. However, the dominant trend of these books is to
condemn the way the revolution has developed since it was established.
Thus the degree to which these documents can mirror the reality of the
4.See also, Encyclopedia Americana, 1986, Volume 15, p. 368-371.
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events must be viewed cautiously.
The roots of revolutions must be looked for in the past.
Fischer	 (1980),
	
quotes from Wendell Phillips, an 	 'American
abolitionist' that; " Revolutions are not made. They come. A
revolution is as natural a growth as an oak. It comes out of the past.
Its foundations are laid back in history" (p. 181).
On January 16, 1979 the Shah was forced out of the country for
the second time, perhaps with a hope, that like the first time in 1953
with the aid of the of CIA, he would one day return. That did not
happen, the end of 2500 years of monarchy had already been endorsed by
the demonstration of millions of people. When the Shah boarded his
aeroplane a few of his followers and two dogs accompanied him to the
airport. Two weeks later, on 1 February, Imam Khomeynie after being in
exile for 16 years, returned to the same airport. Millions of
exuberant people welcomed him along the road from the airport to the
Beheshte Zahra cemetery. There he delivered his first speech to the
Iranian people near the grave of countless martyrs shot dead during a
year of uprising.
So obvious was the corruption of the shah and his regime that
hardly anybody disputes it. He was the successor of his father, Reza
Shah, who himself was brought to power in the 1921 coup 'orchestrated
by the British General Ironside' ( Bonnie and Keddie, 1981, p. 26).
Reza Shah was well known by the Iranians for his attempt to secularise
the country as part of the process of 'modernisation' and
Europeanisation. Fischer (1980), writes;
" Part of Reza Shah's modernising nationalism was a
secularist attack on traditional dress and on the
ulama, [clerical] symbols of Islamic backwardness.
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In 1935-36 a campaign was launched to have people
adopt European dress" (p. 186).
The riot in 1935 against these orders was met with indiscriminate
shooting, the police killing 300 people inside the sacred shrine of
Imam Reza5
 in Mashhad.
The Shah, the successor of his father, was openly an American
puppet. Like his father he continued the process of alienating
religious institutions and expression in a Muslim country. His power
was supported by an army of '400,000, a large police force, and a
fearsome secret police, SAVAK 6 , with 4000 full-time agents and scores
of part-time informers' (Bakhash, 1985, p. 9). Religious leaders, young
students and whoever opposed the regime were imprisoned and very often
assassinated or executed without trial. In 1964 after a series of
disturbances against the so called White Revolution of the Shah, Imam
Khomeynie was again arrested and sent first to Turkey, then to Iraq
where he spent the next 16 years. Bonine and Keddie (1981) (eds),
write;
" Widespread hostility to the shah and his regime
was brought about by: 1) a 'modernisation'
characterised by massive corruption benefiting
especially the rich and the royal family; 2) a
growing gap between rich and poor, between city and
countryside, and between the two cultures; 3) the
association of the dynasty with Western control and
with everything unislamic; 	 and 4)	 jailing,
execution, tortures, and growing controls on free
speech and press. It was natural that this led
among many to an idealisation of traditional
Islamic ways and a willingness to follow religious
5.The eighth Imam of the Shiite muslims. The only Imam whose shrine is in
Iran. The shrine is the holiest place for Iranian Muslims in their country.
6.SAVAK is the abbreviation of 'Sazemane Amniat Va Atelate Keshvar' (The
national security and information organisation)
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opponents of the government" (p. 29).
The events of 1977-1979 were in fact new features of an old
movement. The chain of events is described in many books written on
the Iranian Islamic Revolution. However, Fischer (1980), in
particular, has attempted to find the religious roots and context of
the movement. During the period of 1977-1979 thousands of people were
shot dead in demonstrations mainly organised through mosques and
directed by religious leaders. Fischer (1980), claims:
" If 1979 proves to be a turning point for Iranian
Shi'ism,	 a 'translation' of 'Shi v ism will be
involved. Over the past decades Shi'ism has been
crafted into a powerful moral platform for
criticising the disease of the Pahlavi regime: the
intimidation by the secret police, the massive
corruption at the top of society, the destruction
of agriculture, the punitive price-regulation
campaign against the bazaar, the misuse of the
talents of the middle class, the subordination of
Iranian development to outside imperialist
interests, and the separation of the monarchy from
accountability and responsiveness to its people"
(p. 231).
As examples of the Shah regimes' brutality we mention two cases.
On August 19th 1978, SAVAK set the Rex cinema in Abadan on fire and
over four hundred people were burned alive. The doors of the cinema
were chain locked from outside and petrol was thrown under the closed
doors into the saloon. Although the fire station was near-by, the
fire-men took a long time to come, when they came their equipment did
not work. The police even stopped people going for help. Still, the
government blamed the revolutionaries for this event. But the people
were not fool and this crime triggered further demonstrations all over
the country.
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Another example was the 'Black Friday' massacre on 8 September
1978 in Jaleh Square. 7
 It was named Black because on that day while
thousands of demonstrating people were sitting in the streets, the army
violently opened fire on them. It was claimed that helicopters helped
the army and shot into the crowd from above. Nobody knows exactly how
many people were killed that day. Common belief has it that some four
thousand were shot in those few hours. The same day President Carter
of the United States sent a message of support to the Shah government!
(Fischer 1980, p. 199). This was not the first supporting message, a
year earlier, as Housain (1986), writes:
" The Shah then hosted a dinner for President
Carter in Tehran, where the President declared:
Iran is an oasis of stability in a sea of trouble,
and I am sure that the reason for this is the just,
the great, the inspired leadership of your
Majesty.' President Carter could not have been more
wrong" (p. 29).
The role of religion as the main vehicle of revolution and the
role of the religious leaders is apparent in the recent history of
uprisings in Iran. One of the significant points concerning the
religious leaders in Iran, is that they had and still have no financial
or official link with the government. The Imams of the mosques are
paid by the people or very often have their own income through teaching
or farming and so on. That is why in Iran they tend to be close to the
masses of Muslim people. In most Islamic countries, on the contrary,
the Imams of the mosques are appointed and paid by their governments
and are dependent on them. Thus to take any measure against the
7.This is a square in southern part of Tehran and its new name is 'Meidane
Shohada', (Martyrs Square).
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government would jeopardise their personal interest and naturally the
government would not be likely to appoint any potential opponent to
their policies.
What upset the imperialistic Westerners about the revolution in
Iran was that they lost their closest friend in the Middle East. They
were and still are afraid of similar events in other Muslim countries
of the region; most of whom are the suppliers of oil and other raw
materials Western industries and a major market for their armaments.
On the other hand, the Russians were also not happy because of the
millions of Muslims in their republics and therefore the risk of
uprisings8 . This was perhaps one of the reasons why, shortly after the
Islamic Revolution in Iran, Russia invaded Afghanistan, and remained
there until 1989 when they left after being badly defeated.
The main slogan during the demonstrations was 'No east, No west,
the Islamic State'. From the beginning the people insisted that their
future government would not be run on a Western or Eastern model one,
but would be ruled according to Islamic laws and practices. In the
view of Shi'ite Muslims, politics is not separate from the religion.
Religion is not only a series of personal instructions such as prayers,
but it is a way of political and social life. In brief, the Islamic
Revolution of Iran tended to establish a new model for governing the
country.
Time magazine (7 January 1980), wrote; ' [The Ayatullah]
Khomeini has blown apart the comfortable myth that as the Third World
industrialises, it will also adopt Western values.' Thus the Islamic
8.In recent unrests in Azarbayejan Republic, as I watched on TV news, some o
the demonstrators were holding portraits of Imam Khomeynie.
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Revolution of Iran was perceived by the dominant superpowers of the
world to be dangerous not only in the Middle East but also in all Third
World countries, where Western and Eastern countries have rested
interests. They were quite right and that is why since 1979 the
superpowers have done all they can to stop this revolution growing.
These attempts are still going on and as long as the nature of this
Revolution is kept pure, the risk of loss for the superpowers and their
allies will exist. This hostility of the west and east is one of the
major points which must be kept in mind in our later discussions. In
fact the Iraqi invasion in 1980, shortly after the revolution was a
challenge supported by the superpowers, to destroy or at least to
weaken the new revolution.
The American government took several other steps to achieve the
same goal. First they attempted to influence the new cabinet and
direct affairs towards their own interests. In 1979 they imposed
economic sanctions. In April 1980 they carried out a military
operation to rescue the US Embassy hostages, who had been captured by
university students in November 1979. The students later published
several books revealing the documents they found in the embassy. 9 In
July 1979 a coup (code-named Nowzheh) was discovered and aborted.
Since the Revolution much counter-revolutionary unrest has been
supported by outsiders in Kurdisatan in the east, Khuzestan in the
south and Turkaman Sahra in the north. Each of these brought a lot of
turmoil and most of them were finally settled after armed conflicts.
9.The publication of these documents is still continuing. The important resu
of these documents was revealing American plans to sabotage the revolution
by coordinating with the liberals and even inciting a coup.
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(see also Amirahmadi, 1987a)
With the destruction of the old system completed, the time came
to establish the new order. The model society the revolution aimed at,
was not a copy of those experienced elsewhere such as some form of
socialist model. No single example of an true Islamic State can be
found in contemporary history, to provide an example and from which to
draw lessons. Only in the very early days of Islam, particularly in
the time of the prophet Muhammad, such a model community existed for a
short period. The 14 centuries which have elapsed, makes the task of
defining the context of the new Islamic society a complicated and time
consuming task. It would also require dramatic changes in
pre-revolution norms in every aspect of life, from economy to education
and culture. There are many who still believe that designing a society
according to Islamic ideals is impossible in the 20th century. The
removal of the Shah was another of those impossibilities which proved
to be a myth.
The debate about the content of the new system started soon
after the revolution and showed up the divisions among the politicians.
The first Prime Minister (Bazargan) and the first President (Banisadr),
both failed in their jobs partly because their knowledge could only
assume some kind of society based on the liberalisation and technocracy
along quasi Western lines. It became apparent that that was not what
the revolution was aiming at. Fischer (1980), in relation to this
writes;
"Today Shi'ite leaders have the opportunity to
translate their moral opposition and social
criticism into a framework for modern politics.
Issues such as the nature of politics and
economics, the position of women, and the rights of
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religious, linguistic, and cultural minorities take
on new relevance. It has been well said that the
Western revolutionary tradition stresses individual
freedom, sometimes at the expense of economic
justice, that the Eastern (Communist) revolutionary
tradition stresses economic justice at the expense
of freedom, and that the Shi'ite promise is one of
combining freedom and justice. We wish Iranian
people well in their attempt to reach for that
promise" (p. 231).
What we would like to argue is that since the Iraqi invasion started
shortly after the revolution, defence and liberation of the invaded
territories naturally became the first priority. The economy of the
country, development plans and everything else were overshadowed by the
war with the aggressors. The eight year-long conflict in fact, to some
degree, postponed the 'design and construction' of the new society.
However, significant steps were taken by the government towards
establishing new development priorities and objectives. In terms of
providing services to the rural poor; for instance, with road
construction and electricity supply, more has been done over the last
ten years than during fifty years of the Pahlavi dynasty. But we must
not ignore that without the war many important policies and programmes
towards the implementation of the new society could have been taken.
What the war has meant, is that after the ceasefire the country must
not only rebuild the damage but must also plan its model society, for
the whole country's development. Something which without the war
would have been done in the first flush of the revolution but must now
be done with even greater expedition and determination, to make up for
the lost time of an exhausting and wasteful invasion. This must be
remembered.
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1-3- Khuzestan- Khuzestan Province is located in the south-west
of Iran. Its capital is Ahwaz. It has an area of 64,664 Km2 . From
the south it is bounded by the Persian Gulf; in the west it is the
neighbour of Iraq and its remaining boundaries are with six other
Iranian provinces.
Fig 1-1: Iran and Khuzestan
Geographically, Khuzestan consists of two major areas, a small
mountainous area in the north and north-east, and a large plane of over
40,000Km2 . The capital Ahwaz is only 18 metres above sea level. The
maximum temperature of the capital has been over 51 Centigrade and very
often the minimum temperature in winter is still one or two degrees
above freezing. The average rain fall is over 200 millimetres per
10year.	 Figure 1-2 illustrates the average rain fall and temperature of
Ahwaz for a period of 23 years (1961-1983).
10.See Annual Statistical Report. pp. 11-13
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Fig 1-2: Average rain fall and temperature of Ahwaz between 1961-1983
[Source: Annual Statistical Report, (Iran) 198511
According to 1979 statistics, Khuzestan had a population of over
2,187,000 of these, 912,009 (i.e. 42%) were living in 4,172 villages
and the others lived in 24 towns and cities. The capital Ahwaz in the
same year had a population of 334,000.
In terms of natural resources the area is very rich. The soil
here is called 'golden' and the rivers have plenty of water. The river
Karoun passes from the capital Ahwaz. It is the largest and longest
river (890 Km) of the country and the only one which carries shipping.
Other main rivers in the Province are Karkhe, Karkhe Nour, Jarahi,
Bahmanshir and Arvandroud. The villages are settled on the banks of
the rivers or near irrigation canals. In this Province many kinds of
crops can be grown.
	 Palm groves in the south, citrus fruits in the
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east, rice in the west, wheat and barley and vegetables can be grown
everywhere and sugar cane is planted in the north of the province.
Animal husbandry is common. Even in the city of Susangerd some
houses keep one or two cows. In the villages almost every family has a
few cows. There are also families with herds of a few hundred sheep,
who are semi-nomads, but generally, the villagers keep buffaloes in
the west of the province. Villagers also fish in the rivers and
particularly in the marsh, called Hour Al-Hoveizeh to the west of the
province.
Before the war the area was well off as the main oil fields of
the country are all in Khuzestan; the Abadan refinery is the oldest and
the biggest in the country. Khoramshar port is one of the major ports
and the nearest to the centre of the country. The manufacture of
petrochemicals is also located in this province. Many of this plant
has suffered due to the war and thus employment has been affected.
However, many people from the area work temporarily in the Gulf
countries, which brings them a good income. Amirahmadi and Atash
(1987), in a study of 'Dynamics of provincial development and disparity
in Iran 1956-1984', classified the provinces into three groups of
'Relatively developed, Intermediate and Least developed'. Their study
however, reveals that Khuzestan Province for the period concerned has
always been in the first group. Shahid Chamran university with over
4500 students in different subjects such as medicine, agriculture and
literature is the main university of the Province based in Ahwaz. An
independent faculty of oil engineering was based at Abadan which during
the war they transferred its equipment to Ahwaz and courses resumed
there.
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As has already been mentioned, the majority of the people,
particularly in rural areas are Arabs. They speak Arabic and often
wear their traditional clothes. Men wear a long and usually white
dress, locally called 'deshdashe' and they protect their heads against
the hot sun with a large scarf called 'chafieh'. Women on the other
hand, wear black dresses with trousers, a black scarf called 'Sheile'
.4
covers their heads and when they go out, for shopping for instance,
they wear a special veil called 'Abaia'.
Plate /-/ : Mens' traditional cloth
The tribal affiliation is still very strong and every family
knows which clan and tribe they belong to. The inhabitants of each
village are usually members of one or two large families. The elders
are respected and people live in extended families. Even in urban
areas a single house will sometimes contain more than 15 people, as the
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father and mother, sons and daughters, sons and daughters in law all
live together. The power of the family is in the hands of the chief of
the house who is the oldest member. In the village also until recently
the head of the village was an old person called, 'Sheikh'. The same
hierarchy of power existed in the region and the affairs between
different villages were sorted out by the council of 'Shoyoukh'.
However, with the introduction of new 'Islamic Committees' in the
villages and new organisations such as 'Jahade Sazandegi' 11 the
traditional structure of power in rural areas is undergoing dramatic
changes.
Traditional rural settlements- Apparently the environment has a
major role in characterising the architecture. Generally in the
northern and Eastern parts of the Province, some traditional
architecture influences from central Iran can be seen. Arches, vaults
and domes, made of sun-dried or burnt bricks are used. Occasionally
even stone finds its way into the buildings. Houses have a central
courtyard and the site of the village is compact with units attached to
one another.
In the plain area of the province, particularly in our study
area 'Dashte Azadegan District', villages are usually a cluster of
separated units scattered over the land. No clear street or alley,
with the exception of some of the large villages, can be found. Houses
are a complex of single rooms standing around a large open area, which
is occasionally bounded by low mud walls or piles of hay and fire wood
and so on. The dominant building method was rammed earth. Roofs were
11.Jahade Sazandegi, (Construction Crusade) is a new organisation establishe
since the Revolution to deal with rural development programmes.
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built with wooden trunks, then a bamboo matt and layers of mud on top.
The final layer is a mixture of mud and straw. The same mortar is also
used fur finishing the walls. The climate is such that seldom can any
trees be grown, with the exception of palm groves in the south. The
roof wood is imported from other regions as palm wood here is not
suitable for supporting roofs.
Fig 1-3 : An example of traditional house
[Source: Miri and Shakeni 1987]
In the west of the Province there is a large marsh called 'Hour
Alazim' or 'Hour Alhoveize'. The rivers Karkhe and Karkhe Nour end in
this marsh. Plenty of bamboo grows in the Hour and since the land is
very low it very often floods. The villages here again are in clusters
of scattered units, with the houses built of bamboo and reeds. Bamboo
is also used in other villages far from the Hour, for building cheap
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shelters especially for animals.
Plate 1-2 : A bamboo house
[Source: Miri and Shaken i 1987]
The layout of the houses is an illustration of their life style.
The houses are formed of single rooms and the way they are clustered is
a reminder of the earlier nomadic life of these people. Earthen rooms
are substituted the tents clustered in the middle of the desert. These
nomadic people have mainly since the turn of the century, due to oil
industry, gradually started to settle and to farm near rivers.
Dispersion of the settlement is one of the factors which not enough
attention was paid in the newly designed houses after the war.
In the house each family has one or two rooms used for sleeping,
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storing and sitting at mid-day when it is hottest outside. The other
facilities such as the courtyard, oven, stable and so on were shared by
all members of the household. In the late afternoon particularly, the
outdoor areas come to life. The family sit, eat and sleep outside as
the air temperature drops more quickly than inside the house. Only in
winter when it rains or the weather gets cold for a few weeks they may
eat and sleep inside. These different uses for indoor and outdoor life
are important to remember, as most family life is spent in the open.
Most houses had no toilets or bath room and families use the desert for
their relief.
According to 1976 official statistics as you would expect, in
rural areas of the Khuzestan Province, 93,5% of houses were built of
'poor' materials such as mud, bamboo and cloth. The reasons why mud
has been the dominant building material in this area are several.
Firstly because it is available everywhere and unlike some areas of
central Iran, where the villagers have to bring earth from a suitable
site around the village, in this area almost all the soil is suitable
for construction. Secondly, it contains minerals and is not suitable
for burnt brick making. So in only very few villages were burnt bricks
produced and used 12 , they had to be brought from Ahwaz or other far away
areas. The thick earthen walls built by the rammed earth method
performed well in hot weather. Finally, the most important advantage
of using mud, was that the house could be built cheaply and quickly by
the family itself. In only two or three weeks a family was able to
build the walls of a new room. Only roof beams had to be purchased
12.Near the village Sane two small hand operated burnt brick factories were
working before the war.
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apart from the bamboo matts13 which were not really expensive.
The size of the rooms might be different. But limited by the
roof timbers available a typical room is 3 metres wide and five to six
metres long. Often each house has a guest-room, 'Mozif', which is
located separately from the other rooms, nearer the entrance. The size
of 'Mozifs' could vary depending on the wealth of the family, I found
examples three by twelve metres long. The same space in the villages
near the Hour were built in bamboo. For us it was exciting when for
the first time we visited a huge bamboo Mozif 4.5 by 12 metres long.
(see also Madani Pour 1988)
It seems that unlike many of the villages in other parts of
Iran, privacy was not a major concern since the courtyards were usually
open to outsiders eyes. The room, in fact the core of the house,
provided the most private region for each family. The house, a complex
of several families and rooms, provided a semi-private area for the
inhabitants. The Mozif, however, limits the strangers ability to
interfere with the privacy of the house, since it is located as close
to the entrance as possible. The whole village, then becomes the 'next
area of territory', which isolates it from other settlements.14
13.These matts in some villages were produced locally, other remote villages
have to purchace them from markets.
14.Not only in Khuzestan but in many other villages in Iran, I observed that
the villagers as a whole have a sense of family relationships. For instance,
usually women think less seriously about their veil in front of men of their
own village, than in front of men from outside the village.
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Fig 1-4 : Location of Mozif (Guest room) in the house
[Source: Miri and Shaken i 1987]
In this hot semi-humid region providing relatively comfortable
living conditions is a major task. In urban areas electrical
appliances are often used. In rural areas however, since most villages
had no electricity, natural ventilation had to be employed. Since the
rooms are detached and in any case free on two sides a natural current
of air was provided by installing small holes near the floor in the
wall. In the middle of the day they sometimes pour water near the
holes on the ground outside to increase the moisture in the air and
make it more pleasant.
Each room had a wooden two part door without any glass. The
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windows were small and often without glass but made of wood panels.
The major disadvantage of these mud structures was their poor
resistance to rising damp, since the ground water level is quite high.
The hot weather increases the evaporation process which deteriorates
the situation by spoiling the mud and creating salt on the surface of
the wall. On the other hand their repair was very easy and could be
done by adding some layers of new mud. Very often women were
responsible for this job. Another problem with traditional houses is
the risk from floods. However, the easy availability of materials and
skills made the recreation of settlements a task that the families
themselves could undertake.
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14- The war- With the invasion of Iraqi troops into Iranian
territory on 22 September 1980, the war officially started. It
continued for eight years until 20 August 1988, when Iran accepted the
Security Council Resolution 598 and eventually the ceasefire was
observed.	 In addition to the numerous journals and newspapers
articles, several books and academic papers are available on the
Iraq-Iran war, or as it is often called 'The Gulf war'. (see for
example, Tahir-Kheli and Ayubi, 1983 (ed); Khamsin, 1984; Karsh, 1987;
Amirahmadi, 1988; Chubin, 1988; O'Ballance, 1988) In other books
written on Iran after the Islamic Revolution, also some authors have
included sections on the war and its impact on Iranian life. (see for
example, Limbert, 1987 and Bakhash, 1986)
The roots of conflict- Usually different authors have attempted
to look for the roots of this war in the past and generally they agree
there is no single reason for it. They often consider the following
reasons; a very old established cultural division of Arab and Fars or
Iranian, separation of Shi'ite and Sunni, the quarrel over the Shatt al
Arab waterway, the 'antiquity of ethnic problems, including the Kurds,
the danger of the Shi'ites uprising in Iraq and so forth. (See,
Staudenmaier, 1983, pp. 28-29, Limbert, 1987, p. 139, O'Ballance, 1988,
pp. 1-12) However, these reasons do not seem enough to start a war
since almost all of them existed for years before the outbreak of the
conflict.
It is known that some 55 to 60 percent of Iraq's population are
Shi'ite Muslims. In addition many of the Shi'ite Imams' shrines are in
Iraq. The cities Najaf, Karbala and Kazemain in Iraq are places where
for centuries Iranians have made pilgrimages. In Najaf one of the main
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Shi'ite religious teaching centres is established. 	 But still none of
these were new. Authors usually argue that the disarrayed army and
weakened situation of the new government in Iran was one major
encouraging factor for Saddam, the Iraqi President. The other one was
the strength of his own army, well trained and equipped with Russian
weapons. His personal ambition to become the successor of the defeated
Shah as the major power of the region is also counted an important
factor. Of course the risk of a Shi'ite uprising and a claim for an
Islamic government instead of the secular Bathi one was also serious.
In those days Saddam anticipated a quick victory in a fortnight or
three weeks, which was a miscalculation.
Whatever the roots of the invasion, though knowing these would
be useful to assess the reliability of the ceasefire and as a major
factor influencing reconstruction policies, we have to abandon the
argument about them.
	
O'Ballance, (1988), summarises all these factors
as follows;
"President Saddam Hussein's grand bid for supremacy
of the Persian Gulf area began on 22 September
1980, when about 45,000 Iraqi troops, the best part
of four divisions, invaded Iran. The Iraqi
President expected a swift victory within a
fortnight or three weeks. His war aims included
regaining full control over Shat al-Arab;
favourably re-adjusting his land border with Iran;
obtaining possession of the three Islands
[Abu-Musa, small and big Tonbs] in the Straits of
Hormuz; and probably obtaining autonomy for the
Arab inhabitants of Khuzistan Province. Fearing
the Iranian Shia Revolution might over-spill into
Iraq, President Saddam Hussein intended to cut
Ayatollah Khomeini down to size, weaken his
personal influence in the region, and perhaps even
topple him from absolute power in his own country"
(P .
	30).
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Chronology of the attacks- Edgar O'Ballance (1988), starts his
book with a chronology of the Iraq-Iran war. The main events however,
can be summarised as follows; On 17 September 1980, Saddam unilaterally
abrogated the Algiers Treaty of 1975 which he himself signed. A few
days later on 22 September, Iraqi aircraft attacked Iranian airfields
and moved into Iranian territories along 1300 Km of borders. A week
later the blessing of America reached the Iraqis, in the form of four
AWACS E3C surveillance aircraft positioned in Saudi Arabia to look over
the military movements of both sides and perhaps to supply information
on Iranian army facilities and movements towards Iraq. The Iraqis
succeeded in capturing the main areas of Khuzestan, coming within 10 km
of its capital Ahwaz.	 On 24 October 1980, the city Khoramshahr fell
to the Iraqis after unprecedented resistance by the city. In brief,
the army was in such disarray that in the first two months, the Iraqis
successfully and easily moved up to 80Km into Iranian territory and
captured some 4,126 square miles (14,000 km 2 ) of Iranian territory.
Meanwhile the interior counterparts of Iraqis were also acting
simultaneously. On 28 June 1981, in a terrorist explosion in Tehran by
'Monafeghin' 15 , 74 of the top Islamic leadership were martyred. A month
later on 30 August in another conspiracy the same group, put a bomb in
the President's office that killed both the President and Prime
Minister. During the year 1981 and early 1982 the course of events
was reversed and the Iranian troops pushed the invaders back almost to
the original border line.	 During 1982 in two separate major
15.The Muslim Iranians call them 'Monafeghin' (hypocrites), they still use
their original name 'Mojahedin Khalgh' (people's fighters). For years they
settled in Iraq and with support and supply from Iraq they fought the
Iranian army and were defeated.
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operations, Fath Al Mobin in March and Fath Al Moghadas in April, some
7,780 Km2 were recaptured whereby the city Khoramshar was also freed.
Fig 1-5: Iraqi advances September to December 1980
[Source: O'Bllance 1988 p.34]
On 10th June 1982, the situation had become so bad for the
Iraqis that Saddam announced that his troops would leave Iranian
territory. During 1984 Iraq began to attack the ships in the Gulf by
shooting a Greek ship on 16 March. Also from 1984 the civilian
population of the cities were bombed and in several operations the
Iraqis used chemical artillery, first against the Iranians and later
against their own population.
	
For example in 1988, 5,000 civilians
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died in the a Kurdish Iraqi city of 'Halabche'. By 1986 Saddam was
seeking for peace and stepped up his indiscriminate missile attacks on
several Iranian cities, including Tehran. In any case our main concern
in this study is the destruction caused during the war and more
importantly the evolution of reconstruction carried out over eight
years, in Khuzestan Province.
War damage- O'Ballance (1988), writes; ' It has often been said
that truth is the first casualty of war. The Gulf War is no exception"
(p. xviii). This might be one of the differences between natural
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disasters and war, the numbers of losses of life can have positive and
negative psychological impact on both sides of the conflict. However,
there are other problems that make the collection of reliable data
difficult. First, the damage might be scattered over large areas, in
our instance several cities and villages all over the country.
Secondly, in terms of human loss, the number of those killed becomes
difficult to judge because the number of captured soldiers or civilians
may not be announced by the enemy. Finally, the calculation of damage
and loss is overshadowed by the need for reconstruction.
Human loss and refugees- The estimation of loss of life during
the eight year war substantially varies according to different
documents. Ja'far (1984), claims; 'a conservative estimate, some
300,000 people have been killed on the battlefield so far; other
estimates put the casualties as high as 6-700,000' (p. 8). Amirahmadi
(1988), writes; ' At least one million may have been killed on both
sides with an addition 3 million wounded and disabled' (p. 1). Pudnek
( 1987). claims '500,000' to be killed from both sides (p. 61). Husain
(1986), also claims that 'one million' were killed of which '750,000'
were Iranian (p. 64). Concerning the number of refugees Amirahmadi
(1987b), estimates 2,5 million Iranians were moved to war-free zones
(p. 135). Meanwhile another two million Afghan refugees added to the
government's difficulties.
As a few examples of official statistics published in 1984 by
the Iranian government shows; in the city Abadan, with 400,000
population located in the south of the province (first attacked in 18
March 1980), some 1,200 civilians were killed, 7,000 injured, of which
80 people became permanently disabled. Also 2,228 civilians were
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captured in the early days of Iraqis attacks. 16 The same source also
reveals that in the city Dezful, a city with 300,000 population,
located 146Km north of Ahwaz, up to 1984, 600 civilians had been killed
and 2500 injured due to bombs and missile attacks. In any case now it
makes little difference whether the real figures are a few hundred
thousand smaller or greater than has been quoted.
Economic loss- Amirahmadi (1988), claims;
" Only direct damage to the economy (i.e., damage
to machinery, buildings, materials, and goods) is
estimated at around $200 billion, with an
additional $400 billion for indirect economic costs
( including opportunity costs). These figures do
not include damage to the population and the
military. At the present rate of oil earning, the
direct economic damage accounts for almost 18 years
of oil revenue" (p. 9).
Amirahmadi (1987b), concerning the losses of different sectors writes;
" The Oil Sector (12,851,716) [$150 billion] has
suffered the most,	 followed by Agriculture
(3.494,451) [$45 billion] Revolutionary
Foundations (3, 160,378 ) [$40 billion], Industries
(2,947,050) [$38 billion], and the rest (2,276,828)
[ 28 billion] grouped under 'others' (all figures
in million rials, current prices; one U.S. dollar
equals about 80 rials at official exchange rate;
900 rials at black market rate)" (p. 135).
The same author also reports that from 1982 to 1985 respectively the
following amounts were spent on reconstruction of damaged areas; 70.1,
91.1, 60.6, 50.0 billion rials. [8.5, 11.5, 7.5, 6, billion $US] (p.
139) The important point to notice is that from 1983 to 1985 this
figure declines sharply because the total income of the country
16.Source: 'Shahrhaye Mazloume Ma', (Our Inocent Cities), 1362, (1983)
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decreases.
Mofid (1989), _claims that;
"...the Grand Total Economic Cost of the war to
both countries is the total of $1,156 billion.
...To put the total economic cost of the war of
$1,156 billion in better perspective, it suffices
to say that the cost of the war exceeds the total
oil revenue which Iran and Iraq have recieved
throughout this century" (p. 2).
Pudnek (1987) concerning the costs and damages of war claims;
Now the war is currently costing $25 million per day and the cumulative
total damage to property has been calculated by the government's
Ministry of Plans and Budget as $260 billion. If military costs are
added then the grand total is likely to be between $400-600 billion"
(p. 60).
Damage to the settlements- Amirahmadi (1988), writes; " A total
of 52 cities have been damaged. Of these, 6 cities have been
completely levelled and another 14 have sustained between 30 and 80
percent destruction" (p. 9). The same author quotes from an official
document that up to 1986, 3,891 villages had been damaged because of
the war. The damage is estimated at 560,215.1 million Rials [$7000
million] (p. 137). From this figure in Khuzestan Province, out of 4,316
villages 497 were damaged or destroyed. Amirahmadi (1987b) also
writes;
" The cities of Hoveizeh, Qasr-e Shirin, Musian,
Sumar, Ozgoleh and Khosrawi have been 'totally
levelled' and the cities of Khoramshahr, Nosud,
Dehloran, Gilan-e Gharb, Abadan, Bostan, Mehran,
Susangerd, Shush, Dezful, Andimeshk, Naft-Shahr,
Baneh, and Sar Pol-e Zohab, among others, have
received ' wide-ranging damage.'" (p. 135)
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An official report of 1983 17 reveals that in Khuzestan Province
alone, in the city of Abadan, 40,000 houses were seriously damaged or
entirely destroyed. In Khoramshahr, when it was recaptured by the home
forces, 8000 houses were found razed to the ground and 9,000 others
seriously damaged. The small town of Hoveize, with 1900 houses, after
recapture was found as a 'hill of rubble'. It was entirely razed to
the ground. Pudnek (1987) also refers to official statistics reported
in Etelaat newspaper in 1981 and counts the damage;
"51 cities, 3,091 villages, 118,834 residential and
commercial units, and 14,734 governmental dwellings
and office buildings....710 schools, 126 hospitals,
419 mosques, churches and temples and a significant
number of bridges, highways, irrigation canals and
networks, farm lands, oil pipes,..." (p. 60).
The main figure to remember for us is the 497 villages damaged or
destroyed in Khuzestan Province.
Mechanism of destruction of rural settlements- Apparently the
damage received by rural areas has more than destroyed buildings. Not
just to mention those killed or captured, the swift evacuation of
population, wherever possible, did not allow for the evacuation of
their live-stock. Thus herds were abandoned free 18 , the grain collected
in the stores remained there and house utilities such as beds, clothes
and cooking equipments were left behind as well as machinery.
	 The
17.Shahrhaye Mazloume Ma, (our Inocent Cities), 1362 War Information Head
Quarters 1983.
18.After recapture the cows and buffaloes that survived, were collected and
monitored by a special team. Two problems; first cows and buffaloes had
become violent, and secondly, it was difficult to identify which calf
belonged to which parents and finally to which farmer. Belive it or not the
rural people sorted these matters peacefully.
31
water pumps were the most expensive machines in the villages, upon
which their agriculture was and still is dependent and they were looted
by Iraqis. The destruction of agricultural land was a major obstacle
to resettlement, since both sides of the conflict constructed hundreds
of kilometres of earthen embankments and barriers thus disturbing the
farm land. Later one major step towards resettlement was to move all
these embankments and barriers. Farms were also damaged for another
reason. The planned flooding of large areas, particularly by Iranians
as a defensive military measure, had converted the farms to marshland.
The destruction of rural settlements can be caused by one or
more of the following agents;
a- natural forces;
b- artificial flooding;
c- looting of useful building materials, such as sawn timber stocks;
d- razing the buildings by mechanical means.
e- bombing and shelling, etc;
a- Natural forces- Most buildings damaged in the villages were
built in mud. We have already mentioned that rising damp is a constant
problem in this area which gradually decays the base of the walls. To
this must be added the rain which gradually washes the surface of the
roof and outside walls to accelerate the erosion at the base of the
wall. In fact many of the buildings have gradually collapsed after not
being taken care of for four or five years. It is likely that those
villages that have not been inhabited for eight years are in a worse
situation. There is no problem of freezing in this area, but rising
damp, surface water, and rain-fall have all been effective factors to
damage rural mud-built units.
Those villages in the west of the District, built in bamboo,
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were in a similar condition. The life-span of bamboo buildings is
short and therefore each four or five years they must be rebuilt. The
decay again starts by rotting the footings of the bamboo arches buried
in the ground. In this case cost is unimportant, since replacement is
readily available. The abandoned houses provide an opportunity for
different insects to invade the units as they wished. The wooden roof
beams, the bamboo mats on top and the straw in the finishings all
provided suitable ingredients for termites and other insects. However,
no detailed report is currently available on the degree and extent of
insect damage. To our surprise, we visited some damaged mud buildings
which were still standing intact despite the extensive decay in their
bases. However, these were dangerous structures and the risk of
collapse was high.
b- Flooding- In October 1980, while the Iraqi forces were still
pushing ahead, as a defensive measure, the home forces opened the water
of Karkhe to the alluvial plain between 'Hamidie' and 'Susangerd' and
eventually a large area between the two rivers Karkhe and Karkhe Nour
became a lake and marshland. (see O'Ballance, 1988, p. 41) This was a
successful measure and more than 150 Iraqi tanks sunk in the mud.
Nevertheless all the villages in this area were also flooded and this
in turn caused the collapse of nearly all the mud structures in the
villages. 19
c- Looting- Some of the building components can be used during
the war for roofing shelters, making small bridges and so on. In this
19.When the area was drained plenty of fish were available. When I visited t
area I found people collecting fish from the remaining swamps as if they
were picking vegatables from the ground.
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respect both the enemy and home forces may have exploited the
buildings. Usually the wooden trunks of the roofs and doors and
windows were taken away. Walls remaining intact could indicate that
the roof materials were salvaged.
d- Buildings razed to the ground- Generally any structure can
provide some kind of protection against shelling and bombing during a
battle. Furthermore the combatants also need somewhere to stay while
the battle is in progress. The buildings also provide good cover for
the combatants. Food, artillery and other equipment can also be stored
in existing buildings. Thus one of the main intentions of armies when
they occupy a settlement, is to level it if they are not going to
remain there. For this reason villages were often razed to the ground
by bulldozers. Armies usually do it when they are retreating from
their battle-line to diminish the advantage their opposite forces would
glean from these buildings.
There is another reason to destroy as many structures as
possible. It has a psychological effect on the home army. In the city
of Hoveize for instance, the whole city was levelled and destroyed by
explosion. This could also add to the amount of reconstruction work in
future, causing more economic pressure and delaying quick resettlement.
This latter might be the reason why a large area of Khoramshar was
levelled by Iraqis during occupation and it seems that they intended to
raze the whole city if they had had enough time before being forced
out. In any case levelling the buildings, once a city or a village is
occupied by the enemy, is a cheap method of destruction. The case of
Warsaw is an example of this kind of destruction by the Germans. (see
Ross Gilhome, 1988)
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Another kind of damage might also be created by deliberate
destruction of parts of the building. For instance, in Khoramshahr
during the long battle, the home army had to install a safe passage to
connect the front line to the back. So they had to cut openings
through houses because they could not use the alleys or streets. Or in
some instances they piled hundreds of sand bags inside a house or built
extra shelters inside the houses, all of which could damage the
building.
Plate 1-3: The effect of rising damp on mud built walls
[Source: The author]
e- Weapons and ammunition- Most weapons are designed to kill
people. However, many of them also damage buildings, the collapse of
these structures then can become a new means of killing and injuring
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the inhabitants. It is an irony of war, that while some thought is put
into producing secure shelters against artillery, more thought is put
into penetrating any defence and shelter. If reinforced concrete can
resist machine-guns bullets, more powerful weapons will then be made
to destroy the reinforced concrete shelters.
The mechanism of destruction during the war tends to be more
complex than that of natural disasters such as earthquakes. It
requires an understanding of different weapons and their impact on
different structures. We will explore this subject in more detail in
our chapter on 'War as a disaster'. However, for the sake of
convenience, a short review of the same subject will be made in this
section.
The destruction by weapons and artillery depends on the four
following factors;
1-the kind of weapon used;
2-the frequency of use or shots;
3-the part of the building the shells or mortars impact on, (e.g.
inside the building or outside at some distance);
4-the situation and quality of the building attacked.
For instance damage to a building depends on the kind of mortar or
shell used and its specific power of destruction, the number which
struck the building, where and at what distance the mortars struck from
and finally what kind of material and quality the building was. For
example, to assess the damage to a single building we must know that 81
mm mortars were dropped, five of them, inside the room which was made
of mud. The damage would be different if instead of 81 mm mortar a
heavy missile struck the same buildings or instead of mud, the building
was steel frame and so forth.
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Generally weapons can be classified under the following
categories;
1-Conventional (i.e. explosives);
2-Chemical and microbiological;
3-Nuclear.
The distinction of using Nuclear weapons in war is still uniquely
possessed by the Americans at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. As far
as we know microbiological weapons were not used in the war between
Iraq and Iran. 20
 Chemical weapons were extensively used during the war
(nerve gas, mustard..etc) but these weapons have no direct effect on
structures, they directly affect the people. However, the substance
remains on the ground for sometime and might remain hazardous. So the
main weapons with impact on buildings were the so called conventional
ones.
Conventional weapons range from small machine guns to heavy
artillery, missiles and bombs, each of them with a different impact on
buildings. The weapon that did the most extensive damage in rural
areas were mortar and artillery shells. What is worth mentioning here
is that in some respects, mud structures are more resistant than
stronger materials, such as bricks or cement blocks. Remembering that
the settlements are scattered, that the walls are heavy and thick, and
that the surface of the walls is relatively soft compared with bricks
or cement blocks. More importantly traditional roofs are not well tied
into the walls all these factors could help to reduce the damage to mud
20.In early 1989 reports in the British papers said that Iraq had succeeded
developing microbilogical weapons. Also Panorama on BBC 1, on 10 th April
1989 reported about the production of a rocket called Condor by Iraq and
Egypt, with the help of Argentina. The Rocket could have both chemical and
explosives.
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structures.
The conventional weapons can damage a building three ways;
1-direct strike;
2-the flying fragments;
3-the turmoil of explosion.
By the first we mean that a shell or a bomb acts as a heavy stone,
which by its weight and speed (it is also very hot) when it strikes a
roof for instance, can break the beams and make a hole. This is the
first damage and if the mortar does not explode there would be little
additional damage. After explosion two other mechanisms will be
evident; first a series of fragments would fly in all directions and
because of the explosion, strong air pressure and consequently a
vacuum will be created. The flying fragments can strike the walls and
roof and might cause damage. In this case if the surface of the wall
is soft, it can probably absorb the flying metal and at maximum a small
area of the surface may fall down. If the surface is solid and the
wall is more homogeneous, either it will resist the pressure or there
is the risk of extensive damage. Sections of brick or block work may
separate and fall down.
The most damaging is the simultaneous impact of an explosion and
the consequent air pressure caused by it. Many factors appear to
influence the extent of the damage; the size of the shell or bomb, the
distance to the building, the direction of explosion against the wall
and so on. If a heavy bomb or missile strikes a site, apparently the
buildings close to the strike point will totally disintegrate, other
buildings at some distance may partially collapse and those further
away may only sustain cracks. The diameters of these circles depend on
38
the power of the bombs dropped.
The worst situation for a building is when a mortar, for
instance, strikes the roof and enters inside before it explodes. The
amazing observation in rural areas was that the traditional earthen
buildings still usually performed better than brick-made rooms. What
may explain this phenomenon is partly that the pressure of explosion
was absorbed by thick heavy earthen walls. Also the roofs acted like
a saucepan lid and immediately after the explosion the pressured air
could be released by pushing the roof up. The flexible roofs, wooden
beams and bamboo matts, can settle down again without substantial
damage.
A similar explosion inside a brick room with steel roof beams
could create much more damage. With the heavy roof, the pressure can
not be released so pushes the walls out and the roof will be first
lifted up and then falls immediately inward. The walls will often
crack in the corners or at weak points such as window opening.
Another way of destroying buildings was used at Hoveize,
Khoramshahr and Ghasr-e shirine, where they were blown up with
explosives. Although this method is less used and less effective in
rural areas it is very effective for destroying multi-storey or very
strong buildings. After detonating the bulldozers levelled the
remains to ensure maximum destruction. In any case the Iraqis used
this method frequently in the cities to cause the maximum impact on the
civilian population.
Understanding this process of destruction makes little change to
the reconstruction of villages since the general policy has been to
abandon earthen structures and to replace them by stronger materials
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such as bricks. However, in urban areas this understanding could have
a substantial impact, since many damaged buildings can be repaired
rathcr than rebuilt, which could save both time and money. Repair and
restoration requires the analysis of damages sustained by the building
and understanding the mechanisms of destruction is the first step
towards it.
Plate 1-4 : A view of a damaged village
[Source: Miri and Shakeni 1987]
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1-5- Reconstruction starts- The reconstruction of damaged areas
started shortly after the successful operations 'Fath Al Mobin' in
March and 'Tariegh Al Ghods' in May 1982. In fact by the second half
of the year most parts of Khuzestan were recaptured. However, it
should be remembered that always in war-time an area of security must
be kept between the front-line and the civilians. Thus, even now, to
the best of our knowledge, many areas close to the border with Iraq are
still in security zones and are forbidden to the civilian population.
Like the war, the reconstruction started unexpectedly. Success
in military operations can only be counted when it is actually achieved
and sustained. The security of civilians is one of the major factors
which constrain reconstruction policies. In any case, in Tehran, work
was started to establish an organisation for reconstruction. A Supreme
Council was appointed by the leader headed by the Prime Minister and
other members, including Ministers of the Interior, Plan and Budget and
also a representative appointed by the leader, Imam Khomeynie. A
Central Committee was also established in Tehran to supervise
reconstruction and to co-ordinate different official and voluntary
organisations prepared to take part in reconstruction. The Central
Committee was composed of fifteen Ministers, with the Minister of the
Interior as the President.
	 It also included Ministers of Plan and
Budget, Industries, Jahade Sazandegi, Agriculture, and also the
Director of the Central Bank. Finally under the Central Committee five
provisional committees were formed; 'Committee Supervising Projects',
'Committee for Determination of Damage',
	 'Ordinance Committee",
'Central Committee for Return of the War Immigrants', and 'Setad-e
Mouin'.
	 (see also, Amirahmadi, 1987b, pp. 143-144) The main idea for
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work distribution was to designate each district or an area to the
voluntary organisations of a certain District from the other regions of
Iran.
In the area, however, ad hoc reconstruction efforts were in
progress before any official institution could form or produce any
guidelines. Organisations of people from all over the country started
preparing themselves and some in fact came to Khuzestan to participate
in reconstruction. There is evidence that officials are always much
slower than the people. The effectiveness of popular organisations was
first established through the uprising and the Islamic Revolution of
1979. In the culture of Iranian Muslims, popular religious
organisations have been acting for centuries to organise ceremonies and
religious demonstrations. For example in Iran during the period before
1979, one important factor was that the enemies could not trace the
centre or headquarters who were organising demonstrations. In fact
such a centre did not exist. They were surprised that any announcement
by Imam Khomeynie from Paris, in the evening of the same day or the day
after, was copied and distributed almost all over the country in the
mosques.
With the beginning of the war and rapid invasion of Iraqis,
again the popular organisations became involved. It could take some
time for an army to organise and mobilise its troops but the people
only needed to be transported to the front-line, often they even dealt
with transportation themselves. The continuous support of voluntary
soldiers "Bassiji' was in fact one of the key points to the victory in
the war. Reconstruction of damaged areas was just another example of
action by the people who quickly mobilised and started their voluntary
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work. We will discuss in our next chapter on 'Disaster and people's
participation' the traditional dilemma in such a situation. It is that
on the one hand there is a need to harmonise the action of popular
volunteer organisations. On the other hand, too much control from the
centre can reduce the motivation of grass-root action groups. The case
of Khuzestan was no exception.
Three phases of reconstruction- Generally three phases for
reconstruction of rural areas in Khuzestan can be recognised;
Phase I, was the short period of ad hoc local reconstruction; phase II,
was reconstruction of 'utopian villages', this being diametrically
opposite to the first one and lasting for two years or so; and finally
phase III, modifying the second policy towards the first one.
During the short period of Phase I, starting in late 1982 and
continuing until early 1983, there was no clear criteria for
reconstructing villages. The local organisations, particularly Jahade
Sazandegi, (Construction Crusade), whose job was to organise
engineering supplies for the war, shifted part of their efforts to
village reconstruction. With no experience, their approach was to go
to the villagers to talk to them and do something to help village life
recover.	 For instance in the village Bardie, (see Our Sample Portrait
in the field study report), they decided to build one or two rooms in
brick for each family. They did not attempt anything else. The
decisions about the location of the rooms was made by the family who
they also had to supply the labour. The same principles were more or
less followed in the village Golbahar. Here as the plots were all the
same size the voluntary organisation made a simple design of two rooms
and a porch in front. They only building one room and left the rest to
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be added in future by the family. In Jelizi, (which is another of our
samples surveyed), the story was quite different. The Gold Shoppers of
Tehran started rebuilding a village in the form of an urban
neighbourhood.
Plate 1-5: A view of the village 'Bardie' (phase I)
[Source: The author]
While ad hoc reconstruction was continuing the so were debates
around the appropriate criteria for village reconstruction. The main
issue was to define the reconstruction, whether it should re-establish
the 'status quo' or incorporate some kind of 'development'. Some
authorities debated that re-establishing the previous situation was not
acceptable, since these villages were only a series of earthen houses
without any public services. They thought that if one day we have to
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reconstruct and develop all the 55,000 villages in Iran, why not start
in Khuzestan now. Another group were concerned about the feasibility
of this approach.	 However, the second idea, to develop through
reconstruction, seemed more attractive. Phase II started because of
criticism from visitors to Bardie, where the reconstructed village had
little to recommend it.
An ideal village was what the designers had in mind; houses must
have typical plans, animals must be separated from people, both inside
the compounds and along their routes in and out of the village. In
addition, every house must have a toilet, a bathroom, a kitchen and two
or three rooms. A small courtyard for the family must be separate from
the larger courtyard for animals. The privacy of the house must be
considered, since we are living in an Islamic society. Each village
must have a school, a drinking water system, a mosque, a public square
and even parking space. Concerning the materials, buildings must be
strong enough to resist any earthquake and other forces. All in all
the utopian village was to provide the villagers with 'the ideal
community'.
For this purpose several architects started designing the
villages. Even some private consultants became involved in preparing
the designs. Construction started on the sites while most villagers
were absent. Those nearby were occasionally asked to participate by
digging the foundations. We argued, with one of the utopian
architects, that the boxes he was making would not match these people's
life style. The answer was that '...they have to adapt themselves to
these designs'. Perhaps this approach was encouraged by the unlimited
money designated for reconstruction at that time. 	 It might be true
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that too much money brings corruption. In 1983, more than 90 billion
rials were designated for reconstruction. Every kind of material was
brought to the area.	 From light concrete roofing slabs, to cement
blocks, steel beams, timber beams etc. In this period also several
'fantastic' schools and mosques were built. To my sorrow four years
later many schools were deteriorating, having neither teacher nor
pupils.
Plate 1-6: A view of village Farsie (phase II)
[Source: The author]
From the very beginning of the reconstruction, Jahade Sazandegi
was doing a good job. Once the area was reopened to the people and
cleared of mines, the people immediately returned to live in the ruins
of their houses or in tents or bamboo tents. 	 Then Jahad started
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restoring farms, preparing canals, schools and mosques. So their work
was not halted for design for reconstruction of settlements.
The brake in 1984 on the reconstruction budget, suddenly brought
everything to a halt. Instead of the 90 billion rials of the previous
year, the designated budget was only 60 billion. The construction of
so called utopian villages then had to be reconsidered. Meanwhile in
a few places where the villages were completed and the inhabitants had
returned, the observations we were able to make were astonishing. To
the surprise of some authorities the villagers ignored the intentions
of the new designs and started using the buildings in a traditional
manner; a traditional life in a modern village. For example, the
animals were found kept inside the family courtyards and people living
and working in animal courtyards. Moreover, villagers wanted to know
why the size of families were not considered when building began. In
fact standard houses were allocated whether the family was two persons
or ten. Moreover the work progress was very slow. A study carried out
in 1984, showed that at that pace, it would take 25 years to complete
the reconstruction of Khuzestan villages 21 .	 All these facts
contributed to the necessity of revising the criteria to be more
realistic. By the end of 1983 a new phase was about to start.
Phase III abolished the 'utopian village' design and gave more
choice to the local people. It started with the reconstruction of the
village Sane to the south of 'Susangerd'. Several projects of the
type we discussed earlier, were produced for this village, but all
failed for different reasons. (see Sample Portrait, the case of Sane)
21.The study was carried out be the School of Architecture, University of
Shahid Beheshti, Tehran.
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Finally the knot was untied by proposing and eventually implementing, a
participatory approach. The distant consultant designer was rejected
and as with Bardie, the families themselves were asked to decide about
their needs. They also had to supply the labour and even to manage the
construction work. The main committee of the village became involved
from the beginning and to some people's surprise, six months later 300
houses were completed 22 .
From mid 1984 onward the villages were reconstructed more or
less with these principles. Usually the intervening organisation
insisted on some kind of layout for the houses, with the separation of
families from animals for hygienic purposes being insisted upon. With
the decrease of the budget each of the succeeding years, (50 billion
rials in 1985), and the fact that most villages in the non-restricted
zone had been reconstructed, the work went at a slow pace until 1989.
When in August 1986, I came to Britain, I had the experience of
more than three years observation in Khuzestan villages. By then
almost a hundred villages had been reconstructed. The results of
different policies were apparent. The people of Bardie complained that
the no toilet were provided for them, their alleys were muddy and so
on. The people of Farsie, (one of the 'utopian' villages) complained
about the lack of covered space for their family. In Sane, the most
promising example, reconstruction was quick, cheap and satisfactory but
when the time came to mobilise the villagers for public services in
their village several constraints prevented any useful action. I came
to study in the UK intending to see what had happened with village
22.The construction of Jelizi village for a hundred families by contractors
took more than three years to complete.
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reconstruction in other countries after disasters, what had been
achieved which policies had proved to bring the best results. This
dissertation is the report of what I have learned over the last three
years.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE SURVEY
SOURCES, FRAMEWORK AND PRE-DISASTER PLANNING
Introduction: This chapter and the following eight chapters
contain a review of the literature on natural disasters and post-war
reconstruction. For this purpose the following four steps must be
taken;
a- to identify the sources of relevant literature,
b- to find a study framework and/or to recognise the major
issues concerned,
c- to select the relevant subjects according to the scope of our
study,
d- to review the State of the Art and to elaborate on some of
the most important subjects identified.
From the many different facets of 'shelter and disaster' our main
emphasis is on reconstruction.
2-1- Identifying the sources of information- Disaster research
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and studies is a new area of knowledge. 	 Quarantelli (1972), claims
that;
" The 1950s brought the birth of disaster studies
in this country. [U.S.A.] The 1960s gave the field
a base line. The 1970s will be a period of jumping
off from what we have learned into a much more
systematic, broad-range, full scale, imaginative
attack on disaster problems" (P. 23).
In Japan, famous as an earthquake prone country, the history of
disaster research studies goes back to the second half of the 19th
Century. However for almost a hundred years the researchers were
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focusing on engineering aspects of disasters, mainly earthquake proof
buildings. As is claimed by Machida (1972), research on social aspects
of disasters in Japan are mainly developed during the 1970s (pp.
13-14).
In the same context D'Souza (1984), claims that; "The last years
of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s were 	 the beginning of
disaster research" (P. 496). It appears that disaster studies usually
started with the engineering spectrum and the social and psychological
aspects were conducted later. The place of housing reconstruction
after the disaster is perhaps more recent. Davis (1981a), says; 'Our
Knowledge of post-disaster housing is still in its infancy. It appears
to date from 1970 following the Gediz earthquake in Turkey and various
Bangladesh disasters of the same period' (P. 12).
	 In the same
ow
relation, Quarantelli (1982), claims;
" We found two immediate difficulties in examining
sheltering and housing in disasters. First, there
is very little systematic literature on the
subject, 	
	
The quality and quantity of the
research permits the drawing of very few general
observations, certainly nothing in the way of
systematic and empirically-sound generalisations"
(P. 1).
Thus it seems that documents available for studying disaster and
housing, regardless of the agent of the disaster either natural or
man-made, is scarce. This in turn will make the search for a framework
more difficult.
Our research topic is reconstruction after war, but the search
for literature directly concerned with war and more specifically with
post-war reconstruction revealed a limited number of documents. It
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appears that unlike natural disasters, war among other man-made
disasters, has been neglected. Therefore one of our tasks will be to
develop the subject of 'War as a Disaster'.
Leivesley (198?) compiled a valuable bibliography on 'Disasters,
disaster agents, and response'. It contains 700 subject references,
from which almost a dozen are about war, more specifically about
nuclear war and its consequences and actually none of them are
concerned with reconstruction after war. (pp. 288-308) Our own attempt
at looking for references dealing with war and planning and
reconstruction afterwards found some success, including searching in
literature of the second World War period l . The scarcity of the
documents and the fact that most of them are dated suggested another
approach: to look through literature concerned with natural disasters.
This is not a new idea and can be justified for two reasons;
First as has been mentioned the shortage or even lack of direct
research on some aspects of man-made disasters; and secondly the
assumption of the existence of similarities between the effects of and
response to these two kinds of disasters. (see for example; Warheit
1976, P. 131 and Davis 1986b, p.2) However, it should be admitted that
each type of disaster has its own special effects and consequently
requires the proper response. Warheit, (1972 and 1976) and
Davis (1987 and 1988), both attempted to make a comparison between
natural and man-made disasters. More specifically James Lewis (1988),
talks about the similarity between damage caused by earthquake and
1.More details will be given when 'War as a Disaster' is developed and also
the introduction of the Bibliography on 'Settlement Reconstruction After
War', in Appendices.
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2-2- Looking for a framework- The next task is to identify a
conceptual framework. One of the earliest works on shelter after
disaster is 'Emergency Shelter Study, Phase 1'. It concerns research
conducted by Frederick C. Cuny, Ian Davis and Frederick Krimgold for
UNDRO and was submitted in 1977. 3 4 In this document the authors talked
about '59 issues' and grouped them under the 9 following 'Key Issues'.
"1- Accountability (Issues 1-5)
2- Performance (Issues 6-11)
3- Performance- Limiting Factors (Issues 12-19)
4- Cross- Cultural Problems (Issues 20-28)
5- Aid (Issues 29-35)
6- Development (Issues 36-44)
7- Resources (Issues 45-53)
8- Gaps (Issues 54-58)
9- Alternatives (Issues 59) " ( P. i)
A year later, (i.e. 1978) 'Shelter After Disaster' was published by Ian
Davis. The introduction of this book illustrates the framework
pursued. It reads;
" Having established immediate shelter as my
central concern, I have deliberately brought into
the picture the pre-disaster context. Within Part
I, I have attempted to show that the situation
prior to the catastrophe is a crucial factor and
may be the actual cause of the disaster. In Part
II, I have set out in diagrammatic form the
widespread myths which exist about disaster
shelter,... in Part III, I have commented on the
diverse strategies that are likely to be pursued in
the immediate aftermath 	
2.In calling for papers for the first Workshop on Settlement Reconstruction
Post-war, IOAAS, University of York, May 1988.
3.Ian Davis in 'Disasters and the Small Dwellings", P.12 refers to this
document. From now on we refer to this document as UNDRO 1977?
4.1 translated parts of this document into 'Farsi' and circulated them in Ir
in 1987.
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Finally (and perhaps perversely) I have left the
historical section to Part IV at the end of the
book." (p. XV)
A closer review of the first part of this book indicates that three
major points were elaborated; First, the fact that man kind learns from
loss, in other words disasters can be the starting point for mitigation
and preventive measures for future occurrences. Relating to this Davis
talks about construction of the 'London barrage' on the Thames among
other things. This notion was later developed again in 1983 by Davis
when he wrote 'Disasters as Agents of Change? or: Form Follows
Failure'.
The second point he elaborated is the notion of 'Disaster,
Poverty and Urbanisation' where he claims that poverty is the root of
vulnerability or vulnerability to disaster is one of the many facets of
poverty. Again the same notion has been developed by Davis and others
frequently. (see Davis 1987a, Cuny 1987) The third point of part one
is entitled 'Cultural values' which does not accurately describe the
content. He in fact talks about the importance of understanding the
'normal housing' process. For that he also raises examples of
mismatches between shelter provided after disasters and the real need
of the survivors.
A relatively narrow part of his book, Part II consists of
explanations of 'Myths' which exist on the scene of a disaster. He
classifies the myths under five main headings; "(A) Vulnerability, (B)
Social Attitudes, (C) Shelter Needs, (D) Reconstruction and (E) The
Provision of Aid". (pp. 26-30) And finally he talks about 'Three
Strategies' for 'filling the gap'. It can also be found that many of
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the issues Davis raises in this book are in one way or another a
repetition of the document mentioned earlier, UNDRO 1977?.
In 1977 (Hass. et al), attempted the 'Reconstruction Following
Disaster'. They explain that ;" Our perspectives, in the main, would
be those of geographers and sociologists." (p. XX) They based their
study on eight 'generalisations';
"1- A disaster produces a sudden change in the
physical components of a community.
2- Combined with the physical destruction are death
and injuries. The community can no longer function
as before.
3-During the emergency period, underlying values
and the community norms usually produce a high
level of frenetic activity, most of which is
altruistic.
4- Restoration is the next step. ...
5- Reconstruction, which follows, refer to
activities aimed at permanence. ...
6- The disaster-produced changes in the community
raise new issues and alter the form of old ones.
7- Some issues get much attention, extensive
consideration and early action. ...
8- These community policy issues have a wide range
of impacts" (pp. XX-XXI).
They continue the description of their approach by identifying the
'consequences' of disaster on 'these community issues'. Because their
book is based on study of the reconstruction of three cities, they
continue to look for;
the physical characteristics of the city prior
to the disaster; the economic and social linkages
that existed within that physical setting; the
housing, employment and life style characteristics
of families; and the types of distinct
neighbourhoods which existed in various sections of
the city" (P. XXI).
They also tried to identify the consequences on 'macro' and 'micro'
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levels.
In 1981 the first edition of 'Disasters and the Small Dwelling'
was published. This book is the proceedings of a conference held at
Oxford Polytechnic in 1978. This document contains two important
articles for our present concern; First, the Keynote Address by
Frederick Cuny under, ' Disasters and the Small Dwelling: The State of
the Art' and the second by Ian Davis entitled, 'Disasters and
Settlements- Towards an Understanding of the Key Issues'.
Cuny constructed his argument in the form of 'Recurring
Problems, Gaps in Our Knowledge, Priorities For Research and Priorities
For Action'. (pp. 3-9) As he confesses the problems are faced from
'the point of view of intervenors'. The 'Recurring Problems' are seven
in number;
"1- The first problem is the failure to comprehend
the magnitude or the complexities involved in
providing housing in a developing society. ..
2- The second problem is ... to examine one
disaster and try to draw conclusions which can
be used in responding to another disaster in
another location.
3- The third problem is the lack of adequate
understanding of the differences in disaster
types and the responses required. ...
4- Problem four is the failure to understand
disaster in the greater context of development.
...
5- The fifth major problem is the continuing lack
of co-operation between organisations involved
in relief at all levels. ...
6- A lack of sophistication in dealing with
housing in a post-disaster environment is the
sixth problem. Because housing tends to be
regarded as a product rather than a process.
...
7- The final problem is the inadequacy of the
current criteria used for programme evaluation.
..." (PP . 3-5)
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Under 'Gaps In Our Knowledge', Cuny (1981a), raises three main concepts
and explains them at length; '1- Understanding the system: Intervenors
know where the problem occur, but they do not know why... 2- Real
opportunities: It is often casually accepted that a disaster provides
an opportunity to create change,... 3- Understanding the impact of
programmes' (pp.5-6). Perhaps one of the most important points to note
is the fact that Cuny has the 'view of intervenor'.
In the same reference Davis (1981a), takes another framework.
He summarises the 'Key Issues' under "three broad headings, which are
in order of relative importance: 'A. The survivors' viewpoint. B. The
vulnerability of settlements. C. The role of intervenors' (p. 13).
Under the first heading he counts three issues; 1- 'Coping
abilities', 2- 'Rising expectations'., 3- 'Survivors' priorities'.
Concerning group B., 'The vulnerability of settlements', he considers 9
different observations;
"B.1. Relevance to low income housing. .
B.2. Trade- off.	 ...
B.3. New settlements. ...
B.4. Planning policies. ...
B.5. Bye-laws. ...
B.6. Vulnerability mapping. ...
B.7. The relocation of vulnerable communities.
B.8. Land tenure. ...
B.9. Modification of siting and construction
after disaster. ..." (pp. 14-16).
As it can be seen Davis' conceptual framework is different from Cuny.
In 1982 'Shelter after Disaster, Guidelines for Assistance' was
published by UNDRO. The framework incorporated with this document
consists of three sections; 'Emergency Shelter, Post-disaster Housing
and Conclusions'. The first heading, actually Chapter III of the book,
discusses the following items;
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"The needs and resources of survivors
Allocation of roles to assisting groups
The assessment of survivors' needs
Evacuation of survivors
The role of emergency shelter
Contingency planning (preparedness)" (p. V).
Under Post-disaster Housing the following issues are discussed;
'Reconstruction: The opportunity for risk reduction and reform;
Relocation of settlements; Land tenure and land use and Housing
finance' (P. V). The 'Conclusions' part in fact includes more than the
observations of earlier discussion. It contains four items: 'General
conclusions; Rising expectations; The accountability of assisting
groups to recipients of aid and Advice for the local level' (P. V).
In 1982 Quarantelli studied 'Sheltering And Housing After Major
Community Disasters' which included three case studies. The
'conceptual format' he pursued for each case is outlined as
"...the community context, evacuation, shelter,
temporary housing, and return to their evacuated
community. All three cases deal with individual
aspects of sheltering and housing, but
organisational aspects of sheltering in the
Wilkes-Barre study" (p. 4).
What emerges from this lengthy investigation can be summarised
in the form of some tentative observations;
First, reliable documents and studies of post-disaster shelter
are scarce.
Second, most available literature is produced by 'outsiders'.
By that we mean that the authors are mostly from 'International
agencies' or else scholars studying disasters and reconstruction in
other countries. There are very few document available from native
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people engaged in disaster operations, especially from developing
countries.
Third, there seems to be a common confusion in the use of
terminology associated with shelter after disaster. Phrases such as
'emergency shelter' 'temporary accommodation or shelter','shelter',
'housing' are found to be used by different people with different
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interpretations. Quarantelli (1982), refers to this fact as one of
the 'two immediate difficulties in examining sheltering and housing in
disasters.' (p. 1) He proposes the use of four terms each implying a
mode of shelter; 'Emergency sheltering', 'Temporary sheltering',
'Temporary housing' and 'Permanent housing' (pp. 75-78). However these
definitions are not perceived and spread by others.
Fourth, the available means also suggest that the community
context and the hazard are both influential factors in determining the
study framework. When the study concerns reconstruction of cities the
'issues' confronted are different in some respects from those after a
disaster in a rural area. This is so with the source of the hazard as
well, whether it is a civil war or flood or famine. Though, there
still might be some general concepts reoccurring in every disaster
situation regardless of its context and the agent.
Fifth, the literature does not offer any concrete conceptual
framework. Although most 'issues' raised and discussed by different
authors are repeated by others, in terms of structuring the issues it
seems there is a lack of a connecting rope between the main sections,
headings, or as they are called 'Key Issues'. This lack of a clear
framework may have many causes, among them are; First, the fact that
this area of research is new, and secondly, we know that a disaster can
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affect different aspects of a community, (i.e. economy, houses, human
loss and injuries, etc). (see for example, Cuny 1983. pp. 44-51)
Consequently each discipline attempts to view and study the disaster
from its own stand point. 	 Even politicians claim that disasters and
disaster response have political implications (see for example UNDRO
1977?,	 and Glantz Michael H., 1976) But more important are
interrelationships between different facets of a community's life.
We focus on housing, studying the damage and the reconstruction,
but housing is not only an architectural or engineering task. The
initial status of housing prior to the disaster is a mirror of the
economic state of its inhabitants. Housing reconstruction is also an
economic activity in terms of costs, work-force and so on. It can even
affect the long term development of the community by creating
expectations beyond people's means, 'raising expectations' or in a
positive sense by introducing new technology or building materials and
so on. Thus, there must be no surprise if in a 'Sociological' study
Drabek (1986), touches on issues such as 'Shelter behaviour' and
Housing and Reconstruction Planning Problems'.
This situation persuaded some people of a need for an
'interdisciplinary' framework. Gelman and Macias (1984), in a brief
article, attempted to focus on the necessity of this study 'Toward a
conceptual framework for interdisciplinary disaster research'. The
development of this 'framework' they claim; '...is based on certain
paradigms, i.e cognitive tools,...' (P. 507). Their conclusion is
illustrated in a schematic diagram consisting of five areas; 'Disaster
Engineering, Management Studies, Disaster Studies, Calamity Studies and
Methodological Studies' all linked to each other (P. 509).	 However
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this challenge succeeds more in highlighting the urgency of the concept
rather than proposing a practical framework. Non the less it is a
valuable challenge.
We are living in the era of professionalism. Engineers are
familiar with stone and concrete and psychologists familiar with mental
disorders. While members of a community having experienced a disaster
are presumably shaken not only physically but also mentally. The
trouble is that engineers who reconstruct bridges and roads or
architects who plan for the replacement of houses are usually not
familiar with the psychological effects of the disaster and the
psychologists who are aware of it have nothing to do with the
engineering work. What emerges from this argument is a need for more
interdisciplinary studies. As a step towards this task we will try to
develop the relationships between 	 'Physical reconstruction and
psychological recovery' in the form of a separate chapter5.
At the scene of a disaster the following elements exist; First
there is a community, be it as small as a village or large as a
country.	 Secondly there is a source of danger, an agent jeopardising
the community, a hazard. If this hazard acts on the community and
affects it, the community sustaining some degree of loss transfers to
new circumstances. From then on a new element usually appears on the
scene; the intervenor, no matter whether it is the government or an
international agency etc. The intervention will continue for some time
and the community undergoes a process of recovery until achieving again
its 'normalcy'.	 Of course this is not a general rule, in some cases
5.This opportunity became available through the desire and collaboration of
Iranian colleague Bahman Najarian at the Psychology Department.
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the stricken community may never recover or the process may be
prolonged for years, as it is for example with the Palestinian refugees
who have been for forty years homeless. So one approach to classifying
the issues related to disaster study might be to take these basic and
general elements and their interrelationships; The Community, The
Hazard and The Intervention.
Another approach to studying housing and disasters focuses on a
few emerging concepts. The practice of post-disaster housing in the
past and the research and studies of the process, performance and
obstacles confronted and approaches applied, have resulted in a series
of general issues not necessarily related. For example it is possible
to focus on issues such as 'land and land tenure', 'development through
disaster opportunity', 'technology transfer', and so forth. The
problem with this approach is that the 'issues' are scattered and in
the context of different disasters their existence or content and
importance may change.
In 1988 Frederick Cuny commenting on one of my papers suggested
that the economic aspects of reconstruction were almost neglected in
that paper and in his view housing reconstruction is initially very
much an economic activity. He also referred to one of his recent
involvements in Sri Lanka as evidence. In reply I said that the
context of Khuzestan is very different from Sri Lanka and in fact even
if there were no financial constraints in Khuzestan the problem of
housing reconstruction could still not be overcome. One reason I
mentioned to him was the fact that suitable resistant building material
was absent from the area and therefore ., even if the Government could
supply enough money/
 the problem of producing and transferring the
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material from sometimes thousands of kilometres, was something that
even the most generous government was not likely to be in a position to
tackle.
'Time' seems to be another influential factor. By that we mean
that the stages of a disaster can be perceived as a useful base for
study. Many different studies focus on the two main stages of pre and
post-disaster, the latter is divided into three main stages of
'relief', 'rehabilitation' (or as it is sometimes called 'transitional
phase'), and 'reconstruction'. In terms of housing these four phases
are well established. (see for example UNDRO, 1982. p. 2) The stages
of shelter in these four phases are 'permanent' (pre-disaster),
'emergency shelter', 'temporary accommodation' and 'permanent housing'
(reconstruction).
Although this classification represents a consensus of opinion,
Alcira, Kreimer (1979) has disputed its relevance in the context of
developing countries. The heart of his argument refers to the
definitions or the quality of 'permanent' and 'temporary' shelter which
he borrows from Hass. She argues that in developing countries the
housing situation before the disaster which is perceived as the
'permanent', might in fact be too poor. It could be in reality
'temporary' type accommodation, in which the inhabitants may live for
their whole lives. Thus the sequential stages of rehabilitating the
people in a squatter settlement or in a village, for example can hardly
be attributed with these pre-established phases. It is all related to
the quality of shelter before the disaster and whether we can call this
a 'permanent house'.
Kreimer's argument proves to be consistent with our own
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observations from rural areas of Khuzestan. On some occasions the
villagers lived temporarily in shelters they had built, which in fact
resembled their pre-disaster norms or their so called 'permanent'
housing. (i.e, the village Jelizi) In many others when the people
returned to the rubble of their villages they took shelter for a few
days inside the remains of their houses. Gradually they repaired more
rooms and as time passed more or less the whole previous 'permanent
house' was restored as a 'temporary shelter' before the authorities
started the construction of 'new permanent houses'.
The search through the literature for a 'study framework' so far
leads to the observation that 'innovation' in this subject requires a
separate comprehensive study; perhaps that could be the topic of
another dissertation. At the moment there is insufficient time and
having this general view of the situation it seems more convenient to
take one of the existing frameworks and to begin to review some of most
common 'Issues' and 'Key Issues' as identified by others.
It is felt that using the 'time' or 'phases' of disasters as a
base to categorise the issues of 'shelter' would be suitable. So the
two major phases of pre' and 'post‘ event, in which the second comprises
three 'arbitrary' subsections or phases of 'emergency shelter', 
'temporary accommodation' and 'reconstruction of permanent housing' 
will be used. (see UNDRO, 1982. p.2) It should be made clear that of
these three phases our emphasis will be on the reconstruction phase.
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2-3- A review of major issues in disaster and housing
(Phase 0, pre-disaster)
Introduction: This section of the present study aims at a review
of The State of the Art on disaster planning. It is almost three
decades since the 'international community has become increasingly
alarmed by disasters'. The result of this awareness is the perceived
necessity of developing our knowledge on 'disaster prevention and
pni0(4.?
planning' (UNDRO 1986, p. iii).
The literature available on this subject is prolific, so
selectivity becomes inevitabl. One major contribution in this field is
by UN 'family' particularly UNDRO.	 They have already published 12
volumes on 'Disaster Prevention and Mitigation'. Although UN
publications point to the 'economic losses' due to disaster, which acts
as a waste of income and resources, as the reason for 'awareness' among
the governments of developing countries and that could be true,
nevertheless there could be a quite simple non-professional base for
focusing on disaster prevention, which is what Davis (1984b), refers to
it as the 'axiom' of 'Prevention is better than cure'.
In spite of the tangible efforts in this field, it seems that
those who have benefited most from it are those communities who, in
reality, are less in need of it. The main obstacle at the end of the
day, is not just developing the methodology and principles of planning,
rather, when it comes to dealing with the real world 'resources' and
'political will' are required. In practice it has been shown that
often neither are available to those communities who are in a desperate
situation.
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Discussion about disaster planning clearly requires a
familiarity with the 'terminology' frequently used. A general review
of the procedures and elements of disaster planning should be made and
the role of shelter should be highlighted. Risk reduction is also
found to be one of the main aims in post-disaster reconstruction. It
would be preferable to review the experience of this later on in the
Reconstruction phase.
Definition of disaster- Customarily literature on disasters
includes a section on definitions. Our aim in reviewing it is to
clarify the terms.
One of the earliest definitions comes from Fritz (1961) quoted
in Drabek (1986, P. 7) and also by UNDRO (1984a) as;
"...an event, concentrated in time and space, in
which a society (or a community) undergoes severe
danger and incurs such losses to its members and
physical appurtenances that the social structure is
disrupted and the fulfilment of all or some of the
essential functions of the society is prevented"
(p. 1).
The latter reference also refers to another definition proposed by
'Humberside County Council, United Kingdom' which is ' more specific'
and is 'restricted to more sudden events' as follows;
"A major incident is a serious disruption to life,
arising with little or no warning, causing or
threatening death or serious injury to, or
rendering homeless, such numbers of persons in
excess of those which can be dealt with by the
public services operating under normal procedures,
and which calls for the special mobilisation and
organisations of those services" (p. 1).
Raphael(1986)1 in the sphere of psychology refers to definitions
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suggested by 'Harshbarger (1974) and Kai Erikson (1979).' These two
defined disasters 'in terms of their effects on communities as well as
individuals.' The 'simplest definition', Raphael suggests, ' is that of
Cohen and Ahearn (1980): 'disasters are extraordinary events that cause
great destruction of property and may result in death, physical injury,
and human suffering' (p. 6).
Cuny (1983), did not attempt to introduce a comprehensive
definition of disaster, rather he tried to clarify the idea that what
we usually think of as disasters such as earthquake, flood and so on
are in fact 'agents' of disaster and not the disaster themselves. So
he went on to talk about 'Disaster Hazards' by which he means
earthquake, flood etc. (p. 21)
A brief definition is proposed by UNDRO (1977?) which is only
concerned with housing. 'In terms of housing, a disaster may be
defined as an event which causes a temporary break in the normal
housing process' (p. 1).
It seems there are two major ways of seeing the task of defining
a disaster; firstly to keep it comprehensive and secondly to use a
sectorial approach (i.e. housing, psychology, sociology). It is not
the composition of words in the definition which might be scrutinised,
but its efficiency at drawing a dividing line between whether an event
is to be defined as a disaster or just an incident. 	 Different
definitions have similar components such as 'death and injury', and
'loss of property'. It is very difficult to quantify the minimum
amount or number of losses which will take an incident into the
category of disaster.
The introductory page of 'Disaster News in Brief' published by
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UNDRO, 1988 is evidence of how measuring disasters by numbers can be
misleading. Part of it reads; ' is confined to disasters with
reported losses of at least 10 dead or property damage in excess of US
$1 million'. It is obvious that these figures are very arbitrary and
the pressure felt by a community in sustaining such damage will depend
on its pre-disaster capacity. 10 dead is a very different matter in a
population of 200, than in one of 5 million. The same criticism is
even more applicable to property loss. Is the effect of loosing US$ 1
million really the same for a town in Bangladesh and the United States?
Clearly it is not.
om4uwEl
The same criticism has been made more specifically by UNDRO
(1986, pp. 9-10). There, the question is raised ; 'When is a disaster
a disaster?' This question is also explored in a series of sensitive
debates which finally concludes that no concrete definition exists.
What can be concluded from this argument is; firstly, that as
yet there is no concrete definition of disaster, nor does any evidence
suggest that this is necessary, therefore the word has been used with
different meanings. Secondly, this problem may partly stem from the
context of the community and the relative degree of losses incurred,
thus an equal amount of loss in two events may be perceived in one as a
disaster and in the other as just a normal event or an 'incident'.
Thirdly, 'disaster' can be defined both in a comprehensive and in a
disciplinary manner, such as for example a definition which was
proposed by UNDRO (1977?) concerned with housing.
Disaster and vulnerability- The distinction between 'disaster'
and 'vulnerability' or 'hazard' is not a new idea. However, it is
often discussed and even emphasised by authors.
	 In 1977 Lewis wrote;
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'disaster occurs where an extreme natural phenomenon meets a vulnerable
human settlement' (p. 310). The notion of 'vulnerability' then became
the main theme of Lewis' works. (see for example, Lewis 1981 and 1987)
The same concept can be found frequently in Davis's works. In 'Shelter
After Disaster' (1978), one of his primary intentions is to focus on
vulnerability and to acknowledge its routes in communities. In the
same book (p. 3), he proposes a diagram, borrowed from 0,Keefe 'an
economist working with the Disaster Research Unit at Bradford
University', illustrating the 'vulnerability to disaster' as an
'interface' between 'hazard' and 'dangerous conditions'.
Like Lewis, Davis also continued working on his diagram since th
some modifications. (See Davis 1982, 1984a, 1984b, 1987a) His most
recent diagram, (1987), contains the following four components;
'hazards', on one side and 'vulnerable conditions' which are in turn
caused by the third element 'pressures'. Use of this latter word has
its roots in the last factor; 'root causes'. However, the 'disaster
impact' takes place at the 'interface' between hazards and
vulnerability. (p. 8)
Many others have also developed the notion of vulnerability.
For example Cuny (1983), describes it in this way;
" The hazards themselves are not disasters but
rather a factor in causing a disaster. Two other
factors are essential: the event's effect on people
and their environment, and human activities that
increases its impact" (p. 21).
There is no need to bring in more references because in one way
or another all they are talking about the same phenomenon. However,
the heart of the argument is significant.
	
There is, in our
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understanding a major shift from blaming 'nature' as the source of the
'hazard', to 'human guilt' as creating the 'vulnerable community'.
The implication of this approach in terms of shelter is to see
'poverty' as the 'root' of vulnerability instead of looking at the
poor resistance of shelter against hazards. On the other hand, in
terms of prevention or mitigation of damage from disaster, somehow the
challenge is understood in more depth, despite being more complex and
difficult to approach. It is now well known that vulnerability to
hazards is often just one of the many facets of a poor community and
thus addressing the risk of damage initially requires fundamental
changes in the economic and social conditions of vulnerable
communities, which will obviously not be a simple task.
The relationship between 'development' and 'disaster' nowadays
has become such an important subject that we will devote a separate
section to it. This requires a two way examination; first, how the
state of a community's 'development' can create vulnerability to
hazards, and second, how disaster relief and reconstruction can tackle
developmental issues. Of these the former one is by its very nature an
analytical cause and effect study of which is well explored in the
literature. The second relationship, however, requires more study and
tends to be more complex and worthwhile, so we will focus on it.
Definition of Risk, Vulnerability, Elements at risk and Specific
risk- To avoid confusion in terminology an 'expert group
meeting' established by UNDRO 1979, proposed the following definitions
for these terms. Since then UNDRO in its series on 'Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation' has adopted the terms proposed by that
expert group. However it seems that others still often use the terms
70
in their own style rather restricting themselves to the prescribed
usage of terms. The UNDRO definitions are as follows;
"NATURAL HAZARD meaning the probability of
occurrence, within a specific period of time in a
given area, of a potentially damaging natural
phenomenon.
VULNERABILITY meaning the degree of loss to a given
element at risk or set of such elements resulting
from occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given
magnitude and expressed on a scale from 0 (no
damage) to 1 (total loss).
ELEMENTS AT RISK meaning the population, building
and civil engineering works, economic activities,
public services, utilities and infrastructure,
etc... at risk in a given area.
SPECIFIC RISK meaning the expected degree of loss
due to a particular natural phenomenon and as a
function of both natural hazard and vulnerability.
RISK meaning the expected number of lives lost,
persons injured, damage to property and disruption
of economic activity due to a particular natural
phenomenon, and consequently the product of
specific risk and elements at risk." (P. 5)(also
quoted in UNDRO, 1982, p. 75 and 198e: p.3)
Shelter and disaster damage- Having established shelter as our
central concern, it seems necessary to have run through the role of
shelter in different hazards. Cuny (1983), compiled a table of damage
due to different kinds of hazards. He illustrates that most disasters,
with the exception of 'drought/famine' usually have an 'immediate
effect' on housing. (pp. 48-49)
Damage to the houses in the case of some hazards, especially
earthquake can cause extra loss of human lives and fatalities. With
respects to this, Cuny (1983), claims that; 'Approximately 90 percent
of the loss of life in all earthquakes is the result of building
collapse" (p. 28). Reza Razani, the Iranian engineer (1981), claims;
" During the past 15 years more than 30,000 people
have lost their lives, and in excess of 50,000
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adobe and masonry building units have been
destroyed in earthquake stricken towns and villages
in rural Iran. During this century more than one
million people have died due to earthquakes
throughout the world. ... More than 80% of these
earthquake deaths have been caused by the collapse
of one or two story unreinforced masonry and adobe
buildings" (p. 123).
Davis (1981a), claims; ..perhaps 90% of all deaths in natural
disasters (such as floods, hurricanes or earthquakes) occur as a result
of unsafe houses being built on unsafe sites" (p. 11). Schppisser and
Studer (1984), also claim that ; ' The earthquakes of the last few
years have shown that the major part of fatalities is due to the
collapse of conventional buildings' (p. 1). In the case of earthquakes
it is also identified that the 'heavy roof' has a vital role in causing
damage and killing people. Razani, (1981) in the context of Iranian
earthquakes claims; ' Total or partial collapse of these structures,
especially the collapse of the roofs has been the main cause of the
loss of life and property during the past earthquakes' (pp. 126-127).
The same notion, in a study of Guatemala Earthquake 1976, is expressed
by Davis (1977,1.  ' The vast majority of the damage occurred due to the
collapse of massive adobe walls with heavy tile roofs' (p. 83).
Our argument so far has shown the significant role that shelter
plays in disasters and fatalities caused by the hazards. Enormous
number of studies have been carried out to identify the roots of
a.
housing vulnerability. (e.g. Spence and Coburn 1987) Further more,
attempts have been made to find solutions to increase housing
resistance against hazards. (e.g. Leslie 1984) In this respect it is
unfortunate that while most vulnerable settlements are in the
developing countries, built of conventional materials, the research as
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Razani (1981) claims, has been mainly been developed for application in
the usage of modern materials and techniques. (p. 124) Thus those who
benefit from this research are mostly in the developed societies. For
example, the latter reference indicates that only 5% of the 'total
research funds [are] allocated world wide to the study of seismic
behaviour and design of these types of buildings' (ibid) (i.e.
conventional buildings)
Davis (1978), tried to take some steps towards understanding
the causes of housing vulnerability. He writes;
" The United Nations have obtained verification for
this state of affairs. They find that 95 00 of all
deaths directly attributed to disasters occur
within developing countries. The remaining 5% of
deaths occur within the well-publicised disasters
of the developed world" (p. 15).
In more detail he explores the role of 'unsafe land' and also the high
rate of migration and 'rapid urbanisation' as major attributes of
vulnerable settlements in developing countries. He also attempts to
introduce global poverty and to show that the inhabitants of the
vulnerable squatter dwellings are the most underprivileged group of
communities in developing countries. D'Souza (1984), highlights this
fact in the form of tables, one of which illustrates that due to
disasters occurring between '1959-80' the 'Mean loss of life' in North
America has been 32, while the same figure for Africa stands at 751.
(p. 496) Spence and Coburn (1987), claim;
" Earthquake protection planning falls into two
distinct problems - urban risk and rural risk. In
urban areas, people are concentrated together,
infrastructure and financial investments are high
and change is rapid. .... Rural communities on
the other hand are spread everywhere and almost any
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sizeable earthquake on land will affect some
villages"
	 (P.	 3).
Westgate (1981), explored the crucial role of the 'land' and
'land tenure' in creating vulnerable settlements. " Lima's population
was 600,000 in 1940. By 1990 Turner estimates that this figure will
have risen to 6 million, a rise of 900% in 50 yrs, [years] 4.5 million
of whom will be resident in squatter-type settlements.." (p. 27).
Spence (1984) prior to explaining the problems of disaster planning,
tries to explore the existing situation of vulnerable settlements in
developing countries by highlighting the 'Rapid urban expansion'. (pp.
398-399) The same notion is also emphasised by Davis, (1977 and 1979),
Spence and Coburn (1987).
"Disaster Vulnerability and Rapid Urbanisation' is the title of
Davis' article in 'Open House International', Vol. 12. No.3. 1987. In
this article Davis has brought together some data about the present
population and predictions of the urban population of developing
countries. He also gives an account of the large cities and claims;
'it is expected that there will be 57 cities over 5 million in [the
year] 2000, 42 within the Third World' (p. 6). He also continues to
say that; ' There are 20 cities projected to house populations in the
15-20 million range within forty years. These include nine cities that
are subject to major hazards' (ibid).
To sum up our discussion in this section, it is found that
shelter is one of the sectors which can be damaged by most disasters,
that building collapse is also identified as a major cause of death and
injuries in disasters, that vulnerable shelters are built with
indigenous materials or non-resistant materials and poor techniques,
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that the vulnerable settlements are mostly among the developing
countries, and that squatter settlers on one hand and rural inhabitants
on the other are the most vulnerable communities. Among many other
factors 'unsafe land' is one of the major components creating
vulnerable settlements. Acknowledgement of these issues is necessary
for our future argument on prevention and mitigation or pre-disaster
planning.
Pre-disaster planning- Having established our discussion about
the definitions and context of disaster, vulnerability and the role of
shelter in the event of disaster, in this section our aim is to review
some aspects of pre-disaster planning or in other words what can be
done to prevent, mitigate or prepare for a disaster.
At this point it is necessary to present a clear definition of
the terms which from now on will be used frequently. The main terms
0,404P
are defined by UNDRO (1986) as follows;
"Preparedness. Disaster preparedness may be
described as action designed to minimise loss of
life and damage, and to 'organise and facilitate
timely	 and effective rescue,	 relief and
rehabilitation in cases of disaster.
Preparedness is supported by the necessary
legislation and means a readiness to cope with
disasters or similar emergencies which cannot be
avoided. Preparedness is concerned with
forecasting and warning, the education and training
of the population, organisation for and management
of disasters, including preparation of operational
plans, training of relief groups, the stockpiling
of supplies and the earmarking of the necessary
funds.
Prevention. Disaster prevention may be described
as measures designed to prevent natural phenomena
from causing or resulting in disaster or other
related emergency situations.
Prevention concerns the formulation and
implementation of long-range policies and
programmes to prevent or eliminate the occurrence
of disasters.	 On the basis of vulnerability
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analyses of all risks, prevention includes
legislation and regulatory measures, principally in
the field of physical and urban planning, public
works and building.
Mitigation. The concept of 'mitigation' spans the
broad spectrum of disaster prevention and
preparedness. Mitigation means reducing the actual
or probable effects of an extreme hazard on man and
his environment. Thus an emergency plan if
properly executed can have a mitigating effect on a
disaster just as the proper observance of building
and land use regulations designed to avert
disaster.	 Mitigation is, in effect, prevention to
a degree" (p. viii).
Cuny (1983), also describes his definition of the terms which are not
very different to these preceding ones. (pp. 204-206) The term
'Contingency planning' as can be identified through UNDRO, (1982) is
used as synonymous to preparedness. (p. 35) (see also Davis, 1982)
There is an enormous amount of literature available on this
subject. Some is concerned with the principle or methodology of this
kind of planning, some studies report the issues faced in preparation
in the context of a certain country, explaining the approaches applied.
It also appears that different disasters and the way of planning for
each of them has attracted the attention of scientists and some
disasters, especially earthquakes, have been focused on and elaborated
more specifically. Perhaps the most comprehensive documents available
on this subject are the 12 volumes of 'Disaster Prevention and
Mitigation' produced and published by the United Nations. (see
bibliography for dates)
In this section we will briefly review the principles and
methods of disaster-planning and we will try to highlight some of
the serious obstacles which stood in the way of such preparations, in
the context of those communities most susceptible to hazards among
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developing countries.
by planning for disasters?- The 'Editorial' of 'Third World
Planning Review' (1986), reads;
"One must accept that life involves a measure of
risk and risk, we are told, is the sugar or salt of
life. But just as an excess of sugar or salt can
be dangerous, even fatal to man, so too can the
taking of unnecessary hazards that may lead to
major disasters" (p. 95).
The logic of planning for disaster is very simple. 	 Ian Davis,
(1984b), refers to the 'axiom' that 'prevention is better than cure'.
Bringing examples from medicine he argues that, if possible, instead of
curing the symptom it is better to prevent it in the first instance.
To provide a more scientific interpretation, we quote part of the
'Foreword' of UNDRO (1984a), actually, in one way or another, repeated
in the introduction of all the other 11 volumes of 'Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation'.
" Over the years the international community has
become increasingly alarmed by disasters, which
have tended to be more destructive as they affect
ever-large concentrations of population 	 The
economic effects of disasters form a formidable
obstacle to national development, and may even
cancel out any real economic growth which has been
achieved. Moreover, the work of rehabilitation and
reconstruction diverts resources, both national and
international, from future development into the
re-establishment	 of the	 status quo ante.
Governments are now more aware of the need to pay
much greater attention to disaster preparedness and
prevention, recognising that they should form an
integral part of national development policies" (p.
iii).
There is no debate on the principle usage and benefits of alleviating
damage due to disaster even if only relatively. However, the problem
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does not seem to be in identifying the usefulness of such preparation,
but rather with the application and implementation of this activity in
context. As the 'Editorial' of Third World Planning Review
(1985), claimed; 'It is the responsibility of planners to produce plans
that closely relate what is needed and what is desirable with what is
practicable' (p. 283). Thus the difficulty lies in achieving the
balance between the 'desirable' and 'practicable'.
Concept of mitigation- Mitigation plans naturally involve many
different aspects of the community at risk. Highlighting the status of
'shelter', Van Essche, (1984), claims;
"It can be said with some assurance that relief
management in the fields of medicine, health, and
nutrition has, nevertheless, significantly improved
over the last decade. ... However, there remains
one particular sector in which too little progress
has been made, and in which many conservative and
obsolescent attitudes survive, that is: emergency
shelter, and shelter after disaster in a more
general sense" (p. 165).
Van Essche continues to trace some of the causes for the 'little
progress' in the field of 'emergency shelter, and shelter after
disaster'. Among many others he mentions that; 'The least understood
of all issues is that a house is merely the end-product of a long chain
of social, economic, technological, environmental, political and other
interactions' (p. 165). The same notion has been also raised by UNDRO.
(see UNDRO 1977? and Cuny 1981a).
Cuny (1983), describes the concept of mitigation as follows;
"Mitigation activities can be classified as passive
or active. Passive mitigation is the development
or application of measures such as building codes,
land use, zoning, and urban or regional planning
techniques to reduce vulnerability.
	 Active
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mitigation encompasses those activities that
require direct contact with the people...
Activities include public education, the
introduction of modification techniques, the
initiation of housing improvement programs, the
promotion of land swaps or relocation of people
from vulnerable to suitable and safe sites, and
economic diversification of those sectors most
vulnerable to disasters" (pp. 207-208).
Davis (1984a), has chosen a symbolic approach to illustrate the
concept of mitigation plans. He represents a 'fortress with four
protective corner bastions'.	 The four bastions are 'Raising public
awareness', 'Legislation', 'Training and education', and 'Physical
measures' (p. 29). This fortress provides 'a balanced strategy for
risk reduction.'(ibid). The same model is again repeated by Davis in
'Prevention is better than cure' (1984, p. 7).
The earlier 'fortress' with four bastions appears to be
expanded in the form of a 'castle' with eight bastions. Davis
(1987a, pp. 11-14). It is good to see what these eight bastions are;
"1-Political Will
2-Resources
3-Management
4-Public Awareness
5-Training and Education
6-Research and Development
7-Legal Framework
8-Cash Incentives" (p.11)
Obviously a successful mitigation plan requires the mutual
co-operation of all these 'bastions'. However, Davis confesses that;
"It is also possible that mitigation is highly 'class-related' and the
measures 'may be totally unapplied for poor families living in the most
dangerous sectors of a given town or city" (p. 13). This confession is
some how in sharp contrast with the earlier parts of the same article
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where he explores the situation of rapid urbanisation and the growth of
squatters in the developing countries where the main risk of disaster
exists.
Steps in mitigation- Cuny (1983), under 'Steps in Mitigation'
claims that:
" Reducing the harmful effects of natural disasters
requires actions on three fronts: reducing
vulnerability of the physical settlements and
houses; reducing vulnerability of the economy; and
the strengthening of the social structure of a
community, so that coping mechanisms can help
absorb the shock of a disaster and promote rapid
recovery" (p. 208).
He counts the following steps to be taken for mitigation;
" The first step is to identify the high-risk
areas. This is done by relating a hazard, such as
an earthquake, to the terrain and to the
probability that such an event will occur. This
activity is known as risk mapping and the result of
the analyses are usually presented in the form of
'risk maps' which show the type and degree of
hazard represented by a particular natural
phenomenon on a given geographical location" (pp.
208-209).
Cuny continues to say that : "A further refinement of risk mapping is
known as micro zoning, which is simply risk mapping at a very small
scale" (p. 209).
" Risk mapping requires technical skills and the
application of various scientific disciplines....
The disciplines involved could include geology,
metrology,	 hydrology, engineering, 	 geophysics,
geography,	 agriculture,	 forestry,	 physics,
cartography, and remote sensing" (p. 209).
As Cuny (1983), claims; '...historic pattern of disaster and the
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recurrence of disaster hazards can provide a practical guide in
determining whether or not a community is at risk from certain
phenomena' (p. 209).
The same author continues; 'The second step in vulnerability
reduction is to identify those communities that are particularly
susceptible to damage or destruction. This is done by relating risk to
human settlements and their structures' (p. 209).
" The third step is the selection of the
vulnerability reduction strategy. This requires
two sets of actions. First is the determination of
the	 site strategy.
	 Options	 may include
construction of protective works,	 such as
embankments, to protect from flooding...
The second set of actions determines the structural
strategies for reducing vulnerability. These
include the imposition of design criteria or
building standards to govern construction; the
modification of existing structures; and the
replacement of existing structures with newer
buildings more resistant to disasters" (p. 210).
Reducing economic vulnerability in Cuny's view (1983) 'follows much the
same pattern as does reducing physical vulnerability' (p. 212).
As has been mentioned, understanding the anatomy of the hazards
and the predictability of their occurrence is of significant
importance for any mitigation and preparedness planing. It seems that
among hazards earthquake has received the most attention. That could
be because of the high rate of fatality due to earthquakes, which has
been described earlier.
The available literature reveals that the concept of 'earthquake
prediction' was developed during a seminar 12-15 October 1982 in
Geneva, of which the proceedings are published by UNDRO, 1983. It is a
comprehensive case history discussing the ways in which the earthquake
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can be predicted. In Page (202) of that document the 'basis ' on which
'scientific prediction ' can be made is summarised.
" There is at present no valid theoretical model of
earthquake	 generation on	 which to	 base
determinative predictions of earthquakes,...
The successful predictions that have been made so
far have all been based on the observation and
interpretation of 'precursors', that is to say
geophysical, geodetic, geo chemical or biophysical
phenomena, which are not necessarily related to the
earthquake generation process but which have been
observed to precede earthquakes in the past" (p.
202).
Between 11-14 January 1983, another seminar was held in Athens to
discuss 'Earthquake Preparedness'. UNDRO, (1984b) the proceedings have
classified the contents under the four following headings; " I: The
Earthquake Threat: Protection of Human Settlements, II: Earthquake
Engineering and Seismology, III: Earthquake Preparedness and finally
IV: Conclusions and Recommendations" (p. iii).
From a more recent event UNDRO (1987), has published the
proceeding of a 'Training Seminar' named: 'Earthquake Prediction and
Mitigation	 of Earthquake losses' which was organised by;
'UNDRO/USSR/UNESCO/UNDP' in 'Dushanbe, USSR, 8-14 October 1986'.
Van Essche (198), one contributor to this latter event, counts
the main steps of mitigation planning as; 'Risk assessment' which
include ' Hazard assessment' and 'Vulnerability analysis'. Then he
moves on to the stage of 'Risk reduction' and after explaining the
stages and considerations finally concludes that
" Indeed, experience shows us that it is most
important and urgent that 'hard' scientific data on
earthquake risk be adapted to the needs and
language of planners, architects and those
responsible for the protection of the population in
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times of earthquake emergencies. In effect, the
problem is that of the transfer of technology" (p.
108).
In 1987 UNDRO, has published Vol 2 of the proceedings of that latter
'Training Seminar' which contains an edited version of papers
delivered.
Another example can be introduced from the work of Spence and
Coburn (1987), at the Martin Centre, Cambridge University. They have
done some research on 'approaches to limiting earthquake damage.' Their
research is partly based on laboratory experience recording the
performance of models built of indigenous materials and examining the
modification they are looking for.
Using the phrase ' disaster management' as synonymous to
mitigation planning Davis and Lohman (1986), say;
"The disaster management process is one of
balancing known risks against known resources...
To start with 'hazard mapping', which will involve
both the identification of areas subject to
hazards, by assessing their past incidence both in
terms of frequency and magnitude. .... With the
information gained from hazard mapping and
vulnerability analysis it is possible to assess the
risks to persons and property, but this is a task
which is both subjective and pragmatic. No hard
and fast rules can be offered on how to undertake
this. The question to be asked concerns what level
of protection is to be offered to which group or
community" (p. 84).
Perhaps one important point to be learnt is the 'relativity' of
risk reduction in different contexts.
The methodology of 'vulnerability analysis' is well developed by
2)0
UNDRO. (see UNDRO, 19 pp. 25-30) Because it is known that very often
a single community might be susceptible to different hazards the method
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is improved to study 'composite vulnerability analysis'. (see UNDRO,
1977b) This basically involves a graphic approach. Collecting and
analysing the data of the vulnerable communities, those at risk of
different hazards are spotted and illustrated. The latter reference
contains a case study from, 'Metro Manila Area' of the Philippines.
One of the most current and perhaps most adventurous projects in
the field of vulnerability analysis might be the one Yasemin Aysan in a
meeting of the 'International Panel of Risk Reduction in Disaster Prone
Areas' on 26 October 1988, held at Oxford Polytechnic introduced. She
explained that in the context of some regions of Mexico City, they are
carrying out a vulnerability assessment and trying to incorporate
'human vulnerability' or in other words the assessed ability of
families and different communities to absorb and cope with disaster.
They use a computerised approach for this purpose. This challenge is
important because of the new element of families' economic and social
situation to be incorporated in the assessment and also in terms of
using a computer to process and analyse the data.
Vol 12 of 'Disaster Prevention and Mitigation' is concerned with
'Social and Sociological Aspects'. (UNDRO 1986) However, being the
latest issue in the series is one evidence of the fact that, ' The
sociology of disaster is a relatively young discipline compared with
those of seismology, earthquake engineering, hydrology, metrology,
etc.' (UNDRO, 1986 P. iii) However, sociological aspects of disasters
are inclusively studied by Drabek (1986). He also reviews the social
aspects of planning for disaster. (see Drabek, 1986 Chapter 2, pp.
21-67)
Eric Dudley (1988), in a report of the March 1987 earthquake in
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Ecuador, ' Disaster Mitigation: Strong Houses or Strong Institutions?'
focuses on the role of the local institutions in the process of
mitigation and recovery. Under 'Lessons and Questions' as a
conclusion he said;
"Disaster mitigation is just as much a product of
socio-economic factors as technical ones. The best
hope for a community's recovery in a disaster is to
have a history of strong organisations; it is
towards this end that local institutions must
direct their efforts" (p. 121).
Preparedness- It has already been discussed that preparedness
for disaster basically considers the actions to be taken in vulnerable
areas when the disaster strikes. By its very nature it is about saving
the lives and reducing damage. Davis (1982), in relation to the 'Aim
of Contingency planning' claims that they are;
"(1) To alleviate distress.
(2) To efficiently manage relief provision.
(3) To reduce future risks in any reconstruction
plan.
(4) To restore normality.
(5) To assist overall development" (p. 5)
A.
In Davis' view (1984), 'necessary measures to reduce the risks' are 'in
the following sequence':
"Raising public awareness
Assessing the risks
Addressing the hazards
Devising and implementing appropriate safe
planning and building measures
Developing training and education for various
levels
Statutory provision" (p. 289).
'Public awareness' in Davis' view has first priority as a measure of
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preparedness. The concept of this awareness is developed by
(1984 .) ;
" In relation to disaster preparedness, then,
public information policy must be directed
towards:
a) awareness of the hazards to which a
population, local or national, is exposed;
b) awareness of the risks stemming from the
existence of the hazards;
c) awareness of what can be done to prepare for
the impact of an un-avoidable disaster-causing
phenomenon, and reduce its effects;
d) awareness of what should be done after the
impact, to assist the authorities and initiate
the recovery process" (p. 119).
The concept of 'preparedness' is conclusively described in Vol.
11 of 'Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, by UNDRO (1984a).
	 An
important point can be identified from the introduction. It reads;
'...because of the limitation of resources in many countries of the
developing world, stockpiling as commonly understood may not be a
practicable possibility" (p. 2). It is just this 'practicability' that
plays a major role in the implementation of preparedness plans where
otherwise the techniques and methodologies are available.
For instance let us take an example from a developed country and
see how the plans work in reality. Handmer, (1988) reviews 'The
Performance of the Sydney Flood Warning System, August 1986' and claims
that there were difficulties. He says:
"Problems were experienced with the data collection
and transmission network. Warning dissemination
was inadequate, and the majority of those surveyed
claimed that they did not receive warnings. The
action of householders reduced the flood damage
substantially, but this does not appear to be the
result of official warnings" (p. 37).
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Frequently it could be found that the incorporation of
mitigation plans in development plans are advised. For example,
Bender (1985), claims that; 'Disaster mitigation programs which are
part of an integrated development planning process stand the best
chance of implementation' (p. 1). Those who emphasise the integration
of risk reduction in development plans usually overlook two facts;
First, vulnerability to disaster is not a priority and is not
one of the indicators of development measurement. The communities have
many other needs which if they are addressed could reduce the
vulnerability.
Secondly, they assume that development planning is a simple,
well-known, straightforward activity. This is not the case on the
contrary, development plans, especially in the context of developing
countries, are found to be not only sophisticated and complex in design
but also very difficult to implement and to evaluate their long-term
results. Two examples of this are of Russia and China who have
recently diversified their economic and social policies. It is very
difficult to judge whether a country has achieved development and with
what values. The case of Cuba is a good example, as despite attempts
to free itself from the outside market after the revolution, they have
been unable to dispense with the production of sugar. (see for example,
Burndenius 1981)
Those who claim 'rapid urbanisation' or 'population growth' as
two of the reasons for an increase in vulnerability, usually avoid
acknowledging the basic root cause; that rapid urbanisation is one of
the facets of an ill economy. If the social and economic development
that was planned could be successfully implemented there might not be
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any more unreasonable migration from rural to urban areas in
developing countries. Therefore vulnerable settlements would disappear
or be substantially reduced.
Discussion- Davis' axiom (1984b), is a neat phrase; that, ,t
'prevention is better than cure' is popular in certain circles but the
question has to asked: better for whom?" (p. 3). (emphasis added) It is
true that nowadays treating diarrhoea is a very ordinary task in
medicine, but how many children each year are still dying of the same
symptom in remote areas of the world? If one day total prevention of
this disease were to be achieved on a world-wide scale, it is likely
that by that time many communities would be less vulnerable to
disasters as well.
Cuny (1983), argues the same issue in another form;
"As we have seen, disasters can be a primary cause
of under-development, as well as intertwined with a
country's progress toward development. Similarly,
many mitigation activities either require a certain
level of development or are themselves development
activities. Third World countries are so affected
by disaster in part because of their inability or
failure to address the root causes of poverty and
under-development. Thus it is difficult to carry
out mitigation activities successfully" (p. 206).
Drabek (1986), after reviewing literature quoted from others
concludes; 'Disaster plans too often remain paper plans and are not
rehearsed in whole or in part' (p. 54).
Davis and Lohman (1987), introduce a manual which they
prepared and expect to be published in January 1989. The book is
entitled; ' A manual for the implementation of disaster risk reduction
measures'.
	 ' The sequence of the manual can be represented in Fig.2.'
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The Figure illustrates three boxes the first is 'Risk Assessment', the
second, 'Planning and Decision Making', and finally ' Implementation'.
(p. 41)
The authors when discussing 'The context of mitigation within
development planning', raise the important issue of development
planning and they say; 'Risk reduction measures should be regarded as
an integral part of development plans and be included in all
environmental, land use and site selection plans at the national,
regional and local level' (p. 42). Davis (1987a), also says; ' What is
needed is a long time perspective, recognising that it may take at
least 50 years to implement measures step by step to build up a strong
'castle' of integrated risk reduction' (p. 14).
The United Nations General Assembly 42 Session (November 1987)
approved resolution No 42/169 which embraced the concept that the
decade '1990-2000' should be designated as 'UN International Decade for
Natural Disaster Reduction'. But as a result of designating 1987 as
the year of the homeless, Lord Scarman who had been President of the
International Year for the Homeless said;
'In 1987 we have succeed in concentrating
attention on many aspects of homelessness. Yet,
despite the efforts of many, the stark facts show
that by the end of the year the numbers living in
squalid shanty towns and crammed into Bed and
Breakfast hotels, will have increased." (back
cover, IYSH) (my emphasis)
One would be very optimistic to expect any better result from the
designation of a decade for disaster. But it is a start for one of the
castles' towers, that of 'political will'.
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Remark- In this chapter we started with identifying the range of
literature available. The shortage of items dealing directly with
'reconstruction after war' prompted us to review those about 'natural
disasters'. This step was also supported by the assumption that
'natural disasters have similarities with war in terms of destruction
and reconstruction of damage'.
The next step was to identify a framework for the study. The
review of the literature on natural disasters found that it is hard to
find a universally accepted framework and that the literature
conventionally presents the discussion in the form of 'key issues' or
'issues'. We decided to select the 'stages of disaster' which are
relevant to the study of 'shelter in relation with disaster'. These
phases were: Phase 0; Pre-disaster, Phase I;Emergency shelter, Phase
II; Temporary accommodation, and Phase III; Reconstruction of permanent
house.
In exploring Phase 0, it became necessary to review the
definitions of disaster, vulnerability, risk and so on. The
significant role of shelter in relation with disaster was highlighted.
It was found that not only do most disasters affect and damage the
housing sector, but also that a high percentage of human fatalities are
due to the collapse of buildings.
The three consensus activities of pre-disaster planning, namely;
Preparedness, Prevention and Mitigation were described and their major
components were explained. It became apparent that the methodology and
technology of 'risk assessment' and 'implementation of mitigation
measures' are well elaborated. However, the application of these
methods in the context of those communities most vulnerable to hazards
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is facing serious obstacles.
Despite frequent recommendations on the inclusion of 'mitigation
plans to be incorporated in overall development plans' it seems there
is some negligence, on the part of many authors, in not admitting that
development plans themselves are not easy to prepare ad implement.
Furthermore that in reality it becomes difficult to give a high
priority to the mitigation of hazards, while other more obvious
obstacles, such as employment and basic needs such as clean water and
sanitation, exist on the agenda.
It is also found that mitigation plans are very often one of the
primary goals of reconstruction projects after disasters. We should
examine this subject in the next chapter when the 'reconstruction
phase' is studied.
91
_FI .1='	 _Fe	 _Eli
CHAPTER III
SHELTER AFTER DISASTER (PHASE 1 AND 2) 
EMERGENCY SHELTER AND TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION
Introduction: Before the news of the 6th November 1988
earthquake in south-west China which left 400,000 houses devastated',
faded from public interest, the world was shocked by the news of the
Armenian earthquake of 7th December 1988 which caused an estimated loss
of 55,0002 lives and left half a million people homeless. Incidentally
this chapter proceeds while the news of the recent disaster is still
fresh.
	 Obviously the Armenian survivors, as well as their Chinese
counterparts,	 have taken refuge from the first night in some sort of
shelter which was most likely arranged by themselves.
Two weeks after the event in Armenia, the first steps towards
reconstruction were taken. Prefabricated cylinder form houses were
unloaded at Spitak, one of the damaged areas (See The Times, Monday
December 19, 1988). However, we must wait to see how long it will be
before permanent houses are built for the survivors of this earthquake.
From now until then these survivors will live under shelters of a
'temporary' quality. This is more or less a typical scenario after
catastrophes such as the Armenian earthquake. The subject of this
chapter is to review the approaches implemented and issues identified
in relation to emergency shelter and temporary accommodation.
1.The Times Monday 19, December 1988
2.This was the initial deathtoll reported. However, by the end of the year
1988 it was amended by Russian Authorites to 25,000 or so. UNDRO NEWS
(November/December 1988) also reports the figure 25,000.
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In the previous chapter it was discussed that not only
earthquakes but most disasters damage or destroy houses. People's need
for shelter is so apparent that it does not require any scientific
reasoning. However, it suffices to refer to Rivers and Brown (1981),
who look at the need for shelter from a 'physiological' point of view
and claim; 'Like all other mammals, Man is a warm-blooded creature,
	 Man's physiological need for shelter arises from these factors:
his metabolic rate and the thermal characteristics of the environment
which surround him' (p. 63).
It is possible to study the issues concerned with emergency
shelter separately from those of temporary accommodation. However, we
consciously decided to examine both phases simultaneously because, not
only is it the convention of the literature, but also because in
practice emergency shelter emerges into temporary accommodation and it
is usually difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between these two
kinds of shelter. In addition there are occasions when even
reconstruction starts with survivors immediately after the event.
Thus, UNDRO (1982), proposing the conventional phases of disaster also
confesses that this classification is to some extent 'arbitrary' (p.2).
This chapter will be divided into three sections; first some of
the most common approaches practised for emergency and temporary
shelter will be reviewed and the advantages and disadvantages will be
discussed. Then the second section will focus on some of the most
common observations reported in relation to emergency shelter and
temporary accommodation. Finally a brief guidelines will be provided
as a summary of the discussions.
93
3-1- A review of different approaches- In 'Shelter After
Disaster', by UNDRO (1982), almost half of the main text is occupied by
discussion of emergency shelter. Most issues discussed in UNDRO 1977?
are repeated here, even some of the illustrations are the same and many
of them copied from Davis' (1978) 'Shelter After Disaster'. These
three documents appear to be the most identifiable references currently
available for the subject.
In the first instance let us see what functions emergency
shelter is expected to fulfil. In relation to this UNDRO (1982) reads;
" Emergency shelter serves several vital functions
(not listed in order of priorities): Protection
against cold, heat, wind and rain.
	 Storage of
belongings and protection of property.	 The
establishment of territorial claims (ownership and
occupancy).	 The establishment of a staging point
for	 future action (including salvage and
reconstruction, as well as social recognization)
(p. 8).
In addition to the shelter for survivors of disasters, there is
also a need for other spaces such as temporary schools and offices.
The Swiss Disaster Relief Unit (1984), introduced 'ISO-Shelter' which
they used in Poland, North Yemen, and Turkey. They claim it suits
different climates and is suitable for different uses such as health
posts, schools and offices (p. 11). 'ISO-Shelter' is built of an arch
form skeleton with plastic sheets to cover this. They claim that each
unit weights '950 Kg and costs (including canopy) US$ 5500' (p. 11).
Emergency shelter after disaster can take many forms. Drabek
(1986), in relation to this writes; ' When they leave, where do
families go? To some extent this depends on event qualities, especially
length of forewarning and anticipated evacuation time' (p. 117).
94
He also adds that in most cases families go to stay with a friend or
with relatives. The distance has a role of course. More importantly
he reports from surveys which show that a large proportion of families
received invitations from their relatives before moving to stay with
them (p. 117-118). He also indicated that those who seek shelter in
public places are found to be of a lower class and minority and ethnic
groups (p. 118). Thus it can be seen that selection of a certain form
of emergency shelter largely depends upon the context of the community
and not all social groups will perform identically.
The literature makes it evident that among other items shelter
has been one of the components of the relief period supplied by relief
agencies. It is also known that in the emergency phase shelter does
not usually have high priority. UNDRO (1984), reads;
" Immediate emergency assistance is, usually,
required in up to six main categories. A league of
the Red Cross Societies' study and analysis of 106
disaster appeals .... indicated the frequency of
requests for specific items as:
1-Food	 68%
2-Cash for local purchases 65%
3-Blankets
	 60%
4-Clothing	 59%
5-Emergency shelter 	 54%
6-Medicaments	 45%
7-Vitamins	 15%
8-Cooking utensils
	 13%
9-Antibiotics	 9%" (p. 46).	 [my
emphasis]
What are the main characteristics of emergency shelter? The
situation is usually that a huge number of families need it in a short
time, almost immediately. Thus whatever type of shelter is concerned
it must be of a quality that could be easily transported; therefore
light-weight and collapsible, easily erected by the survivors who are
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ordinary people, not expensive and ideally reusable either in other
disaster situations or by the first users in a permanent form.
However, other characteristics such as ease of storage and those of
performance in different climates could be added to this list. In
reality it is found hard to answer all these requirements with a single
product.	 Inevitably some have to be overlooked for the sake of the
others.
It is interesting to know that, as Latina (1987), claims;
" Sometimes, also many great names of Architecture
(such as Le Corbusier, Aalto, Rudolph, Kurokawa,
etc) have ventured themselves upon the theme of
designing an ideal emergency or temporary unit for
industrial production (8). But most often these
efforts have been frustrated by reality: many of
their ideas have been developed only at sketch or
prototype levels, and even when these industrial
design products have been tested, undergoing mass
production,	 their use by the homeless has
frequently led to unexpected fiascos" (p. 33).
In the same relation Davis (1975b), writes;
" The philosophy of designing an exportable
solution for disaster housing recently found
expression in the UNESCO UIA sponsored
architectural competition (AD 7/75, page 448).
However, it is interesting that within the
prizewining entries for this competition, an
American consortium (Fred Cuny of 'INTERTECT' in
Dallas, The Emergency Shelter group of
Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburg, and the
Emergency Housing group at the University of Texas
at Austin) proposed an indigenous shelter using
known local skills and local materials. The
critics of the Western exportable shelter have
insisted that the overriding need is for a local
indigenous solution using local expertise, local
materials in the local vernacular (where this is
appropriate or safe)- the emphasis being on a
culturally acceptable labour-intensive, as opposed
to capital-intensive, solution' (p. 660).
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Perhaps what Davis concluded in 1975 is more or less the final
word even today. In any case one of the prizewinning projects in the
competition which Davis talked about was proposed by two Indians, Alka
and Vidyadhar Chavda (see Architectural Design No.7, 1975, P.448). In
(1977) in an interview with Ekistics they described their 'emergency
habitat system'. Their design consists of a 'collapsible tent-like
structure of aluminium frames covered by woven laminated polyethylene
that encloses an area of 8 by 12 feet for a family of six' (p. 56).
Their claim is that this structure can be used as roofing for a more
permanent house developed by the survivors themselves. It is also a
flexible structure and it is possible to join some of the units to
provide a larger space. They were also concerned to make it in such a
way that it could be used during all three stages of emergency,
temporary and later permanent houses (p. 57). The Indian Red Cross had
expressed interest in using this kind of shelter, so they claim (p.
56).
Davis (1978), in 'Shelter After Disaster' provides a series of
photographs of emergency shelters experimented with after different
disasters. His approach to emergency shelter in this book mainly
emphasises cultural aspects and he talks about 'myths' existing in
relation to the survivors' behaviour and so on. One of his final
conclusions in relation to emergency shelter and temporary
accommodation is that; 'most families appear to go to official shelters
only when all other alternatives have failed' (p. 28), and he
continues;
" People have clear preferences, which normally
follow this order:
1) the homes of relatives or friends
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2) improvised shelters
3) converted buildings- schools etc.
4) official provisions" (p. 28).
UNDRO (1982), includes an appendix on 'case study summaries'
which also contains the approaches implemented for emergency sheltering
of survivors of the 11 disasters reviewed, 10 of which were in fact
earthquakes (pp. 65-73). This document alone can reveal the variety of
approaches practised after disasters. It goes from tents to wooden
huts and polyurethane igloos. Having a review of the ways survivors of
a disaster usually prefer to choose their emergency or temporary
accommodation, it is time to focus in more detail on the performance of
some of them.
Tents- Perhaps the only form of emergency shelter which has been
universally provided after disasters, during the last two and a half
decades and before, is tents. The available literature usually dates
back to the 1963 earthquake in Skopje, Yugoslavia where 5000 tents were
provided after the event (see UNDRO 1982, P. 65).
Tents have their origins in nomadic life and in fact are the
design of non-educated and non-professional people. They can be seen
in a variety of forms and sizes among nomads. In principal they are
combined pieces of cloth, which are assembled on the site with few
supports, mostly wooden poles 3 . Although over the years new artificial
materials have been provided for tent cloth and light metals such as
aluminium have substituted for wooden supports, the principal of the
tent structure seems to have stood constant over the years.
3.In 1985 I produced a book entitled 'Light Weight Structures in Rural Areas
which is in Farsi and reviews different forms of tents in rural areas of
Iran.
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There seem to be three main issues to examine in relation to
tents; The spread of their use after disasters, the advantages and
disadvantages and finally the issue of establishing them in the form of
camps, otherwise known as 'tent cities'. This latter issue tends to be
more or less similar to those of any other kind of emergency shelter.
Lewis Emery (1981), reports from the experience of the U.S.
Agency for International Development (AID) and Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA). He says that 'more than 56,000 tents [have
been distributed] to homeless victims of more than 68 disasters at a
cost of $4.6 million'. Then he moves on to count the advantages and
disadvantages of this kind of emergency shelter (pp. 153-158).
Howard and Mister (1981), review the 'Lessons Learnt by Oxfam
from their experience of Shelter Provision 1970/1978'. Oxfam has used
three major types of emergency shelter including; ' tents, flexible
sheeting material and polyurethane housing' (p. 159). In their view
'tents have [been] and continue to be a dilemma to an agency like
Oxfam'. Although they admit the usefulness of tents, they mention
problems which discouraged Oxfam from stockpiling them, including cost,
difficulty of storage because they have an estimated shelf life of only
two years, the cost of transportation to the area and even then they
are not usable in the reconstruction phase (pp. 164-165).
Bayulke (1984), claims;
" The Turkish practice of providing temporary
shelter is through tents....
Tents are not successful in the colder regions of
Turkey.
The practice of providing organised tent cities for
the disaster-stricken people is not possible since
people want to stay close to their houses, even if
they are damaged. Tents are a kind of moral
support: providing a covered sleeping place for
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people...
Tents are not made of reusable materials. If later
collected, they are mostly damaged and unfit for
further use" (pp. 111-112).
The UNDRO (1977a), report from the cyclone and torrential rains
disaster in Oman in June 1977, states that tents have been supplied as
emergency shelter. (p. 11) In another 'Case Report' by UNDRO (1977c),
from the earthquake of November 1976 in the Van Province of Turkey, it
appears that evacuation  and emergency shelter policies are closely
interrelated and it is likely that some of the survivors refuse to
abandon their damaged settlement. It reads;
" People who wished to move to the larger towns in
the area, rather than to isolated tent camps, would
be cared for there, and if they wished to spent the
winter in other parts of Turkey this would be
arranged. Some 1,600 families accepted the offer
of accommodation away from Van Province.
Some 5,000 winterised tents, fitted with stoves,
were erected at 19 sites within the disaster area
and at Van (Plates 11 and 12). As these became
fully equipped, people were moved into them from
temporary tents and, in the case of Van town, from
schoolhouses where they had been sheltered
initially" (p. 8).
This was just one example illustrating the psychology of
survivors of a disaster. The issue of the survivors' intention not to
leave the area or to stay as close to it as possible is developed in
one of the following chapters of the present study under 'Physical
reconstruction and psychological recovery'.
Coburn and Leslie (1985), from the Dhamar earthquake in Yemen
Arab Republic report their observation of people's emergency shelter as
follows;
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" Short term relief for the estimated 300,000
homeless was provided in the form of tents,
blankets and food. A sizeable number of people
left the affected area to seek accommodation
elsewhere.... Soon after the earthquake, many of
those living in tents began building more
substantial temporary shelters, from corrugated
iron on timber framing. This shelter was built
largely by the villagers themselves, .. Those who
erected temporary shelter demonstrated their
ability to provide for themselves in the short
term 	  Some fifteen months after the earthquake
it was estimated that four out of ten villages in
the affected area were still living in some form of
temporary shelter" (p. 2).
This observation from Yemen, in terms of survivors' modification
of their shelter is in keeping with our own observations in Khuzestan
Iran, which have been developed in previous chapters. Parsa (1985), in
the context of the Tabas earthquake (1978), in the Khorasan Province of
Iran has written;
"The government spent more than 1 bn Rials 4 on
provision of temporary shelter, but unfortunately
this had little impact. In some places expensive
camps were set up; in other places tents and old
buses were used for emergency shelter; and in some
places people did not receive even tents. During
the field study of Tabas in September 1984, exactly
6 years after the earthquake, one could still see a
few people living in some of the mobile homes,
either on the site of their original home or in the
specially prepared sites. In some villages around
Tabas which were visited, camps were standing
adjacent to new houses which were built after the
1978 earthquake. The camps are being used either
as additional living spaces or storage rooms and in
some cases, for animals and chickens" (p. 43).
Two major points can be observed from Parsa (1985); first that the
distribution of tents or any other kind of shelter is not always an
4.Roughly equal to £10 million. (my footnote)
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easy task and secondly that the emergency shelter tends to be used for
longer than is initially intended.
Mitchell (1974, visiting the area damaged by the 1970
earthquake in the Gediz area of Turkey reports that;
"Turkish Red Crescent (Red Cross) sent in 6,000
tents ...one week after the earthquake 15,000 tents
had been distributed. Three months later, white
canvas Turkish tents and brightly coloured tents
donated by West Germany, France, and Sweden dotted
the landscape, serving as temporary shelters. When
I returned to the area three years after the
earthquake, I saw fewer than ten tents in the
regions, and not one of them was serving as a
shelter" (p. 303).
This was a good example to show that tents by their very nature
cannot resist the climate and last for long periods either in use or on
the shelf. Davis (1975b) in 'Skopje Rebuilt' which is a study of
reconstruction of the city following the 1963 earthquake claims;
"During the first 8 months of building the initial
14000 houses, displaced families were living
in tents, caravans and temporary housing. I have
not been able to determine how fully the 14000
tents were used, but it seems likely that many
were never lived in" (p. 661).
Davis (1975a), [AD/1/75] reports from Managua, Nicaragua, after
the earthquake of 1972;
"The government decided to build 'tent cities', in
various locations, two in Managua and three or four
in outlying towns where the refugees had moved.
The tents.... were not fully used. Why not?
Firstly, due to the extraordinary response of the
extended family system they were not needed, and
secondly, with one notable exception, they were
laid out by the military on military lines with
regimented control of cooking, sanitation and
little recognition of family needs" (p. 43).
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One major disadvantage of tents is that they are not suitable for every
climate. In rainy seasons they must be covered by an extra sheet such
sometimes plastic and in any case in cold weather, as was reported from
Turkey, as well as in hot weather they can not provide a comfortable
shelter. Kreimer (1984), in the context of the Dominican Republic
affected by 'hurricane David' in August 1979 claims; 'The emergency
shelter provided by various agencies to the hurricane victims consisted
of tents, plastic sheeting and plastic cardboard panels, all of which
were environmentally and climatically unsuitable' Tp. 471).
Tents could be erected after disaster, inside or close to the
damaged houses. This was the dominant way in the city Susangerd, when
the people returned there. In another form they might be established
as camps. In this case the layout and organisation of the units
becomes crucial. Cuny (1983), pointing to the involvement of military
organisations in disaster operations, counts some of the advantages and
disadvantages this has. In terms of emergency shelter he points out
that most armies have stockpiles of tents which can be used, but more
important their engineers will be familiar with military-type camps
layouts, which simply do not suit civilians (pp. 227-228).
This has created constant problems over the years and it seems
to exist still. For example, Gavron (1988), a journalist reporting
from the Sudan flood in September 1988, used some photographs from
camps that are set up in parallel lines, military fashion. (p. 47)
This issue has been raised by Davis (1978) and he provides a successful
example designed by Cuny in Nicaragua (p. 56). Cuny (1977), has
published a document on the principals of camp design and in his book
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(1983), he has again raised the same issue. However, it seems while
the army is in charge of post-disaster relief operations, we should
hardly expect this seemingly simple problem to be overcome.
Plastic sheets- Plastic sheets can be used both as the main
cover substituting the cloth of tents or as an extra cover in
combination with tents or local materials such as bamboo etc. Howard
and Mister (1981), have found Plastic sheeting is quite good because of
the waterproofing it provides and it's use with local materials such as
bamboo. (p. 165)
Kreimer (1984), in the context of the Dominican Republic, where
after the 1979 hurricane plastic sheets were provided as emergency
shelter material, claims;
" The plastic sheets were light coloured and
absorbed heat, obliging the occupants to paint
their surface in order to reduce the heat
absorption. Furthermore, the idea underlying the
provision of the sheets was that plastic is a more
adaptable material than tents and, in any case,
less permanent. However, in December 1980, that
is, one year and four months after the disaster,
shelters built of plastic sheets were still in use
in several settlements" (p. 471).
Howard and Spice (1981), have produced a 'technical guide' for using
plastic shelters for 'emergency housing and other purposes'. This has
been published by Oxfam continuously since 1973 when it was originally
written. The 'Guide' includes appropriate instructions for assembling
plastic sheets on site.
Another plastic material occasionally used after disasters is
plastic cardboard. Kreimer (1984), in the context of Dominican
Republic 1979 has written;
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" Another material, plastic cardboard sheets, used
by large families in a mountainous area, were too
hot during the day but condensed humidity and froze
at night when the temperature dropped. As of
December 1980, despite the fact that they were not
intended to last, these structures were still being
used in San Jose de Ocoa, some by a second
generation of occupants,.." (pp. 471-472).
Lamina and corrugated iron sheets- This material is basically
useful for temporary shelters and has been used in many disaster
situations.
	
Norton (1980), when discussing Guatemala, 1976, reports
that 'Lamina sheets.. [were supplied not only].. for temporary
shelters but also used when more permanent houses were built (p. 343).
Howard and Mister (1981), of Oxfam, claim that; corrugated sheeting has
been a successful approach and they still recommend it. (p. 165) Cuny
(1983), also reports from the earthquake of 1976 in Guatemala, that
corrugated iron sheets were supplied to be used as roofing material
both in emergency and permanent housing reconstruction. (P. 170)
Corrugated sheets have some advantages, namely; they are
light-weight and can easily be handled by one person. They are also
relatively cheap in proportion to the cover they provide. They are
durable if thick enough and properly galvanised, so unlike tents and
plastic sheets, may be used later on in more permanent forms of
shelter. They are waterproof and resist the rain and easy to fix with
nails, without having special skills (see for example, Howard and
Mister 1981, p. 165).
The main disadvantage, however, is that they are not good
insulators against hot or cold weather. In Khuzestan it was observed
that the refugees used an extra layer of mud and straw to reduce the
heat absorption. Having a smooth surface, however, a mortar like mud
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does not easily stick to the sheets except in the near horizontal
position.
Polyurethane for shelter- This has been one of the challenges to
introduce more advanced technology into post-disaster temporary
shelter. It has been used on a few occasions after disasters and it
has been abandoned for the reasons which will be shortly reviewed.
The principal of this method is instead of transporting the
ready-made shelter, to take the 'raw' material and machinery onto the
site and to produce units there. The main substance is Polyurethane or
some other similar material. A balloon is used as the cast to shape
the space and then the processed substance is applied on to it.
It seems that the idea of such shelters in a disaster situation
has been one of the applications of the designs which were developed
during the 1970s called 'Pneumatic or Vaccumatic structures'. For
example, Colonolly and Fisher (1971), [Architectural Design (AD). Vol.
41. No. 4. 1971] introduce their pneumatic design which they claim when
it is folded is '100 times smaller than the completed enclosure', and
'costs £13.50/m2 including all labour.' This convenience may encourage
some designers to consider the use of this kind of system for the
disaster situation. In brief they appear to simplify the home need to
a space enclosure.
Vaccumatic structures were also another attempt along the same
line. They work by creating a light-weight shelter using a big balloon
which is then covered with an 'envelope'. When the outside cover is
hard enough the inside balloon is removed and the form stands by
itself. However the application of these approaches in disaster areas
remains a matter of fantasy (see AD, Vol.41, No 4. 1971, pp. 197-199).
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Mitchell (1976), visiting Turkey reports;
Wbst Germany ... [provided].. .a new form of
temporary shelter that resembles an igloo.... The
shelter is a dome-shaped Styrofoam shell about four
and a half inches thick, with a sixteen-foot
diameter on the ground. It is cast at the site by
spraying Styrofoam substance on an inflated
balloon. The shell is then treated with a
water-proofing compound and can be set into place
by two men. After the shelter is cast, a doorway
and circular ports for windows are cut out for [of
the?] plastic covers. In 1973 the 'igloos'
appeared badly weathered but were still being used
in Akcaalan" (p. 304).
Davis (1975a), reports from the earthquake in Managua;
"The West German Red Cross donated spun
polyurethane foam Igloos which were built on site
by Bayer,. These were slow in arriving and were
not occupied until 5 months after the earthquake.
The cost of the igloos was 2,000 DM for 500 units,
which averages about $930 per igloos5 . 310 igloos
were built on a site at Masaya and the remainder
were built at Diviamba. Of the 310 igloos built at
Masaya, only a total of 75 were occupied, the
remainder lay totally derelict with long grass
gradually engulfing them. These formed a useful
'quarry' for the families in occupation to remove
chunks of polyurethane in order to modify their own
homes (p. 43).
On the other hand some positive impressions are also recorded about the
performance of the Igloos. For example, Bayulke (1984), claims; 'In
Gediz 1970, igloos made of polyurethane were provided by the Federal
Republic of Germany (about 400) and they were relatively successful'
(pp. 111-112). He also adds that the polyurethane igloos of Gediz were
still in use after more than 10 years (p. 113)
5.The 2,000 DM must be the cost of each unit not the cost of 500. [my
footnote]
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Howard and Mister (1981), report that polyurethane was used
experimentally 'in Pakistan for flood victims and a bigger operation in
Turkey in 1975, where 450 units were built following an earthquake' (p.
165). However, they also claim that this approach has been abandoned
because of the high technology it required and unfamiliarity for
recipients and so on. (p. 165)
Salvaged materials- The need for emergency shelter after
disaster is so real that it is unlikely that the survivors will remain
apathetic about it. Obviously their actions depend upon the
preparation of design, advice issued and the evacuation plan. However,
as most disasters are not easily predictable and in developing
countries even if precautions are announced evacuation might be less
feasible, the provision of emergency shelter will remain mainly the
responsibility of the survivors.
In this respect there is also a big difference between survivors
in urban areas and those of rural areas. Rural people are usually
familiar with vernacular building skills, so it is likely that after a
disaster they can start sheltering their families more promptly, using
salvaged and local materials. Despite the emergency phase in temporary
accommodation the use of local materials becomes more possible. Cuny
(1983), claims;
"In a developed society people rarely build their
own houses, and housing reconstruction may take
many months or even as long as one year, justifying
a large outlay for emergency shelter. In
developing countries, most emergency shelter needs
are met by the victims themselves. The survivors
quickly assemble materials from the rubble and
build an interim shelter" (p. 17).
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Howard and Mister (1981), agree that ; ' Disaster victims will quickly
rebuild some form of shelter for themselves using local material, or
materials re-covered from their previous homes' (p. 167). Gere and
Shah (1980), from the Tangshan earthquake of 1976 in China report that;
'Soldiers erected temporary shelters for medical works and injured
people' (p. 48). They also add;
" To house survivors of a city that lay in such
ruin was no small challenge. Soldiers built
temporary houses for hundreds of thousands of
people; they are one-story brick dwellings (or
huts) made of rubble from the quake itself" (p.
49).
The survivors' skills in the use of local and salvaged materials and
their effectiveness in the provision of emergency shelter and temporary
accommodation can not be overemphasised. Nevertheless donors and
governments can contribute to the survivors initiatives' by providing
them with more easy access to the local materials or some additional
materials such as plastic or corrugated iron sheets, which the
survivors can use in combination with their own materials and
techniques. One of the main advantages of this approach is that
because the survivors themselves decide about the location, size and
design of the shelter, the so called 'cultural problems', which usually
arise in term of adaptation to imported and unfamiliar shelter units of
camps, could be eliminated to a large extent. UNDRO 1977? and 1982,
have discussed these issues in depth.
Wooden Huts- This approach has only occasionally been practised
by donor agencies. Bayulke (1984), reports that after the 1966 Varto
earthquake in Turkey, timber huts were provided, some of which were in
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use as secondary spaces after 15 years. However, the cost of these
huts was estimated at '25 per cent of the cost of 50 square-meter
houses of brick masonry' (p. 113).
Davis (1975a) also reports from Managua that;
"The American government made a donation of $3
million to build temporary wooden shelters for the
refugees, with this money 11,135 were built, at an
average cost of $269 each.... Assuming an average
family size of 4 persons, provision was made for
approximately 44,540 persons. Final occupancy was
15,784. The first of these huts were built within
14 weeks of the disaster" (p.43).
Cuny (1983), also provided a photograph of the wooden huts from
Nicaragua with a caption which reads; ' A monument to waste:temporary
housing unused and abandoned' (p. 156).
Perhaps the main problem with this approach is that wood in many
developing countries is a scarce and relatively expensive material,
both intrinsically and because of transport costs. Besides it is
usually used in more permanent and essential forms of buildings. Added
to that, if untreated wood is open to the weather it could quickly
deteriorate.
Mobile homes, Caravans- This expensive approach is only feasible
in developed countries. As UNDRO (1982), reveals they were used in
Yugoslavia after the Skopje 1963 earthquake and in Italy after the
Fruili 1976 earthquake (pp. 65-71). However Parsa (1985), reports
using old buses as temporary shelter after the Tabas earthquake of 1978
(p.	 43). In the United States mobile homes seem to be the dominant
approach to temporary shelter. 	 Cuny (1983),	 in Disasters and
Development claims that in the United States 'mobile homes' are
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stockpiled in strategic sites. He claims that each of them costs
approximately $5,500 (p. 17). 	 This question of cost is of major
interest, especially when it is compared with common types of shelter
such as tents provided after disasters in developing countries, with
Cuny (1983), estimating that it would cost 'approximately sixty-five
dollars' per family. (p. 17)
Corner (1984), in the context of the United States reviews the
common approach of using mobile units as temporary shelter after
disasters. He claims; 'The units have been hauled over hundreds of
miles from Strategic Storage Centres to be set up in camps near the
damaged home-sites' (p. 12). He also describes the context of
American disasters, saying that; 'First, the disaster loss rates are
really quite low.... Second, Americans have shown a great willingness
to relocate even under normal circumstances,. .Finally, there is surplus
accommodation in much of the United States...' (p. 12). He counts some
of the problems which exist with these mobile units.
" The same unit may be sent to hot or cold climate
extremes with high energy costs and endless
maintenance problems being the inevitable outcome.
The mobile homes are uniformly unattractive,...
The units do have a very low initial purchase price
and they are relatively easy to transport over the
highway on their own wheels. However,
transportation becomes expensive when long hauls
are required" (p. 13).
Corner (1984), observes more operational obstacles on the site for the
preparation of the land. He continues that; 'The real failure of mobile
homes results from the fact that they are not truly self contained,
they rely [or rather demand] on adequate water, power, and sewage
connections.... Mobile homes are at best a short term remedy' (p. 14).
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Prefabricated houses- Prefabricated houses, are more often used
after disaster as permanent houses. For example, after the 1963 Skopje
earthquake, Yugoslavia, in Peru after the 1970 earthquake, in Honduras
after the hurricane of 1974 and in Lice, Turkey after the 1975
earthquake some kind of prefabricated units were used in reconstruction
programmes. However, there are occasional cases in which prefabricated
houses were used as temporary accommodation. The cases of Skopje and
Fruili are among them (see UNDRO, 1982 pp. 65-73).
Prefabricated units can be used when the period of temporary
accommodation is expected to last long, but in essence can be used in
industrialised countries. UNDRO (1982), concerning the efficiency of
this approach reads;
" The policy of 'two stage' reconstruction- pursued
in the Italian earthquakes of 1976 and 1979- where
prefabricated temporary housing is subsequently
replaced by the full reconstruction of damaged
home, is not viable in developing countries because
of the extremely high cost of what amounts to
reconstruction twice over" (p. 32).
Reviewing the earthquake of 1976 in Fruili, Italy in terms of
using prefabricated homes as temporary accommodation under 'Lessons
Learned' UNDRO (1982), reads;
" The 'temporary' housing policy, pending permanent
reconstruction, proved to double the costs of
reconstruction, in view of the price of
prefabricated units and the investments needed to
provide sites and services. This policy in effect
retarded reconstruction" (p. 71).
There is evidence that when prefabricated units were used as a
permanent housing reconstruction approach, they faced some degree of
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unwillingness by the users. It is likely that the same critics or
perhaps others besides exist in the case of prefabricated units used as
temporary accommodation. UNDRO (1982), in this relation concluded;
" Prefabricated housing built by the Turkish
Government at Lice following the earthquake of
September 1975. Many families objected to the form
and siting of the house. These objections related
to their lack of participation in what was
provided, and the cultural and climatic
unsuitability of the housing" (p. 32).
Latina (1987), reviews 'The Long-term Performance of
Prefabricated Housing After Italian Earthquakes'. He claims that; 'the
Italian experience is very peculiar' in its use of prefabricated
low-cost housing. He refers to the recommendation of UNDRO that, the
creation of temporary accommodation is among policies to avoid because
the overall findings relating to this kind of shelter, have not been
promising. He also adds that the creation of temporary accommodation
after disasters in Italy has been the rule. He follows this with;
"The most recent historical researches in the field
of post-disaster reconstruction in Italy, on the
other hand, show that the creation of temporary
settlements, made-up of any sort of durable
shelters, has a long tradition in our
country [Italy] (p. 29).
He adds that
"As a matter of fact, nowadays Italy can be quoted
among the most relevant world producers of
pre-fabricated housing, and belongs to the main
donor nations, in 2ffering shelter assistance to
foreign disasteredu countries.... Today, an
estimated number of more than 250,000 Italian
6.Such a word seems not to exist in English, it is the only time I ' ye seen
used.
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homeless	 live permanently in	 'temporary'
settlements" (p. 30). Ce..le...pv nAsIs3
In the next section the author reviews 'The government's role and
public opinion'. Latina (1987), refers to the primary assumptions
governments make, that given the industrial capacity of the country,
prefabricated units have the advantages of being cheap, easily
available and possible to erect and distribute quickly. This will
provide enough time for the authorities to allocate resources and to
plan for permanent reconstruction (p. 32). He explains that because
the demand for these temporary shelters is not predictable,
manufactures are reluctant to invest fully in this type of product (p.
33).
Latina then refers to a field investigation they carried out;
" In 1982, when the temporary re-settlement of the
Irpinia homeless was completed (120,000 people,
altogether, dwelling in 25,000 prefabricated houses
plus 14,000 improved containers), .. The most
evident and diffused phenomenon is the difficult
self-adaption of the 'homeless' to the housing
situation, shown by a large number of alterations
and extensions worked out on the original dwelling
units. Since the 'temporarity' has still
concerned only a small number of families (not more
than 10% of the total re-settled population), the
consciousness that this living condition is going
to last for an unpredictable time-length or
forever, is growing among these people... .Despite
the low performance of many of these buildings, the
opinion poll survey among the 'homeless' has put
into evidence a level of satisfaction which is much
higher than in our expectations" (p. 35).
Among other ways of explaining this satisfaction he refers to the fact
that the condition of many of these people's previous shelter was worse
than it is now ( p . 35).
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The same author also reports some of the deficiencies he
observed during his study. In almost all types of prefabricated units
used there were some problems; 'water penetration, poor acoustic
insulation, mechanical and impact noises, vapour condensation, ducts
leaking, air penetration through rough joints, etc' (p. 36). In
conclusion he emphasises that although he does not want to recommend
and generalise the establishment of temporary accommodation, he
recommends that it should not be totally discarded. He also says that
in some cases where instead of temporary accommodation rapid
reconstruction has been pursued, the results are subject to comments
and not necessarily satisfactory (pp. 38-39).
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3-2- A review of major issues- Having reviewed some of the most
common approaches of emergency shelter and temporary accommodation in
this section we attempt to identify some of the common issues
concerned.
The first point relates to the progress of our knowledge about
emergency shelter. In relation to this Van Essche (1984), from the
UNDRO office in Geneva claims that; ' emergency shelter, and shelter
after disaster in a more general sense' are areas of disaster not still
properly developed (p. 165).
The second point is the importance of the context of disaster.
There is not a unanimous approach or a blue print for emergency
shelter. Van Essche (1984), claims that; 'The emergency shelter
problem in developing countries is fundamentally different from that in
industrialised societies' (p. 166). It was quite obvious from the
previous section, that in the USA mobile homes are used but in most
developing countries tents or salvaged materials are assembled by
victims as their emergency shelter. Another relevant fact is that the
emergency shelter approach is also related to the type of disaster and
the preparedness of the community. If for example, a cyclone is
predicted to strike a settlement, evacuation plans might be implemented
and there is more time available for people to seek shelter in other
cities and towns or in public shelters provided by the government. It
is also important to remember that evacuation and mitigation measures
can not always be implemented.
Let us take the case of the 1988 flood in Bangladesh, in which
it was claimed that three quarter of the country was flooded so there
was nowhere people could be evacuated to, even if the government had
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issued earlier warning. Even if safe areas were identified, then
providing enough transportation to move the people could make
evacuation impossible. Thus it becomes apparent that emergency shelter
policy is closely liked with evacuation and in general terms the
preparation of the community.
The third point is that after a disaster a variety of approaches
may be chosen by the survivors, not necessarily including construction.
Bayulke (1984), in the context of earthquakes in cities, claims that
the situation could be quite different from villages. He believes that
the use of tents as temporary shelter is not feasible in urban areas
o,
(p. 115).	 Quarantelli (1982), has written an article about the
'General and particular observations on sheltering and housing in
American disasters'. As has been discussed earlier he classifies the
modes of shelter after disaster into four stages of; 'Emergency
sheltering, Temporary sheltering, Temporary housing and Permanent
housing'. His observation on Emergency sheltering is;
" Emergency sheltering probably permits the least
planning, but it is possibly the sheltering problem
which least requires preparedness planning... such
shelter seeking is of a very temporary nature,
disaster victims will accept conditions
unacceptable under other circumstances. ... As a
result, schools, churches, armoires, or any
building which can temporarily house large numbers
of people can be used for emergency sheltering" (p.
278).
He defines 'temporary sheltering' as;
” ...living in quarters other than one's own long
after the peak of the emergency period ...
However, most preparations are usually for public
or mass shelter arrangements; unfortunately, as
disaster researchers have consistently found, this
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is the least preferred of all sheltering
arrangements. Disaster victims overwhelmingly
prefer to stay with friends and relatives, although
they will, if absolutely necessary, use mass
shelters to obtain food. Even those that go to
mass shelters stay as briefly as possible" (p.
278).
In brief, among many approaches, survivors have a preference for
staying with friends and relatives rather than of living in public
shelters.
The fourth issue is that despite the efficiency of units
provided as shelter, the environment quality becomes more significant.
The experience of camps and tent-cities are constantly found
troublesome. The most common negligence on the side of donors and
governments is to simplify the need of shelter to a need for an
enclosure. Kreimer (1984), discussing the Dominican Republic affected
by 'hurricane David' in August 1979 claims; for 'temporary shelter' in
the area:'(the National Housing Institute) introduced a program of
(barracks)- each housing eight to ten families- conceived of as
temporary solutions, in order to evacuate the displaced persons that
had taken refuge in schools and other public buildings' (p. 472).
He then reports that this approach has been highly criticised by the
public because no adequate service was provided in them and they were
far from the working place of the refugees. Moreover he reports that;
'Thousands of refugees were still living in almost subhuman conditions
for over a year after the hurricane in many affected areas' (p. 472).
The fifth issue is that emergency and temporary shelters are
found to stay in use longer than they were initially intended to and
their title implies. Van Essche (1984), says; 'So-called 'temporary'
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or 'emergency' shelters are often inappropriate, but at the same time
become permanent, only to create fresh sets of problems' (p. 166).
Oliver (1981), states;
" One of the advantages of the temporary structure
is that it matches the temporary nature of the
post-disaster period. At least in theory; just as
the post-disaster periods are sometimes long-term
in their effect, so too are temporary shelters
likely to become long-term in their use. As
temporary has a way of becoming semi-permanent, so
semi-permanent shelter is likely to last
indefinitely" (p. 41).
The dilemma is that as Bayulke (1984), argues if the temporary shelters
are comfortable it may discourage the reconstruction of permanent
houses. Moreover this increase in quality will add to the costs of
units, which in turn will affect the reconstruction programme as a
whole. (p. 112)
The sixth issue refers to shelter units donated after disasters
by different agencies especially from developed nations. There seem to
be two different points of view towards emergency shelter units: the
one of the donors and the other of the survivors and users. For the
first party the cost and transport have priority so they look at the
shelter units in a design perspective. For the users, however, the
appropriate shelter is one which suits them both physically and
culturally. Cuny (1981a), in this relation claims that; 'Let me
emphasise this fact: new housing types are not needed. Every relief
agency has a file cabinet full of bright ideas submitted by graduate
students, industrial designers and architects,..' (p. 7).
Van Essche (1984), claims experience has shown that imported
shelters provided by donors, 'often arrive in insufficient numbers, or
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too late to be of value during the emergency phase' (p. 167). Added to
that they are also 'uneconomical', he thinks that the current practices
must be re-examined. In his view ; ' The spontaneous reconstruction
of housing begins extremely rapidly after a disaster, and often during
the emergency phase itself' (p. 167). UNDRO (1982), again emphasises
the cultural aspects of shelter and that the survivors are the main
resource for sheltering themselves and that they must be involved in
all stages of work. (pp. 5-37)
UNDRO (1977?), reviews emergency shelter strategies and
concludes that the use of local materials was found both helpful and
necessary in refugee camps. In relation to emergency units provided by
donors it claims that ; 'The problem, however, does not lie in moving
the units to the disaster area, nor in speed of erection. The main
problem is distribution of the units within the disaster-affected area'
(p. 6). The document also reveals that the donated shelters were found
to be used by victims as a '...secondary type such as the storage of
goods'. The same document also concluded that 'The vast majority of
shelter following disasters have been provided by the refugees
themselves' (p. 7).
The seventh issue concerns the cost of the units provided and
the restriction of financial resources after disasters. UNDRO (1977?)
in relation to this states;
"The main problem of the temporary housing strategy
is that the cost of the 'temporary' units which are
provided, is often more than a permanent structure,
especially when the disaster victims normally build
their own houses from indigenous materials" (p. 7).
These findings are then extensively discussed in later sections of the
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same reference.
UNHCR (1982), 'Handbook for Emergencies', must be one of the
best and most valuable documents for practical use in the field after
disasters. Chapter 6 of this book is concerned with emergency shelter
and the planning of camps mainly based on documents referenced earlier
in this chapter such as Davis (1978) and UNDRO (1977?). The principles
they pursue, without going into the detail of the book are as follows;
" Avoid high-density refugee camps.
Involve the refugees, whose home it will be.
Only select a site where the basic needs,
especially for water, can be met.
Site planning is essential, and should reflect a
decentralised, small community approach,
preserving past social arrangements as far as
possible.
Shelter must provide protection from the elements,
space to live and a sense of home. Local
materials and designs are best; take account of
local standards.
So-called temporary arrangements often come to last
much longer than expected; thus a well planned
response is necessary from the start.
Site selection, planning and the provision of
shelter require expertise and must be closely
integrated with the planning of other services
especially water and sanitation" (p. 56).
Perhaps in terms of cultural aspects of shelter after disaster it can
be said that 'temporary accommodation' by its very nature implies not
having a 'home' because permanence is one of the necessities of home.
Remark- Although a conclusion may not be necessary, a few
sentences may be said about the major observations;
1-Emergency shelter approaches are dependent on the context of the
community and are fundamentally different between developed and
developing countries.
2-The concept of emergency shelter is not of design; that is rather a
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donor's view, this is different from that of the users view which is
more about provision.
3-Temporary accommodation has been found to stay in use longer than it
was 'designed' to.
4-In the majority of cases emergency shelter and temporary
accommodation is provided by the survivors themselves, using salvage
and local materials.
5-The experience of establishing camps or 'tent-cities' was on balance,
found not to be a suitable solution and where possible is to be
avoided.
6-If there is no high risk, it is better to avoid evacuation following
disasters. The shelter needs of survivors can be more easily handled
on the disaster site itself if possible. This also gives an important
psychological support to the victims. (see Chapter Nemof this
dissertation.
7-Involvement of survivors in all stages of shelter planning is
crucial.
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3-3- Technical guidelines for selection of temporary shelter-
Selection of a certain emergency shelter and temporary accommodation
policy depends on many factors, such as, the spread of destruction and
or the number of homeless, the availability of financial and technical
resources, the climate and environmental circumstances. Thus it seems
impossible to provide a blue print to serve as a guide. Nevertheless,
our study indicates some of the factors that can influence appropriate
decision-making for emergency shelter policy. In this section
technical guidance is provided to assist in the selection of one or
more approaches. There are at least four recommended documents to
consult for this purpose; first, Emergency Shelter Study unpublished
document (1977?) Second, Shelter after disaster, Davis 1978. Third,
Handbook for Emergencies, by UNHCR 1982, Shelter after disaster, WiMVO,
1982.
1-Assessment of shelter needs- To estimate, as accurately as
possible, the number of families in need of shelter, is the first step.
At this stage the ability of those families to cope with their shelter
needs themselves should be considered. Location and distribution of
the survivors is another factor to consider, as is their accessibility.
2-Weather consideration- The climatic situation of the affected
areas, the season when the disaster occurred and the season ahead, will
help to determine two major factors: what quality of environmental
enclosures are necessary and for how long they will be in use. It also
helps to determine the time available for setting up temporary
accommodation before the climate becomes hostile. In the same way the
prospect of reconstruction of permanent houses is also an influential
factor.
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3-Assessment of the resources available- This includes the cash,
stockpiles ready for delivery by government, national and international
agencies and the locally available resources such as building skills,
indigenous materials and re-use of salvaged materials. In brief, cash,
materials and skills must be assessed.
4-Cost of units- If new materials or units are going to be
purchased the unit cost should be considered in relation to the total
number required as well as the available cash. Obviously the
cost-in-place of each unit must be evaluated against the area and
quality of shelter it provides, etc.
5-Availability of units- It must be asked if it is possible to
purchase or otherwise obtain sufficient units in the nearest market or
from any other source. A specific quality might be required.
6-Transport and distribution- It must be asked what transport
the purchased units require and how they can be taken to the survivors.
This requires assessment of the type of vehicles necessary and
available, the size and fitness of roads, bridges, tunnels, etc. In
practice it is sometimes found that transporting units from thousands
of kilometres away, in a foreign country, is often easier and quicker
than, transporting and distributing them from the harbour or airport to
the affected area. Organisational considerations for distribution must
not overlook the value of the units provided and whether they are
expected to be returned or collected up after some time.
7-Using a mixture of methods- Selection of each method depend on
the overall circumstances, and a variety of approaches might be used in
a single disaster situation. It might be possible to use for example,
some units provided in conjunction with the locally available
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materials. (e.g. Tents and reeds or bamboo)
8-Climatic performance of units- It is necessary to make sure,
as far as possible, that the units can perform reasonably well and
provide environmental protection in the given situation over the period
concerned. Temperature control, water proofing and support against
wind and perhaps sandy winds must be considered. In some areas there
are other factors such as dangerous pests. 	 The colour and quality of
the units may become important to absorb or reflect heat and cold.
9-Setting up the units- It must be assessed who can and is going
to set up the units and other necessary services such as sanitation and
water. The skills required to build the units and the availability of
those at the local level, including using the survivors themselves, are
important. The cost and the speed of establishing the units must also
be assessed. At the early stage the army may be prepared to take part.
The necessary tools and machinery must be identified and their access
be considered. In this respect the most crucial aspect is the
organisation and management of the work. It is recommended that as
much involvement possible be given to the locally existing community
organisations.	 Survivors seem to be the readiest available source of
manpower on the scene of the disaster.
10-Location and site selection- This depends upon the evacuation
policy. Are the people still at the site or have they been evacuated
to other areas? The general recommendation is not to evacuate the
survivor unless there is a serious risk of repeated hazards. There are
two approaches to site selection for the erection of temporary shelter,
either, let each family take it's unit inside or close to its original
plot or alternatively to group them all in a 'camp site'. The first is
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usually more convenient for families, since it prevents looting and
crowds problems associated with high densities of people. It also can
provide more privacy and a feeling of normality. In the case of
setting up camps it is better to avoid too many populated centres and
to avoid barrack-type camps. Within reason families and group leaders
should be permitted to decide on the layout of their settlements.
11-Performance of units- It must be considered that survivors
are not chicken and the space they need is 'home' not just 'enclosure'.
Privacy and other cultural requirements must be taken seriously in all
stages of selection and setting up of temporary shelters. The
families' need for space also goes further than a place to sleep. They
need space to store their possessions, to keep their animals, to cook,
wash etc. One crucial factor is to provide opportunities for
extensions or improvisations to the provided units by the families
themselves.
12-Period of temporary shelter- If the provided units are too
strong and of 'permanent' quality, they may in practice become
permanent. The survivors themselves may settle down and feel
permanency in these temporary units. The evidence suggests that
emergency units usually have to last for few years. 	 Frequently some
percentage of the affected population are found to live longer in these
units.
	
However, governments may be reluctant to replace the destroyed
shelters with units performing more or less similarly.
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CHAPTER IV
SHELTER AFTER DISASTER (PHASE 3, RECONSTRUCTION) 
Introduction: In the two previous chapters the issues concerned
with 'pre-disaster planning' (phase 0), 'emergency shelter and
temporary accommodation' (phases 1 & 2) were examined. The present
chapter focuses on the third phase which is the 'reconstruction of
permanent housing' after disaster.
Perhaps successful post-disaster housing reconstruction,
for the moment not speaking about the economic, social and
psychological regeneration and rehabilitation aspects, must fulfil the
following needs; buildings and services of suitable quality, must be
built in a convenient period, using a correct procedure, with a
reasonable or affordable cost. The complexities of the process,
however, lie in identifying the appropriate answers in a given context.
In other words, put simply there are these and many other questions of
where to build, with what quality and design, using which materials,
also who should build and finance them. To try to measure the success
of a housing programme, it must also be made clear as to who needs to
be satisfied with the reconstructed settlement, judged by what
criteria and what long-term consequences are intended for the
community, if any.
The available literature covers the records of post-disaster
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housing reconstruction mainly over a period of two and a half decades 1 .
(starting with the Skopje 1963 earthquake) It contains two types of
materials: first, there are some theoretical arguments such as
discussion about 'the opportunity for change after disaster', or as it
is sometimes called, 'disaster induced change'. 	 These issues also
emerge from the second group of studies. The second type, and in
fact the main body of the literature available, contain field reports
or case studies. There are also occasionally empirical findings or new
challenges introduced, such as training local people in building
skills,	 or recording inhabitants' 	 satisfaction with their new
dwellings.	 Detailed surveys of reconstructed settlements, however,
seem to be very scarce. (See for example Snarr and Brown 1980)
When Cuny (1981a), claimed that; 'The total number of thorough
studies which have been conducted on the impact of housing programmes
can be counted on two hands' (p. 6), he was well aware of the
situation. In fact, since then no tangible items seem to have been
added to that number. It would be unfortunate if our present findings 
went no further than his conclusion from those studies in which he
stated;
"They indicate that housing aid often inhibits the
recovery
	
process	 and	 creates	 dependency
relationships, and that the internal coping
mechanisms of a society can be seriously affected
by an ill-conceived relief programme" (p. 6).
Looking through literature concerned with post-disaster
1.There are occasional records of older reconstruction programmes such as on
by Ciborowski which explains about reconstruction of Warsaw following the
Second World War.
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settlement reconstruction, one faces familiar names; Skopje, Managua,
Gediz, Guatemala and Fruili. Only occasionally are documents found of
any disaster other than those 11 listed in UNDRO (1982), (p. 65). The
literature also indicates another fact; that our knowledge of
post-disaster reconstruction remains, to a large extent, limited to the
observations and occasionally empirical findings of those 'western'
enthusiasts, who as staff of the intervenor agencies, visited or
worked in a disaster affected area. The number of available reports
from native authors is limited too.
In this chapter our attempt is to identify some of the issues
concerned with settlement reconstruction by reviewing some case studies
and reports from different disasters. The structure of the present
chapter is as follows; after the introduction, a summary review of case
reports on post-disaster housing will be compiled. It will be followed
by a section reviewing the major issues emerging from case reports.
Then, some of the subjects identified as of outstanding importance will
be explored in more detail and finally we will end the chapter with a
conclusion.
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4-1- Case reports review- UNDRO (1982), reviewing 11 case
studies provides a summary of the main observations and findings
concerned with the shelter-reconstruction programmes (pp. 65-73). We
have accumulated some extra reports from a few other disasters, which
will be reviewed in this section. The full details of each case is
obviously not necessary since the original documents are available.
Thus, our main concern is to introduce each case briefly and to extract
those 'lessons learned', looking wherever possible at the different
views of those involved. A summary of most documents which will be
reviewed is constructed in the following Table.
NO Name Country Year Disaster Author Pub/da
1 Skopje Yugoslavia 1963 earthquake Ciborowski 1967
Skopje Yugoslavia 1963 earthquake Davis 1975
Skopje Yugoslavia 1963 earthquake UNDRO 1982
Skopje Yugoslavia 1963 earthquake Arsovski 1983
2 Managua Nicaragua 1972 earthquake Davis 1975
Managua Nicaragua 1972 earthquake Kreimer 1978
Managua Nicaragua 1972 earthquake UNDRO 1982
3 Guatemala Guatemala 1976 earthquake Kreimer 1978
Guatemala Guatemala 1976 earthquake UNDRO 1982
Guatemala Guatemala 1976 earthquake Bates & 1982
Killian
4 Fruili Italy 1976 earthquake Norsa 1981
Fruili Italy 1976 earthquake UNDRO 1982
Fruili Italy 1976 earthquake Geiple 1982
5 Darwin Australia 1974 Cyclone Walters 1978
6 Tangshan China 1976 earthquake Gere & Shah 1980
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7 El -Asnam Algeria 1980 earthquake UNDRO 1982
* El -Asnam Algeria 1980 earthquake Lewis 198?
8 Honduras Honduras 1974 Hurricane Snarr&Brown 1980
* Honduras Honduras 1974 Hurricane Snarr&Brown 1982
* Honduras Honduras 1974 Hurricane UNDRO 1982
9 Chimbote Peru 1970 earthquake Sagov 1981
* Chimbote Peru 1970 earthquake UNDRO 1982
10 Tabas Iran 1978 earthquake Abedini Rad 1983
* Tabas Iran 1978 earthquake Parsa 1985
11 Gediz Turkey 1970 earthquake Mitchell 1976
* Gediz Turkey 1970 earthquake Germen 1978
* Gediz Turkey 1970 earthquake UNDRO 1982
* Gediz Turkey 1970 earthquake Aysan 1987
* Gediz Turkey 1970 earthquake Aysan & 1987
Oliver
12 Qir-Karzin Iran 1972 earthquake Razani 1984
13 Bingol Turkey 1971 earthquake Coburn,
Leslie &
1984
Tabban
1.4 Lice Turkey 1975 earthquake UNDRO 1982
15 Van Turkey 1976 earthquake UNDRO 1982
16 Andhra
Pradesh
India 1977 Cyclone/
storm surge
UNDRO 1982
17 Ecuador Ecuador 1987 earthquake Dudley 1987
* Ecuador Ecuador 1987 earthquake Dudley 1988
18 Dhamar Yemen Arab 1982 earthquake Swiss Red 1984
Republic Cross
* Dharnar Yemen Arab 1982 earthquake Leslie 1984
Republic 1986
1987
131
Dhamar
19 Albania
Yemen Arab
Republic
Albania 1979
1982 earthquake
earthquake
Coburn &	 1985
Leslie
Xhediku	 1986
Notes of the Table:
1- The first 30 documents listed are from urban disasters. However,
for several reasons this is not very accurate. For instance, the
debate around the criterion for distinguishing an urban settlement from
a rural one might be extended here. Moreover, since many disasters
have extended their damage to both urban and rural areas, the report
available covers both of them.
2- There are other cases reviewed but not appearing in this table
because of their specific subject, such as training programmes.
However, a more comprehensive list of references can be found in the
Bibliography.
3- In some cases the authors had a comparative method and therefore
have referred to more than one disaster in the same article. There are
also, cases of more than one report from the same disaster by a single
author. These will be noted as we go through the text.
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Case 1- Skopje, Yugoslavia (earthquake-1963) 
Reconstruction of the city Skopje, Yugoslavia after the
devastating earthquake of 1963 is one of the oldest disasters studied
by different authors It was a city of 200,000 population of which
160,000 became homeless. For emergency shelter and temporary
accommodation, tents, caravans and prefabricated units were used. The
provision of permanent houses was based on construction of
prefabricated units and apartment buildings (UNDRO, 1982. p. 65).
UNDRO (1982), concerning the reconstruction policy of Skopje
reads;
"A decision was made to requisition land to build
14,000 houses for a total of 70,000 people.
Repairs to existing houses were undertaken to
provide housing for 80,000. A new town plan was
designed and implemented. This included an
international competition for the design of the
city centre" (p. 66).
Repair of the damaged houses before the reconstruction of those totally
destroyed units seems a useful action. The same reference referred to
the following observations as major findings of the case;
" 4. The ability to requisition land contributed to
the rapid reconstruction of houses. Another
contributory factor was the massive aid received
from Eastern and Western sources (82 countries).
5. Overall there was a balanced, diversified
approach to shelter provision which satisfied the
needs in spite of the exposure threat of cold
weather, which came 3 months after the disaster.
6. The estimated damage total was US$ 2.4 billion,
while the overall cost of reconstruction was in the
order of US$ 40 billion.
8. Needs of ethnic minority groups (40 per cent of
the population) were insufficiently considered by
authorities" (p. 66).
133
Davis (1975b), discussing the Skopje earthquake reconstruction,
expresses his impressions as below;
" A decision to provide 14000 permanent housing
units within a year required new methods, and the
fact that most were provided within 8 months
reflects their efficiency. By comparison with
other urban disasters, Skopje seems to have been
uniquely successful in achieving its initial
housing target. There appear to be three major
reasons for this success: firstly the political
situation of Yugoslavia which produced
international aid on a totally unprecedented scale,
..Secondly, the use of prefabricated systems; and
thirdly, the land tenure system. In Yugoslavia the
free-hold of all land is in state ownership, and in
this instance, farm land surrounding Skopje was
made available for housing" (p. 661).
Three points from Skopje are noteworthy so far; Land
requisition, the political situation and the use of the technique of
prefabrication. As has been discussed in previous chapters, land
tenure tends to be one of the major obstacles of post-disaster housing
in urban areas. Safe land with easy access to the city centre or
working places, is usually costly and if the government is unable to
provide a safe site, it is likely that the poor communities would
re-settle on the same or another vulnerable site.
The second point concerns the political situation of Yugoslavia,
which persuaded 82 countries to contribute to its rehabilitation. It
requires an in depth study, to see how the political position of a
government can influence the help other nations may provide in a
disaster situation. The recent case of the Armenian earthquake
(December 1988) was interesting, as according to the media, the British
Government provided much more aid than was supplied to Bangladesh
after its 1988 flood.
	 This is important because in every way, the
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Bengali victims were more desperate for that aid and in incomparably
larger numbers. It appears that sometimes even humanitarian goals are
defined by political values.
The third point was the use of prefabricated systems. This
approach is characterised by mass production and rapid delivery of
units. However, there are two points to note; first the quality of the
units and their degree of success in providing 'homes', as opposed to
'buildings', requires a study of users' satisfaction. The second point
is that this approach requires manufacturing plant and skills that may
limit its feasibility to the more industrialised countries.
Davis (1975b), from his study of the reconstruction of Skopje
continues;
"Seven days after the earthquake, the central
government appealed to the whole nation to rebuild
the city within five years. (It will actually have
taken over 15 years). Three weeks after the
earthquake, Yugoslav experts began work on
planning; and by October (fourteen weeks after the
earthquake), provisional costs for the new city
were published quoting a figure of £200-300
million" (p. 662).
The prompt action by planners to produce a new plan is noteworthy. It
appears that after disasters, conventional planning procedures are
ineffective and major decisions must be taken in a short time. In the
case of 'Susangerd' in Khuzestan, the reconstruction of the city was
nearly completed when the consultant, appointed by the 'Ministry of
Housing' brought his first planning proposal for the assessment of the
Local Authorities.
Another interesting fact of Skopje, is that the period of
reconstruction became in practice much longer and the costs much higher
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than estimated. Usually politicians, with a short period of four
years or so in office, do not have the patience for a long-term plan.
However, this is also in line with the public interest. In conclusion
Davis (1975b) claims;
"Seen from any standpoint, the reconstruction
achievement is a remarkable example of efficiency
and co-operation following a disaster....But, more
important, the rebuilding of Skopje raises again
the fundamental question of the appropriateness of
a 'revolutionary modern architecture' as opposed to
an architecture evolving within a local tradition
to satisfy local needs" (p. 663).
Ciborowski's (1967) article on Skopje must be one of the oldest
documents available on this topic. In 'Some aspects of town
reconstruction (Warsaw and Skopje)' Ciborowski, the polish architect,
who became famous for his contribution to the reconstruction of Warsaw
after the second World War and later worked on the reconstruction of
Skopje, has attempted a comparison between the two projects (Warsaw and
Skopje) in respect of their contexts and situations. First he raises
a question; 'Which is more difficult: to plan and build a new city or
to rebuild a city that has been destroyed?' (p. 31).
Generally, he believes that planning for reconstruction of a new
city is easier and involves fewer problems than planning for
reconstruction of a destroyed one. First, he discusses the
differences of social contexts and related problems. He claims that in
the case of planning for a new city, the planner has more choice and
the inhabitants are likely to adapt themselves to the new settlement.
The planner also has more time, while in rebuilding a city, many
decisions must be taken and services provided as quickly as possible.
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He also adds that;
"In a reconstructed city, even if all the old
industries have been destroyed and must be replaced
by new ones, the future economic model will be
largely dependent on the occupational structure of
the surviving population, which may change only in
the course of a gradual evolution" (p. 33).
He also writes; 'In a reconstructed city the planner comes up against
inveterate traditions, habits and preferences' (p. 33).
The second major issue he raises is the 'Legacy of the past'. By that
he means the psychological needs of survivors to re-establish their
previous settlement. He claims; 'But it was a social impossibility to
leave several hundred thousand people among ruins, [Warsaw] making no
investments to help them, and to start building a new city on a virgin
site' (p. 35).
Ciborowski (1967), also discusses the differences that a natural
disaster may have from a man-made disaster such as war. He says that
in Warsaw there was planned destruction of all valuable and important
buildings, while a natural disaster usually 'chooses' the weak parts of
the city. He states; 'In the instance of Warsaw and Skopje, nature
has proved yet more 'humanitarian' as compared with man's activity' (p.
37). He continues with; 'In Skopje the buildings which survived were
mainly the best ones, those of highest technical standard and highest
use value...	 Briefly, what was left in Warsaw was the worst and
weakest,..' (p. 38).
Another important point he raises is the 'Psychology of
survivors' after the two disasters and talks about the notion of 'the
will to rebuild'. He discusses that in times of war the people are
137
aware of possible damage and are perhaps more prepared for
reconstruction, while the damage from a sudden disaster is unexpected.
The psychological aspect of survivors is discussed in our chapter on
'Physical Reconstruction and Psychological Recovery'. (See also
Warheit 1976) Ciborowski continues;
"The earthquake paralysed the life of the city
[Skopje] and put a great question mark on its
future and that of its people. In the face of this
unexpected disaster, a natural reaction of fear -
the flight of the surviving population from the
ruined city - would have been psychologically quite
understandable. But no such thing took place in
Skopje... Only women and children were for a time
evacuated from the city. The men set themselves to
work immediately." (pp. 39-40)
Ciborowski also believes that after a disaster some opportunities are
provided for improving the communities' life. He writes; 'More and
more of the inhabitants [of Skopje?] came to realise that the tragic
disaster was at the same time a great opportunity for the city, an
opportunity of which full advantage ought to be taken' (p. 40).
Ciborowski (1967), also adds;
"The linking of economic planning with the
programming of the city provided a basis for
working out models of the population structure, and
of occupational structure in particular - and of
its gradual evolution in the successive stages of
the city's development" (p. 42).
The same author later refers to the problems for any future master
planning, that were created by erecting the prefabricated emergency
units in Skopje after the earthquake for any future master planning.
In conclusion he writes; 'I would like to point out that the modern
town planner is no longer concerned only with technical and artistic
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matters but must involve himself more and more deeply in the social
aspects of town planning' (p. 47).
Arsovski (1983), describes the details of reconstruction of the
centre of Skopje. He talks about the competition that was organised
for the design of the city centre, some of the projects submitted and
the team of Kenzo Tange who won the first prize.
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Case 2- Managua, Nicaragua (earthquake 1972) 
The city of Managua, Nicaragua was devastated in 1972 by an
earthquake of 5.6 Richter. From 80,000 dwellings as many as 50,000
were destroyed and apparently many additional thousands damaged. From
city of half a million population, 200,000 became homeless. For
emergency shelter, tents and wooden huts were used as well as
polyurethane igloos. For reconstruction a variety of approaches were
implemented (UNDRO, 1982, pp. 67-68). Davis (1975a), in this relation
says that the provision of permanent houses took many forms, including
'Stack sack', prefabricated asbestos-cement housing and also a site and
services project supported by the World bank. (pp. 44-45)
Davis (1975a), on Managua, also observes that after the
earthquake one of the issues was relocation of the city for
vulnerability reasons. However, because most of the land was owned by
the dictator Samoza, it was unlikely that he would agree. In addition
as most industries were located in Managua it would make relocation
very unrealistic. (p. 45)
Concerning the estimated period of reconstruction Davis (1975a),
claims; 'It is anticipated that it will take at least 12 years to
repair the damage and this figure may be highly optimistic' (p. 45). He
also points to the problem of compensation to land owners for the
construction of new roads. Here the idea was to reconstruct the city
in its previous place but to develop the city centre by making large
open spaces, parks and so on. It was thought that the suburbs and
periphery of the city would inevitably expand. (p. 46)
In conclusion Davis (1975a), adds that cultural acceptance of
reconstructed houses must be observed. He suggests that it is better
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to use local materials rather than delaying reconstruction to import
materials from abroad. (p. 47)
Another author, Kreimer (1978), reviews two cases of
reconstruction of earthquake - Nicaragua 1972 and Guatemala 1976.
Initially she suggests that disasters 'bring to light a vast number of
problems already existent in each country, but which were not normally
visible' (p. 23).	 Describing the two disaster situations she claims;
"The quake in Managua almost completely destroyed
Managua, the capital of the country. Its effects
were centralised in one area, and it did not have
primary effects over the rest of the country. In
Guatemala,	 the quake affected primarily rural
areas, it had extensive impacts in different
regions of the country, and only some sections of
Guatemala City were affected" (p. 23).
Kreimer (1978), then continues to say that;
"The subsequent responses were as dissimilar as the
effects of the two earthquakes. In Nicaragua the
processes of relief and reconstruction were shaped
by a vertical decision-making structure which led
to a highly centralised operation. Maybe the
evident failures of the Nicaraguan approach, plus
structural conditions internal to the particular
context, led the Guatemalan government to respond
to the earthquake in the opposite way" (p. 23).
Kreimer (1978), also adds;
"Early decisions also set a pattern of urban
segregation	 based	 on	 socio-economic
differentiation. This residential segregation
entails a division according to social class as
well as differential access to scarce resources
such	 as	 transportation, 	 education	 and
infrastructure" (p. 26).
That is just more evidence that post-disaster reconstruction involves
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social and political components. Kreimer (1978), then, refers to nine
different plans or reports produced following the Managua earthquake.
"With the exception of the first Mexican Plan,
which proposed concentration of population in
high-rise buildings with high-speed road ways
following the lines of the faults, all the other
plans	 listed supported	 the strategy	 of
deconcentration/decentralisation.	 This was also
the official policy adopted by the Government" (p.
28).
Using the opportunity of a destroyed city, to create a modern
settlement, as was the case with Warsaw and Skopje, seems to be another
preoccupation of governments and planners. Kreimer (1978), also
continues; '...this vision of a 'modern' city, another Los Angeles,
relying on freeways to provide access and dependent not only upon
individual automobile ownership but also upon a good and efficient
public transportation system is, in the case of Managua, almost a
utopia' (p. 28).
Providing a taste of the income distribution as one indicator of
existing social system prior to the earthquake she claims;
"The bottom 50 percent of the population has a
median income of $90 a year (15 percent of the
GNP); the top 5 percent of the population has a
median income of $1800 a year (30 percent of the
GNP); 47 percent of the urban homes and 81 percent
of those in the countryside have no sanitary
facilities; 8o percent have no running water in
Managua; 99 percent have no drinking water in the
countryside. It seems doubtful that the bulk of
the population living under such conditions would
be able to afford higher travel costs out of
wages. ... Even though some of the notions
underlying the theory of deconcentration have
proven inconsistent with the social and economic
reality of Managua, it has been implemented to a
certain extent" (pp. 28-29).
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The policy to deal with economically and socially deprived communities
tends to become a major issue in reconstruction programme. Real change
in their life style requires more than just a new shelter, though that
might not have been achieved either. Incorporation of development
plans at the time of reconstruction planning, seems to be one of the
concerns. It must be seen what change, in reality, can take place in
the life of these groups. Kreimer (1978), writes;
"Given the housing conditions of the low income
population in Managua and the importance attached
to it by the planning proposals, it is ironic that
a large number of low and middle income housing
sits vacant because of the prohibitive prices of
housing units which the population cannot afford"
(P . 31).
Kreimer (1978), then refers to the case of Guatemalan earthquake of
1976 where 1.6 million people became homeless in both Guatemala City
and its surrounding rural areas and writes;
"In contrast to what happened in Nicaragua, in the
operation of reconstruction, in Guatemala the
government adopted a policy of hands-off the
problem. The task was left either to individual
decisions by the relief agencies or to the
communities themselves, with no global guidelines
or controls, and with subsequent conflicts and
problems arising as a result of this lack of
co-ordination" (p. 33).
The example Kreimer (1978) reports from Guatemala is astonishingly
interesting.
	
'Three weeks after the earthquake, and after the
emergency situation, an 'auction' took place which allocated the
affected areas to the different relief agencies' (p. 33). [emphasis
added] Then she lists the more than 30 agencies that were involved in
the situation (p. 30) and points the variety of approaches implemented
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in Guatemala, including the training programme of Oxfam and imported
wood panels, roofed with corrugated zinc sheets used by the Canadian
Government.	 (pp. 34-35) In one word it seems that Guatemala became a
laboratory for examining different ideas. Perhaps, one of the big
advantages in reconstruction of the war damaged areas of Iran, is that
no foreign agencies were or are involved. That is especially true in
terms of settlement reconstruction. The issue of accountability again
is significantly visible in Guatemala. How can one expect 30 agencies
all to have explicitly humanitarian objectives and, while unable even
to talk to local people, to be responsible or even questioned about
their products.
Identifying some of the positive aspects of . Guatemalan
reconstruction Kreimer (1978), writes;
1. Emphasis on the utilisation of recycled and
recovered materials.
2. Attempts by several agencies to implement
self-help and training programmes, and to promote
the organisation of cooperatives" (pp. 35-36).
In the same context Kreimer (1978) adds;
" Two problems associated with the decentralised
approach undertaken in the reconstruction were:
L Emphasis on the reconstruction of rural areas
rather than urban areas. —
2 Lack of provision of comprehensive plans for
development of infrastructure and social facilities
for the communities" (p. 36).
Kreimer (1978), then moves on to comment on her study of the two cases.
Altogether she raises five points.
The first point she notes is that it is important to see how widespread
are the effects of the disaster. 	 Is it partial or total 'paralysis in
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the functioning of the system'?
The second issue is the communities 'coping abilities' and to what
extent the survivors are able to cope with the aftermath themselves
without external help.
His third observation refers to 'reinforcement of social differences'.
By that he meant that disasters tend to affect the poor more than other
social classes and that reconstruction may enforce these social
differences.
The fourth point she raised was migration; that evacuation and
migration have created serious problems in both cases.
The fifth and final point she observes is the transfer of technology
and that in local and traditional technology, change becomes a major
issue, where the mitigation of the next possible disaster is concerned.
There were two policies in the two cases he reviewed; either
introducing and importing new techniques or modifying the existing
ones by training and education programmes. (pp. 37-39)
UNDRO (1982), from the 1972 earthquake in Managua, Nicaragua,
reports that evacuation has caused many problems and that anti-seismic
planning caused considerable social disruption . The reconstruction
policy was 'freezing' the central area of the city, which has in turn
caused a 'vast suburban sprawl'. Also the evacuation policy resulted
in much city land remaining undeveloped until the revolution of 1979.
(p. 68)
In terms of the political and social implications of the
reconstruction programme UNDRO (1982), adds; 'Reconstruction policy was
dictated by the interests of a small but wealthy land-owning class
under the former regime' (p. 68). One positive observation of the
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Managua reconstruction in the view of UNDRO (1982), is that; ' The
private sector played a key role in reconstruction, [by building new
houses] particularly on the periphery of the city' (p. 68). We will
elaborate on the role of private sector in discussion section.
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Case 3- Guatemala, (earthquake 1976) 
In addition to Kreimer' (1978), observations of the
reconstruction of Guatemala, two other reports are also consulted.
UNDRO (1982), reports that a ' wide variety of traditional construction
and light prefabrication..', were used. In terms of reconstruction
policy as could be understood from the latter reference;
"1. There was no clear reconstruction policy. This
was left to individual municipalities to determine,
in consultation with assisting groups.
2. Reconstruction in Guatemala City was made more
complicated by land tenure problems, which delayed
all urban reconstruction" (p. 70)
UNDRO (1982), also quotes the major observations of a committee of
'voluntary agencies' who wrote to the 'President of Guatemala two years
after the earthquake' which is summarised as follows;
"...too much aid was given away; too many houses
constructed were merely of an emergency type; some
organisations used large number of foreign
volunteers; too much was done under pressure and
without proper consultation, so that the victims
became mere spectators of the work carried out
rather than participants; a lot of reconstruction
work was undertaken without first consulting the
Government's Reconstruction Committee" (p. 70).
In the view of UNDRO (1982);
"Other vital lessons included the following:
1. The widespread improvisation of shelter in
Guatemala City underlined the resourcefulness of
survivors.
2. The Oxfam/ World Neighbours Housing Education
Programme was a major innovation in post-disaster
housing
	
programmes, with its emphasis on
accountability	 and	 training	 in low-cost,
anti-seismic construction.
3. Problems of land use were a fundamental issue in
Guatemala City, since the majority of earthquake
deaths related to unsafe siting as much as to
precarious building" (p. 70).
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One of the most significant experiences of Guatemala is the training
programme conducted for the first time, as is claimed by UNDRO (1982).
As we will see later, this approach became a source of inspiration to
other agencies and in other places after disasters (see for example
Dudley 1988).
The results of the reconstruction of Guatemala city can be seen
in the reports of the survey carried out by Bates and Killian,
published in 1982. Without going into the details of their
methodology and other relevant issues, in terms of changing people's
attitudes towards traditional housing systems, they write;
"Where respondents were asked to name the three
best wall materials in a separate question, 82%
mentioned brick, 78% mentioned concrete blocks and
15% mentioned stone. Only 8% mentioned adobe, and
13% mentioned bajareque" [a traditional building
technique] (p. 100).
One of the primary objectives of reconstruction programmes is
usually the mitigation of the risk of future disasters. That requires
change and improvement in existing housing techniques. This will be
developed later in this chapter, however, there seem to be two major
approaches; one to introduce modern techniques and materials and the
second to improve the strength of the traditional building methods by
intermediate changes. In case of Guatemala Bates and Killian (1982),
claim;
"This research shows that the primary adaptation of
people in Guatemala to earthquake vulnerability has
been to abandon the use of traditional earthen
buildings and to shift to the use of concrete
blocks and wood as the primary building materials.
Wood is a scarce and expensive commodity.. .The
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concrete block is expensive and if [used]
improperly, as dangerous as adobe" (p. 100).
If the new materials are cheap enough and locally available there would
be little hesitation to recommend using them.	 However, the local
people need to become acquainted with the techniques introduced,
otherwise the maintenance and expansion of houses, as well as provision
of housing in the long-term might be affected. Thus, Bates and Killian
suggest; 'A more desirable solution to the problem of aseismic housing
would be to find a cheap and effective means of improving the aseismic
qualities of adobe' (p. 100). Their recommendation is manifested in
other disaster situations. (see for example, Dudley 1987, 1988)
k
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Case 4- Fruili, Italy (earthquake 1976) 
Fruili was a small city with a historical background from the
medieval ages. A population of 89,000 lived there, of which 45,000
became homeless due to destruction and damage of 30,527 houses, as
UNDRO (1982), reports2 . Tents, mobile homes and prefabricated units
were among the approaches to temporary accommodation, as well as taking
refuge in hotels on the Adriatic coast.
Concerning housing policy UNDRO (1982), claims; 'All damaged and
destroyed houses to be rebuilt to original form, incorporating
earthquake-resistant design/codes...' (p. 71). The same reference
explains that;
"Reconstruction Policy: Pending the rebuilding of
houses to their historical form, 'temporary'
prefabricated houses were provided on specially
prepared and serviced sites. All construction was
to be to earthquake-resistant standards. This
policy of building twice over was designed to
prevent migration away towards the large industrial
centres of work" (p. 71).
UNDRO (1982), also makes the following observation of Fruili
reconstruction;
"Lessons learned: the 'temporary' housing policy,
pending permanent reconstruction, proved to double
the costs of reconstruction, in view of the price
of prefabricated units and the investments needed
to provide sites and services. This policy in
effect retarded reconstruction" (p. 71).
Not everybody agrees with the deficiencies of the two stage
reconstruction of Fruili.	 Norsa (1981), for instance, argues that the
2.The figures seem to some extent odd because they imply an occupation rate
between 2 and 3 persons in each house.
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provision of prefabricated houses after the earthquake, had provided
the authorities with an opportunity to set-up a comprehensive and well
designed development plan. (pp. 177-178)
Geiple (1982), talks about post-disaster reconstruction in
Italy. His first statement is that;
"Relevant decisions to be taken during
post-disaster reconstruction of an area with the
historical depth of Fruili are more complicated
than when it is a matter of rebuilding a city with
a past of only a century or two. ...
The question of timing and form of reconstruction
play a major role. Two points of view are
conceivable in these regards, which were also
subject to much disagreement after the rebuilding
of cities destroyed by war.
(a) Should the 'identity' of a city that has
developed over centuries be preserved by
painstaking reconstruction,..
Or shall
(b) the rebuilt city amount in fact to a new
structure, accommodating traffic patterns ('the
automobile city').." (p. 113).
One major issue of city reconstruction it appears might be to simplify
the rebuilding by the authorities and the planners. A real case is
the reconstruction of the city Hoveize in Khuzestan, Iran. The city
was totally razed to the ground by Iraqi troops during their long term
occupation. A much larger new city was built in the absence of its
inhabitants and without any sign of their involvement. I visited this
city in late 1987, when it was claimed that more than forty percent of
the population were re-settled but it still looked like a ghost town.
In one word it is a complex of modern houses and streets built for a
small population of a few thousand, many of them farmers. I had the
feeling of a small boy wearing his father's large but new suit. In the
case of Fruili, it seems that those involved were more cautious.
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Geiple writes;
"Fruili, Barbina argued, on May 6, 1976 lost not
only its buildings but its history, geologists and
engineers could reconstruct the buildings. But to
reconstruct the pattern of human activities as it
existed in this area before would require that the
expressions of a culture and a way of life be
brought back in order to restore to the people
their lost identity" (p. 114).
Geiple (1982), then moves on to argue that there are of course parts of
an old city which are useless in our present life. What was built
centuries ago, for needs of that time, may not necessarily be useful
today. He also argues that there were two major solutions for the
reconstruction of Fruili;
"(a) gradual reconstruction in situ in traditional
style, but more secure against earthquakes, or
(b) the importationof the missing housing stock in
the form of prefabricated houses made elsewhere and
merely assembled inside the disaster area"(p. 115).
This notion of preserving the past or just ignoring it is a two edged
sword. In our view, it is dangerous to be overwhelmed by 'modernism',
as it is to be totally committed to rebuilding brick by brick the
previous settlement. This question of new build or conservation is one
of the major discussions concerned with the rebuilding of historic
settlements. Keeping signs of the damage may also become relevant in
some circumstances. In the case of war for example, preserving parts
of the damaged areas could become a symbol to the resistance and the
enemy's brutality for the next generation.
Geiple (1982), then moves on to count some advantages and
difficulties involved with the first option; such as generating local
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employment. With respect to the second approach he claims;
'Certainly, space is thus created rapidly, but it is of dubious
quality; it is 'housing' more than homes' (p. 116). However, he adds;
'For one thing, there are not enough architects properly trained for
such jobs. The latter are mostly prepared by their education for
building new buildings, and less for the restoration of old ones" (p.
116).
This problem is not restricted to Italian architects. Even this
comment is surprising, because of the rich historical environment and
long period of experience and reputation Italians have in conservation
and preservation of monuments 3 . In the case of Iranian architects,
based on my own observation over a period of nearly 20 years, it is
true that most graduate professionals usually attach little importance
to their own country's architecture, and know little about the new
development and design methods that distinguish between conservation
and restoration. Geiple (1982), continues;
"The problem of reconstruction after a catastrophe
cannot simply be solved technocratically, but
requires
	
considerable	 social-scientific
verification
	
of	 all	 measures	 adopted.
Consequently, not only engineering damage
estimators, geologists and housing planners should
be part of the 'zero hour' team, but also social
psychologists and regional planners acquainted with
empirical social-science methods" (p. 119).
Admitting that Geiple's view is correct, in practice reconstruction
still seems an architectural and engineering task. Even if all other
disciplines he suggests should become involved, the co-ordination of
3.Most lecturers in the 'Conservation Department' in our school of
Architecture graduated from Italy.
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such a group requires a minimum dialogue or understanding within these
disciplines, that can not easily be achieved.
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Case 5- Darwin, Australia (cyclone 1978) 
Walters (1978), provided a report of the reconstruction of
Darwin, a city of 45,000 population prior to the cyclone Tracy that
struck in 1974. This is a good example for comparing problems of
post-disaster reconstruction in developed and developing countries.
There are many interesting points in his report, including his claim
that; 'High priority was given to getting damaged houses repaired so
that the increasing population returning to Darwin could be sheltered'
(p. 63). He also writes; 'A large liner, the 'Patris' was chartered by
the government and berthed at the wharf to act as a floating hostel'
(p. 63), an approach that is possible only in coastal areas. He
continues;
"In May 1975 Commonwealth Government contracts were
placed With four major contractors for the erection
of a total of 1,300 houses. The first new houses
were started on 25 June 1975, six months after
Tracy. ... Private house owners were recompensed by
their insurance and were also to have access to law
interest loan funds, this was at a maximum of
$42,000 at 6% over 45 years. The government owned
some 1,500 blocks of land out of some 8,000 blocks
within the City" (pp. 63-64).
In developed countries damage to property insurance schemes seem to be
common. On the contrary in the developing world they are unheard of.
In Iran for instance, the insuring of households was becoming common
under the heavy Iraqi missile raid in the second half of 1988 before
the cease-fire was settled. It is also notable that land tenure again
was one of the major issues in Darwin, as discussed earlier. However,
it appears that the reconstruction of Darwin, with the advantage of
different financial resources, improved at a reasonable pace.
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Nevertheless, there were problems which Walters points out. He writes;
"Today, [19781 nearly three years after the cyclone,
the city is nearly rebuilt. The Commonwealth has
completed or has under construction some $330
million worth of reconstruction work, some $500
million is estimated to have been paid out by the
Insurance Industry..." (p. 64).
Let us see what contingency measures they considered and compare these
with cases of Turkey or Iran or one of those disasters in Latin
America. Walters (1978), continues;
"Following cyclone Tracy it was essential to amend
the local building requirements and a new 'wind
code', as well as certain specific requirements
relating to the reduction through building failure
and protection of occupants from debris. Added to
this there was a requirement to evaluate and test
different materials for design and construction
purposes.
Under the Darwin Area Building Manual all aspects
of design and material use have been defined and
are continually updated" (p. 64).
Commenting on his report from Darwin, Walters (1978) then adds;
"There are lessons of similarity from the aftermath
of natural disasters throughout the western
world....
The most obvious, of course, is.. .total cost of the
disaster ...the worst aspect, i.e. death, there is
an obvious decrease in the numerical amount. From
cost, one decreases to unemployment, then to
damage, thence to homeless,sickness and health
problems..." (pp. 65-66).
Does this not emphasis the fact that there are 'Two Worlds'? Walters
(1978), also refers to the economic consequences of disasters, such as
a sharp increase in property market prices and also the bonus to those
who receive low interest loans from the government. This bonus,
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Walters calculates might be up to $14,000 per person. (p. 67) He also
claims that after disaster, 'There is the obvious tendency by retailers
to extend their show rooms, offices, etc, in the belief that this boom
will continue' (p. 68).
Walters' (1978), conclusion, particularly about development in
the reconstruction period, seems very clear, as he writes;
"There is always a debate on 'shall we rebuild',
and, without exception, rebuilding has followed a
disaster. The debate which went on in Darwin, as
in other disaster areas, could be said to have only
one advantage and this is therapeutic. It tends to
waste time instead of getting on with the job.
Generally, big plans do not succeed; one can look
at San Francisco which brought in a planning team
after the 1906 earthquake, and they, rather like
Darwin, were left behind by the builders.
The only real chance of having a new plan
implemented after a disaster is to have a plan of
agreement which has been fully discussed and
accepted by the community prior to any disaster"
(p. 68). [emphasis added]
Leivesley (1981), has studied 'The Social Consequences of Australian
Disasters'. She claims;
"Policy in relation to reconstruction is to assist
with public repairs while leaving the householders
to provide for his own reinstatement by insurance
or bearing the loss. In a number of major
disasters the government has modified this
agreement by providing assistance in the form of
grants or loans, tied to a means test, which have
been made available to householders" (p. 43).
She also writes;
"The findings of the study indicate that planning
requires a broad range of social and physical
adjustments and that organisations need to utilise
the capacity of disaster victims for self help
while at the same time providing direct welfare to
certain groups in the population" (p. 43).
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As has been discussed in the case of Darwin's reconstruction, the state
used the sophisticated market system. In the absence of such a system
in rural areas, we assume it is possible to support families to carry
out the reconstruction of their houses as quickly as possible. Thus
the government can be more engaged in the construction of
infrastructures and services.
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Case 6- Tangshan, China (earthquake 1976) 
Gere and Shah (1980), report from their visits to Tangshan city
in China following the earthquake of 1976. These two authors are
engineers and had little interest in social and architectural aspects.
The earthquake was so devastating that according to Lewis (1985), an
estimated figure of '700,000 to 1 m.' people perished. In relation to
the losses of the earthquake Gere and Shah claim;
"In Tangshan [city] itself, 148,000 people died -
with another 81,000 seriously injured. The total
life lost from the great quake was 240,000 people,
with about 164,000 badly hurt. These are official
figures but many Chinese engineers believe the true
loss was much higher. The economic loss to China
has been estimated at 3 billion Yuan ( which is
about $2 Billion)" (pp. 47-48).
Gere and Shah did not provide any clear account of pre-disaster
construction methods and only claim that they were un-reinforced brick
buildings. (p. 48) However, a few photographs included in their
reports also indicate that the previous buildings were mostly built of
masonry bricks and presumably wooden trunks supported the roofs. They
explain that instead of one single city 'three separate districts are
to be built... These districts will form a triangle several kilometres
on each side...[which] provide additional safety in the event of
another earthquake' (p. 52).
This notion of dispersion of settlement as a mitigation measure
must be taken seriously. In the case of war, as is our concern, this
issue is extremely relevant and will be explored in a later chapter.
Concerning the housing aspects of the reconstruction approach Gere and
Shah (1980), report limited observations.
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"We were able to visit one of the residential sites
currently under construction. A typical apartment
building is four or five stories high, has about 60
apartments, and houses 200 to 250 people. (An
apartment for four people typicall has four rooms
with a total area of 42 to 52 m .) Gas will be
piped to apartments for cooking purposes, an
improvement over the present coal-burning stoves"
(P . 52).
They also continue to report that;
"The entire reconstruction project will provide
apartments for almost three quarters of a million
people,...Apartment buildings are of the same
design in each complex, but vary from one complex
to another; all are designed to be earthquake
resistant,..." (p. 52).
We do not currently have access to any further study to address the
issue of the inhabitants' satisfaction with these new dwellings or any
other possible matter of performance associated with these apartment
buildings. It is likely that this change in the housing situation
constrain the families for the adoption. In this respect it should be
added that different nations and cultures might provide different
degree of ability to adopt change in their life style.
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Case 7- El Asnam, Algeria (earthquake 1980) 
There are certain countries and more specifically certain
disasters from which more reports are available. This issue in itself
calls for further investigation, which unfortunately is beyond the
resources of the present research. For instance, it would be good to
know why so many researchers had been able to visit Turkey and more
specifically, why Gediz earthquake had attracted their attention, while
a case like the El Asnam earthquake has been only occasionally studied.
Among possible reasons, one might be the political system of the
stricken country and its attitude towards foreign agencies. At least
in the context of Iran this speculation seems to be strong. One reason
which may explain the small number of published reports and studies,
(in English) might be because, not only since the Islamic Revolution
but even prior to it, we never heard of the direct involvement of
foreign agencies in relief or reconstruction following disasters.'
The El Asnam region of Algeria, with an estimated population of
a million in 1980 was stricken by an earthquake of Richter 7.3. The
result was 400,000 homeless5 caused by the destruction of 80,000
dwellings and damage of 60,000 other houses. (UNDRO 1982, p. 73) James
Lewis in 'Housing and physical development in Algeria', [no date
available] after saying that the same city had been stricken by
earthquakes in 1905, 1922 and 1946 claims; 'The earthquake of October
10 1980, destroyed the city for a second time, killing 1,500 people.
15,000 dwellings were destroyed and 148,000 people were made homeless'
4.Another example, is only one report from Albania by Elmaz Xhediku, 'Coping
with earthquake in Albania', in Ekisticks 318-9 1986.
5.Lewis (1988), once reports an exact figure of 331,216.
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(p. 8). (see the last footnote).
The emergency shelter provision was based on tents and plastic
sheets, plus many survivors stayed with their friends and relatives.
(UNDRO 1982, P . 73)	 It appears from the same reference, housing
reconstruction was based on the construction of 'Prefabricated
temporary' housing (pending reconstruction) 'in El Asnam town'...and
reconstruction of 'traditional housing in rural areas'. (p. 73)
Concerning the reconstruction policy, the same document reveals
that;
"1. After some debates, decision to retain existing
site of El Asnam. Reconstruction only after
micro-zoning study.
2. Provide prefabricated temporary housing, pending
reconstruction.
3. Reconstruct conventional, reinforced concrete
housing to earthquake-resistant standards" (p. 73).
It appears that again the location of the new site has been one of the
major issues, as in other cases discussed earlier. Altogether, UNDRO
(1982), identifies the following 'lessons learned';
"1. As a consequence of recent rapid urbanisation
many unsafe modern, reinforced concrete structures
collapsed in the earthquake.
2. The collapse of 85 schools indicated the
priority need for aseismic design and construction
of public buildings.
4. Officials underestimated the self-help capacity
of survivors" (p. 73).
An Algerian friend6 , remembered a rumour spread among the survivors of
the El Asnam earthquake, that the event was due to the unfair name of
6.Ahecine Saouli, Kings Manor, 1988.
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the city. The word 'El Asnam' means 'idols', that is what the Arabs
worshipped before the introduction of Islam. For this reason alone
the people insisted on changing the name of the city. The new name was
'Chleff', which is the name of a river passing by the city.
James Lewis, in 'Housing and physical development in Algeria', also
focuses on a historical review of Algerian earthquakes and is
especially concerned with 'vulnerability aspects' of this country.
However, since he has been involved in after-event activities, his
report provides some useful information about the El Asnam earthquake.
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Case 8- Honduras (hurricane 1974) 
A hurricane 'Fifi7 ' in 1974 swept Honduras, it left behind up to
350,000 homeless, and caused the destruction of up to 15,000 dwellings
and further damage to another 12,000 units. Tents and prefabricated
units were provided as emergency shelter and as UNDRO (1982), reports,
a 'wide variety of systems including prefabricated timber and pre-cast
systems' were used. (p. 68) Concerning the reconstruction policy the
same document reveals that;
"There were the major programmes of house building
- each by a voluntary agency. In addition, CARE
distributed roofing materials for 5,324 houses;
housing was built above the flood plain, on the
hill side, but remained vulnerable in many
instances, due to poor 'cut and fill' techniques"
(p. 68).
In the view of UNDRO (1982), the following lessons can be learned from
reconstruction following the hurricane of the Honduras 1974;
"1. One of the new housing settlements ' Colonia
Canada' in Choloma is interesting in that it
evolved from a refugee camp of 485 families to a
permanent settlement of 381 houses.
2. There was a marked absence of government
provision of new housing.
3. There was a marked lack of local involvement in
the refugee camp and in rehousing programmes, many
of which were culturally unsuited to local
conditions.
5. Many of the housing systems have not been easily
modified.
6. New buildings have not been designed or sited to
adequately resist future high winds or flood
action" (p. 69).
7.UNDRO NEWS, September/October 1988 contains information of the terminology
of hurricane, cyclone and so on.
164
Snarr and Brown (1980), carried out a survey concerned with an
assessment	 of the users' satisfaction with the permanent
post-disaster-housing built after Hurricane Fifi of 1974. In the
introduction they state that surveys of this kind are scarce and they
quote from Ian Davis who " observes that after examining 1,500 items,
...he only found 5 'in-house' evaluations of relief performance, and
they all stemmed from Oxfam" (p. 83). They also mention that 'Two
papers on user satisfaction in high-rise apartments in Singapore did,
however, give some direction to this effort' (p. 83).
Snarr and Browns' (1980) findings from this survey can be
summarised as follows;
"Replacing housing after natural disasters enables
victims to avoid personal disaster and in some
instances may help them surpass their pre-disaster
standard of living....
Diminishing the amount of space per house in order
to provide more lots for houses is a second means
of increasing the number of houses and diminishing
the cost per house. ..
The crowding, which is generally new to these
people and the loss of some independence associated
with the possibility of raising part of one's food
are high costs to pay. It is also generally true
that the availability of land is not as crucial in
this area as it is in most Latin American urban
areas.
Finally, it would be possible to build a partial
home and let the owners complete the structure....
Of the three options (traditional houses, less
space per house, or the construction of a less
complete house) we feel that the latter is, at
least in these cases, the more viable alternative"
(P . 90).
The issues they raised are significant. That intervenors unlike users
are in favour of providing a higher number of units, rather than
focusing on the quality or the minimum local standards. They also
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observed that access to land was not as difficult as predicted, thus
one should be careful of generalisations in such matters. The
outstanding suggestion they propose, however, is the three choices of
housing reconstruction and that they feel 'construction of [a] less
complete house' tends to be more efficient, since it provides the
'
opportunity for gradual expansion of the house according to the
inhabitants'	 requirements and the availability of the necessary
resources.
Snarr and Brown later, in 1982, published a report on a
continuing survey from Honduras. Some of the major findings they
report are as follows;
"After 3 years of occupancy at least 66% of the
original residents of the three CEDEN Projects
continued to reside in their houses 	  In order
to investigate the correlates of continued
occupancy and attrition we analysed seven variables
that authors felt might be related to such. Of the
seven we found three seem to be statistically
significant:	 (1) the number of persons per
household, (2) religious affiliation, and (3)
participation in the construction of the houses.
... After 3 years 90% of the occupants surveyed had
made some improvement on their houses (out of a
total of 218 houses where occupancy was continuous
for the 3 years) ... Of the five variables we
examined with reference to housing improvement,
only one proved to be statistically significant and
this was the number of persons per household" (p.
131).
As can be seen a high proportion of occupants, 90%, made some
improvements to their houses. This can be perceived as evidence
supporting Snarr and Brown's suggestion to consider the house as a
growing feature and not a static one.
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Case 9- Chimbote Peru, (earthquake 1970) 
An earthquake with a magnitude of 7.7 Richter, shook Chimbote,
Peru and villages around it in 1970. The earthquake affected a
population of 1.8 million, of whom half a million became homeless.
Out of 2,550,000 [255,0001 8 pre-earthquake dwellings an estimated
number of 59,800 were damaged and 139,000 destroyed in both urban and
rural areas. (UNDRO, 1982, pp. 66-67)
UNDRO (1982), reports that a variety of approaches to emergency
shelter were implemented. Tents, corrugated iron roofing sheets and
polyurethane igloos as well as traditional shelters were used by
survivors. The same variation existed in terms of shelter
reconstruction from '...prefabricated systems to adobe houses'. These
were also provided by different bodies and via different approaches;
'the Government, through loans, roofing schemes and from other sources'
(P . 67).
The same document made the following observations;
"3. The Government decision to relocate some towns,
due to risks of further mud slides was logical but
highly unpopular with those affected.
4. The decision to halt all reconstruction activity
in Huaraz until seismic micro-zoning studies and
the master plan were completed, seriously retarded
the reconstruction process.
5. The 16,180 conventional houses built were only
accessible to middle class families" (p. 67).
Sagov (1981), reporting from Peru, criticises the approaches
implemented there after the 1970 earthquake. He highlights some
political constraints within the community as well as delineating the
8.The figure of 2,550,000 dwellings seems to be wrong, perhaps the correct
figure is 255,000 dwellings.
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people's initiatives in reconstruction. Not surprisingly he also says
that the privileged had a better chance to gain from the reconstruction
incentives. (pp. 179-184) The same author in conclusion writes;
"The conclusion I am forced to make is that the
reconstruction of Huaraz is a fake, little more
than a sop to the consciences of the remote
agencies who send their taxpayer's money as
'foreign aid', currently totalling about £30
million. Not only have the planners failed to
reproduce the qualities of charm, ... but they
have failed in their stated intention 'to avoid
repeating the same mistakes'" (p. 183).
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Case 10-Tabas, Iran, (earthquake 1978) 
Iran is an earthquake-prone country. (see Ambraseys and
Melville 1982) The north east province, Khurasan, is one of the
vulnerable areas from earthquake. Different cities and villages of
this province have been affected by earthquakes in 1952, 1962, 1968
twice, 1970, 1972,1978, 1979 twice. (Parsa, 1985, pp. 8-10) At the
moment we are concerned with the Tabas earthquake of 1978 in which
according to Abedini Rad (1983), 7,000 dwellings and 5,500 other
buildings were destroyed. The earthquake flattened the city of Tabas
and affected 100 villages in the area, claiming 6,381 lives. (p. 62)
Tents were provided and tent-cities or camps were established by
the government and some old buses were also hauled to the area to
provide emergency shelter for survivors.
Parsa (1985), in his dissertation reports his observations from
reconstructed areas after the Tabas earthquake of 1978. His main
findings are, that in some cases the villagers have abandoned the
reconstructed settlements, which were built to earthquake-resistant
standards and built new dwellings with traditional materials. The main
inconsistency of the newly built units, he claims, is the new houses
'were not hospitable in the local environment'. He also writes;
"Other people who deserted entire villages and
migrated to other areas, mainly urban centres, were
forced to move out of their home because they were
unable to continue life in an area without water
and any services" (p. 133).
It is astonishing that there seems to be a regular pattern to the
deficiencies arising after most reconstruction of disaster affected
rural areas. On a national level in Khuzestan for instance, it was
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observed that the shelter provided sometimes did not suit the
inhabitants needs. In one way or another the same has been observed in
Tabas. Examples can be found in other countries, as we will see in
forthcoming rural examples.
Abedini Rad (1983), reports from the same earthquake about a new
approach he tried for construction of earthquake-resistant houses,
based on training the local inhabitants and improving traditional
methods of construction, which will be referred to later. However, he
also points to the fact of the unaffected communities' participation
and the significant role they played in the relief period. (P. 62) This
seems not to be peculiar to Iran or the Tabas area. It is people's
humanitarian instinct. It is important to see why as the emergency
period of disaster passes, the participation of outside agencies
becomes more unlikely, especially in the last reconstruction phase. In
Khuzestan province, there were many enthusiastic voluntary groups at
the beginning coming to the area with goodwill and resources, including
cash, manpower and occasionally skills. The management of these
groups, and the fact that the one who has the resources naturally wants
to have control of its use and distribution, created a lot of problems.
It is again the issue of accountability, which tends to be a major
obstacle in the case of voluntary organisations, though it exists with
official organisations as well.
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Case 11- Gediz, Turkey, (earthquake 1970) 
Like Iran, Turkey is also an earthquake prone area. The Gediz
earthquake of 1970 damaged more than 5,000 dwellings and destroyed
14,852 others. It left behind 90,000 homeless and killed more than a
thousand people. (UNDRO 1982, p. 66)
For emergency shelter, polyurethane domes and tents were
provided and new apartment buildings were built to create permanent
shelter for survivors. Relocation of Gediz and its consequences is
one of the major components of all reports available from the Gediz
reconstruction.	 Mitchell (1976), from the reconstructed rural areas
of Turkey especially Gediz, makes the following observations;
Although the relocation of Gediz site, was due to vulnerability of the
village and to rock fall, the people still kept their links to the
previous site, their working places are still there and old Gediz is
more crowded than the new settlement9.
The new settlement has many services and public amenities such
as water, sanitation, a mosque and a school. The villagers
complained that the houses were small and that no room had been
provided for their animals. Some of the houses cracked because of
poor construction. There are other villages in the area that remained
uninhabited, Kiran, for example. 'Cold in the winter and hot in the
summer' was a frequent complaint, says Mitchell (1976). (p. 312)
Germen (1978), in relation to the Gediz earthquake claims;
"The price of dwelling-units in New Gediz has more
recently reached big-city levels. In old Gediz
itself houses are now changing hands in what is
technically an abandoned town in the eyes of both
9.D'Souza (1986), has researched on 'Recovery following the Gediz earthquake
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geotechtonics specialists and of the public
administration" (p. 69).
Germen (1978), then reports that some of the local people claimed that
relocation of Gediz was not made on a scientific basis. They claimed
that the report indicated that the old location was relatively safe and
that the authorities were under some pressure from certain groups of
Gediz inhabitants who were ' without property in Old Gediz and may have
wished to strike a blow at the town, who were strongly represented
through employment in the municipality' (p. 71). Germen also points
to another factor justifying relocation , because the clearance of
debris could be an expensive and time consuming task. (p. 71)
Concerning land expropriation Germen claims;
"Whilst expropriation was made at rather low land
values there are 'nevertheless' people who do not
mind quoting very exact figure and who claim that
this figure was 14 times the pre-earthquake market
value of this land" (p. 72).
Germen (1978), then refers to the sharp increase in the population of
Gediz after the earthquake and claims that since reconstruction, some
migration has taken place from other areas of Turkey to Gediz and from
surrounding villages to Old Gediz. Altogether, he thinks that some
prosperity has come to the area because of the reconstruction of Gediz.
(p. 72) (For more detail of economic and social consequences of the
Gediz earthquake reconstruction see D'Souza 1986).
Germen (1978), then adds that; 'It is said that in New Gediz
only debts for commercial property are paid back on the insistence of
the Government and those for residential property not at all' (p. 73).
Germen also reports his observations that houses built were small and
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roofs were too low and the question of privacy had been raised by some
residents of new Gediz. He also claims that old Gediz is gradually
becoming alive. (p. 74)
Aysan (1987), has a cultural approach to post-disaster
reconstruction. She focuses on the Gediz earthquake of 1970 which
destroyed 17,000 houses and left behind 90,000 homeless. (p. 22) Then
she refers to the post-disaster houses built in that area; both single
storey and multi-storey 10 . Her criticism of the project lies in the
examples of inconsistency of design to the users' needs, and the
modifications they made to their houses. Her main emphasis is that not
every house can be a home and that the common technological approaches
to post-disaster housing are inconsistent. (pp. 21-25)
Aysan and Oliver (1987), wrote 'Housing and Culture After
Earthquakes'. The focus of this book, as its title implies, is on
cultural aspects of reconstructed houses with a detailed case report of
Gediz. Aysan, presumably influenced by Davis, highlights his view
about 'Survivors' resourcefulness', that he first raised ten years ago.
Oliver, as emerges from his other publications", is very much culture
oriented and familiar with traditional, rural settlements. The message
of the first book is that there is a gap between the survivors' need
for shelter and the needs of the donors. It usefully stresses the
mismatch of 'outsider provided shelter' with the people's needs and
shows how the users modify the provided shelter, when they don't
abandon it altogether.
10.UNDRO 1982, only mentioned apartment buildings.
11.For example, Shelter, Sign & Symbol (1975) and Shelter In Africa (1976)
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UNDRO (1982), also reports from Gediz. The reconstruction
policy given is;
"1. The Government decided to rebuild Gedez 5 km to
the south of the destroyed town.
2. New housing was built very rapidly by the
Government.
3. The town of Ackaalan was rebuilt on the original
site " ( p. 66).
This latter reference quotes the following major observations;
"1. The relocation of Gedez has created long-term
problems, occupants still maintaining close links
with the old town.
3. Co-ordination between village communities and
Government planning officers was not satisfactory.
4. The very swift reconstruction of buildings
created many problems. Local residents believed
that more time could have been devoted to the
planning process with long-term benefits" (p. 66).
D'Souza (1986), also reported from the Gediz area in a study of four
reconstructed villages. Her main interest, however, is the social and
economic recovery and the long term effects of reconstruction.
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Case 12- Qir-Karzin, Iran, (earthquake 1972) 
As Razani (1984), reports, on April 10, 1972 a destructive
earthquake of magnitude 6.9 (Richter scale) destroyed the town of Qir
and some fifty neighbouring villages, killing more than 5,300 people
and destroying nearly 3,200 traditional adobe and masonry units. Tents
were supplied by the government to provide emergency shelter and
survivors remained near their destroyed houses. (pp. 79-80)
Razani (1984), discussing the Qir reconstruction plan reports
that;
"According to the initial version of this plan, the
Ministry wanted to move the people out of their
small hamlets and relocate them in large rural
centres which were to be administrated as rural
cooperatives" (p. 80).
Taking the opportunity provided by earthquake, officials attempted
global change in the rural communities' conditions. Razani (1984),
also claims that despite the time available, no tangible attempt was
made to identify the earthquake-vulnerable sites in order to avoid
them. (p. 81) He also adds; 'According to some reporters, the new site
was selected by high officials who flew over the area in helicopters'
(p. 81).
Scrutinising new sites conditions, Razani (1984), writes;
"For the sake of expediency, new village sites were
often selected within the treeless areas, far from
the old village sites. The old sites were usually
located at the centre of the farms and orchards and
close to the sources of water supply. Many
co-operative members who wanted to live in the new
rural centres had to become separated from their
private farms and orchards. Every day they had to
spend a few hours of their time going to their
farms and coming back to new towns" (p. 81).
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As can be seen the story of Gediz is repeated here, as it was in some
villages of Khuzestan in the recent reconstruction after the war.
Razani (1984), also explains that there were twenty separate
contractors for reconstruction and they were supposed to complete the
project in 5 to 7 months. In practice they had an average delay of
seventeen months and the cost overran by 30%. He also observed that
seven contracts were not completed four years after the earthquake.
(p. 82) He says that four years after the earthquake 'many of the
houses, roads, water distribution systems, and public buildings' in the
area were not completed or operational. (p. 84)
The shortcomings he observed in 'concrete block buildings' are
enormous. He writes;
"There were many shortcomings mostly due to
insufficient client field supervision. Some
important ones were; use of poor aggregate, leaky
roofs, wall cracks due to improper foundations, and
poor quality of finishing" (p. 83).
He also observed more technical problems in another type of shelter
provided called; 'Dome-Shaped Buildings'. (pp. 83-84)
Razani is an engineer, so less familiar with architectural
aspects of housing, nevertheless his recommendations are interesting.
He refers to some basic mistakes in house design such as ignoring the
Islamic and traditional privacy of houses (p. 84), and suggests that
flexibility of design for different uses and for future expansion of
the units, must be incorporated in the design. He also suggests that
after disasters it is better to invest in the production of building
materials on site, in order to give future advantage. (P. 85)
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Case 13-Bingol, Turkey, (earthquake 1971) 
The 1971 earthquake of Bingol affected some 19 villages (over
75% of buildings collapsed or were heavily damaged) and 46 other
villages suffered the loss of more than 25% of their dwellings and over
100 other villages and three major towns were reported moderately
damaged by the shock. (Coburn, Leslie and Tabban 1984, p. 49)
In relation to 'reconstruction strategy' the authors claim;
"The decision concerning reconstruction were
heavily influenced by the methods adopted in the
previous major earthquake around Varto, Mus
Province, in 1966....
A vital aspect of the reconstruction was to have
permanent shelters for all the homeless before the
onset of winter:	 speed of construction and
organised, efficient logistics were major
priorities to produce the 5000 housing units needed
within six months. Only prefabricated housing
could be constructed fast enough and it was decided
to adapt a prefabricated housing factory in Ankara,
newly opened to manufacture holiday villas, to
produce houses which could be assembled in the
damaged villages" (pp. 49-50).
Coburn et al (1984), refer to their major observation where they claim;
"The resettlement of the occupants of traditional
villages in Bingol Province has caused a massive
change in the life style, and the physical,
economic and social structure of the villages.
Communities suffering from the effects of an
earthquake, not least the economic disruption of
the losses of animals, possessions and houses, have
been put in new and unfamiliar surroundings.
A large number of other villagers have not accepted
the houses provided, because they could not adapt
them to their normal life style, and thus their
household economy was disrupted. 	 Some, with
private funds available, have abandoned the
prefabricated houses and built another house
elsewhere.." (p. 55).
As can be seen some similarities such as abandoning the newly built
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houses and the inconsistency of the new houses with peoples requirement
are emerging from different cases reported.
_
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Case 14- Lice, Turkey, (earthquake 1975) 
The Lice earthquake of 1975 in Turkey affected an estimated
number of 50,000 population, mostly in rural areas. More than 8,400
houses were damaged and more than 7,700 were destroyed. Tents were
provided as well as polyurethane igloos and survivors also used their
initiative to improvise the remains of existing houses for the
emergency period. (UNDRO 1982, P. 69)
According to UNDRO (1982), the main housing reconstruction
scheme was through providing prefabricated units: (asbestos sheets in
timber frames) provided by Turkish Government. They moved the town of
Lice 2 km to the south due to the risk of rock falls at the old site.
(P . 69)
"The housing policy was to provide prefabricated
homes, not to rebuild on local building traditions.
The town of Lice was planned for an eventual
population of 20,000 (twice the pre-earthquake
total)" (p. 69).
UNDRO (1982), refers to the following observations under 'Lessons
learnt':
"The decision to relocate Lice has been very
unpopular with its residents, and was made without
their participation. The new site does not possess
climatic shelter from the hillside, has taken
valuable agricultural land out of use, and was
initially without water supply. The new choice of
a flat site may have been influenced by the
requirements of the prefabricated houses. ...
The capacity of the Turkish Government to build
prefabricated houses so rapidly (1,568 units in 54
days) was an achievement, but conversely the houses
had many deficiencies: climatic and cultural
unsuitability; no provision for animals: they were
too small; and they did little to generate local
work. Essentially, they reflected an urban middle
class set of values, in sharp contrast to rural
values and priorities" (p. 69).
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These observations are simply more evidence of some issues that are
fast becoming 'the traditional deficits of post-disaster settlement
reconstruction.
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Case 15- Van, Turkey (earthquake 1976) 
The 1976 earthquake of Van Province affected a population of
over 180,000 creating more than 50,000 homeless caused by damage to
over 5,000 dwellings and destruction of another 9,200. Tents and
winterised tents with stoves were provided for survivors, while many of
their number preferred to live in the improvised shelter they prepared
for themselves. (UNDRO, 1982, p. 71)
According to UNDRO (1982), for reconstruction prefabricated
houses, asbestos panel/timber frames were used (10,000 erected between
April and November 1977). (p. 71) The reluctance of many survivors to
leave their ruined area, as referred to earlier, for emergency shelter
or temporary accommodation is notable. However, the same reference
points to another fact that no advice was given 'for the improvement of
traditional adobe or masonry dwellings.' (p. 71)
181
Case 16- Andhra Pradesh, India, (cyclone 1979) 
In November 1979 a tropical cyclone with winds up to 270 Km/hr
killed 30,000 people and left behind 250,000 homeless. An estimated
number of 150,000 homes were damaged or destroyed. Local materials
were the main source of emergency shelter. (UNDRO 1982, p. 72) For
housing reconstruction, according to the same source, a 'Wide variety
of 'low' or 'appropriate' technology solutions using timber, mud,
thatch....
Some 'pukka' (brick/concrete blocks) ...' were used. (p. 72)
	 The
'Reconstruction Policy' is reported by UNDRO (1982), as;
"1. The state Government made certain promises to
provide 'pukka' housing for surviving families in
lieu of providing support for traditional types of
construction. (The houses to cost about Rs. 6,500
with a plinth area of about 190 sq. ft.).
2. Build 1,300 community of cyclone shelters (500
completed by March 1982).
3. Build environmental protection measures, such as
tidal embankments, tree belts and other
plantation" (p. 72).
The following observations are made from the reconstruction programme
in the same affected area; (UNDRO, 1982)
"1. The debate between supporters of 'pukka'
housing and those of traditional housing was
ultimately won by the former, with the proposed
building of 20,000 'pukka' houses.
2. The Government adopted a Preparedness Plan which
included 1,300 Community Cyclone Shelters.
4. Nevertheless initial evidence suggests that the
concrete block housing has had a positive effect in
the local economy.
5. Opportunities were missed to instigate
programmes in improved construction techniques, the
only exceptions being the programmes organised by
the Village Reconstruction Organisation (VRO), and
an organisation called Appropriate Training and
Information centre (Artic)" (p. 73).
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Case 17, Ecuador, (earthquake 1987) 
The 1987 earthquake of Ecuador is among the most recent
disasters from which reconstruction reports are available. Dudley
(1988), reports that an estimated number of '3,000 houses were totally
destroyed and a further 15,000 seriously damaged' (p. 111). The major
point was that the affected population were scattered over an area of
'30,000 Km2 that include the Amazonian jungle and mountains up to 5,800
in high' (p. 111).
Dudley (1987), reports, from his involvement in reconstruction
following that event, of the problem of access to the affected areas
and justifies the housing reconstruction approach they urged and
claims;
"From the start we excluded the possibility of
'providing' new model houses because:
-it would be too expensive
-the population is so dispersed that any project
involving bringing in large quantities of cement,
blocks and steel would be impractical
-it would take far too long
-it would be socially divisive
thus we wanted to help primarily through 'enabling'
actions and education" (p. 62).
They initiated an educational training programme which incorporated
'moulding the corner of the walls', while the straight parts of the
walls were built by the families themselves. Also some training was
given for making stronger roofs. (pp. 62-65)
In 1988 Dudley published another report from the same area with
more details. Dudley seems very genuine in his report, and it is
clear he is very development oriented. He named his 1988 article,
'Disaster mitigation: strong houses or strong institutions?'.
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Dudley (1988), explains that for reconstruction after the
earthquake, they were invited there by CAAP (Centro Andino de Accio'n
Popular), which is a developmental oriented organisation and 'has
worked in the zone for more than 12 years on agricultural and community
development' (p. 113). He writes;
"Our thinking in drawing up the programme was
partly influenced by my visit the previous year to
the Dhamar Building Education Project in North
Yemen (Leslie, 1987). But unlike Yemen, in Ecuador
there was an existing organisation in the area with
both organisational infrastructure and extensive
personal contacts within the affected communities"
(p. 114).
Their approach was to use an 'L' mould for making stronger corners of
rammed earth.	 Dudley (1988), also briefly reviews other technical
approaches implemented by others in the area. He points to the
problems each of the approaches faced, including; ' Stabilised earth',
concrete foundations, wall reinforcement and lightweight roofs'. (pp.
116-118)
His sincerity can be seen for instance in this part of his
report; ' It would be easy to give the impression that the project was
formulated by the people; this would be misleading' (p. 114). The
notion of survivors participation in the reconstruction process is not
always easy and there is evidence that community participation,
regardless of its context, be it a normal development project or a post
disaster housing reconstruction, has many issues to be addressed. In
fact it deserves a separate study in its own right. (see Chapter VII)
Dudley's conclusion from their modest approach is as follows;
"We have learnt that with outside support but not
external control, and with limited technical
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objectives the people can achieve great things.
The character and long term presence and
perspective of CAAP in the affected zone made this
particular reconstruction programme possible. A
team of four people in CAAP, with occasional
technical advice from Centro Sinchaguasin, helped
the people of 80 communities build 1,500 of the
1,700 damaged homes in six months" (p. 120).
One problem with this approach is that we will not know anything about
the real performance of the reconstructed houses, until the next
earthquake occurs. Nor are we are sure about the users' view of these
settlements. However, this is not peculiar to this case and it seems,
to some extent to be applicable to other post-disaster settlement
reconstruction efforts.
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Case 18- Dhamar, Yemen, (earthquake 1982) 
An earthquake with a magnitude of 5.5-6 on Richter scale in 1982
caused extensive damage over 6,000 Km2 of Dhamar Province, Yemen, it
destroyed 25,000 hoses and damaged 18,000 others creating an estimated
number of 300,000 homeless. The main form of temporary shelter was
tents. (Coburn and Leslie, 1985, p. 2)
The significant feature of reconstruction following this
disaster is the training programme conducted by the Oxfam team in the
area. (see following section) We know from Dudley (1988), that this
training programme was the source of inspiration for their training
based response in Ecuador. However, there were more conventional
approaches as well from from the government of Yemen, including the
construction of prefabricated concrete units.
The Swiss Disaster Relief Unit and the Ministry of Health of
Yemen Arab Republic (1984), reported from their observations of
earthquake reconstruction in Dhamar 1982.
"At the end of January the contract bidding for
1,500 homes (in about 200 villages) had already
been completed. In comparison with other cases,
this is noteworthy. ...
. The construction of pre-fab houses has been,
astonishingly, consistently rejected.
. The bid was based, however, on a standard type
and allowed unfortunately scarcely any freedom of
design" (pp. 13-14).
It seems that some traditional mistakes were made in the reconstruction
phase. The decision to produce a larger number of units in a short
time, usually means sacrificing the quality of the products and their
lack of suitability as homes for their users, seems to be repeated
here.
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Case 19- Albania, (earthquake) 
Albania is a country politically famous for it's 'closed door'
policy to foreigners. It is a surprise to see even this single report
from that country published on earthquake reconstruction. Nevertheless
the content of the article itself is a manifestation of the system of
government of that country.
Xhediku (1986), first introduces the background of earthquake
research in Albania and claims that there are micro zoning
vulnerability maps for whole the country. Then he refers to the
earthquake of April 15, 1979 which shook Albania and as the author
claims; ' ...was one of the strongest registered in Europe during the
20th century 1 (p. 163).
Concerning the damage, the article claims, ' The earthquake of
April 15 and the after-shocks damaged about 17,122 items - mostly
buildings - in Shkodra' (p. 164). No death toll figure is suggested.
Most damaged structures were one storey stone buildings, with wooden
roofs covered with tiles.. .and single storey and multi- storey brick
buildings, mainly State housing. (p. 164)
The author then describes the process of reconstruction. The
important feature of the case is the bureaucratic system of preparing
the plans. Another important point is the repair methods they have
implemented for damaged houses. (pp. 168-169) The new house and site
designs are also illustrated. In general terms the report is as to be
expected, evidence of a highly centralised government planning
procedure. The reconstruction is primarily a highly technical and
engineering task in their view. However, the conclusion of the article
is worth quoting:
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"The successful completion on September 29, 1979,
of the effort for the elimination of the
consequences of the earthquake of April, 1979, was
a strong manifestation of the solidarity and unity
of the people of Albania. As Enver Hoxha, the
unforgettable leader of the country, said at a
ceremony to celebrate this event, 'The earthquake
shook the mountains, but not the hearts of the
people'. It proved, above all, the vitality and
power of its citizens that they will be able to
overcome successfully any future difficulty or
natural misfortune, always aiming at a beautiful
and prosperous life" (p. 170).
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4-2- A review on major issues of post-disaster settlement
reconstruction
Introduction: In this section our aim is to review some of the
recurring issues of settlement reconstruction in the light of the case
studies already reported, as well as reviewing other sources in
literature.
In the previous section, when looking for a 'conceptual
framework', we came to the conclusion that the literature fails to
provide a concrete and universally applicable structure, to classify
those issues concerned with the relationships between shelter and
disaster. The realism of that conclusion can be seen if we look at the
case studies above. For example, there seem to be different issues
faced in reconstruction of urban areas than in that of rural areas.
For instance, the way to deal with 'legacies of the past' may be one of
the concerns in urban areas, while it seems unlikely that such a
concept would on present showings, become a major issue in
reconstructing a village. 12 Another example, is the subject of housing
deficits in urban areas and adopting appropriate policies to handle
them. In rural areas, regardless of the quality of pre-disaster
dwellings, which might have been very poor, this problem is usually not
faced up to.
The other major factor must be the economic and social situation
of the affected community. There are evidently significant differences
between the coping abilities of communities, within the developing
world and those of industrialised nations (for example, compare Darwin
12.For many reasons including psychological implications, of course it is
relevant in both rural and urban cases.
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with Managua). In addition, the issues of settlement reconstruction
could be grouped according to the views of the different parties
involved. For example, intervenors face some problems, that are very
different from those of the survivors. All in all, it seems that any
attempt	 to identify universally applicable
	
guidelines and
•
specifications regarding reconstruction 'remedies', will yield so few
results that it will help but little, if at all.
Here we present two examples as evidence of different approaches
to categorise the reconstruction issues. UNDRO (1982), identifies four
key headings, each including some further issues. These four are;
'The opportunity for risk reduction', 'Relocation of settlements',
'Land tenure and land use', and finally 'Housing finance'. (pp. 38-51)
On the other hand, the findings of a conference (Disasters and the
Small Dwelling, 1978, Oxford), are grouped under ten headings that
speak of the major issues involved. They are;
"Survivors of disasters, assessment of needs, Aid
and recovery, Accountability, Cultural collisions,
Mitigation measures, Education techniques,
Evaluation, Technology, and Application of research
findings" (Disasters and the Small Dwelling pp.
193-194).
Bearing in mind that we are mainly concerned with the reconstruction of
rural areas, we will concentrate on it. But first we will briefly
review some urban problems and then shift to the rural ones. Housing
reconstruction as the major component of settlement reconstruction
deserves its own treatment.
Urban issues- Hass, Trainer, Bowden and Bolin (1977), in
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Chapter 2 of their book entitled 'Reconstruction Following Disaster',
which is concerned with "Reconstruction Issues in Perspective', count
seven major issues existing in a post-disaster situation. Each of
these major issues has other 'subsidiary issues' related to it.
However, the seven key issues are;
"Should normal, as contrasted to extraordinary,
decision-making mechanisms be used in deciding how,
when, and where to rebuild the heavily damaged
city?
Should there be changes in land use?
Should there be changes in the building codes?
Should a concerted effort be made to make the city
more efficient and more attractive?
Should there be compensation or special financial
assistance for private property losses?
How should disaster-produced personal and family
problems be handled?
How should increased local public expenditures be
financed?" (pp. 44-57).
The authors then move to provide 'A Summary of Do's and Don'ts' based
on their study of reconstruction in four cities. (p. 67) They list
ten points as follows;
"1- Don't wait until the restoration period is
nearly over before starting to examine,
systematically, the upcoming reconstruction issues.
2- Begin immediately to consider whether new
decision-making mechanisms, including the
possibility of advisory groups, are going to be
needed.
3- Do examine, at an early stage, the availability
of an adequate number of local specialists who may
be needed to carry out rapid but thorough efforts
early in the reconstruction process.
4- Don't assume that decision-makers in the private
sector will hold off on their decisions until the
most important public policy decisions have been
made.
5- If there is to be significant relocation of
families or business, consider the full range of
services needed and full array of consequences
which may follow.
6- Remember that despite the best efforts to shape
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the character of the reconstructed city,
fundamental change is unlikely. Past trends will
be accelerated in most cases. Design the planning
process with this in mind.
7- Don't assume that all temporary housing will be
temporary.
8- Don't confuse physical reconstruction with
recovery of the city as a whole.
9- Do use every reasonable opportunity to make the
city safer, but don't make invulnerability your
ultimate objective.
10- When tempted to delay an important decision,
don't" (pp. 67-68).
The case studies reviewed also reveal some common issues to be
addressed in the reconstruction of urban areas. It must be pointed out
that the degree of damage has a major role. By that we mean to what
extent the housing stock and other facilities of the city are damaged
or destroyed. This alone could affect the decision to renew or replan
the city or to keep its previous structure. Let us bring some real
examples from Khuzestan Province, Iran. The city of 'Susangerd'
although it was seriously damaged during the war, the main structure of
the city and a high proportion of the houses survived. For
reconstruction purposes there was no point to think of changing the
location of the city, nor was there any consideration of major changes
in the existing pattern. It can be said that an 'in-fill' approach was
selected and it appears to have been a correct decision.
The city of 'Hoveize', was different. It was totally razed to
the ground and therefore replanning of a new city became inevitable,
allowing planners to include any changes to the overall plan of the
city as they wished. In practice, however, they went too far and
completely ignored the remains from the previous plan and the familiar
characteristics of the old city. The remain of the destroyed city is
192
now surrounded by the new city.
Between these two extremes the case of 'Khoramshar' comes to
mind. The city is seriously damaged and thousands of buildings are
flattened. The remains of the city is worth million pounds, so there
is no way of ignoring it and moving to another place. After all the
future of this damaged city and its rubble can not simply be
overlooked, since its future will be linked with the future of any new
Khoramshar. In this case, there seems to be an opportunity for some
change, or replanning but not to the extent there was in Hoveize.
Nevertheless, the restrictions of Susangerd do not exist either.
Through the case reports we found that the notion of replanning
or modernising the city has been exercised after major disasters.
(e.g.	 Skopje, Managua, Gediz) The success of the planning, however,
was not automatic. Often, the physical reconstruction after major
disasters aimed at social and economic development as well. Although
there is no general rule for success or failure, evidence suggests that
economic and social change requires serious long term commitment, that
may not be compatible with the goodwill of the authorities at the time
of the disaster or with the resources made available. In turn there
are cases where previously socially deprived groups should have
benefited and did not and even where social segregation widened the gap
in the given community. (see case examples of Peru and Gediz - D'Souza
1986).
In urban reconstruction the economic system of the city plays a
major role. Rural areas are dependent on land and land is fixed. The
urban economies, mainly based on industry and marketing may be
dislocated and established in another area. The example of 'Abadan' in
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Khuzestan Province is significant. The original city was built to
house those working in the refinery, the most active and oldest
refinery in the country. The city had no other major economic source
other than providing services to the refinery staff and workers. At
the time of reconstruction it becomes crucial to know whether the
refinery is going to be repaired and reopened and with what capacity it
is going to work. Not having the refinery restored leads to there
being no need to reconstruct Abadan and if the staff are to be
substantially reduced that means a decrease in size of the future city.
The allocation of appropriate roles for different groups and
parties in shelter provision after disaster is of major importance.
Davis (1981a), illustrated his suggestions by using two matrices one
concerned with the 'immediate shelter needs' and the other with
'reconstruction'. (pp. 18-19) Among the different groups the
partnership of the private sector also must be identified.
Davis in the same document assumes the appropriate role of the
local private sector to be mainly in construction of infrastructure
(physical) and (social provision) and mitigation measures such as
construction of dykes. (p. 19) Thus it appears that he does not
suggests any direct involvement of the private sectors in housing
construction. However, there is evidence that both in developed and
developing world in several cases private companies were directly
involved in housing construction. (see for instance the case of Dhamar
Yemen or Darwin Australia). Though this role allocation which seems to
be Davis' suggestion, is more likely to be applicable to the developing
world.
There is a dilemma in engaging the private sector in
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reconstruction.	 On the one hand, it is legitimised by the fact that
establishing new state supported organisations to handle a temporary
job of reconstruction, would usually seem unrealistic. It is a
proverb among Iranian professionals that government can never make a
good contractor. There is evidence that projects implemented by
government based companies in practice were overrun by time and costs.
On the other hand, disaster destruction may be a booming business and
provide a unique opportunity for private companies to make huge profits
out of enormous number of projects to be built. In some countries,
present Iran for example, this may be politically and socially
unacceptable to the public.
It must be pointed, that in this respect, the situation of
developed and developing countries seems to be different. In the
former private companies are part of a system, that can temporarily
increase their capacity to meet an emergency. They may be supported by
several companies producing building materials and have access to
skills and professionals to respond quickly. (see Darwin for example).
In developing countries the situation might be very different.
Production of building material might be limited and their distribution
controlled by the government. One example was the reconstruction of
the village Jelizi in Khuzestan, that took three years to complete and
the original contractor failed to handle the job. One reason of course
was that cement, steel beams and bars were all in short supply and
their price on the black market were some ten times more than official
prices. In such a situation, the private companies are still dependent
on the government and can do little to contribute to reconstruction.
An additional point is that reconstruction projects by their
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very nature are different from normal development projects. The
professional staff of private companies may have no experience of
reconstruction and its related issues. This is likely to be one of the
primary reasons for unsuitable dwellings being built by companies after
disasters.
One should be careful in using the term 'private sector'. Since
this can be applied to big companies, as well as to an individual
builder working in housing sector. In the reconstruction of villages
in Khuzestan, a especial approach was practised. For construction of
each house the agency contacted a builder. Obviously the supply of the
materials remained the responsibility of the agency and the builder had
only to erect the structure according to the specified conditions on
the contract. After completing each house the builder if wished to
could apply for another house to build and so on.
A more imaginative method was practised in Bakhtaran Province,
Iran for the reconstruction of the bombed houses in the urban areas.
In that case the local authorities focuses on the use of the local
building industry and used small craftsmen in the process. The
authorities provided the raw materials, such as cement, steel profiles
and glass sheets to the existing local shops. In turn they were asked
to convert these materials to the components needed for the
reconstruction of the damaged houses. The householder was then
referred to these local businesses to receive the component or services
required. This was very successful since on the one hand, it involved
the local economy in a controlled manner and the prices were controlled
by local officials.
On the other hand, the authorities were directly involved in the
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construction and in turn were better able to centralise their efforts
of management and control. Such a method in rural the areas of
Khuzestan would be more difficult. The nearby cities do not have
enough artisans to take part and could not produce the massive
quantities of extra building components. In addition the
transportation of the products to the villages, and to each individual
rural householder, becomes unrealistic. However, there is still a need
to devise a modified approach of that kind, even in Khuzestan Province.
One aspect of settlement reconstruction is the way in which the
preservation of the previous settlement (legacy of the past) is
determined. Certainly in the case of the reconstruction of a city with
a historical heritage, this phenomenon becomes more important. The
design and construction becomes more difficult since the products must
be careful to harmonise with the rest of the buildings. A more
difficult decision would be the reconstruction of a monument, for
example if it has been substantially damaged and little or nothing is
left of its original fabric.
Though the cultural heritage and buildings which contain such
items such as museums are supposed to be protected by international law
from attack in war time, in the recent war the Iraqis did in fact raid
Iranian monuments several times. In Khuzestan in the city Shush, the
shrine of 'Daniale Nabi' was damaged by canon artillery. More brutal
was a planned attack on the Jame Mosque of Isfahan. They carried out
the attack at noon on a Friday, when thousands of people were gathered
for the Friday prayer. The plane aimed to shoot up the two main domes
of the mosque. In the event both were saved but instead a huge part of
the eastern part of the mosque was destroyed. Another rocket missed
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the northern dome but killed a group of Afghan refugees settling in a
nearby caravanserai there. Obviously the whole of this building, which
is known as one of the best examples of Islamic architecture all over
the world was severely shaken by the blasts and minor damage was found
in many parts of the building.
In the case of the Jame Mosque of Isfahan, the reconstruction
started promptly. Since detailed documents of the building were
available, a group of architects and engineers skilled in conservation
were able to rebuild the mosque to the correct specifications. The
decision to rebuild could have been more difficult if the mosque had
been razed to the ground.
At an urban scale we are facing similar cases as that of the
single monument. In Khuzestan for example, the city of Dezful has a
fabric that is at least a hundred years old. The whole city is built
in brick and is like a museum. It is one of the best places for
architecture students and researchers to study traditional and Islamic
architecture. During the war over a hundred missiles were dropped on
Dezful and about third of it was destroyed. Reconstruction was very
difficult because the damage was scattered all over the city. In such
a case the reconstruction became very difficult. It was not just the
form and quality of the new buildings but many other practical
difficulties were faced. There was the problem of identifying the
boundaries of each house plot, deep basements (Sardab), a traditional
feature of these houses, were filled with rubble. The large missiles
were so devastating that nothing was left of the building and its
inhabitants whatsoever. Though the families insisted on finding their
original plots in order to rebuild, the removal of the rubble on a
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house by house basis would have cost too much. So the idea was to
level the damaged area and rebuilt on top. In most cases, the new
houses were built on the same plots and with a design inspired of
traditional layout and style.
There is still a further point to raise in relation to this
issue of conservation. In our view the conservation of physical
structures, such as those traditional family houses referred to above,
also means the conservation of traditional social values. 	 In the
industrialised countries the economies are far too dependent on
increased of consumption, this is also somehow a social value.
	
In
another view consumption might be replaced by contentment.
The repair business is quite common in our countries, more than
it is the case in developed communities. We learned for instance from
our fathers, that when his suit had been used for many years, it was
re-tailored for the children. If a jacket had become faded by use,
there was a service in the city that would dye it to new colour.
Nowadays, some of these recycling practices are dying out especially
in the urban areas. But still the repair of cars and electrical
machines is very common. In Iran it is normal for a car to be fifteen
years old and very often this may go to twenty years or more. When a
car is delivered to the scarp yard of necessity all its useful parts
are removed for use in other cars.
The same philosophy, it has to be said, mainly because of
economic constraints is also applicable to housing, where the high cost
of building has encouraged householders, even in developed countries,
to develop do it yourself (DIY) techniques of repair and maintenance.
In our view this notion of repair and maintenance in place of new
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build, is applicable to the reconstruction of damaged settlements.
One example of this can be found in Khuzestan. There for
sometime, the authorities have wanted to use bulldozers to level the
remains of houses with 50% damage. Also all the mud built houses
regardless of the degree of damage were supposed to be taken down. For
the first time, in the city of Bostan we 13 adopted the policy of repair
instead of rebuild and houses that were to be razed to the ground, were
instead repaired under our supervision. We kept a detailed analysis of
the costs. The final records indicated that the cost of repairs are up
to 50% less than the cost of constructing a new house. This practice
convinced the agencies in charge of reconstruction to pursue this
policy in other cases. There was however, one major difficulty. The
technical analysis of the damaged structures was usually beyond the
ability of ordinary builders. Some degree of risk was also involved in
working in such buildings. In one case I was urgently called to the
area because of a collapsed wall which fortunately had not caused any
casualties.
The same Agency asked the University team to repair and renew
one of the mud built houses. The result cheered both the Local
Authorities and the Agency involved as well as ourselves 14 .	 The
reconstruction work, including ours, had to be stopped because of
continued heavy bombing by the Iraqis. Three years later, during my
field survey trip, I was told by the head of the District that the
owner was still concerned about our demonstration house. He felt that
13.The School of Architecture, University of Shahid Beheshti, Tehran.
14.The report of this project is published by our School entitled; 'Maramate
Elaneie Geli', 'The repair of a mud built house'. (Farsi, 1985)
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he had lost an opportunity of obtaining a new brick built house.
However, the head of the District promised to consider his case, should
the reconstruction of Bostan started again. In brief, we would like to
conclude that repair instead of rebuilding is still a sound philosophy
to apply to the war damaged areas of Iran. In cities like Khoramshahr
this could save millions of Rials.
In most instances the problem of vulnerability analysis of the
existing site of the city and other areas around it becomes one of the
major issues to be confronted. If the risk assessment endorses the
future risk of hazard in the same area, which it is likely to do since
there has already been one disaster there, then relocation of the city
may be recommended. From examples we gave in Iran, it could be
understood that the relocation of a large city has many economic and
even psychological implications. Many other social and political
constraints will also affect the decision-making. In Tangshan, for
example they not only relocated but even divided the city to three
different parts. In other cases new expansion or reduction of density
have been exercised.
Land tenure, is the other issue faced in large cities with major
damage. Private land ownership makes changes in existing situations
difficult. In addition, there are those who have not owned land before
and now require to do so. On the other hand there are the major
landlords, who usually have political power as well, and are reluctant
to lose the value of their land. 	 (see the case of Managua for
example). Along the same lines is the problem of land requisition and
acquisition by the government. In China, or Yugoslavia, since the
State is the owner of land this is not a major constraint. In other
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countries the situation could be different. (See for example the case
of Gediz and the price the Turkish government paid for the new site).
Underestimating the costs and time to reconstruct a city after
major disasters seems to be another fact. Despite the initial plan and
promises of governments to rebuild the city in five years or so, in
practice it is found to take double or triple the first target time.
(Skopje, Managua).
Rural issues- Rural communities, in developing countries, are
characterised by poverty and subsistence. Despite the housing issue
which will be examined in the following section, there are quite a few
problems to be faced in their reconstruction after major disasters.
One is of course concerned with development through reconstruction.
This also exists in poor communities within urban areas. The aim of
the reconstruction programme may go further than just re-establishing
the status quo. This was one of the basic arguments in reconstructing
rural areas of Khuzestan. However, this is often difficult in practice
and deserves a more detailed study which we will come to later.
Relocation of the site, for vulnerability reasons, is found to
be practised in the reconstruction of villages. The primary
consequence is the change in farmers' access to their land. It appears
that the feasibility of allocating safe land suitable for housing in
rural areas varies greatly. In villages, very often there is 'spare
land' for housing, but in Khuzestan for example, it was found that in
some villages farmland extended to the edge of houses. Farmers
therefore had to sacrifice their fertile land if they wanted to expand
their houses, something which apparently they did not want to do. (see
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for example the case of Jelizi in Khuzestan or Lice and Gediz in
Turkey).
Modernisation of the settlement is the next issue. Graded
geometrical site patterns are often substituted for 'organically grown'
old sites. This is seen as one step towards development, since in some
cases at least the villagers may have more respect for their
traditional culture and be less prepared to adopt unfamiliar changes,
this symbol of progress may in fact achieve the opposite effect and
provide an unsuitable environment for them.
Housing reconstruction issues- Davis (1978), borrowed an idea
from Dr. Fred Krimgold who suggested that ' there are three basic
approaches to shelter following a disaster'. He describes these three
strategies;
'Strategy 1- Housing survival,
Strategy 2- Filling the gap, and
Strategy 3- Accelerated reconstruction' (pp. 34-61).
Concerning the first strategy it seems to have led to confusion.
Basically it suggests that the vulnerability of communities should be
eliminated or at least mitigated before hazard strikes. The confusion
is that this might be incorporated into one of the other two
strategies, but if it is undertaken before a disaster then the earlier
quoted sentence, ' ..three basic approaches following a disaster' must
be amended. This seems to be Krimgold's original idea. [my emphasis]
The second strategy, as can be understood from Davis'
explanation, refers to the two stages of shelter recovery. Again, he
brings in examples and discusses the problems of emergency shelter and
temporary accommodation provided after disasters.	 His sharpest
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criticism is directed at donors who provide shelter, particularly the
practical failure of Western designed shelters. On the other hand he
focuses on the capability of local people to use their initiatives and
local resources in shelter provision after disasters. (pp. 39-61)
The third strategy, 'Accelerated reconstruction' as the title
itself implies, is actually a recommendation to abandon the two stage
recovery and to go straight from the relief phase to reconstruction, or
in more precise words to cut the phase of temporary accommodation as
short as possible. Davis (1978), bases his argument on some
assumptions that include; first, the construction time, especially of
poor families houses using indigenous materials, is much faster than
the time required to construct a house in a developed country. He
says; "...in a poor country house building is very rapid, and can be
thought of in terms of days, whilst in the 'developed' world it is a
matter of months" (p. 63).
The second basis of Davis' argument is, in his words;
'Another myth that colours our thinking is to imagine housing as a
static, complete entity, when in actual fact it is always evolutionary'
(p. 63). Davis is saying that in many cases a house starts with a
core, being a room or two and then gradually as more resources are
available, more spaces or services will be added to the house. (pp.
63-64) Later on Davis also refers to some empirical cases such as the
construction of '1,500 prefabricated (permanent) houses' by the Turkish
Government over a short period of eight weeks after the Lice
earthquake, (p. 65) as evidence that it is possible to build more
quickly than is usually assumed.
Davis' first argument about the reconstruction of houses among
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poor families 'in a few days' seems to be rather a sad fact. It is the
irony of disaster that for those who have no home at all, living on the
streets of Bommbay for example, a disaster will not destroy their house
as such but their livelihood will be disrupted. Many of these families
are immune to the consequences of disaster from living permanently in a
disastrous situation. The same argument applies to the majority of
people living in developing countries, some four fifth of the worlds
population.
As has been discussed, one of the problems after a disaster is
the decision about what attitude should be taken towards 'normal'
housing deficits, that existed prior to the catastrophe. In this
relation UNDRO (1982), recommends;
"Confusing the 'normal' housing deficit with that
created by a disaster. Experience indicates that
authorities undertaking reconstruction are
frequently asked to address chronic problems as
part of the reconstruction process. Thus,
pre-disaster housing deficits are added to disaster
losses and reconstruction targets. Such a policy
is probably inevitable but unrealistic, unless
additional resources of cash, land, building skills
and planning expertise are made available" (p. 44).
It is easy to recommend not confusing normal housing deficits with the
disaster induced losses. In practice, however, it becomes a very
difficult task and may create social upheaval. During the 'Susangerd'
reconstruction, while the Local Authorities were discussing how to deal
with somebody who has lost more than one house during the war, they
felt oppressed by a very simple question from families who had no room
of their own prior to the war: 'Is the Islamic Revolution in favour of
rich or poor?' It seems that the problem of housing deficit occurs
205
more in urban areas. Despite the poor quality of shelter in most rural
areas and the associated vulnerability, housing deficits are less a
problem of rural areas.
As the review Table of Case Reports shows there were many rural
disasters in Turkey. In relation to this Bayulke (1984), reviewing
post-earthquake operations in Turkey, points out that in the past most
earthquakes have occurred in rural areas or small urban centres. He
also refers to reconstruction of permanent houses after earthquakes and
claims;
"The Ministry has a stock of prefabricated wall
panels and roof elements suitable for 1,000-1,500
dwelling units. All these wall panels are built at
the central factory of the Ministry in Ankara. All
these units are light-weight one-storey elements.
The wall and roof elements for a dwelling unit of
50 square metres weighs about 4-5 tons. A 10 ton
truck can carry two units at a time. While the
houses are light for easy transportation, their
normal insulation is extremely poor. They are not
suitable for the colder and hotter regions of
Turkey, and can only be suitable for the western
and coastal parts" (p. 110).
Turkey is becoming famous for the capacity of providing a large
number of houses immediately after a catastrophe. Nevertheless,
Bayulke (1984), about the reconstructed houses provided by the Turkish
Government, said; ' ...a considerable percentage of these houses are
not used or accepted by the disaster-stricken people. There are a
number of reasons for this' (p. 113). [emphasis added] Among the
reasons he refers to are relocation of the villages, the existence of
undamaged parts of the original houses, which may encourage the owner
to return there and make use of remaining space after restoration, the
poor climatic performance of the prefabricated houses provided, the
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building of three-storey apartment blocks for villagers with animals
and the crucial fact of separating the users from the process of design
and construction. (pp. 113-114)
Bayulke is not the only one recommending the participation of
survivors in the design process. Van Essche (1984), on the same lines
writes;
"The spontaneous reconstruction of housing begins
extremely rapidly after a disaster, and often
during the emergency phase itself 	 The key to
success ultimately lies in the participation of the
local community-the survivors-in reconstruction"
(pp. 167-168).
Survivors participation in the design and construction process in
practice seems not to be an easy task, since, it is time consuming,
which in the race against time after a disaster is a great obstacle to
the argument for such an approach. In any case, we explore this
subject elsewhere in this dissertation. Van Essche (1984), also refers
to accountability and the rising expectation of survivors, an issue
frequently repeated by others. 	 His other conclusions are exactly
what can be found in the concluding section of the UNDRO (1982) book.
Cuny (1981a), reviews the major problems occurring in
post-disaster housing provision from an intervenors' view point. His
major point is that housing is a complex process and agencies attempt
to simplify this process by providing units. His recommendation is to
conduct the housing projects in accordance with the normal housing
process. (pp. 3-4)
Another point he raises is understanding housing in the context
of development of the community and not to perceive it as a separate
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event. He also recommends that housing after disaster should be
supplied in the same manner as the development projects. Bottom-up
approaches and so on must be considered. (p. 4) This is more evidence
for the importance of exploring the relationships between
reconstruction and development.
Cuny (1981a), also refers to 	 'Real opportunities' after
disaster. He writes;
"It is often casually accepted that a disaster
provides an opportunity to create change, not only
in housing but also in the social and economic
standards of a community. This is often one of the
prime reasons, in fact, why organisations attempt
to deliver so called 'modern' housing systems and
materials in the post disaster period. However,
recent evidence suggests that the real
opportunities for change are extremely limited" (p.
5).
This subject requires further investigation, since there are a series
of contradictory claims for it. (see for example UNDRO 1977 or Drabek
1986)) we will develop this in Chapter VI.
Davis (1981), reviews some of the key issues of housing after
disaster. He divides the key issues into three main categories; 'The
survivors' viewpoint'. 'The vulnerability of settlements'. and 'The
role of intervenors.'(p.	 13)	 Under the 'Survivors viewpoints', he
raises	 the issues of 'Coping abilities'	 of survivors, 'rising
expectations',	 and	 'Survivors priorities' as opposed to the
intervenors priorities. (p. 14)
In relation to 'The vulnerability of settlements' he talks about
'Relevance to low income housing', 'Trade-offs', by which he means that
vulnerable families have many problems greater than shelter. He also
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refers to 'New settlements' and writes;
"The application of the principles of safe
construction are enforceable only to a rapidly
reducing sector of low income housing. They are
still applicable to middle income housing and high
investment constructions" (p. 14).
Different approaches and methods used for reinforcement of the
new buildings is another issue which deserves more comprehensive study
and one of the following sections of this chapter is designated for
this purpose.
Other issues such as the consequences of the relocation of
settlements and land tenure are also among the issues he discusses.
(pp.	 14-15) We have already raised and commented on these issues the
case reports In relation to the intervenor, Davis (1981a) argues
that the first problem is that they are not usually accountable to
survivors, also that intervenors have their 'own values' of housing,
which are different from those of the users and that they lack
'...knowledge of Third World housing' problems and the '...long term
development'. He writes;
"The traditional role of agencies has been 'first
aid'. The problem with such a policy in the
housing sector is that they are acting (perhaps
unwittingly) in a 'development', not a 'relief'
context. Agencies have only rarely accepted the
responsibility of long term commitment with the
groups they seek to help, and they only rarely
consider the long term consequence of their
emergency intervention" (p. 19).
He also adds that agencies occasionally have pre-disaster involvement
in the area. However, there is evidence that this pre-disaster
involvement and familiarity is a key to success for post-disaster
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housing projects, especially when the community approach is
implemented. (p. 19)
Ressler (1981), has written a very important and useful article
about accountability in post-disaster activities. He believes that the
participation of the users in all stages is the key to success of the
programmes. He explores in great detail the reasons why the agencies
do not feel accountable to the victims of a disaster. (pp. 145-149)
Oliver (1981), focuses on the points Davis has already raised
namely that the 'survivors view point' is different from that of the
intervenors. The argument is very clear and many examples were found
in the case reports reviewed. The new houses are often provided in a
form that does not meet the users needs, habits and values. They might
be both functionally and culturally unacceptable. (see for example.
Gediz, or Qir reconstructions)
	
Oliver (1981), writes about the
cultural context of post-disaster operations and activities.
	 He
writes; 'A town is made of buildings, but a community is made of
people; a house is a structure but a home is much more' (p. 41).	 He
then continues to identify the reasons;
"By far the majority of victims of disasters are
the poor, while those who are engaged in the study
of disasters, in the planning and implementation of
relief and in the designing or rebuilding of
appropriate shelter are from the more privileged
classes" (p. 39).
Oliver's argument is a reminder of what Robert Chamber (1983), claims
about rural poverty and urban bias.
Wenger (1984), after the 1980 earthquake which '...hit the
regions of...southern Italy', is in favour of keeping the originality
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of the reconstructed settlement. He claims;
"We believe that prefabricated housing is justified
following an earthquake particularly in the field
of public and social buildings.... However, we
feel that conventional construction work is in many
respects the only way to properly reconstruct
living quarters" (p. 19).
Norton (1980), who is a former Oxfam Field Director explains his
general views about 'Disasters and Settlement'. Being a member of an
agency he attempts to give recommendations to donor agencies. He
recommends agencies concentrate their efforts in areas where access is
possible and that they work in co-operation with, or inside an existing
local agency to avoid duplication.
Concerning emergency shelter, his observation is that rural
victims are particularly able to cope with their needs in one way or
another. In the reconstruction phase he also advises agencies to keep
the local people involved in all stages of reconstruction and as for
decision-making, to leave it to the users. His emphasis is that after
the agency has left the area the community must be able to cope with
its future needs in terms of provision and maintenance of shelter.
(339-347)
This preference for the previous settlement and location has
strong psychological implications, which we have developed in a later
chapter. It is interesting to quote the observations of Quarantelli
(1982), in the context of American post-disaster housing;
"It does appear that the vast majority of evacuees
return to their old location, often rebuilding on
the same spot they occupied in pre-impact times.
However, this seems more true of home owners than
renters. ... Overall, it does appear that the kind
of permanent housing which will be developed in a
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community after a major disaster is related to the
pre-disaster housing situation and the influence of
various local interest and power groups" (pp.
279-280).
So far a review of major issues faced in the reconstruction phase has
been made. The case reports and other authors conclusions both
highlight some recurring problems and issues to be addressed. We have
also identified the problem of reinforcement of new buildings to be an
important area of interest. In the following section we explore it in
some detail.
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4-3- Technical innovation for building reinforcement- It is
known that one of the major reasons for building collapse in a disaster
situation is the poor quality of the materials and techniques used,
such as adobe structures. After a disaster, one of the primary goals
is usually to mitigate the next hazard by constructing strong
buildings. In some countries this seems to be simple. New building
codes are issued and new resistant materials and techniques developed
to ensure any new buildings will withstand the next disaster. (See for
example the case of Darwin)
In many others, however, the situation is different. The access
of all the survivors, to new resistant materials and techniques is not
always possible. The economic situation of the country as well as many
other circumstances often do not allow the introduction of such speedy
and comprehensive innovations. Moreover, the literature also points to
another consequential factor that might arise when materials, designs
and techniques are imported. That is the long-term dependency it
creates and the unfamiliarity of users with these imported, presumably
western materials and techniques. The same problem may exist even when
introducing urban housing systems into rural areas within the same
country. (See for example, the case of Gediz)
We have the technology to build constructions resistant to most
disasters, but as has been discussed the transfer of this technology
and the costs involved, make the process difficult if not impossible.
For instance, Mayo (1988), has produced 'Cyclone-resistant houses for
developing countries'. Recommendations on appropriate site location as
well as construction details are provided. However, there remains the
application of these techniques and recommendations to the real context
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of developing countries.
These obstacles are felt by many intervenors and a new more
appropriate idea for vulnerable poor or low-income families of the
developing world is slowly developing. Rather than introducing
wholesale change, modification in pre-disaster techniques and materials
is being looked for. The best idea along these lines is the training
and educational programme that we will elaborate in the next section.
There is evidence that the reinforcement of traditional
buildings against hazardous forces and conditions is not a new idea.
Many techniques have been developed in the past for this purpose. The
use of wooden braces in mud structures in Iran has a long history. In
this context Mathur (1984), introduces many examples of traditional
approaches to increasing buildings' resistance against earthquakes in
India, including walls, roofs etc. (pp. 129-131)
Lamping (1984), examines the usefulness of 'indigenous sources
for post-disaster housing'.	 His argument is that;
"A reconstruction project using all indigenous
sources at disposal will certainly not need all the
money donated by foreign countries. Thus saved
funds could be used to build up an effective
infrastructure (f.i. schools, roads) and to
ameliorate the agricultural structure" (p. 113).
The argument of Lamping (1984), seems logical. It is a reminder of El
Asnam earthquake where many public buildings, including schools,
collapsed.	 It seems that giving higher priority to public centres is
a correct conclusion.
Improving the resistance of existing housing stock is not
completely peculiar to the developing world. For instance, Durkin
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(1984), discusses the issues concerned with 'Improving seismic safety
in unreinforced masonry buildings'. His major information source of
concern is the United States, where many masonry buildings still exist.
(PP . 553-557)
Razani (1981), explains comprehensively about the methods and
problems of earthquake resistant adobe and masonry buildings. He
brings in evidence that the research in this field has not been enough
and that it is an urgent task, since millions of people of the
developing countries are at risk of losing their lives. (pp. 123-132)
Spence and Coburn (1987), have written about their research on
approaches to reinforced stone structures, that are an expression of
Turkish vernacular architecture. They introduce a summary of the
increase in cost of buildings in earthquake zones to different degrees
of safety. This might mount up to 66% of the original costs without
reinforcement. (p. 292) [emphasis added]
Sturm (1984), proposes a design for modifying the traditional
housing in rural Turkey. He claims that the Turkish government
rejected their project without reason. (p. 60) Their suggestion is to
add a separate wooden structure of posts to bear the roof made of
corrugated iron sheets and covered in mud. (pp. 57-60) Although there
was not enough information with their sketches, the first impression
from their drawings was that there was no real disaster situation and
at best they only thought of building resistance and cost.
Minke (1984), introduces the 'Bamboo reinforced rammed earth
technique' which was experimented with in Guatemala during 1977 and
1978. He claims this is a cheap approach to earthquake resistant
construction. (pp. 105-108)
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Besides the reinforcement of indigenous materials and building
techniques some attempted to introduce the notion of mass production as
well.	 Kurowia (1984), introduces a project of 'Prefabricated Quincha
construction'. He says; " A method for housing construction has been
developed using prefabricated wood and bambu [bamboo] panels improving
a traditional Peruvian construction named Quincha" (p. 115). This is
"A traditional Peruvian construction using wood
bambu, mud and straw named Quincha has been
improved by the use of modern ideas of
prefabrication, mass production, quality control,
rationalisation in the use of non-skilled labour
...in addition to use local, abundant and cheap
materials, and low initial investment for the
'industrial plant'" (p. 121).
Salim Ullah (1988), introduces a project of Cyclone-Surge
Resistant Housing in Bangladesh. He claims;
"Construction of [unsuitable] large community
shelters, ....The reluctance to leave dwellings to
go to a community shelter suggests the need for
cyclone surge resistant houses to avoid population
movement at the verge of a surge" (p. 46).
He also argues that;
...any protection by dykes, of individual
homesteads, is not economically feasible. Keeping
in line with their living habit it is proposed that
homesteads should be organised in a cluster around
a community water body.. with agricultural land
around each cluster. In deciding on the number of
homesteads in each cluster, it is to be kept to the
minimum in view of the existing attitude of the
settlers to remain isolated from each other" (p.
46)
In terms of costs of the houses he admits that, '...consideration of
maximum wind and surge loading in a low-bearing capacity soil,
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determined through laboratory tests, made the houses prohibitively
costly" (p. 48). [emphasis added] He suggests usage of a reinforced
concrete frame and corrugated iron sheets for roofing.
Besides the development of new techniques for reinforcement of
buildings some attempts have been made to repair the damage to the
existing stock of buildings. This is a very useful approach but
nevertheless difficult. The statistical analysis of the damage the
building has received makes it difficult to assure its future strength.
In Khuzestan it was observed that the main policy towards damaged
buildings was to clear them and to rebuild again. That would mean the
loss of all the valuable materials. One problem in that situation was
to convince the authorities about the cost efficiency and usefulness of
restoration techniques. The other problem, of course, was to find
skilled people capable of carrying out restoration jobs. That made the
restoration approach very limited.
Dartsch (1984), introduces 'Repair of building structures by
concrete-techniques'. (pp. 153-160) Obviously these techniques are
only viable in those countries where enough machinery and specialised
tools, as well as skilled people are available. Generally the idea of
repair instead of reconstruction is very significant.
Formis and Giovannozzi (1981), also introduce 'Methods of
restoration and aseismic adjustment of masonry buildings'. (pp.
877-906)
Davis (1975a), explains about 'Stack sack', which was used after
the Managua earthquake of 1972.
"This is a system developed by an American
engineering firm, Dicker Stack International,. ..The
system is very simple. A sand-bag is filled with
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cement and is dipped into a tub of water. The bags
are then laid, stretcher bind in a concrete
foundation, 8. Small 8 inch mild steel bars are
then skipped into the wet sand-bags. The next row
of sacks spikes onto the vertical bars. The final
stage is spraying the surface with cement render.
A great advantage of the system that it can be
erected by an unskilled labour force" (p. 44).
So far, a series of technical reinforcement approaches experienced in
different disaster situations have been reviewed. Wherever
modification of indigenous buildings is concerned, the idea is also for
the survivors themselves or at least local builders to build the units.
One major approach has been the training of ordinary families or local
builders and masons in the new techniques. In the following section we
review some of these projects to see what the issues involved were.
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4-4- Training and education- Holt (1981), in 'Some Observation
with Non-Literal Communities', has discussed briefly problems of
communicating with non-literate peoples in the third world. He writes;
" Attitudes to disaster housing are changing.
There is increased emphasis on helping victims of
flood or earthquake to help themselves in
rebuilding dwellings, as opposed to providing
complete, pre-fabricated units" (p. 87).
Cuny (1983), on the same subject claims;
"In earthquake reconstruction, there are three
basic possibilities for housing assistance to
victims. First, to provide people with the
resources, money, or materials to rebuild; second,
to provide a replacement house for the one
destroyed; or third, to work within the usual
system for building houses and teach better
building methods" (p. 182).
Cuny (1983), introduces a case study of a reconstruction program
from Guatemala which was implemented after the 1976 earthquake. He
writes;
"The three things that made Programa Kuchuba'l
unique were the high degree of citizens
participation and involvement at all levels of the
program, the educational component, and the
sophisticated strategies for utilising project
funds" (p. 179).
Cuny (1983), continues;
" The housing education programme that developed
was the first attempt to use housing education as
an approach to reconstruction following a major
disaster.	 It was unique in giving priority to
long-term objectives.	 The use of low-cost
indigenous materials and support of the normal
building	 'profession' and processes were also
unique and key elements" (p. 182)[ my emphasis]
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It is important to see why this shift from providing reconstructed
units to the training and educational programmes has taken place. In
relation to this Cuny (1983), admits; 'The realisation that relief
agencies did not have the resources to build houses for everybody
contributed to the decision to undertake a housing education program'
(p. 192).
The main component of this program has been training the local
builders or young people interested in training for a job. Cuny (1983)
evaluating the 'contribution' of the 'Programa Kuchba'1' identifies the
two short-term and long-term contributions. He says; 'In the
short-term, the program helped alleviate the burden of reconstruction
by providing materials that reduced the overall cost of rebuilding' (p.
189). He also continues;
"The long-term contribution is also clear.
Throughout the program, development objectives were
stressed and, especially for those involved
directly in the various project activities,
permanent new opportunities were provided.
Spin-off activities, such as the road improvement
project, contributed to other development
objectives, especially in the economic sector.
Contracting the cooperatives as the agent for the
materials distribution program helped to strengthen
these institutions and enhanced their standing in
the community. Finally, Programa Kuchuba'l has
helped to reduce the vulnerability of the people to
a future earthquake disaster by improving stock and
developing the capacity of the local builders to
construct safer housing" (pp. 189-190).
Obviously Cuny has taken the concept of development objectives very
simply. His judgements on both short-term and long-term effects of the
programme they executed in Guatemala are only based on his personal
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ideas and he does not give any reliable data as evidence for such
success.	 In fact it is the Guatemalan users whose views really matter
for such a judgement.
Mckay (1981), talks about the same educational and training
programme in Guatemala after the earthquake of 1976. Repeating the
same observations, perhaps in more detail, under 'Lessons learned' she
writes;
"1- Reconstruction of permanent housing has
proceeded at a much slower pace than anyone
involved with the programme expected. A
preliminary study of 20 villages in San Martin
Jilotepeque showed that only 18.2% of the
population had reconstructed a permanent house 2
years and 2 months after the earthquake. (Most of
the people are still living in corn cane houses and
other temporary structures).
The housing education programme is dedicated to the
principle of self-determination and letting the
people decide their own priorities including when
they feel they can reconstruct a permanent
dwelling. Thus the programme has had to wait for
the people to get ready and there have been fewer
new houses to influence than originally
anticipated.
2. With an educational programme such as this one
can feel the pressure to measure success in the
traditional terms of how many houses are rebuilt in
a given amount of time...
3. Temporary houses, such as the small wooden
houses provided in the department of Chimaltenango
by the Red Cross have inhibited the construction of
more permanent and formal housing..." (p. 101).
She also adds other issues such as the need to do more research on
education materials, the need for a structural engineer standby to give
advice and so forth. (p. 101) One of the most interesting
observations she reports relates to the rising expectations of the
local people. She claims that;
"In rural Guatemala there has been a problem
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related	 to rising expectations after the
earthquake. Expensive materials are considered
synonymous with safe materials. Everyone wants a
cement block house whether or not he can afford it
or even if it would not be a reasonable housing
solution considering where he lives. Thus there
are cement block houses being built without the
necessary (and expensive) steel reinforcement by
people who know nothing about working with cement"
(pp. 101-102).
Chisholm (1979), has written his dissertation about rural
housing in Bangladesh with special reference to post-disaster housing.
His dissertation includes an appendix on an educational chart programme
produced by S.F.C.A. (Swedish Free Church Aid). Mainly it is an
approach for the use of illustrations for teaching non-educated persons
how to use their own locally available materials. It shows the ways in
which bamboo can be treated to lost longer and also the ways in which
the poor rural families can strengthen their newly built shelters with
some additional elements such as wind braces. It is quite interesting
because it was produced many years before the Dhamar educational and
training programme by Oxfam in Yemen. (pp. 126-147)
Abedini Rad (1983), reports from a training scheme he has been
involved in after the earthquake of 1978 in Tabas, Iran. The idea of
self-help was in his mind when he started with two families to modify
their existing traditional rural techniques to make seismic resistant
buildings. However, he did not provide detailed information about the
training methods and materials he used for this purpose. Finally, he
admitted that although some interest to be involved was shown by
neighbours, the project ended in its 'pilot stage' because of financial
shortages. (p. 62-63) In our view, convincing the Authorities of the
use of a training programme is not easy. This relates to the
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psychology of disaster and the position and role the Authorities may
see for themselves. It is likely that the disaster damage be perceived
by them more as material damage and therefore they may have a strong
desire to see that building, and perhaps strong and modern building is
under construction.
Leslie (1987), introduces an educational programme he has been
involved with in Yemen after the earthquake of 1982. He was there as
a member of staff of Oxfam and the author met him twice in London and
Oxford to exchange ideas about our experiences. He is an architect
graduated from Cambridge and has also worked with Coburn from the
Martin Centre in Cambridge.
From this project Leslie published several articles. The first
in March 1984 in a conference in Zurich, the second in 1986 in
Disasters/10/3/1986.	 The third publication was in Open House
International Vol.12.No.3. 1987. Meanwhile Leslie and Coburn have
also produced a report for Oxfam in November 1985 entitled; 'Dhamar
Building Education Project, Project Assessment'.
The idea of this training approach to reconstruction was very
simple, instead of supplying building materials or building anything
the training of local masons was started in new building techniques
designed to withstand the next earthquake. This programme was
especially interesting because of the need to use teaching techniques
and materials suitable for illiterate people. They experimented
several materials, including posters and drawings, photographs and even
video. The demonstration of techniques was found very effective in
teaching and persuading the local people to adopt the new technique.
Leslie confessed that one major large problem with this approach was,
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that those families who benefited most from this programme were the
better off families. The poor simply could not pay for extra costs of
materials for reinforcement and hire a trained builder.
The 1987 earthquake of Ecuador is among the most recent
disasters for which reconstruction reports are available. As Dudley
(1987 & 1988), reports they did make use of a training programme partly
because there were problems of transporting building materials to the
affected areas, he writes;
"From the start we excluded the possibility of
'providing' new model houses because:*-it would be
too expensive * - the population is so dispersed
that any project involving bringing in large
quantities of cement, blocks and steel would be
impractical * -it would take far too long * -it
would be socially divisive. Thus we wanted to help
primarily through 'enabling' actions and
education" (p. 62).
Dudley (1988), confesses that he was inspired by the Yemen training
programme. (p. 114) He writes;
"The offer had four components:	 * -building
education * -a tool kit for each community
-a salary for a master builder in each community
for six months, and * -a standard contribution of
roofing materials to each of the affected
families" (p. 114).
Their reconstruction programme was based on moulding the corner of the
mud walls by a trained builder and leaving the straight parts of the
walls were built by the families themselves. Also training was given
in how make stronger roofs. (pp. 62-65)
Dudley's conclusion from their modest approach is as follows;
" We have learnt that with outside support but not
external control, and with limited technical
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objectives the people can achieve great things.
The character and long term presence and
perspective of CAAP in the affected zone made this
particular reconstruction programme possible. A
team of four people in CAAP, with occasional
technical advice from Centro Sinchaguasin, helped
the people of 80 communities build 1,500 of the
1,700 damaged homes in six months" (p. 120)15
One of the major issues faced in training programmes is the
communication with illiterate or semi-literate peoples. Bowers (1981),
in relation to this has written 'Some Thoughts on communication'. He
claims;
"There is a tendency to assume that written
materials are more or less useless in largely
illiterate communities, and that pictures are more
effective.	 There are three fallacies in this
seemingly logical argument. In the first place
there are very few communities in the modern world
which do not contain a smattering of literate
members who are ready to interpret the written word
to their illiterate brethren.	 Secondly the
understanding of drawings, photographs, etc. is
largely a learnt skill and research in many
countries has revealed that illiterate and
semi-illiterate adults have serious problems in
interpreting two-dimensional representations of
three dimensional realities. This phenomenon is
sometimes known as 'visual illiteracy'*. Thirdly
here is the difficulty of representing reality in
drawings, or indeed in photographs, and the
difficulty of finding people with the necessary
skill to communicate with the visually illiterate"
(PP . 93-94).
Windass (1981), reports from the reconstruction programme
following the 1977 Cyclone in Andhra Pradesh. Initially he explains
about some customs and beliefs associated with the traditional
construction of shelters. (p. 103) Then he writes;
15 . See John Turners book 'Freedom to Build', 1972.
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"The Appropriate Reconstruction Training and
Information Centre (ARTIC) was established in mid
December 1977 to fulfil a need expressed by many
voluntary agencies for an organisation which should
provide the following services.
A forum for exchange of ideas amongst agencies.
Information, technical advice and education on
housing, especially concerning policy issues and
ways to make traditional houses safer against
winds..." (p. 105).
Later he explains how they trained existing village carpenters and also
explains about the training materials they used, including Cartoon
books, Wall poster and Booklets. (pp. 107-108) He claims that;
"The modification represents an increase of about
5% in the total cost of a house or 10 days' wages,
a not insignificant sum, and for people living a
day to day survival existence the long term
benefits compared with today's expenditure may not
prove acceptable" (p. 108).
In brief it can be said that establishing training and educational
programmes as an approach to reconstruction of permanent houses is
becoming fashionable in the poor communities of the developing world.
Despite the problems of communication with ordinary and mostly
illiterate peoples the main idea is to improve the performance of
locally available materials or to teach the appropriate use of newly
provided materials. Two different groups might be trained; either the
local builders and masons or members of most affected families.
In the case of Bangladesh for instance the programme aimed to
educate all families and persuade them to strengthen their new
buildings, by showing them how it is possible to do it. In Dhamar and
Ecuador, on the other hand, the idea has been to train the existing
local builders or to train new masons. In both cases the problem of
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affordability of the modifications will remain. In the second case,
the additional problem is that many rural families can not afford to
hire a builder, be he trained one or untrained.
However, training programmes have a big advantage for the
intervenors, since they do not require material and cash imports on a
large scale and they can run such a programme with just a few staff.
Although in some instances the education programme has incorporated
distribution of new building materials free or subsidised. All in all,
it appears that education programmes have the big advantage of
producing something; 'the skill' which remains in the community in the
long term.
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Conclusion: We are not going to summarise all the issues which
have arisen through this long chapter about settlement reconstruction.
Instead, we feel that a general personal impression would work better.
A review of the literature on post-disaster housing
reconstruction over a period of two and a half decades, reveals a total
shift in the attitude and policies of agencies and their supportive
scholars. This is especially true in the context of the developing
world. In sharp contrast to the goodwill of those who seek the bliss
of 'One World', there is concrete evidence that 'north' and 'south', in
terms of disaster have two different stories. To give an impression
of the reality, in the northern hemisphere, in terms of emergency
shelter, it is the question of the quality of 'mobile homes' that is
scrutinised. In the south, however, the 'resourcefulness' of survivors
is the major issue after a disaster and they must take refuge in shacks
set up from the salvaged materials of their previous hut or mud house.
Call it a process of consciousness, or call it being cynical, as
evidence of defeat and failure to see an effective response, this shift
in policies has taken place as a change from 'idealism' to 'realism'.
Implications of this total shift can be identified in all aspects of
reconstruction. In terms of development, it is a shift from creating
the 'utopian community' after disaster to the re-establishment of the
'status quo'. The Bengali rural survivors of the 1988 flood are
awaiting the flood of 1989 to test their fate, and the squatter
settlers of 'Rio' hoping the sloping ravine their shelters are built on
will be kind for another year. On the same line Ecuadorian rural
inhabitants live in hope of high performance of their 'earthen corner
moulded' rooms.
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There has been a shift in technology, from mass production of
prefabricated 'quality controlled' units, to reinforcing masonry
structures and finally under the blessing of 'appropriate technology'
to 'stabilised earth'. In terms of material policy, it is a shift
from steel and concrete to rammed earth and bamboo. From the design
aspect a shift from 'modern' or 'western' design to traditional and
vernacular layout. In terms of intervenors' aid a shift from providing
a completed unit to limiting the donors' role, to establishing
'training and educational' construction programmes.
	
From capital
intensive approaches to purely cheap managerial intervention.
The literature is full of repeated stories, whether in Turkey or
Iran, Latin America or India. The scenario is like this; An
earthquake, flood or hurricane strikes a group of poor communities.
The news of the disaster is followed by an appeal for antibiotics and
tents. The government establishes a headquarters from which to operate
the relief and rescue. The dead are buried, those injured treated,
survivors evacuated or they remain inside the rubble and messages from
the government announce that a totally new and modern settlement will
be built.
Time passes quickly. Years after, visitors report that some of
the survivors are still living in temporary shelter waiting for the
reconstruction angels to come one day and do something for them. Those
who were luckier and their settlement has been reconstructed are
complaining because of the dislocation of their village. Their access
to farms or jobs becomes troublesome. The houses provided are too
small, so they cannot keep their animals, neither have they succeeded
in finding an answer to the simple question of how to keep cows and
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sheep in an 'apartment building'. Rooms are like saunas in the summer
and like refrigerators in the winter. Roofs leak, joints open and rain
and wind penetrate the houses. The design does not match the
traditional life style and the householder does not find room for his
extended family. Many houses are not occupied and many of those
occupied are abandoned, those left are altered or modified by mud and
bamboo structures. And unlike the time before the disaster, the
community is no longer able to cope with its shelter needs. No doubt
if this disaster had struck one of the so-called industrialised
countries the story would be substantially different.
As this discussion had preceded promises were given that some of
the outstanding issues would be elaborated in more detail. In addition
to a section on 'War as a disaster' with a focus on rural issues, the
following subjects will be studied in more detail in the following
sections of the present study;
1-Development and reconstruction.
2-The opportunity to introduce change after a disaster.
3-People's participation in the reconstruction period.
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CHAPTER V
DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT'
"Let's not fool ourselves, after a disaster is the
most difficult time to work for long term
development but it may also be the most important
time." ( Cuny, Disasters and the Small Dwelling pp.
196-197)
Introduction: When reconstruction of rural areas in Khuzestan
Province started, the authorities debated whether the damaged villages
should return more or less to their previous situation, or whether some
improvement should be incorporated in reconstruction programmes.
Evidence suggests that this issue has been one of the major
preoccupations concerning several cases of reconstruction after
disasters and it is one of the tasks that the present study needs to
come to a conclusion about.
The author attended Development courses in the Politics
Department because he felt this issue was so significant. 2
 For the
study of this topic more than a hundred pages notes and	 reports were
produced on different aspects of development theories,
	 rural
development and so forth.
In the study of the connection between disasters and
development, three major observations can be mentioned;
a- The relationship between the development level of a
society and the occurrence of disasters.
b- The effects of disaster on the development of the community.
c- Developmental objectives in the 'relief and reconstruction'
period.
1.Part of the content of this chapter is included in a published paper by th
author in an article named; 'Reconstruction and Development'. Open House
International Vol, 13 No.3. 1988.
2.Most lectures and tutorials were given by Dr, Adrian Leftwich.
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5-1- Disasters and the degree of development- Most natural
disasters occur in so called Underdeveloped or Third World countries.
Davis and Seitz (1982), 'claimed;
"Numerous commentaries claim that disasters in
general are more frequent or more severe (or both)
in underdeveloped than developed countries.
According to a 1972 (UNDRO) study cited by Ball
(1979), 90% of some 300 disasters surveyed occurred
in Third World areas" (p. 555).
Anderson (1985), writes;
"An UNDRO study in 1976 estimated that 95% of
disaster-related deaths occur among the 66% of the
world's population that lives in the developing
countries... .between the 1960's and 1970's, while
the number of natural disasters increased by 50%,
the number of deaths from these disasters increased
by 600%! Similarly, while the average annual death
toll from natural disasters in Japan is 63, in Peru
it is 2,900" (p. 46) (see also Cuny 1983, p. 3)
As another example we also refer to Shah (1983), whose study
found that 'average loss of life per disaster impact' (between
1947-1980) in North America was 32, while the same figure for Asia
accounts for 2,412 deaths. (p. 209) During the same period 1,054,090
people perished in Asia alone, compared with the relatively minor
figure of 11,531 people in North America. (p. 206)
Having discussed the concept of vulnerability and its roots in
the socio-economic status of the community in one of the previous
Chapters, it is clear that the poor suffer most from disasters. In
other words, vulnerability to hazards can be defined as one of many
consequences of poverty and underdevelopment.
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5-2- Disaster impact on development- Whatever our definition of
development, though this is crucial, it is also clear that disasters
do destroy some of the resources, material and non material, necessary
for the development of the community. Disasters can kill or injure
people, damage or destroy infrastructure, buildings, industries etc.
Some of these losses, human lives for instance, are not replaceable,
where as the replacement of material losses will consume extra
resources which could have been spent on the improvement of the same
community.
Some people have attempted to illustrate the relationship
between disaster and development in a graphic way. For example,
Schramm (1985), introduces 'a three dimensional model showing the
disaster development continuum', and the 'temporary break' disaster
causes in the ongoing development of the community. (p. 42) Anderson
(1985), also briefly introduces the 'Cuny - Beaumontmobius Strip'. (p.
50) The same concept is also explored by Cuny (1985) and its summary
reported by the editor of the journal. (p. 27)
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5-3- Reconstruction and development- Besides the two previous
facts,
	
a third point has emerged from disaster relief and
reconstruction in developing countries.	 Many communities once
supported by relief or aid, were found to be susceptible to further
catastrophes. Bangladesh is such an example, for despite decades of
help from various agencies, it is still regularly troubled by new
disasters, particularly floods. This has led to a new understanding of
disasters.	 Instead of perceiving them as separate and individual
events, they must be considered in a broader context. It was thought
that if the relief and reconstruction efforts were addressed the roots
of poverty and underdevelopment, the degree of vulnerability would
'automatically' diminish. Whether or not this is possible, to what
extent and what obstacles are confronted is the theme of the present
section. (see for instance, Cuny, 1983, p. 15)
Along the same line, intervenors gradually became aware that in
many cases, their short term help, had negative effects in the long
term on the communities concerned. Very often surviving communities
became dependent on aid and their previous coping ability was not only
not enhanced but was weakened. For example, Mirren (1985), refers to
the role of engineering in disaster response and his main point is that
for the sake of long term development, it would be more convenient to
use 'labour based' approaches instead of technological ones. (pp.
96-97)
Frequently even the primary objectives of reconstruction were
not achieved. There are abundant examples of houses supposedly
reconstructed to withstand further disaster which when finished, were
found to have little more resistance when tested in another hazard.
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(See for example D'Souza 1986) These observations encouraged the
agencies to review their approaches. In fact this is the main theme of
Cuny's 1983 book 'Disasters and Development'. Part of this book
reads;
"The disaster and the havoc that it causes form
only one part of the picture. The ways in which
agencies respond to disasters and the implications
of that response for the development of the
affected countries are of major concern, for
inappropriate response, constituting a second
disaster, occur frequently" (p. 89).
Thus there seem to be two major questions to answer: first, how is it
possible to reduce or ideally eliminate any negative effects of relief
and reconstruction efforts, and secondly, what chance is there of
incorporating developmental objectives in reconstruction after
disaster? Or, to what extent can reconstruction programmes address the
fundamental necessities of the stricken community? In this section we
explore some of the relevant basic issues.
What is development?
["Everybody wants development, but what does it mean?"]
(Todaro, 1985, p. 61)
Disaster literature is confused about the meaning and therefore,
the objectives of development. It is surprising that Cuny in
'Disasters and Development' 1983, while giving a good analysis of
hazards and their impacts on communities, has not designated a separate
section to define what he means by development in the first instance.
At one point he writes; '...development:stronger housing, better
agriculture,	 a more diversified economy,
	 and more responsive
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governments" (p. 13). In another place in the same book Cuny claims;
'Development; the modernisation of a society' (p. 262) If Cuny thought
that the concept of development was universally agreed upon, he could
be mistaken.
The 'Conference Findings' in 'Disasters and the Small Dwelling'
reads;
"It was apparent that various speakers and
delegates had different understandings of the
nature of 'development', and also on the issue
whether or not disasters provided any 'unique
opportunities' for development activities by relief
agencies" (p. 196).
We would like to claim that such a confusion is not restricted
to disaster studies or agencies involved in relief and reconstruction,
but has been a matter of continuous debate for decades among
development scholars. What is significantly important is that not
having a clear understanding of the definition of development in the
first instance, could only lead to a series of misconceptions in
discussions and conclusions there after. In our view these
misconceptions are apparent in much disaster literature.
"It matters little how much information we possess about development if
we have not grasped its inner meaning. Denis Goulet, The Cruel
Choice" (quoted by Todaro 1985, p. 61) [emphasis added]
In 1984 an 'Institute' was organised, sponsored by Harvard
University's School of Education to discuss the topic of 'Disasters and
Development', which its proceedings was published as a supplement to
'Disasters Journal' in 1985. 	 The supplement included several useful
articles,	 one of them represents an adventurous definitions of
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development proposed by Mary B. Anderson (1985) in that 'Institute'.
Her explicit idea is manifested in the following phrase;
-Disasters are indicators of the failure of development -Development is
the process of reducing vulnerability to disasters' (p. 46). She then
continues to analyse this definition in more depth, saying;
Individuals and societies may be vulnerable in three areas: the
material, the organisational and the socio psychological' (p. 46).
In terms of 'material invulnerability' she claims that there is
a minimum that everybody needs to survive: the so called basic needs.
"Material vulnerability is reduced when resources
for meeting basic human needs are sufficient both
for present consumption and for sustaining a
community through a non-productive period which
might be caused by a crisis event" (p. 47).
Obviously there are many debates about that 'minimum sufficient for
meeting basic needs' can actually mean. (see for example, Stewart
1985, pp. 2-5 and Lisk, 1985, p. 23)
What Anderson later tries to explain is that in terms of
material vulnerability, not only are the poor vulnerable, but also
those who have too much wealth. They may be more vulnerable than poor
families and communities. In another word, the poor families may lose
less because they do not have much at all. She argues that we have
not succeeded eliminating vulnerability to technological disasters and
in that sense, modern life is in some respects more hazardous than the
old life. She also raises the issue of dependency, associated with
technology transfer to developing countries, as a kind of new
vulnerability. (P. 47) 	 Her statement is a reminder of Schumacher's
237
small and beautiful world.3
Concerning organisational vulnerability she then claims;
"The organisational capacity to cope with crises is
of equal importance to the material/resources
-based capacity. A poor community which is closely
knit and neighbourly may withstand or recover from
a natural hazard more effectively than a wealthier
community where social and political suspicions and
divisions exist" (p. 47). [my emphasis]
The theme of organisations and institutions and their role in coping
with crises in the community, has also been raised and highlighted by
others. Cuny (1983), clearly emphasises this matter and Dudley (1988)
was also concerned about this subject when he entitled his article
'Strong Buildings or Strong Institutions?'.
Anderson then confesses that institutional strengthening is not
simple. She claims;
"While both development and emergency relief
programmes may directly address material
vulnerability and help in disaster prevention by
helping ensure adequate material resources, it is
much more difficult for such programmes to reduce
organisational vulnerability" (p. 48).
Thus she takes an optimistic view and advises caution about
organisational damage in the stricken communities due to intervention.
"However,
strength
agencies,
encourage
undermine
capacity
reduction
while the creation of organisational
may be difficult for external aid
they may promote the climates, or
processes that,
	 at	 least, do not
or weaken existing organisational
if they intend to address the issue of
in organisational vulnerability" (p. 48)
3.See for instance, 'Small is Beautiful', Schumacher 1973 and 'Small is
possible' by McRobie 1981 or Kitching 1982, pp. 92-102.
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Anderson (1985), then tries to identify another area of vulnerability.
Since the terminology is new it remains to some extent obscure.
However, she writes;
"Finally, socio-psychological invulnerability must
be of equal importance to material and
organisational invulnerability, though we know much
less about it....In another publication, I have
suggested that, in addition to the three
traditional neo-classical factors of production of
land,labour and capital, there is an equally
important fourth productive factor: ideology
(Anderson 1978). Ideology, when joined with the
other three factors of production, may greatly
increase productivity in certain situations" (p.
48).
The next step Anderson takes towards opening her 'new idea' is to put
it in the context of existing development theories and to see what
differences and similarities emerge. 	 She writes;
"The understanding of development as a reduction in
the	 degree of vulnerability reflects and
incorporates elements of past development
definitions and measures in several ways. These
differences, in turn, suggest new approaches to the
design and implementation of development projects
and programmes, whether undertaken as a part of
national development strategies by the governments
of the Third World or as a part of the aid programs
of intentional agencies" (p. 49).
Summarising development theories and trends throughout recent history,
she writes;
"W.W. Rostow, launching the development approach
of 1960's ...focused on the economic/material base
of development.. .He was soon challenged by others
who, concerned with the maldistribution of economic
growth, stressed the 'social indicators' of
development. Raymond A. Baur et al (1966) shifted
away from the sole focus of development on 'how
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much' to include considerations of 'how good' and
'for whom.' Also concerned with distributional
issues, 'the growth with equity' school of
thought. .World Bank....merged their concerns with
equity	 and	 Rostow's
	
focus on	 economic
determinants" (p. 49).
But where does this new definition fit into the long string of theories
and definitions? This is her explanation; 'The reduction of
vulnerability definition of development goes one step further in
integrating the material and non-material components of development'
(p. 49). The real trouble starts when she comes to the conclusion;
"By this definition, no nation is yet fully
developed (i.e. invulnerable to all points). At a
fundamental level, the reduced vulnerability
definition challenges much of so-called development
achieved to date by the northern tire insofar as it
has produced new threats to the ecosystem on which
all societies depend" (p. 50).
Anderson's definition, though it seems very challenging, still contains
some problems. Firstly, there is no evidence that any development by
this definition is achievable in the real world. For instance,
concerning environmental aspects, the welfare of the world population
is closely based on more and more exploitation and extensive use of
natural resources. In our view, it is naive to believe that the
present population of the world can return to a mode of isolated
tribal-fashion life, living scattered on the land and in a natural
balance with the environment. This problem is conclusively explored
by others. (see for example, Riddell 1981 on Ecodevelopment).
The second problem is that Anderson' definition is totally based
on 'survival' or elimination or at least reduction of 'vulnerability'.
But man does not only live to survive, rather in all aspects he is
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every day challenging some sort of progress and development. In
another word, for man it is not enough to survive, it is his nature to
move, to discover and explore and to achieve a higher or better degree
of welfare, both in a material and a non-material sense.
Dudley Seers wrote two articles entitled 'The meaning of
development' published in 1969 and 'The new meaning of development'
1977. In the first one he writes; "...We cannot avoid what the
positivist disparagingly refer to as 'value judgements'. 'Development'
is inevitably a normative concept, almost a synonym for improvement.
To pretend otherwise is just to hide one's value judgement" (p. 10).
The next step is to see where we get our judgement values from.
He then explains that the yardstick for judgement, in other people's
view, might be taken from the government or history. By the latter,
he means that the present situation of some of the so-called developed
nations, might be perceived as a model for others to copy. This is
more or less defining development as modernisation. Then he claims
that those rich countries are not necessarily good models since they
have many hazards, such as industrial pollution, which are not
desirable. On the other hand, there is no evidence that so-called
undeveloped countries are able to follow and achieve the status of the
present rich nations, even if they wanted to.
Seers (1969), then moves to the question of 'If values are not
to be found in politics or history, does this mean that we are each
left to adopt our own personal set of values?' and he answers; 'Surely
the values we need are staring us in the face, as soon as we ask
ourselves: What are the necessary conditions for a universally
acceptable aim, the realisation of the potential of human
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personality?' (p. 10).
In brief Seers is trying to find a universally acceptable
definition for development. Seers then identifies three main elements
for his definition; first sufficient 'food and shelter',.. second,
'employment' and thirdly 'equality'. (p. 11) He writes;
"The questions to ask about a country's development
are therefore: what has been happening to poverty?
what has been happening to unemployment? what has
been happening to inequality? If all three of these
have become less severe, then beyond doubt this has
been a period of development for the country
concerned" (p. 12).
In the 'The new meaning of development', 1977, Seers claims; 'The time
is indeed ripe for another critical look at the meaning of development.
..The essential element to add - as is being widely recognised - is
self reliance' (p. 27).
We can raise serious questions about the values Seers refers to,
to build his universally acceptable definition of development. It is
possible to take the argument one step back and to ask, for example,
what are the 'basic needs' and how it is possible to qualify and
quantify them. This issue itself has been debated by others. (see for
instance, Stewart's 'Basic Needs' 1985, pp. 2-5). Seers frequently
uses phrases such as 'self-respect', 'development of personality',
'potential of human personality', 'fulfilment of human potential' etc.
These are all words with various interpretations which in different
communities are perceived differently, so how could they be universal?
Our conclusion from this argument is that any definition of development
is a philosophical or ideological matter and will change from one
society to another. However, with Seer's definition of development one
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major question remains, he does not suggest any ideal model of
development for the so called developed countries, for instance, we can
ask what is the ideal level of consumption for those who have choice?
Kitching (1982), in his book 'Development and underdevelopment
in historical perspective', reviews the history of development
theories.	 In this book he takes a basic argument, 'an old orthodoxy',
giving 'industrialisation' as the pre-condition for development. He
brings forward two theoretical and empirical reasons for his claim.
(pp. 6-15)
In relation to the definition of development Kitching (1982),
says;
"...I have talked about 'developing' societies and
economies and of 'development' as if these were
concepts with an obvious or agreed meaning. In
fact, however, this is not the case, and....there
has been great debate about the meaning to be given
to the idea of 'development' ..." (p. 15).
Concerning the complexity of development he wrote;
"Fundamental changes in the economic and social
structure of human societies, total shift in their
forms of production and ways of life, do not, even
in this century of government-directed development
efforts, occur overnight. They do not even occur
in a decade or two, even in the most dramatic cases
(such as Japan or the Soviet Union). On the
contrary thirty years is the minimum for even basic
changes, and other shifts, in social practices and
in values and attitudes, may take fifty years or
even a century" (p. 123).
We brought up this example to make it clear, that those who over
simplify the expression of development, by assuming that sufficiency of
food and new buildings could alone represent development are mistaken.
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Todaro (1985), seems to be in favour of Seers' definition of
development. Looking to the present situation of the developing world
he claims;
"Development must be redefined as an attack on the
chief evils of the world today: malnutrition,
disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment and
inequality. Measured in terms of aggregate growth
rate, development has been a great success.	 But
measured in terms of jobs,	 justice and the
elimination of poverty, it has been a failure or
only a partial success.	 Paul P.	 Streeten,
Director, World development Institute" (p. 61).
In the next step he attempts to pull together some elements from
different definitions and to establish his own version;
"Is it possible to define or broadly conceptualise
what we mean when we talk about development as the
sustained elevation of an entire society and social
system toward a 'better' or 'more humane' life? The
question, what constitutes the good life? is as old
as philosophy and humankind" (Todaro, 1985, p. 85).
He then attempts to define development;
"But we believe ...that at least three basic
components or core values should serve as a
conceptual basis and practical guideline for
understanding the 'inner' meaning of development.
These three are life-sustenance, self-esteem, and
freedom,representing common goals sought by all
individuals and societies" (p. 86).
Todaro by 'life-sustenance' later explains that he means 'the ability
to provide Basic Needs'. He says; 'basic human needs include food,
shelter, health, and protection.' (p. 86). Then he writes; 'A second
universal component of the good life is self-esteem, a sense of worth
and self-respect, of not being used as a tool by others for their own
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ends' (p. 86). He then adds; 'A third and final universal value that
we suggest should constitute the meaning of development is the concept
of freedom' (p. 87).
The problem with Todaro's definition, as was the case with
Seers' is that the values he refers to are difficult to generalise,
since they are moral values and their concepts may change in different
cultural and ideological contexts. Is it really possible to define a
universal 'freedom'? We know that this phenomenon has several
different boundaries among Western, and Eastern thinkers, both of which
are different from what we understand for example in Islamic ideology.
Moreover he does not give any account of the role of wealth which
currently many people consider it as a necessary element for comfort
and development. Again like Seers he limits his definition of
development to 'survivor'. The question is whether survivor is equal
to 'good life'.
The importance of the 'definition of development' is that the
objectives and concepts of Development Plans necessarily stem from it.
Todaro (1985), after giving his definition, moves on to list the three
objectives of development and he writes;
"1. To increase the availability and widen the
distribution of basic life-sustaining goods such as
food, shelter, health, and protection.
2. To raise levels of living including, in addition
to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs,
better education, and greater attention to cultural
and humanistic values, all of which will serve not
only to enhance material well-being but also to
generate greater individual and national
self-esteem
3. To expand the range of economic and social
choice available to individuals and nations by
freeing them from servitude and dependence not only
in relation to other people and nation-states but
also to the forces of ignorance and human misery"
(P . 87).
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Riddell (1981), under 'the development concept' writes;
"The process, development, like the condition,
underdeveloped, is an expression with many meaning.
Some employ the word when 'change' alone is meant,
others when they mean 'gain' or 'profit'. One
helpful understanding of the term is that
development implies change in favour of general
human improvement, and change of two kinds, usually
links: expansion in consumption and enhancement of
welfare.	 Development is thus both a material and
an organisational matter" (pp. 3-4).
To identify the roots of the present situation of so called
underdeveloped countries he claims; 'A moral case, of deep concern,
arises where it is proven that Northern prosperity is the result of
Southern denial' (p. 5) He shares this view with others such as
Macdonald 1981.
Our aim so far has been to get an insight into the issues and
complexities associated with development theory and practice. We did
not attempt to explore the content of different development theories,
rather to highlight the confusion which exists within disaster
literature about the meaning of development. It was also found that
the definition of development, regardless of disaster has been a matter
of continuous debate and has had many definitions over the years. It
is dubious whether there is any universally acceptable definition for
development, it seems that any definition must be built on
philosophical and ideological premises. This is a very important issue
since nowadays in revolutionary Iran such a task is on the agenda of
both the state and the scholars.
It was also revealed that development contains both material and
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non-material components. It is dangerous to limit it to employment or
strong building. In addition it can also be assumed that the
development process is a multi-faceted task. The global improvement of
underdeveloped communities requires integrated action.
A glance at the development forum, (January-February 1989),
which talks about 'The seven Sins', provides an outline of the problems
of development planing and progress on an international scale. This
report confesses that most new ideas and plans for development on an
international scale have not gone any further than micro projects,
therefore have a minor effect on the communities involved. The
application of the new ideas and technologies to the broader scale, the
report suggests, must be the challenge of the next development decade.
(p. 24)
Very often disasters strike vulnerable rural areas of developing
countries. Thus reconstruction in this context is concerned with rural
development issues. It seems necessary to review the definition,
approaches and scales of practice of rural development. This would
help the later discussion, with the possibility of incorporating
developmental objectives after disaster.
Rural development- According to the World Bank (1975), '80%' of
the poor population of developing countries is rural, (see also, World
Development Report 1988), thus the first step is to have a definition
of the term 'rural development'.
	 The World Bank (1975), reads;
Rural development is a strategy designed to improve the economic and
social life of a specific group of people - the rural poor' (p. 3)
By that definition, the same reference explains that;
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"The objectives of rural development, therefore,
extend beyond any particular sector. 	 They
encompass improved productivity, increased
employment and thus higher income for target
groups, as well as minimum acceptable levels of
food, shelter, education and health" (p. 3).
It is true that very often rural buildings are susceptible to hazards.
Reconstruction then aims at rebuilding the houses with some
modifications to achieve a higher resistance. But the question is how
important is housing in the overall development of the communities. In
fact, the roots of poverty in rural areas of developing countries, are
deeper. The primary obstacle, very often, is that the peasants and
labourers do not have access to land of their own and this means they
can not build up an income of their own. They are at the mercy of
their landlords who totally control their lives by exploiting their
labour for very low wages.
"Land policy has obvious implications for the rural
poor, given that their incomes depend on the extent
to which they control land and its output. In many
instances, therefore, land reform is a necessary
part of a rural development program" (p. 6).
In how many cases can a reconstruction programme really address the
land issue? We believe that it is unlikely that such problems could be
dealt with by agencies involved after disasters.
Another important fact is the scale of development planning. It
is simple to write off the possibility of any contribution to the
development of rural communities, by stressing the necessity of
their co-ordination within the national development plan. Though,
basically, this is the case, development projects might still be
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designed and implemented on smaller scales. The World Bank (1975),
claims;
"Ideally, the planning and implementation of rural
development programs involve adequate regional
planning, strong central co-ordination, effective
local level organisation and the participation of
the rural people in the planning and implementation
process. Few countries have been able to come
close to this ideal" (p. 6).
Obviously reconstruction after disaster is usually restricted to the
damaged areas, a few villages for example, but how effective this can
be in an enclosed area, is a matter of concern. In relation to this
the same document reads;
"Experience indicates that a strong commitment to
rural development at the national policy level is
necessary if the impact is to be effective and
broad-based. In many countries, the commitment is
lacking" (p. 6).
For different approaches to rural development see Poostchi (1986), (pp.
5-6). He classifies the approaches into the two groups of 'Extended
and Integrated'. On the other hand the World Bank has three approaches
divided into the following categories;
'1-The minimum package approach
2- The comprehensive approach
3-Sector and other special programs' (p. 8).
For a long time the practise of rural development programmes
which only focus on some aspects of rural life, agriculture for
example, have been obviously doomed to failure. We have already argued
that change and improvement in other aspects of poor communities, such
as organisation and even culture is also necessary. 'Integrated rural
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development' is a manifestation of this idea.
	 Lea and Chaudhri
(1983), in relation to this claim state;
"Thus, the phrase 'integrated rural development'
was coined for those situations where planning
objectives had some or all of the following
interrelated attributes in common:
(1) To improve the living standard or 'well-being'
of the mass of the people by ensuring that they
have security and that their basic needs such as
food, shelter, clothing and employment are met.
(2) To make rural areas more productive and less
vulnerable to natural hazards, poverty and
exploitation and to give them a mutually beneficial
relationship with other parts of the regional,
national and international economy.
(3)To ensure that any development is self-
sustaining and involves the mass of the people
(this involves among other things encouraging
self-reliance and public participation in
planning).
(4) To ensure as much local autonomy and as little
disruption to traditional customs as possible. The
former usually means promoting administrative
decentralisation and political self-government"
(pp. 12-13).
As it can be seen reducing the vulnerability of the rural communities
to the disasters is one among many other necessities of rural
development. The main trouble is that addressing the vulnerability
aspect without incorporating it with many other important requirements
of the rural communities can become waste of resources. The same
authors, concerning the scales of planning argue that;
"A rural development project is a single,
grassroots, or micro-level attempt at bringing
about a specific type of change in a specific rural
area, say a village or a group of villages." (p.
16)
"Rural development programmes, unlike projects,
....deal with a number of related and carefully
orchestrated mutually supportive activities which
cannot be seen as discrete projects. Ideally a
number of grassroots (micro) rural projects should
aggregate into a rural development programme but in
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practice they never do. Part of the reason is that
in the area of development the whole is always
greater than the sum of the parts" (p. 18).
What are the main ingredients of a rural development programme? Let us
investigate Lea and Chaudhri's answer.
"Any strategy of rural development has a strong
implicit or explicit ideological orientation...
The following basic elements are common to all
strategies of rural development. Their
organisation and interrelatedness is, as explained
below, uniquely different in different strategies.
(1) Land policy;
(2) technology policy;
(3) employment policy;
(4) education, research and extension policy;
(5) rural institutions policy;
(6) price policy;
(7) linkage with the rest of the economy" (pp.
19-20)
All these explanations may help to achieve a deeper understanding of
the scale, objectives and sophistication of rural development plans.
In our view, it seems that disaster literature and agencies involved in
relief and reconstruction have simplified this task for their own sake.
Regardless of the hazards, development programme implementation in
practice is not straightforward. The following is perhaps a cynical
view, but nevertheless has elements of reality. Knippers Black
(1985), writes;
"An American who has spent more than 20 years
trying to promote development in Latin America says
that development work is rather like shovelling
smoke. No precise boundaries can be drawn; no
projects are ever concluded; no results are
definitive;	 and no assessments are entirely
reliable" (p. 527).
The same author then introduces 'ten Paradoxes' of development some of
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which are as follows;
"1- Development programmes Are Given Imputes Not by
Underdevelopment, but by the fear of Development
that is Not programmed from Above.... The
objectives of the best financed programmes are the
channelling and control of the initiatives of the
poor.
2- To Every Solution there Is a problem (Exchanging
feudalism for Capitalism)
3- The Longer a Development Agency Has Been in
Existence, The Weaker It Will Be;
4- In Ecuador there is a Need for Technicians Who
Are Less Well Trained
... Rural people customarily speak of officials of
the Ministry of Agriculture as "homobres sin
piernas' (men without legs) because, it is said,
they never get out of their jeeps.
5- Treating the Symptoms May Prolong the Illness
(development Programs May Divide and Demobilise)
treat the symptom of poverty without dealing
with its structural roots.
6- Credit Is Extended Only To those Who Do Not Need
it.... The poorest peasants are often afraid even
to seek bank loans, ...for fear that the bank will
seize their land.
7- He Who Pays the Piper Does Not Necessarily Call
the Tune.... ' It would be most naive to
suppose...United States are greatly concerned about
the welfare of Ecuadorian ...
8- The Impact of Rural Development Programs Is Most
Apparent in the Cities" (pp. 529-547).
Whether these observations are relevant to all situations is not
certain. Nevertheless a degree of reality exist in all these comments
in case of top-down development plans. Perhaps, the distance urban
based and trained officials or specialist of rural affairs keep with
the villagers is a common problem. It is so with the loans which the
banks apparently intend to make sure that the recipient is capable to
pay back the money. In this case those who are better off not only
knew of the procedures of applying for the loan but in fact can make a
better use of this opportunity by presenting enough certification to
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the bank will make use of it.
From this brief introduction to the definition and concept of
rural development, several issues emerged. The rural settlers of
developing countries are poor and at risk from natural and man-made
disasters. Rural development plans should aim at global change in the
life and welfare of these communities. Ideally the plan should be
integrated to encompass several aspects of their lives. This has the
difficulty that the integrated development plans naturally become
top-down plans. In any case, land ownership is a fundamental issue, it
is well established that a high proportion of fertile land in
developing countries is owned by a small wealthy landlord group.
Rural development plans can take several forms and scales. What
is obvious is that micro and isolated single sectorial projects, can
have only a minor effect and whether any improvements are sustainable
in the long term, is suspect. In fact this kind of activity is what
the 'charity industry' of the industrialised world is often engaged
with in developing countries. Until more recently they have failed to
address the roots of vulnerability and poverty. In fact the action
they take can undermine the way of life of rural people as much as put
it up. Food aid is a good example. Imported food encourages
dependency and communities loose the means to cultivate for themselves.
In these circumstances they are vulnerable to pressures from all
quarters. The voluntary agencies have a seemingly sound philosophy;
'something is better than nothing'. It is of course difficult and
perhaps unacceptable to stop these agencies providing this emergency
aid. And it has to be said, that the lessons learnt from the case of
Ethiopian famines, first in 1970s and then again ten years later in
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1985 have helped to shift aid to long term agricultural development.
But we should never forget that the foundation of the problem is that
these people are poor and lade resources of all kinds because of
political and economic games being played by the rich countries.
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5-4- Discussion- We have reviewed the meaning and objectives of
development and rural development, now it is time to see what it really
is possible to do about development after disasters. We build our
argument on two foundations; first a theoretical reasoning and secondly
a review of the empirical records.
a- Theoretical argument- At this stage let us examine the ways
in which development of the stricken community can be seen in a
post-disaster situation. Initially three options can be assumed;
1- to ignore any developmental objectives and to re-establish more or
less the previous situation;
2- to only improve the resistance of some vulnerable aspects, housing
for example; and
3- to launch development projects, with or without the second option.
As far as the first option is concerned, there is no argument,
that without development objectives the negative effects of
intervention could always occur.
As far as the second option is concerned, it is important to see
what significant role housing improvement can play in the overall
development of the community.
	 Cuny (1983), writes;
"Recognising poverty as the primary root of
vulnerability and disaster in the Third World, is
the first step toward developing an understanding
of the need for change in current disaster response
practices. For if the magnitude of disaster is an
outgrowth of underdevelopment and poverty, how can
we expect to reduce the impact with food, blankets,
and tents, the traditional forms of assistance? (p.
15).
Davis (1983), in 'Disasters as Agents of Change?' argues that the
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disaster makes communities aware of destruction and persuades them to
find counter measures to eliminate future losses.
"There are three contexts in which these risks can
be addressed: existing buildings, new buildings,
and reconstruction. By far the most difficult
context is that of the existing building stock....
Such families have other more pressing risks and
priorities to contend with than protection against
a long-term hazard such as an earthquake which last
occurred 'when grandma was a small girl'" (p. 295).
It is this knowledge of all the needs of the survivors and matters of
priority, that in some cases, has convinced agencies to disregard any
housing reconstruction after disaster. And to come to the conclusion
that the resources designated for house building can be shifted to the
more chronic and fundamentally important needs of families, such as
agriculture and education. (see for example. Winchester, 1981 p. 157)
Apparently development programmes can be launched at any time
and their success or failure depends on many circumstances, which are
out of the focus of the present study. Agencies' or governments'
decisions to initiate development programmes immediately after
disasters, knowing that disaster is a state of change, are based on two
assumptions; first that in comparison with normal situations more
resources are available after disasters, and secondly, that the
stricken community is more prepared to accept changes in their life
style.
We have already explored the truth of this latter assumption in
the previous chapter. It was found that as far as survivors of a
disaster are concerned, there is no evidence that such a higher degree
of acceptability exists. In fact, mainly the agencies and governments
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were found to perceive such a chance. Therefore, if there is a
government really concerned with the welfare of its population,
development could and should be its task even without a disaster.
Working under the temporary pressure resulting from the havoc of the
hazard, in our view does not provide sufficient stimulus to lead to a
long term and realistic improvement in the lot of the poor communities.
The other underlying assumption of the availability of more
resources is also in our view much over trumpeted. There are several
reasons for criticising this assumption; first, there is evidence that
the donations from other countries and what the agencies bring with
them contributes only a minor percentage of all that is spent on
reconstruction. Even without any further development costs, Cuny
(1983), talks of between 30-40 percent (p. 3) and Davis (1977b), states
that something around 20% of these costs may come from other sources
than the national resources of the stricken community (p. 21). Both
might be optimistic and the real percentage might be much less.
In any case one thing is certain, the burden of financing
reconstruction after disasters in developing countries is felt most and
borne up on the shoulders of the same community. Even if more
resources are temporarily allocated for the stricken community, this
will be at the cost of putting pressure on other areas of the same
country and with the corresponding cost of halting other development
programmes or projects in other parts of the country. These plans
would presumably could have been well studied and prepared in normal
times and thus would have had a greater chance of success as a result.
In brief, as far as global national development is concerned, spending
money in disaster areas may not be the best option.
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In addition, one can argue that the availability of funds,
although necessary, does not necessarily have the most significant role
in the development of the community. Wealth does not equal
development. A glance at the World Development Report indicated that
the wealthiest nations of our world are the 'high-income oil
exporters', such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, whose 'GNP' per capita is
much higher than the United States. Still by any definition of
development, there is evidence that in terms of many indicators applied
to measure their degree of development, such as life expectancy, the
illiteracy rate and infant mortality, they must be counted among the
developing countries.
There are other important issues to raise at this stage.
Disasters are selective in their damage and area. Development plans on
a regional or national scale do not necessarily follow the order of
disasters.	 In an area where for example, education or land reform and
agriculture are the major priority, an earthquake may damage the
housing stock. Reconstruction then has to focus on housing while it is
only the immediate need of the given community. If the reconstruction
ignored house building and focused on other developmental issues, then
it is hard to call it 'reconstruction'. It then will have the same
chance as any other development programme for success or failure.
Disaster reconstruction is a matter of a limited period, while
development plans are matters of long term commitment. Development
plans should be based on empirical data and a close study of the
communities to find the benefits and costs involved. The immediate
urgency after a disaster does not permit such studies and data
collections.
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Another major point for which we have evidence from Khuzestan,
Province, is that if the reconstruction is going to address the welfare
of the survivors, their post-disaster status must also be compared with
other areas not stricken by a hazard. For example, Khuzestan farmers
are usually much wealthier than peasants in the Kerman Province, where
there are several rural communities that have no access to a clinic at
all. They also have land problems and there is no river to supply
regular water to their farms. The question is whether when they are
compared with Khuzestan farmers, though the latter are war refugees,
the land-less peasants of Kerman, on humanitarian grounds, deserve
higher priority for attention and resources.
b- Practice of development after disasters- In the next chapter
we will reefer to Drabek (1986) that several studies indicate no
significant trend for accepting change in communities because of
disaster. We also brought forward several case reports of
post-disaster housing reconstruction and the long term problems they
caused in the community. Let us review a few other experiences and see
what will emerge and why.
The Conference Findings in 'Disasters and the Small Dwelling' in
part reads;
"Subsequent to the conference Mary McKay has made
the observation that statement suggesting that
Disasters	 are	 unique	 opportunities	 for
development', or that 'temporary injections of
financial and technical aid may be essential for
development' have been proven to be false. She
suggests that there are three myths still
subscribed to:
A. Large injections of money equals development.
B. Development can be defined in terms of things
(such as big dams or nice houses) rather than in
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the development of people.
C.	 Development means converting people to a
superior 'modern' or 'western' life style....
If you understand development to be defined in
terms of human development, it is clear that the
time following a major disaster is a particularly
difficult, time	 to develop self-confidence,
leadership, technical capacity, community
organisation and self-reliance. The impact of the
disaster itself plus the many activities of other
organisations (busy taking care of people) are
going to be in direct opposition to your
development goals. Therefore, in planning a
disaster relief programme, you must be even more
careful than ever to respect local initiative and
self-determination and and to strengthen local
organisation and self-confidence.
Let's not fool ourselves, after a disaster is the
most difficult time to work for long term
development but it may also be the most important
time" (pp. 196-197). [emphasis added]
Sibtain (1984), reports his experience of reconstructing an
earthquake damaged village in Afghanistan. Despite his claims
concerning integrated development and so on, his work is completely top
down, artistic, full of stranger ideas. Houses he built only resemble
traditional houses in 'Form'. It is no surprise that he has studied in
a school of 'Art'. He has imposed communal toilets and stables, using
dome shaped roofs etc. The village was very small with '25 dwellings'.
His plans and illustrations are reminders of the colourful drawings of
second year architecture students. (pp. 167-176) What is most
disgusting about his work is that he did not realise the mistakes he
had made and at the time of his next visit, he still believed that he
had succeeded in building the utopian village.
Johnson (1985), from American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
scrutinises the applicability of the earlier definition of development
proposed by Anderson (1985). He writes;
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"Question: What is development, and what does AFSC
try to do about it in its work outside the United
States?
Answer: ' Development is a process through which
people's vulnerability (economic, social,
political, personal) is reduced'- a definition that
emerged during the 1984 Institute on Disasters and
Development sponsored by Harvard University's
School of Education, in which Corinne Johnson
participated" (p. 36).
The author brings examples of four projects they were involved in in
Chile, Kampuchea, the Gaza strip and from Mali in Africa. Through
these examples he attempts to reveal how agencies are facing
situations, prohibit any significant achievement towards the goals of
development as defined earlier. For instance from Chile, where they
launched a health programme he claims;
"The dilemma is clear - as people are strengthened
on one arena, health and community, are they made
more vulnerable in another, the political? The
program tries to address this totality and to avoid
decisions that expose people beyond the exposure
they themselves have chosen" (p. 36).
From their involvement in agricultural promotion in Kampuchea he
concludes that
"For development activities, we have had to rely on
funds from non-U.S. sources, handled by non-U.S.
citizens, for purchases made outside the United
States. It is a credit to the donors and reflects
a certain ingenuity all around that such work does
continue to reduce the vulnerability of Kampucheans
to future disasters and pressures on them. (It is
a discredit to the United States government that it
continues the conflict of the war in Indochina in
such a way as to maintain that vulnerability.)" (p.
37).
The third example is from the Gaza strip where the Israelis do not
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allow promotion of any viable projects among the local inhabitants.
(p. 37) In the case of Mali the author concludes;
"The difficulties and dilemmas for this work in
Mali are many, but perhaps chief among them is that
it is carried on in an area subject to repeated,
severe drought which leaves people in need of
immediate as well as long-term help to alleviate
the impact of future natural disasters, and how can
immediate relief be provided in ways that enhance
rather than impede continuing development? " (p.
38).
The author then very cleverly points to a major issue.
"This discussion has focused on people and
communities at the local level and on what might be
called micro-development. It has not placed these
projects fully in their national and international
contexts, but we know that macro forces do impinge
with enormous significance on the capacity for
local development" (p. 38).
The author wanted to express the fact that tackling development
problems is much easier on paper than in practice. Isn't it true that
many Chilean peasants will remain poor until their dictator vanishes?
Is it possible to do anything fundamental for the deprived Palestinian
poor while the Israelis are still brutally shooting them in the street,
destroying their houses and villages and bulldozering their 'olive
groves'? What kind of 'development' are American and western agencies
going to undertake there?
D'Souza (1986), in a study entitled 'Recovery following the
Gediz earthquake: a study of four villages of western Turkey' writes;
"This [study] is particularly urgent in view of the
fact that preliminary investigations of other small
rural and under-developed communities struck by
earthquake suggest that material aid may actually
preclude recovery in the longer term" (p. 35).
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After discussing the question of how to define development and measure
it in the stricken community, she suggests;
"If recovery is equivalent to development and
development implies a reduced vulnerability to
disasters, then perhaps recovery has not been
achieved in the Gediz region in spite of the
massive assistance programmes" (p. 37).
As one example of the consequences of disaster reconstruction, which
was broadly described in the chapter on reconstruction of permanent
housing, D'Souza writes; 'One farmer reported that a house built in
1972 cost 35,000 Turkish lira and could be sold in 1984 at 1.5 million
Turkish lira. Land prices are doubling approximately every year in the
Gediz region' (p. 47). She then adds;
"The post earthquake programme was clearly not
directed towards intensifying agricultural
production in the area, quite the opposite since
the decision to build New Muhipler necessarily took
away precious arable land and prevented the new
residents from relying on agriculture as a sole
source of income" (p. 49).
Her observations from the study seem very important in that they
highlight many of the points we raised earlier in this chapter. She
concludes;
"If we consider that disasters represent a failure
in development (Anderson, 1985) in that it is only
in under-developed societies that disasters have
such a major impact, then we perhaps ought also to
see development initiatives as attempts to reduce
people's vulnerability to disasters" (p. 49).
In her conclusion from the study she claims;
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"The overall conclusion must be that remarkable
changes have occurred in this region as a whole due
to the creation of the marketing and industrial
centre in New Gediz....A degree of poverty and
under-development is still apparent in the villages
which because of lack of land and remoteness still
cannot participate in the wider economy. However,
those communities which before the earthquake were
more favoured have clearly gained from the
Government package of housing, cash and opportunity
for work in Germany" (p. 51).
One should think about the 'opportunity' for a Turkish villager to
labour in Germany as being counted a kind of prosperity and
development. In terms of housing which we discussed in the previous
chapter, the same author claims; 'Finally the increasing vulnerability
due to poor construction of new houses may have been avoided if a
building training scheme with appropriate subsidies for safer housing
materials had been part of the government housing scheme...' (p. 51).
D'Souza (1986) retains her optimism, she claims; 'Disasters,
after all, in that they focus both attention and resources on small
under developed communities, can be an opportunity for development' (p.
51). What she did not address, is that the cost with which this
development has been achieved in Gediz and what else could have been
achieved with the same resources, in other parts of the country.
However, she confesses that those better off before the disaster, have
apparently gained more than the poor and isolated.
Winchester (1981), reports his observations from the work
progress of some development agencies in India, where most of them were
involved in post-disaster activities particularly after the Andhra
Pradesh Cyclone of 1977. From one training programme he writes;
"I discovered that the ARTIC-trained carpenters had
not constructed or supervised many houses because
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they had returned to agricultural work soon after
their training. The diagonal bracing, successfully
introduced in Guatemala after the 1976 earthquake,
had not been accepted here, possibly because in
these different conditions one group of villagers
could not be relied upon to implement the changes"
(p. 156).
In relation to another type of house provided by agencies he explains;
"These [pucca] houses...are made entirely of
concrete, cost about 5 or 6 times more than a
traditional house, but are usually about half the
size with one room,...In many cases they have been
used as cores for extension in traditional
materials, and used for food and grain storage, but
not for animal shelters" (p. 157).
In the previous chapter we brought in several examples of houses
reconstructed after disasters which were not used as they were intended
to, by their inhabitants. The extension of vulnerability by people
rebuilding their unsafe houses was also observed in many cases.
However, one of the basic developmental arguments we have already
discussed, is reported by this author. 'The same agencies add that the
money which goes into housing would be better spent improving the
economic prospects of deprived villagers in other ways' (p. 157).
Winchester (1981), then argues that the role housing improvement
may play in the economic improvement of the survivor communities is a
suspect matter. Moreover, all the projects conducted after the Cyclone
in the area he visited are small micro projects.
"So far this article has looked at small scale
rural and urban housing projects and concluded that
the link between improved housing and the
achievement of economic independence by their
occupants, is slight. It was obvious that
agricultural improvements and craft regeneration
were more important, but the small size of the
projects associated with housing also seemed to
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critically limit their effectiveness" (p. 159).
The debate about the priority for developmental goals is a matter of
concern.	 The same author reports; '[one agency]... 	 regard adult
education and literacy as the foundation of development together with
the Credit Union formed to enable the villagers to raise loans from
rural banks for communal projects' (p. 160).
Micro projects might be effective to some extent. Nevertheless
the question of dependency on the donor organisation is something which
must be looked at more carefully. Winchester writes;
"...Many people have benefited from their economic
strategies and in some cases the social effects
have been remarkable,...However, until the
voluntary agencies withdraw it will not be possible
to see if 'community awareness can be sustained"
(p. 161).
Cuny (1978),[quoted by Ressler (1981)] says; ' It remains to be
seen, however, whether the short-term contribution (in Andhra Pradesh)
will out-weigh the long-term problems which the programme has created.'
[Disasters and the small dwelling, p. 196]
UNDRO (1977?), also discusses developmental issues of shelter
after disaster. This document highlighted four major aspects of
development; first, that the procedure of relief and reconstruction
must be based on developmental methods such as 'bottom-up' or 'citizen
participation' and that usually these approaches are left aside by
agencies. (p. 54 and p. 58) Secondly, that 'the vast majority of
foreign intervenors do not realise the development issues ...' and then
explains why this situation exist (p. 55).
Thirdly, several development issues are overlooked by the
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intervenors, such as 'land reform and land tenure'(p. 56). It is of
course questionable whether a foreign or even a local intervenor is in
a position to play a major role in effectively changing land tenure in
a developing country. We would like to argue that foreign intervenors
are not capable of this, they are not merely 'overlooking' the problem.
The fourth issue is that whether we like it or not relief and
reconstruction have a long term effect in the community. (p. 59)
UNDRO (1977?), discussing the negative consequences of some housing
programmes writes;
” Some of the most common negative factors relate
to;
a. the creation of a dependency relationship;
b. the destruction or inhibition of local
initiative;
c. the setting in motion of demands which
cannot be met in the long term;
d. the creation of unrealistic expectations"
(P . 57).
It is uncertain to what extent these negative side effects can be
eliminated.	 It is not only the international relief agencies whose
unfamiliarity with developmental issues creates problem. In the
context of Khuzestan's reconstruction this issue has become more
critical since several voluntary groups rushed to the area. They were
usually organised through the mosques and religious leaders and were
composed of ordinary people such as peasants and shopkeepers or even
students. It was almost impossible to expect such voluntary interest
groups to be familiar with developmental issues or be be able to spare
time to study them.
Thomson (1987), from 'The Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Fund' in Canada, writes about the projects they funded in Latin
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America. The main concern of this agency is development matters
through the reconstruction projects they fund. In conclusion he
writes;
"If the goal of long-term development is a serious
one, the degree of analysis required for
reconstruction projects is, if anything, greater
than that needed for 'normal' development projects.
Just where the line is between reconstruction and
'normal' development, between urgency and careful
planning, is difficult to perceive in the best of
circumstances" (p. 9).
As we can see, development planning after disaster is by no means
easier than the same task in normal times.
Chisholm (1981), explains about problems of relief and
reconstruction in Bangladesh. He claims 'over 182 relief and
development agencies' were involved in Bangladesh. He also talks about
a school building whose roof sheets became like 'razor blades' flying
about the village, jeopardising peoples' lives and 'huts'. His main
emphasis is on development. He writes;
"Confusion exists amongst many relief, and
voluntary workers, as to the role of relief and
initial aid in their place in the on-going process
of development. Thus, there seems to be a
blindness or an unwillingness to see the
implications of various types of relief in the
socio-economic set-up of the local communities" (p.
173).
Scawthorn and Lofting (1984), have a more positive view about
the possibility of economic development after disaster. However, they
do not show any empirical example of such a success and claim;
"Although a region may have had economically viable
industries and businesses prior to an earthquake,
the post-disaster relief-intended infusion of
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capital and human resources offers opportunities
for development in patterns differing from those
prior to the earthquake. This is especially true
for less industrialised areas since their
development is less integrated than other, more
industrialised areas" (p. 87).
Fernandez (1981), in a study of 'The Relationship Between
disaster Assistance and Long-Term Development', has an optimistic view.
He tries to seek for the opportunities a disaster provides. He writes;
" Disasters however can be 'Acts of God' in a more positive sense: as
opportunities to break the pattern of events which together hold people
in the grip of increasing poverty" (p. 186).
In terms of housing-reconstruction he uses the term 'pedagogy of
home building'. By that he means that changing people's attitude
requires a long-term commitment and they must be changed. He also
writes;
"Development agencies, often due to lack of
resources, or under pressure to spread them over a
wide area, tend to develop a halo around
'microrealisations' -small is beautiful. Small
projects that succeed in the short run (their long
term record is poor), do so largely because they
are protected from social pressures in developed
areas and supported by institutions-often
church-related- in the disaster-prone areas. For
their efforts to be self-sustaining in disaster
prone areas, agencies need to operate on the
macro-level" (p. 189).
This was just one instance of what we have already argued in
theoretical discussion in this section. At best the agencies can get
involved in micro development projects. Without relating them to the
broader context of regional and national scale plans, little success
or positive effects should be expected from such efforts.
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It seems that the conventional mode of development by agencies
is what is currently carried out by the British Government. 'British
people in development' (1983), is a report from the 'Overseas
Development Administration' (ODA). It reveals that Britain pays over
£1000 million a year to 130 countries. This is one approach to
development. The report reads;
"The 'top ten' aid recipients in 1981 were: India
£169 million, Kenya £35 million, Bangladesh £33,
Sudan £32 million, Tanzania £30 million, Sri Lanka
£25 million, Zambia £24 million, Pakistan £21
million, Zimbabwe £17 million" (p. 7).
The question is what effect such aid can really have in these
countries. If we distribute the amount of aid to the population of
the recipient countries, something around 30 pence a year is given to
each person. Even if we assume five or ten other generous countries
all over the world are paying the same amount of aid, the result would
not change substantially. What development can be achieved by 30 pence
per capita in the life of the poor in developing countries?
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Conclusion- The findings of the present chapter can be
summarised as follows;
1- Most disasters occur in the developing world. These communities
lose more and are less able to cope with the aftermath of disasters.
2- Disasters directly damage or destroy part of the resources necessary
for the development of the stricken community.
3- Disaster responses were also found on several occasions to create
further long-term damage by undermining the coping ability of the
community.
4- It is known that if the community's fundamental development needs
such as income and employment, equality and political stability are
achieved, the disaster resistance of the settlements and communities
will be automatically enhanced.
5- Disaster literature is confused about the meaning and objectives of
development.
6- It was found that such a debate exists in development studies as
well.
7- It is hard to believe there is any universally acceptable definition
for development to be achievable at all. In contrast we argued that
any definition must be constructed based on premises, which have to be
defined and agreed in the first instance. Thus, each ideology or
political system and philosophy can define development according to its
own values and basis.
8- By any definition, common sense tells us that development is a
multifaceted concept. Some of the major components are access to basic
needs, the nature of which are still a matter of debate; employment,
social and economic equality,...
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9- The concept of rural development was also discussed. The rural poor
are usually struggling with poverty stemming from lack of land,
unemployment, illiteracy,...
10- Rural housing has a minor role in rural development. 'Strong
houses' do not necessarily contribute much, if any thing at all, to the
betterment of rural families, if other basic and chronic needs such as
land and employment are not addressed.
11- Rural development policies must be planned in different scales of
local, regional and national levels. The co-ordination of all these
plans is crucial.
12- Rural development programmes and projects can be designed on
several scales. They can be so small as to cover only a few aspects of
rural life, or so extensive as to cover all aspects. In any case, the
integration of objectives and plans is a precondition for success.
13- Small sectorial projects (micro-projects) may lead to some
improvement of the life of a small target group. However, the long
term performance of these projects is dubious.
14- Development work is a very difficult task. Very often it may
result in underdevelopment. More dependency may come out of it or
unrealistic expectations might be created.
15- There are three modes in which reconstruction after disaster can
view developmental objectives;
a- To ignore them;
b- To introduce sectorial improvement, housing resistance for example;
c- To launch development projects after the disaster.
There is no discussion of the first option. The problem with the
second option is that even if the goal of resistant housing is
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achieved, too often it has many side effects which are measured as
negative on developmental scales. Moreover, housing has no significant
role in development and usually there are many other priorities for the
stricken community.
Concerning the third option, that is based on two assumptions;
first, the availability of more resources after the disaster. And,
secondly, the existence of a higher degree of readiness for change in
the survivors. We argued that both these two are suspect. In contrast
there is evidence that if the stricken community first returns to a
'normal situation', then when the development plans were executed
later, there would be more chance of success.
16- Some of the side effects of relief and reconstruction can be
reduced or controlled by minimising the role of outsiders and
increasing the role of survivors and local organisations in all stages
of planning and executing the operations.
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CHAPTER VI
CHANGE AFTER DISASTER
Introduction: The literature about disaster suggests that,
whether disaster creates a 'unique opportunity' in the stricken
community to introduce changes in its previous norms and situations, is
a matter of controversy. In normal times, perhaps the attitude
towards change might be ambivalent, showing interest and resistance.
Psychologically, it seems, man is more comfortable following familiar
routines, but increasingly in the modern world there is the expectation
that life at least for some, has provided new things and new ways. That
when change appears to be for the better it is possible to overcome
fears of the unfamiliar.
In the post-disaster situation, this notion of change is
relevant since mitigation measures usually require change in
pre-disaster norms. Thus the adaptation by the users to the new
environment becomes a matter of great concern. This phenomenon,
however, becomes even more significant when it is one of the
underlying assumptions for execution of post-disaster development
programmes, where change is planned not only on behalf of the
settlement but in the economic, social, even political and cultural
situation of the community.
The exploration of this subject may help to achieve better
understanding of its complexities, and facilitate identification of
some of the factors that can encourage acceptability of change in
communities after disaster. At the same time moderate the thoughtless
enthusiasm of politicians and officials, who are often tempered to take
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advantage of communities in shock, to impose their priorities.
The structure of this section is as follows; after the
introduction some examples of the contradictory literature will be
used to illustrate the relevant factors. After discussing the major
5iudie5issues identified, we will take advantage of psychological
	 to
examine the subject.
275
6-1- Controversy in literature- Davis (1978), quotes Professor
Otto Koenigsberger as saying; ' Under the immediate impact of a
disaster people are ready to change long-standing methods and customs.
Therefore act quickly to introduce improved construction methods and
bye-laws' (p. 66). Professor Koenigsberger himself in 1982, claimed;
'The immediate post disaster period provides the planner (reformer)
with two unique advantages:
a) Survivors are ready to accept change;
b) The public is ready to provide funds.' (p. 1).
From the above citations two major points are noteworthy; first that it
is the survivor who is assumed by the planners to be ready for change
(an imposed assumption) and that the planners are provided with a
unique opportunity to implement their plans with the increase in the
funds available after disasters.
Not everybody agrees with this conclusion. For instance, Cuny
(1981A), discussed 'real opportunity' as being one of the 'gaps in our
knowledge' of post-disaster activities. He claims;
"It is often casually accepted that a disaster
provides an opportunity to create change, not only
in housing but also in the social and economic
standard of a community. This is often one of the
prime reasons, in fact, why organisations attempt
to deliver so called 'modern' housing systems and
materials in the post disaster period. However,
recent evidence suggests that the real
opportunities for change are extremely limited.
One of the major gaps in our knowledge is the
inadequate understanding of exactly what the
opportunities are and how to use them to create
long-term changes within the community" (pp. 5-6).
[emphasis added]
As can be seen this assumption that communities are prepared to accept
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change, is one of the reasons which persuades agencies to provide
modern houses after disaster.
Cuny (1983), in his book 'Disasters and Development' dedicated
less than three pages to the discussion of 'Change after Disasters'.
He writes;
"It is a common adage within the relief and
development community that disasters have the
potential to introduce change and to improve the
society during reconstruction period. Often after
a disaster, one hears government or relief agency
staff talk about the possibility of rebuilding a
model society and describe the tasks ahead much in
terms of a phoenix rising from ashes. That such a
desire is felt and expressed is certainly laudable.
If millions of dollars will suddenly be available,
why not use them to rebuild a better community?
Unfortunately, the record of success in producing
the phoenix has not been overly noteworthy. For
the disaster victim, recovery means returning to
normal, and normal usually means whatever existed
before the disaster. The success ratio of these
attempts to use disaster as opportunities for
change has been rather low, even in the more
industrialised nations where more extensive
resources exist" (p. 101). [emphasis added)
From the above quoted piece a few important points can be raised;
firstly, that it is governments or agencies assuming that wholesale
change is possible. Secondly, that funds may persuade the agencies,
thirdly in contrast to Professor Koenigsberger's proposition, Cuny
assumes that survivors of a disaster are more in favour of returning to
pre-disaster norms and situations, and finally that in practice the
'success ratio' of 'change' is poor.
UNDRO (1977?), in relation to this subject claims; "The
opportunities to create 'change' following a disaster are limited" (p.
53). The same reference reads;
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"Many organisations view a disaster as an
opportunity to create or promote change. They feel
that a disaster provides a climate of receptivity
to new ideas, methods, technology and life styles.
Undoubtedly, there are some opportunities to
introduce change, but these opportunities are much
more limited than is currently believed; and the
long-term impact of such change has been, in many
cases, extremely negative in terms of traditional
social values" (p. 53). [emphasis added]
Four points can be extracted from UNDRO 1977?. First that this is the
view of organisations. Secondly, a 'climate of receptivity' by the
community is assumed to exist. Thirdly, there are 'some opportunities'
and four, they are 'limited' and the results are found very often to be
'negative'.
To bring an example of housing which is closer to the main theme
of our study we quote from UNDRO (1982);
"Post-disaster housing programmes are different
from normal low-income housing to the extent that;
In major disasters there is more money available
for housing assistance;
The need to modify housing to achieve hazard
resistance is generally accepted;
There are more agencies present than in normal
conditions;
The provision of post-disaster shelter for the
poorest sections of the community is of special
international interest; and
The euphoric mood of the reconstruction period
presents unusual opportunities for improvements"
(p. 40).
The same source later modifies its position shortly after and claims;
"Disasters will inevitably be regarded as ideal
opportunities to introduce wholesale reforms in
housing, building and planning. In reality reforms
are costly, technically difficult and politically
complex. Progress in reform is generally slow, and
an incremental approach is therefore easier to
adopt" (p. 40). [my emphasis]
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UNDRO (1982), then under 'Pre-conditions required for change' mentions;
. The need to limit changes, respecting traditional values and
housing forms;... The need for confidence of survivors in those
advocating changes;..' (p. 40). [my emphasis]
Fernandez (1981), has an optimistic view of introducing changes
after disasters . He claims that; " Disasters however can be 'Acts of
God' in a more positive sense: as opportunities to break the pattern of
events which together hold people in the grip of increasing poverty"
(p. 186).	 Without giving any particular example he claims that;
"...some 'constructive self-sustaining programmes' have been
implemented and some ' fell by the wayside'. Unfortunately the causes
of success and of failure have not been sufficiently researched within
disaster prone areas" (p. 186).
Fernandez then goes on to claim that disaster can have the
following positive consequences; ' Disasters foster linkage..and local
leadership...
	 Disasters lead to co-operation.. 	 Disasters draw
resources and personnel to the most needy areas....	 Disasters
introduce a process of selectivity. .Disasters often lead to surveys'
(pp. 187-188).
UNDRO (1977?), proposes a contradictory view to Fernandez and
claims that 'disasters have been shown to precipitate rapid political
and social change in developing countries' (p. 52). Then it goes on
to state that the creation of Bangladesh was partly due to 'the
inability of the national government to respond to the cyclone
destruction in East Pakistan'.... 'More recent examples include the
fall of many governments in the Sahelian region' (p. 52). What emerges
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from this last reference is that the political aspects of the
governments' role in a disaster situation is significant.
Besides those references cited, it seems advisable to look for
some empirical findings after disasters to see whether in practice
disasters have any significant consequences in the stricken
communities. As has been noticed the 'change' could be so broad as to
include economic and social affairs or be limited to, change in
housing.	 Here we introduce examples of findings on both scales.
Cuny	 (1983), identifies three approaches to change after
disaster. The first is 'invisible change', such as modification of
traditional houses in reconstruction without interferiag or changing
the appearance of buildings. The second method Cuny gives is the
'substitute method', which he claims; ' is often used when introducing
new varieties of crops'. (p. 102) The third approach is the 'building
block method', where 'an agency begins to introduce change slowly by
first working to re-establish a semblance of normalcy, and then
introducing limited innovations.' (p. 102)
Cuny (1983), also gives the example of Andhra Pradesh, in India
where agencies interpreted the high demand of the local people for
hurricane resistant buildings, as a sign of their readiness for change.
They built 'duplex and larger multi-family' houses and also some
'one-room single family units' intentionally designed to be rather
small so that the available resources could be stretched as afar as
possible. (p. 103) Cuny then claims;
"In both cases, the agencies overestimated the
willingness of the people to sacrifice their
traditional houses (which met the functional needs
of the families) ...Today, many of the agencies'
housing units stand vacant, while immediately next
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to them, a traditional building has been erected
and occupied" (p. 103).
As an example of broad results of disasters we refer to Torry
(1978), who has written about,' Natural Disasters, Social Structure and
Change in Traditional Societies'. His study, besides the literature
review, is based on observations of an 'African tribal population
confronted by floods and the adaptations they made, as their homelands
became flooded, following the erection of the colossal hydroelectric
installations on the Nile, Zambezi and Volta rivers' (p. 170). It is
necessary to be reminded that we are dealing with a tribal and
traditionalist group of people in rural areas of Khuzestan.
Torry's conclusions are very important.
"A few of the citations earlier in the paper refer
to the 'flexible' adjustments inherent among
traditional populations. If by the term 'flexible'
these writers mean a capacity to readily alter
established	 behaviours to conform to new
socio-technological exigencies, then the preceding
analysis suggests the contrary: Instead,
traditional societies during the post-disaster
equilibrating phase-...- are loathe to experiment
with new routines. Major social and technological
innovations are avoided. Yet organisational
modifications do occur, but on a modest scale.
Under such circumstances established conventions
are adjusted' (p. 180). [emphasis added]
Torry (1978), also quotes this from Sjoberg;
"As to change in these pre-industrialised civilised
orders, we submit that most disasters -
catastrophic though they may be for countless
persons and family groups - seem, over the long
haul, to have had relatively minor effects upon the
society's dominant structural arrangements" (p.
168).
1.In the original text, small characters instead of Italic. It is the same
with the next two quotations as well.
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Torry's final conclusions about change in disaster stricken
communities (1978) were;
"I concur with Scudder's remark made in the context
of dam resettlement: (n.d.: 468)
to introduce major changes in economic and social
behaviour during the transition period would be
unwise since the degree of stress among the
relocates would be increased still further. A
better strategy would be to help the people get
back on their feet at the earliest possible date
while preparing the way for more rapid
modernisation once the transition period ended" (p.
181).
This final suggestion is a crucial task in our study as a whole.
Whether or not it is possible or how it could be implemented in
practice are matters of further investigation.
Drabek (1986), has a section on 'Disaster-Induced Comaunity
Change'. (p. 293-303). He writes;
when the University of Massachusestts at
Amherst project members...concluded that disasters
produced no discernible long-term effects, some
relief agency representatives were not sure how to
respond. ..this conclusion paralleled that reached
at about the same time by a team at Northestern
University...Thus, for a limited range of variables
and across a broad sampling of natural disasters,
the hypothesis of 'resumption of normalcy' received
substantial support. While lacking a
comparative community data base, these conclusions
are not consistent with the interpretations from
many case studies" (pp. 293-294).
So far discrepancies surrounding change after disasters, have been
illustrated. It was also seen that the feeling that there is a unique
opportunity to introduce change after disasters is viewed differently
by different parties involved. The availability of funds and the
psychological status of the survivors were frequently pointed out.
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6-2- Discussion- Further exploration of this dilemma requires
finding an answer to the critical question of 'whose opinions are most
important, the intervenors or the victims?' Initially, it may look as
if it is the survivors who, as a result of observing and personally
experiencing the trauma, insist on implementing significant changes and
improvements as a contingency measure. Even though on the face of it
this assumption seems to enjoy validity, the current literature does
not support it with indisputable data (or observation).
Besides victims, there are other parties involved (e.g.,
international or national intervenors, planners and engineers), who
have their own individual ways of viewing disaster and the changes
required to be introduced in the stricken community. It should be
pointed out that those who financially, socially and politically
support the process of relief operations and physical reconstruction
may wish to build a community in many different ways , such as, less
vulnerable to future disasters than to the previous one. In other
words, they may regard rebuilding everything the same as before the
disaster, as a waste of time and resources and as a result they may
enforce considerable change aimed at diminishing the vulnerability of
the community in the future. At this point we suggest that the
position of different parties involved in a post-disaster situation
should be reviewed, to see whether they have any special reason to wish
for change. Among interested parties the following are most obvious;
a- Governments
b- Planners and engineers or architects
c- Intervenors (International or national or local agencies)
d- Survivors
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Before we move on to examine the above parties' position as
regards change after a disaster, we should refer to an important issue
of post-disaster activity, the issue of 'accountability'.
The heart of the argument is that, in a post-disaster situation,
the outsiders involved are not usually accountable to the survivors.
This has caused many problems in practice. We observed real examples
in Khuzestan. Voluntary groups rushed to the area, overflowing with
goodwill and with some resources to contribute to the reconstruction.
It was almost impossible to find an organisation or a person able to
take responsibility for these voluntary community based organisations.
Naturally those who possess the resources feel liable to decide how and
where to use them. The task of co-ordination then became a matter of
the individual position of each group.
UNDRO (1977?), devoted the first five 'issues' of the study to
'accountability'. 'Issue 3', however, brings total disappointment.
It reads; 'At present, there are no corrective mechanisms which make
disaster intervenors accountable to disaster victims' (p. 17). The same
notion is pointed out in UNDRO (1982, p. 4). In the same line of
thinking Ressler (1981), developed the concept of accountability and
explores the reasons why intervenors are not or can not become
accountable to survivors. (pp. 145-149)
Ian Davis (1977b), in 'Intervenor', discusses the realistic
questions which surround the concept of accountability. In an
attached chart he illustrates very well, that most parties involved in
a disaster scene are accountable to people other than the survivors.
(pp. 21-23)
We do not aim to identify the potential factors which interact
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to create this unaccountablity and one way relationship between the
intervenors and the recipients. What emerges from this argument is the
necessity to have a clear perception of the position of the parties
involved after a disaster. To this end we assume the lack of
accountability, we can solely influence the intention of governments,
planners and intervenors in general terms.
It is necessary to point out that the humanitarian objectives of
those involved in post-disaster relief or reconstruction programmes
may still remain the major stimuli for their actions. To what degree
this is true depends on the circumstances and must be evaluated in each
individual case. Nevertheless, there are other possible factors which
may influence a desire for change after disaster. In the following
section an attempt will be made to identify some of these factors.
Government- Has a disaster any constraint on governments?
Initially it seems that at least the more successful and effective the
response of the government, the safer its future is. Kreimer (1978),
claims;
"Earthquakes ...bring to light a vast number of
problems already existent in each country, but
which were not normally visible. Thus, massive
poverty, growing disparities between the rich and
the poor, congested cities, shortage of housing,
malnutrition, and illiteracy in countries affected
by natural disasters surface and become public
knowledge" (p. 23).
Cuny (1983), supports Kreimer and puts forward the same idea in
other terms;
"More than any other human event, a disaster
traumatically brings into focus all the basic
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problems in a society 	 Disasters highlight the
inherent weaknesses in a society and often force a
reappraisal of goals 	 When it became evident in
Guatemala that the earthquake had affected the
poorer sector 	  people who had been unconcerned
about	 poverty in Guatemala	 were brought
face-to-face with the reality..., new
organisations sprang up to work not only in
reconstruction, but also toward more fundamental
changes in the society" (pp. 11-12).
Disasters do not always strike poor communities. An example from the
States is illustrated by Abney and Hill (1966), who have studied
'Natural disasters as a political variable'. They claimed:
"The argument set forth is that the effect of a
natural disaster depends upon two sets of factors:
the political and material capabilities of the
government to react to the disaster, and the
pertinent aspects of the political culture" (p.
975).
They claim that after the disaster the people become 'hostile to the
government'. (p. 974) Whether this degree of hostility changes if the
disaster was a man-made one such as war or an industrial one, or a
natural one such as earthquake, is a matter of interest. Initially it
seems that a man-made disaster may bring more hostility against the
government than a so called natural catastrophe. (see our Chapter on
War as a Disaster)
Abney and Hill (1966), report how 'Hurricane Betsy' of 1965
brought political movements in the area. The main purpose of their
study is to find out the effects of the hurricane on the election of
the	 'mayor'. [Louisiana, New Orleans] Although their conclusion was
that no significant change was found, (p.
	
976) nevertheless they
illustrate well how winning the next election became a major concern
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for 'Mayor Schiro' and his opponents.
"Television newscasts showed the Mayor working in
the heart of the disaster area with his shirt
sleeves rolled up. In his handbills and
street-corner speeches Schiro attempted to project
the image of 'a man of action' which was his
campaign slogan" (p. 975).
Angotti (1977), looked to the Fruili and Belice (Italy)
earthquakes and titled his article 'Playing politics with disaster'.
There he apparently shows how the way the resources are spent in the
community and the approaches implemented by the government had caused
political demonstrations. (pp. 327-331)
Bommer (1985), wrote an article entitled 'The politics of
disaster - Nicaragua'. There he shows how the change in the political
system of Nicaragua after the earthquake of 1972 and the flood of 1982,
the latter occurring after the revolution, related to significant
differences in the performance of the government in response to the
victims. (see also Case 2 - Managua, Chapter IV)
We are not about to explore all the political dimensions of
disasters. However, the references mentioned so far obviously indicate
that for several reasons governments are almost forced to move towards
change in pre-disaster situations. At least two factors seem relevant;
first, that re-establishment of the status quo or generally poor
performance after a disaster, may be perceived as a weak point in the
government and causes social and political upheaval, as for example was
the case in Fruili and Belice (Italy), (see also UNDRO 1977? p. 52)
Secondly, the temporary instability of the disaster stricken community
and the dependency of the survivors on the resources they receive from
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the hands of the government, may persuade the latter to take the
opportunity and to condition its aid with political changes in the
recipient community. The case of the reconstruction after the Qir
earthquake is just one example of this. (see Chapter IV)
Intervenor agencies- Davis (1977b), in 'Intervenor', referred to
earlier in this section, poses serious questions to the intervenors.
What he argues there , besides the problem of lack of accountability of
the agencies, is that the agencies have a desire to prove their success
with a more rapid delivery or a greater number of items delivered.
(pp. 21-23) Agencies' social support and the donations they receive are
to some extent dependent on their performance and the reports and
publicity they make from their efforts. The crucial point is, that it
would be unlikely that re-establishment of the pre-disaster situation
would satisfy the supporting bodies. In the view of the intervenors
the longer term efficiency of their activity may be achieved by
introducing new ideas or items into the stricken community. Norton
(1980), claims; 'It is perhaps too much to expect a voluntary agency
not to take advantage of a disaster to capture the public attention'
(P . 339).
In addition to the lack of accountability and organisational
interest, we should add that the relationship between the agencies and
the victims of a disaster, particularly in the developing world, is of
a top-down nature. The staff of international, or even national
agencies may feel that being educated, urban, or western will enable
them to plan a better future for the victims. UNDRO (1977?) explored
thoroughly the issues concerned with aid and its consequences in the
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recipient communities. (see issue 29-35 pp. 45-51) All these are
signs to persuade the intervenors to think of change after disaster.
Planners and engineers- The planners and engineers may perceive
the occasion as a opportunity to introduce new designs and plans
because the accountability of their performance is usually less in the
post-disaster situation than under normal circumstances. After
disasters a unique opportunity is created for them to put into practice
some of their new ideas or designs. Usually money becomes available
for experimental work. For instance, after the Tabas earthquake in
Khurasan, Iranian funds became available for some engineers to build
examples of their new earthquake resistant designs. (see Parsa, 1985)
The number of units which must be provided and decisions made in
a short time after the event, provides a more indifferent atmosphere
for the authorities. The professionals usually feel secure of being
questioned about the long-term and final results of their innovations.
This could encourages them to, or more they may feel that it is their
professional duty to introduce new methods or designs in a stricken
community.
Survivors- The earlier discussions revealed in short that,
parties involved may wish to impose some changes to the pre-disaster
norms for their own benefit rather than for the sake of victims.
However, victims of a disaster might also be considered as the major
body seeking change after a disaster. The simplest assumption which
can be made is that those who have experienced a catastrophe become
aware of the risk associated with their previous position and will look
289
for substantial change in order to escape further potential loss. For
instance, Professor Koenigsberger focused on the readiness of disaster
victims for change. However, there appear to be a number of other
factors which should be taken into account including the following:
a- Rationality of victims- Survivors may accept new things only
because they find them financially beneficial. For example, if a
house is donated to them as a free or subsidised gift, it is likely
that they will accept it anyway. The real readiness of the survivor
can be measured when they have to pay for it.
b- Availability of choices- Victims may not have many options
(or any alternative at all) but to accept the conditions or
accommodation offered them by the agency. Therefore, they may be
forced to accept rather than to select what has been offered to them.
For instance, Glantz (1976), claims;
"Each of the drought victims has only limited
options....Their only real options are, in fact, a
return to a subsistence way of life as nomads or to
less-than-subsistence way of life as refugees in a
camp or as migrants in a city slum. Such options
are apparently perceived as offering no favourable
alternative to returning to the known way of life.
Things apparently do not have to change. They have
to be made to change" (p. 8).
c- Acceptability and sustaining the changes- There is abundant
evidence, suggesting that victims' acceptance of what is offered, does
not necessarily mean that they will sustain their acceptance for long
periods of time or use donations as the intervenor intended. In our
chapter on reconstruction of permanent houses, several examples were
introduced of the inconsistency, of the house units provided or the
settlement in general, with the inhabitants requirements.
	 (see for
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example, the Gediz case). Any judgement on change in people's
attitudes should be based on the long term performance and use of the
aid provided. However, in several examples we found that contrary to
the desire of the agencies or governments the inhabitants showed
resistance to changing their attitude toward their pre-disaster housing
or even in a broader view, towards the social structure. 	 (see for
example Cuny, 1983, p. and Torry, 1978, p. 180) Yet, the reasons why
governments regard the higher degree of acceptability, shown by
survivors after disasters, as an opportunity to introduce changes
remains obscure.
d- Reasons for rejection in normal times- Over-emphasis on the
post-disaster situation as an opportunity to introduce change,
overshadows the reasons for rejection of change in normal times. If
the change is so beneficial to the people, what are the reasons for
rejection? Whose fault is it, the recipients' or the planners' and
designers'? Is our assumption that traditional systems and objects
should be replaced by modern or western substitutes always correct?
Perhaps we should remember an example referred to by Glantz (1978), who
claims;
"Commenting on the value of the traditional nomadic
way of life, a recent USAID report
'suggested that the only cost/effective and
realistic approach to this critical problem is to
create the necessary environment to permit the
traditional management systems, with some
improvements and adaptations to again function'"
(I) . 13).
e- Psychological effects of disasters- Despite all the debates
which may potentially predispose outsiders to see a unique opportunity
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to introduce change after disaster, it may be worthwhile to inspect the
psychological effects of disasters further, in relation to their direct
effect on the survivors' willingness to accept new things. To tackle
this problem, we now turn to three intermediate and underlying
mechanisms which may help us understand the psychological effects of
disasters in relation to 'accepting the changes'.
	 These three are:
peoples attitude towards change, the role of observation and stress
effects. 2
Davis (1983), in 'Disasters as Agents of Change?' argues that
disasters cause changes in pre-disaster forms and norms, so as to
eliminate or at least mitigate the loss from other disasters. He
argues that disasters are agents for change. That man learns from his
past experience for the future. It is hard to dispute such a clear
conclusion, but it would be wrong to assume that this is a general rule
and has no other pre-condition. Glantz (1976), under 'Nine fallacies
of natural disaster: the case of the Sahel' writes; 'Historical
evidence, however, tends to indicate that individuals, as well as
governments, do not necessarily learn from past mistakes either
directly or by analogy' (p. 7).
Glantz (1976), also quotes an example from a person who was
going to shift to picking 'string beans' instead of his routine of
picking 'peas'. He quotes;
” ...And I still remember how hesitant I was that
first morning as I was about to address myself to
the string bean vines. Would I be able to pick
beans? Even the change from peas to string beans
had in it elements of fear.
2.A more comprehensive description of survivors' psychological status can be
found in our chapter no VIII.
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In the case of drastic change the uneasiness is of
course deeper and more lasting" (p. 8).
We can find many examples of this nature in our daily life. Moving
from home to a new country, addressing an unknown audience in a
conference and so forth. That is to say, in normal time and for the
ordinary person, change involves some anxiety and instinctively people
prefer their known routines.
It might be claimed that the survivors of a disaster have
different situations. That is true but unfortunately against our wish,
there is evidence that they are more in favour of their normal and
known situation and are more reluctant to change.
For instance, UNDRO (1982) in relation to this claimed;
"The disaster period is one of trauma for the
stricken population...On occasion, the weakness or
vulnerability of the disaster-stricken population
is taken advantage of in order to impose social or
economic policies which the victim population is
temporarily unable to resist.
After a disaster, people simply want to get back to
normal as quickly as possible. If change is to be
effected during this period, it must be
evolutionary and appropriate to the constraints
previously existing within the society" (p. 53).
Professor Koenigsberger (1982), points to this fact and says;
Pre-disaster conditions, however bad, appear to victims in a rosy
light' (p. 1). Glantz (1976), in 'Fallacy 2: Things Have to Change'
writes;
"There is a strong tendency for people to return to
the known way of doing things, to return to
'normal'. This is a feeling manifested by the
Sahelian drought victims: nomads, sedentary
farmers, herders, and Sahelian governments. Yet,
one must ask, what options do they have?" (p. 8).
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The same author in conclusion writes; "Like the preceding nine
generalisations, 'where there's a will, there's a way' could also be
considered a fallacy, One might argue that sometimes when the will
exists the way does not" (p. 20).
Thompson (1985), goes further than endorsing the reluctance of
the survivor to change, he suggests that 'over-learned familiar
routines', which result from living in the same or similar environment,
may be regarded as a therapeutically effective means of assisting
people under stress. [see our own chapter on psychology].
Role of observation- The underlying assumption is very simple.
Victims who personally witness the vulnerability of their homes are
likely to become aware of the risks involved, and as a result they will
seek significant improvements in the strength and resistance of their
buildings for example. In other words, they are prone to rejection of
their old buildings (and perhaps, very susceptible and suggestible to
the offers regarding new things, i.e., 'change').
The current literature, however, does not empirically confirm
this apparently common-sense speculation. There is a wide range of
differences in the way people perceive a single event, while factors
which contribute to the formation of different perceptions are not very
clear. (see Drabek, 1986) There is evidence suggesting that
interpretation of a single disaster (and its causes) may vary from one
observer to another (see Holder, 1982). Therefore, the perception
and effect of observing a disaster may not be necessarily be the same
among different observers.
The theory of 'belief, attitude, intention and behaviour'
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described by Fishbien and Ajzen (1975) may be employed to assist us
with assessing the claim, that observation of a disaster may induce a
change of attitude in its observers. According to this theory, if we
desire to change the 'behaviour' of survivors towards their traditional
buildings, for example, we must first change their 'intention' about
that type of housing. The change in the latter, however, requires a
change in their 'attitude'. Furthermore, a change in their attitude
requires changing their 'beliefs' regarding, for instance, their
houses.
	
One way to pursue this line of reasoning is to ask about the
process whereby the 'belief is formed in the first place'.
According to Fishbien and Ajzen (1975), there seem to be three
modes of belief formation, namely, "descriptive belief" (which is
formed through direct observation), "inference belief" (which is based
upon inferential reasoning) and informational belief (which depends
upon acceptance of what is told to us by a source of information).
Our next task is to identify the means by which the currently
held belief could be influenced and changed. In brief, a person's
belief may be influenced either by personal observation or by receiving
information.	 The problem of the marked difference in different
individuals interpretation of the same event still remains to be
resolved.	 The following excerpt may help us understand the intricacy
of this matter:
"An attitude represents a person's general feeling
of favorablness or unfavorableness toward some
stimulus object. In our conceptual framework, as
a person forms belief about an object, he
automatically and simultaneously acquires an
attitude toward that object. Each belief links
the object to some attribute; the person's attitude
toward the object is a function of his evaluations
of these attributes" (Fishbien and Ajzen, 1975; p.
216).
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The key point perhaps is the "person's evaluation' of attributes
because people evaluate the situation or the acquired information in
association with their other beliefs, backgrounds, or experiences.
Thus, experiencing a hazardous event, or receiving information about it
will not necessarily lead to a similar change in beliefs, attitudes,
intentions and behaviours in all people, if they experience any change
at all.	 However,	 the likelihood that similar psychological
consequences may follow can not be completely ruled out.
Governments and intervenors' perceptions of a disaster may
direct their efforts and plans towards mitigation of the next potential
disaster(s), but this concern may not necessarily be shared by the
victims because a change in their beliefs and behaviour is not the
inevitable consequence of experiencing a disaster. Therefore,
observation of a disaster may have some influence upon the rejection of
past relevant experiences, but it seems unrelated to the selection of
new things for the future.
We would like to claim, that victims' lack of opportunity to
experience or to get acquainted with the new techniques and materials,
casts serious doubt over the allegation that they may accept changes
very readily. The desirable acceptance of these new things bears no
relation to their experience of the vulnerability of their own homes.
To persuade victims to accept the new things, we should give them a
chance to "observe" or "be informed" about the suitability of the new
materials or techniques.
It may be added that there is no reason to believe that the
post-disaster period is the best time for "induction" of such "attitude
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changes" through learning or observation. Under those circumstances,
where victims are provided with the information about the new things,
their acceptance of the offers has no direct and clear relationship
with the actual observation of disaster. In other words, information
could be provided for victims before the disaster, or at any time,
irrespective of the disaster, in which case there is no evidence
indicating that victims are more likely to accept changes after the
disaster, than at any other time.
The tragic mistake which commonly occurs after disasters is that
the intervenors and governments focus their attention and efforts
solely on the 'improvement of the strength of the homes' at the expense
other important aspects of the new building. It may be added that
'resistance' of a home against hazards is only one of the many
attributes of a 'suitable home'.
People expect many additional, and perhaps even more important
qualities (such as space, proper location, costs and maintenance) from
their homes besides just resistance. Thus, dwellers who abandon their
new homes or carry out major alterations to them may not do so because
of their disbelief in the resistance or stability of the new buildings,
but rather due to their 'discomfort' and 'discontent' with living in
homes that do not satisfy their tastes and basic needs. In short, a
'strong and resistant building' does not necessarily provide a 'home'.
Stress and higher acceptability- Another important issue is the
effect the disaster has on victims' suggestibility, so they are more
likely to accept changes offered or imposed. There is some evidence
to suggest that for a certain period after the traumatic event, the
survivors may become to some extent modest and more suggestible than
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before the disaster. However, this period of heightened acceptability
is short. We believe that the alleged enhanced level of suggestibility
may be due to the feelings of "helplessness" (i.e., learned
helplessness) immediately after the disaster (see Seligman, 1975).
Otto Koenigsberger (1982) claims that the period immediately
following any disaster may provide a particular opportunity for
intervenors or planners, because survivors appear to be at a higher
state of readiness to accept changes offered to them. This implies
that the period of greater susceptibility due to the disaster is
short-lived.	 However, it might be debated whether there is a better
chance of success if changes are introduced after the community has
returned to its normal life. We believe that intervenors and
governments should have a long-term outlook and avoid basing their
plans, policies and resources upon the immediate and short-lived
effects of the disasters.
Conclusion- In this section we explained that the assumption of
the existence of a 'unique opportunity' to introduce change after
disaster, has been one of the underlying factors encouraging
governments and agencies to introduce change either on a small or a
large scale. The controversy in the literature and the fact that this
issue is one of the gaps in our knowledge were shown. It was also
found that the literature suggests empirical findings from change after
disaster to be more negative.
For the purpose of analysing the subject we tried to see the
disaster situation from the relevant positions. It became apparent
that governments, intervenors and their staff, including planners and
engineers,	 have the intention to create change in pre-disaster
298
conditions. Among the different parties, survivors were considered and
some misleading factors which may cause outsiders to perceive a
readiness for change were explored.
Concerning the psychological status of the survivors, we pointed
out that in normal times change involves some degree of anxiety and
psychologically we are reluctant to make it. For the survivor of a
disaster, we brought evidence that they are more reluctant than usual
and furthermore that a return to normal has psychological benefits for
survivors.
Concerning victims' point of view, we pointed out that there is
no unanimous perception and reasoning by survivors and that the
underlying factors are not yet known. Further more we discussed that
even if we assume that witnessing a disaster influences the beliefs of
the survivors, this change will be against the pre-disaster situation
and has nothing to do with accepting new things. On the other hand, so
far as the stress consequence of a catastrophe is concerned, it appears
that under the pressure of the event the survivors may lose confidence
for a short period. This mood changes quickly for the majority of
victims and we doubt that taking advantage of such a helplessness would
be beneficiary for either the survivors or the intervenors.
To sum up our conclusion, one should ask, what change is planned
to take place after the disaster and whose view really counts.	 While
governments,	 intervenors, planners and architects view the
post-disaster situation as the right place and time to introduce
change, there is no evidence that readiness for change exists among
survivors.
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CHAPTER VII
DISASTERS AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION
Introduction: This introduction serves two purposes; to indicate
the relevance and importance of the subject to the present study, and
to clarify the scope of our objectives.
Several factors prove the relevance of this subject to the
present study.
	
Initially, a participatory approach was pursued in the
reconstruction of some of the villages in Khuzestan province.
	 Later
it was changed to a technocratic method.
	
The inconsistency of the
professional practice approach temporarily caused a shift to
participatory approach. (see our Chapter on Sample portrait, cases of
Sane and Bardie) However, the implementation of the participatory
method confronted several obstacles and later the degree of the
villagers' involvement was reduced and the role of the intervenors
enhanced.	 Nevertheless, the necessity of the people's participation
is still agreed on by the authorities in the reconstruction of war
damaged Iran.	 Besides all that, our field survey also indicates the
importance of survivors' participation in reconstruction.
Disaster literature almost unanimously recommends increasing
the survivors' role in all phases of disaster, from pre-disaster
planning, to relief and reconstruction. For example, one of the most
promising approaches to reconstruction, training and educating,
involves a certain level of survivors' participation. 	 (see for
instance, Dhamar training programme, Leslie, 1987).
Our study of the psychological recovery of survivors and its
links with physical reconstruction (Chapter VIII) also led to the
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conclusion, that the greater the role of the survivors in different
reconstruction activities, the greater the chance of a rapid
psychological recovery.
Despite the strong case for participatory relief and
reconstruction, the evidence suggests that there are several obstacles
in the way of these approaches. 	 For instance, the role of the State
in pursuing such approaches remains a matter of interest. While
community participation implies grass-roots, local, bottom-up action,
in practice the co-ordination of these initiatives by a state based
organisation becomes necessary. 	 There is a 'contradiction in terms'
when the instigation and possible control of grass-root initiatives
comes from the State.	 (see Midgley 1986, p. 151)
Our aim here is to study the issues surrounding the
participation by the survivors of a disaster in their own
reconstruction.	 Thus far, we have not found any document explicitly
concerned with this subject.
	 However, suggestions as to the role of
survivors are we believe, an indispensable ingredient of disaster
guidelines.
	 In general terms the notion of popular participation is
an old theory, well explored in many other contexts such as
development, rural development and housing. Here, the intention is to
review those aspects of the participation theory which might be
relevant to our own subject.
Both time and space act to constrain the presentation of a
comprehensive review of the subject. ' But, there are several issues it
is essential to understand in the analysis of participatory approaches
1.In September 1987 1 submitted a report of a hundred pages on this subject
The present chapter is a revised, summarised version of that report.
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to reconstruction after disaster.
In this chapter, first some of the major theoretical issues
about popular participation will be discussed. Then, since we are
dealing with rural settlement reconstruction, a brief review will be
made of community participation, in the context of rural development,
in the provision of shelter. 	 Finally, we will attempt to outline some
of the specific aspects of disaster and community participation.
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7-1- The spread of people's participation- Community
participation is discussed in most documents dealing with planning and
development. As Oakley and Marsden (1985) claim; 'In fact it is rare
these days to find a document on development strategy or approaches
which does not refer to participation or suggest that the strategy
under discussion is participatory in nature' (p. 1). 	 Styles (1971),
writes;	 'Participation has become a key word in the planner's
vocabulary' (p. 163).	 Ekistics Editors (1972), claim; ' In the past
few years, almost every planning report has had its participation
component' (p. 71). Carapico (1985), says; 'Virtually all
contemporary development strategies stress the importance of
participation by working people in both policy formation and the
benefits of economic growth' (p. 203).
In terms of human settlement there are studies on 'community
participation in water and sanitation', 'low-income housing projects',
'squatter settlements upgrading' and so on. The notion of 'community
building', 'community architecture' are also on the agenda of present
architectural debates in Britain, all of which have the people's
participation as their central theme. 	 More generally, there are
studies of 'community participation in development planning', in 'rural
development' and 'social development'. It seems that from this long
list of documents a study on ' disasters and community participation'
is missing.
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7-2- Historical background- Although the notion of people's
participation is among the recommendations of new development plans, it
is in fact an old approach. Gittell (1980), says; ' The role of
community organisations in America has been a primary subject of
concern for all the social sciences since the 1960s' (p. 29). 	 Claude
and Zamor (1985), in relation to this claim;
"The notion of participation was brought into focus
in the 1930s. The idea was that the more involved
people were in the challenges of production, the
more productive they would be....But the term
'participation'
	 continued to gain currency
primarily
	 in decision-making processes
	
in
industrialised societies. It is only since the
late 1960s and the 1970s that the concept started
to be used in the context of the newly developed
subdiscipline of 'development administration'" (p.
5).
Martin's Preface to Lisk's 1988 book entitled, 'Popular participation
in planning for basic needs', reads;
"One of the key features of development planning
that has emerged from the wider conceptualisation
of development since the mid-1970s is the notion of
popular participation, both as an important
condition for achieving sustained economic growth
and social progress and as a fundamental goal of
development in its own right" (p. vii).
Moser (1985), also argues that the reason why community participation
was introduced, in fact was the failure of the 'growth theory' of
development.	 She writes;
"It is a commonplace that the growth strategies
undertaken by many governments in Third World
countries have frequently failed to secure a
significant amelioration of mass poverty or a
radical redistribution of income. It is this
criticism which has led to an alternative view -
that the involvement of the community in the
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project can compensate for these deficiencies.
Over the past decade, community participation has
been incorporated in a variety of development
programmes and projects in order to make collective
involvement effective" (p. 3). (see also Oakley
and Marsden 1984, pp. 5-10)
It must be made clear, since time began that co-operation and communal
actions have been the dominant approach to problem solving in all rural
communities of the developing world.	 Several examples can be cited
from villages in Iran. 	 For instance, cleaning the canals or 'Ghanats'
is a communal task, no individual can do it alone. Also the
distribution of water, where it is short such as in central Iran,
requires well co-ordinated measures not only in each village but even
between villages dependent on the same source of water. 	 In relation
to this the United Nations report (1975), reads;
"Historically, most societies have a tradition of
popular participation at the local level. ...The
existence of these traditional forms of popular
participation indicates the willingness and ability
of the masses of the people to work together for
the collective benefit and that many of their needs
were served in this way.
These local traditions have often been among the
first casualties of modernisation" (p. 32).
[emphasis added]
It should be no surprise that the people have chosen participatory
approaches to solve their problems in traditional societies. What
needs attention is the difference between mutual co-operation and the
introduction and organisation of the co-operative. Between a
grass-roots community action and an imported or even imposed 'community
game' from outside.	 The traditional methods worked successfully
through the ages, but the new methods often end in disappointment. As
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Mandl (1982), puts it; 'High hopes have been vested in community
participation. . However, some unforeseen problems and distortions
have come to the fore. Implementing community participation has been
more difficult than anticipated' (p. 9).
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7-3- Towards a definition- The literature indicates a variety of
definitions for people's participation. (see, for example, Lisk 1988,
p. viii) However, it is generally accepted to be a good thing. Wolfe
(1982), writes; "From the stand point of many development analysts and
planners, 'politics' is bad, 'participation' good" (p. 86).	 Moser
(1983), says; " participation currently considered a 'good-thing'." (p.
3) Arnstein (1971), writes; 'The idea of citizen participation is a
little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle because
it is good for you' (p. 176). This positive attribute of participation
might stem from values such as democracy and liberation which are the
basis of Western thinking. Speaking up for the people implies an
intellectual or even radical position as opposed to speaking in favour
of bureaucratic systems, which indicates to support authoritarian
governments with their centralised power. Although there is little
doubt that participation is good, it remains to be seen to what extent
it is effective and useful in practice. One concrete example is the
ever-rising problem of homelessness in the developing world, despite
years of propaganda for and practice of popular participation in
solving the problems of shelter.
Moser (1983), concerning the definition of people's
participation claims; '...no clear consensus exists, the diversity of
definitions reflects the ideological range of development and the
different approach, to planning' (p. 3).	 Whyte (1983), argues;
"Community participation is, for some people, an
ideology of development.
	
For others, it is a tool
for planning and management. Community
participation has no absolute, distinct and clearly
defined boundaries. It comprises inputs that are
variable from place to place and from time to
time" (p. 6).
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Lisk (1988), says; 'A wide variety of interpretation is associated with
the idea or concept of popular participation...' (p. 15).
White (1981) with reference to the definition of community
participation agrees with the 'diversity in the objectives',
nevertheless he looks for a 'working definition' which he borrows from
the World Bank and says; . participation has three dimensions:
involvement of all those affected in decision-making about what should
be done and how; mass contribution to the development efforts. i.e.
to the implementation of the decisions; and sharing in the benefits of
the programmes (World Bank 1978)' (p. 6).	 Whyte (1983), adds another
component to the definition cited above; 'involvement in the evaluation
and modification of the programmes' (p. 6).	 Lisk (1988), defines
popular participation as follows; 	 Popular participation in
development should be broadly understood as the active involvement of
people in the making and implementation of decisions at all levels and
forms of political and socio-economic activities' (p. 15).
There are generally two categories of definitions; those which
perceive participation as a 'means' and the others which see it as an
'end'.	 In the first definition people are as tools or 'objects' of
development.	 For those who define it as an 'end' the people and the
community are the 'subject' of development. But for those that see it
as a 'means' the people and their activities are the resources. As
Oakley and Marsden see it; ' participation as an end is the inexorable
consequence of the process of empowering and liberation' (p. 28).
Wolfe (1982), also argues that;
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"One's conception of participation can be broad or
narrow, active or passive. It can be considered
equivalent to political democracy: the people
decide,.. .what development objectives and policies
they want, and what political representatives shall
try to convert the objectives and policies into
reality. It can be considered equivalent to
involvement in the processes of societal change and
growth that the term 'development' suggests" (p.
85).
Although 'involvement' of people in 'execution' and 'implementation' of
development programmes can be perceived as a form of participation,
Bugnicourt (1982), argues that participation 'is opposed to centralised
decision making' and the aim of 'popular participation' is to reduce
the role of people as 'passive executants'. He emphasises the role of
sharing in 'decision-making' and the meaningful presence of the people
at all stages of 'discussion, decision making (at various levels),
'training',	 'executing', 'management', 'control' and 'education'.
( p. 58 )	 Arnstein (1971), claims; '...citizen participation is a
categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power
that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the
political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the
future' (p. 176). (see also, Gittell, 1980, p. 35)
Thus it becomes apparent that one of the key elements of
participation is a meaningful role in the 'decision-making' process.
Oakley and Marsden (1985), present a review of their impressions of
active participation as follows;
"...Popular participation in development should be
broadly understood as the active involvement of
people in the decision-making process in so far as
it effects them...
participation is considered to be an active
process, meaning that the person or group in
question takes initiatives and asserts his/her or
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its autonomy to do so...
the organised efforts to increase control over
resources and regulative institutions in given
social situations, on the part of groups and
movements of those hitherto excluded from such
control" (p. 19).
Arnstein (1971), suggests eight levels of participation, from the
bottom of the 'ladder' they are;
'1-Manipulation
2-Therapy
3-Informing
4-Consultation
5-Placation
6-Partnership
7-Delegated power
8-Citizens control' (p. 177).
In her view, the two modes mentioned first are in fact
'Nonparticipation', the next three imply 'Degrees of tokenism' and the
other three imply 'Degrees of citizen power'. (p. 177)
By 'manipulation', she means occasions where the people are
guided and used as tools by 'powerholders'. The 'therapy' mode can
often be seen in the literature prescribing 'remedies' for the Third
World. For example when a government agent travels to a remote area to
lecture the people about what is right and wrong and the of benefits of
the co-operative and so forth. Arnstein in defining the 'therapy'
mode of participation writes; '...under a masquerade of involving
citizens in planning, the experts subject the citizens to clinical
group-therapy' (p. 178).
The third level, 'informing', is more clear, the citizens are
called and gathered to be told about their rights and responsibilities.
'Consultation' is also clear.
	
The citizens might be invited to
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express their view about a matter. The same author claims; 'But if
consulting them is not combined with other modes of participation, this
rung of the ladder is still a sham since it offers no assurance that
citizens' concerns and ideas will be taken into account' (p. 178).
By 'placation' Arnstein explains that she means those situations where
the citizens have actual and legitimate presence in a decision-making
process, but the final decisions must be taken by people other than the
citizens, the local authorities for example.
Concerning the sixth level of participation, 'partnership' the
same author explains;
"At this rung of the ladder, power is in fact
redistributed through negotiations between citizens
and powerholders. They agree to share planning
and decision-making responsibilities through such
structures as joint policy boards, planning
committees and mechanisms for resolving impasses"
(p. 180).
The seventh level of participation in Arnstein's view (1971), is
'delegated power'.	 She says;
"Negotiations between citizens and public officials
can also result in citizens achieving dominant
decision-making authority over a particular plan or
programme... At this level, the ladder has been
scaled to the point where citizens hold the
significant cards to assure accountability of the
programme to them" (p. 180).
The highest degree of participation, Arnstein argues, is where the
citizens have the highest degree of control on a matter.
	 She writes;
"Though no-one in the nation has absolute control,
it is very important that the rhetoric is not
confused with intent. People are simply demanding
that the degree of power (or control) which
guarantees that participants or residents can
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govern a programme or an institution, be in full
charge of policy and managerial aspects, and be
able to negotiate the conditions under which
'outsiders' may change them" (p. 181).
There seems to be a theoretical problem with citizens decision-making.
Citizens, either partially or completely in control of the decisions,
will in fact themselves become part of the system or authority. The
question is who are the authorities? They may be people from the same
community.	 In that case it would make very little difference whether
a few representatives make the decisions or the appointed or elected
authorities to run the community administration. One of the
theoretical obstacles to the participation of the masses, is that in
practice direct involvement in all tasks becomes impossible, and an
indirect participation through the representatives must be used. In
this case, again a few people will decide on behalf of the others, as
the authorities do.
The other underlying assumption is that governments may have
different goals to those of the citizens. This is not necessarily
always true. At least in theory we can assume a situation where the
people trust their government and believe in its decisions. 	 There is
also another criticism of Arnstein's description of levels of
participation.	 She assumes that 'citizens' are a uniform body. 	 In
practice it is unlikely that such a uniformity exists. Thus there
would be factions among citizens on every matter. 	 The final
compromise will either be something less than everybody's ideal or that
the will of the majority will prevail.	 In this sense again, the
citizens have only a partial part to play in the exercise of power and
control.
	 There are several other theoretical obstacles associated
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with popular participation which we will refer to later.
The United Nations (1975), points to the importance of popular
participation in decision-making as the heart of the participatory
approach.	 It reads;
"A more comprehensive view of the decision-making
process involves four stages: defining the
situation requiring a decision; choosing the
preferred alternative; determining how best to
implement the decision once it is made; and
evaluating the consequences of the action taken"
(P . 5).
In brief, so far, we have found that the theory of people's
participation is an old idea and its concepts have been defined in
several ways.	 It is also realised that participation can be a matter
of degree. The heart of the notion is identified to be, the power of
the people (or citizens) to have control over their affairs through the
decision-making process.
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7-4- Who are the people? Although the words 'people' and
'community' imply a totality, everyone or all the members, it appears
that in discussing community participation theory, another meaning is
anticipated.	 Lohman and Muller (1986), claim;
"If different opinions about 'participation' are
held....there is hardly more clarity about the
meaning of 'community'.
	
Three points will be
made.
	
First, a community is not a uniform mass of
people, but a heterogeneous collection of
individuals and groups among whom multiple social
ties have developed.
Secondly the distinctive community groups have
different, often opposing, interests...
The third point about 'the community' is that, as
individuals and groups have different interests in
neighbourhood improvements, they do not have equal
chances to participate in decision making. An
improvement programme is not a neutral
intervention" (pp. 25-26).
Along the same line of thinking, Racelis Hollnsteiner (1982), claims;
"There is a general agreement that people's
participation refers not to everyone in an
identifiable community - since local elites already
have a strong say in decision making - but rather
to the poor majority with little access to
resources and power..." (p. 39).
There are several problems with these narrow definitions of 'people'
and the 'community'.
1- Dividing the community into the two groups of 'elite' and 'poor'
will not necessarily apply to all societies. A community as small as
a village, or as large as a country usually constitutes more than two
groups. In addition there remains the problem of defining each of the
groups and identifying the status of each individual as a member of a
group.
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2- The exercise of so grouping the community may in practice, increase
the existing differentiations and decrease the local solidarity without
substituting it with a stable alternative.
3- This is an outsider's view of the community. It remains to be seen
whether the members of the community see it as the outsiders do, or
otherwise. In several cases the author found in rural areas of Iran,
that the relationship between the poor and the so called elite is one
of respect and not hostility. Racelis Hollnsteiner (1982), in this
relation claims;
"Peasants frequently maintain a functional
paternalistic relationship with one or a few local
elite families who would feel threatened by the
dependent partner's linking with others of similar
class interest. To cut oneself off from
dependency upon one's person patron is to court
economic disaster in the form of losing access to
land and other employment" (p. 39).
4- In practice this classification becomes meaningless for another
reason.	 Let us assume that a road, clinic or school is going to be
built in a village. Is it correct to prevent the so called elites
from participating in the decision-making in such a matter? On the
contrary they might be in a position to contribute more, especially in
financing it for instance, than the rural poor. In any case it would
be ridiculous to assume that the children of the elites would not be
accepted or treated at the new school or clinic.
5- Another difficulty is that this definition and classification falls
short of explaining situations where thousands of young students for
example, go to the rural areas to contribute to the harvest or the
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construction of services2 . These people are present in the village
and though neither poor nor elite, still their participation is
welcomed in every way.
Mince the Islamic Revolution thousands of urban people have gone to rural
areas help villages with different tasks.
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7-5- Participation and politics- It is said that the
'corner-stone' of participation is 'sharing of power'. 	 In this sense
popular participation becomes a political matter. 	 Whyte (1983), with
respect to this argues that;
"Community participation is the most political
aspect of the Decade approach because it involves
directly the relations of a national government to
its people. It can also change the relative roles
of different levels of government. Community
participation is thus a political process and, as
such, needs political commitment at all levels,
including the highest" (p. 4).
In their definition of participation as a process of 'empowering',
Oakley and Marsden (1985) claim;
“ ....the promotion of popular participation implies
a redistribution of power (basically a conflictful
process)... .participation is concerned with the
distribution of power in society, for it is power
which enables groups to determine which needs, and
whose needs, will be met through the distribution
of resources....power is the central theme of
participation" (pp. 25-26). (see also Smith, 1981,
p. 16)
Although initially it might be thought that people's participation may
jeopardise the stability of the existing governors, there is evidence
that this is not necessarily always the case. Racelis Hollinsteiner
(1982) in this respect says;
"Yet leaders truly interested in promoting
'progress for all' will recognise that between the
two extremes of apathy and violent confrontation
lies a broad range of legitimate and effective
participatory behaviours that can lead to peoples
development and genuine structural change" (pp.
47-48).
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Costs and benefits- The United Nations (1975), has discussed the
'costs and benefits' of popular participation for 'leaders', 'planners
and administrators', and 'individuals, citizens'. The cost for the
leaders, the document argues is; '...reducing the leaders scope of
decision making authority' and also that, '...the level of conflict in
the society may increase'. (pp. 15-16) Among the benefits leaders
may gain from popular participation, 'the most visible benefit ...is
the elimination of popular resistance to decisions' (p. 11). In other
words this approach can even legitimise the existing power of the
rulers.
Contrary to the opinion of those who believe that popular
participation, by its very nature, is an action towards democracy, it
seems that the ruling system can control such actions and if its own
power is endangered can stop it, unless it is convinced that the final
result is compatible with its own goals.
Concerning the costs and benefits of participatory approaches
for planners and administrators, the United Nations (1975), points to
the fact that involvement of the people in the process can '...reduce
the mistakes in programme or project design and implementation' (p.
19). Obviously this can only be achieved at some cost. The same
reference in this respect claims;
"First, popular participation in planning makes
information processing more complex,..
Secondly, opening the planning process to popular
participation will make it more of a political
exercise as opposed to a technical one, and the
technical criteria used by planners will have to be
harmonised with the collective felt needs and
political preferences of the beneficiaries of
development" (p. 21).
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In terms of costs and benefits for the citizens, the same
document argues that;
"The means clearly involve benefits for the
individual in terms of educational effects-improved
skills of self-expression, a sense of effective
tactics to confront and solve problems and an
increased sense of personal efficiency" (p. 26).
Among the costs to the citizens, the same document counts; the people
have to 'limit their involvement in other activities in order to be
able to be effective participants'. Also in participating, citizens
have to accept the responsibility of their decisions, and finally it
notes that 'individuals will make an extra effort to inform themselves
about issues' (p. 26).
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7-6- Advantages of popular participation- White (1981) lists the
following ten advantages for community participation.
"1- With participation, more will be accomplished.
2- With participation, services can be provided
more cheaply.
3- Participation has an instinctive value for
participants.
4- Participation is a catalyst for further
development.
5- Participation encourages a sense of
responsibility.
6- Participation guarantees that a felt need is
involved.
7- Participation ensures things are done the
right way.
8- Participation uses valuable indigenous
knowledge.
9- Participation frees people from dependence on
others' skills.
10- Participation makes people more conscious of
the causes of their poverty and what they can
do about it" (p. 11).
In the next section White (1981), explores in detail each of these
advantages. (pp. 12-24)
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7-7- Obstacles to community participation- Some of the obstacles
of popular participation have already been reviewed under 'costs' for
different sectors of a community.	 However, there are still other
shortcomings which could be pointed out. It might be convenient to
divide them into two groups of theoretical and operational obstacles.
Apparently these two are closely related to each other.
a- Theoretical aspects- The first problem with the participation
theory is that it is by its very nature a western product. It has
already been pointed out that what the present literature suggests
about participation has nothing to do with the ad hoc and grass-root
co-operation and communal action in the developing world, rather it is
a theory, designed on western 'values' such as democracy, liberation
and voting. The participation theory then becomes under attack in a
community that has values different from those mentioned, for its own
good reasons. Then participation if imposed might become an insult to
the community.
For instance, among many communities in Iran, particularly rural
communities, the power and decision making is concentrated in the hands
of a few older people. They are not selected by voting, nevertheless
the village people can be happy with them and support them. In such a
situation introducing a participatory organisation, that requires the
involvement of all members, becomes an 'imposed external force'. If
the people have the right to decide on their representatives and they
appoint those who, in the view of the outsiders, should be discarded
from the scenario, how can this be justified? Wilkinson (1986) says;
"participation' is very Western, very polite but
generally makes little change to existing
procedures,...	 the terms 'participation'	 and
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'self-help' belong only to the professional world"
(P . 3).
Bugnicourt (1982), presents his impression about the same notion in the
context of Africa as follows;
"The prospects for popular participation have been
rendered even more confused by the incursion into
Africa of theories of participation from the East,
the Mediterranean, or across the Atlantic. This
participationism - often influenced by Christian or
Maoist thought - undoubtedly mobilises much
goodwill, but is not exactly suited to the African
situation, and leads to distorted interpretations"(p. 74). [emphasis added]
The second problem with this theory is that decentralisation of
decision-making and distribution of power as were argued, are the major
components of this theory. In practice development programmes require
the assessment of the matter on a regional or national level. A
higher rate of people's involvement is possible in small communities
and on a local scale. Beyond that, indirect participation, through
representatives only will be possible. In our view it is likely that
these delegates, presumably elected by voting, will become part of the
bureaucratic system. The decisions will be made by 'few' on behalf of
the masses anyway.
The third theoretical problem, and in fact a dangerous one, is
that participation requires knowledge.	 In our daily life we
frequently rely on the knowledge of others, the so called
professionals. We do not assemble a congregation to decide what to do
with somebody who is sick. We simply take him to a physician and we
follow his advice.	 In brief, participation by its very nature,
opposes professionalism. At least there should be areas of social
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affairs where the knowledge of the skilled must still be appreciated.
The risk of this criticism is that it might be used to justify
dictatorship. What emerges, is that those affairs which the community
must leave in the hands of professionals, should be identified.
The fourth obstacle refers to democratisation and liberation,
echoed by Oakley and Marsden (1985), for example. The editor of
Ekistics 1972, (No. 201) in relation to this wrote;
...the issue of the democratisation of local
decision-making has become a jaunting court for all
speeches,	 policy discussion and	 political
campaigns. Some of this rhetoric can be taken
seriously, but most of it proves only to be a
manipulating or quietening tactic" (p. 72).
Democratisation at the highest level will end in autonomy. One should
wonder how is it possible to achieve in a country which has several
groups, minorities, races and religious affiliations in its population.
The meaningful existence of a modern nation State is in sharp contrast
with the autonomous communities within it.3
The fifth shortcoming of the participation theory is that
contrary to what it implies, it is unable to create the 'fundamental
change' required for the development of a community. We have already
discussed that this approach is quite neutral and can be applied in any
political system. It was also mentioned that it could strengthen the
roots of the ruling powers, which themselves might be 'the main
obstacle to development'. 	 White (1981), claims;
...it has to be made clear that in discussing
community participation here we are not concerned
directly with these broad goals of democracy,
3.Examples can be found in recent clashes in Russia, Yougoslavia and Iraq.
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employment, or income distribution: they must be
pursued separately. The only exception is where
community projects contribute-usually in a minor
way-toward these goals" (p. 2).
The sixth and one of the most important problems with this
theory is that it transfers the 'burden' of the problem from the
authorities to the weak shoulders of the poor. Bugnicourt (1982),
claims;
"The peasants and poor town dwellers have only to
'participate', that is to say, make themselves the
effort needed to secure what the privileged part of
the population enjoys free of charge, thanks to
public financing" (p. 73).
One example of this is the self-help housing projects, where the people
are asked to build their own houses, while they have to work everyday
from dawn to midnight to feed their families. What is hidden under
overemphasising the participatory approach, as the treatment for most
if not all underdeveloped communities, is that it is not supported by
an extraordinary success rate, rather it is evidence of the failure of
scholars and administrators to find an effective alternative.
The seventh obstacle is the contradiction between participation
and bureaucracy. Running a country approaching the 21 century without
a bureaucratic system of some kind is unlikely. As Wolfe (1982),
explains;' ...tension between bureaucracy and participation seems to be
unavoidable, and it is unrealistic to expect the tension to be resolved
in favour of one idea or the other' (p. 102).
b- Operational obstacles- Gittell (1980), studying citizens'
participation in school affairs [USA] concludes that ; 'Our analysis
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suggests that community organisations generally avoid and are virtually
powerless in, all aspects of policy-making in the major policy areas of
budget, personnel, and curriculum' (p. 156). The same author also
claims; 'The findings of this study and others confirm the great
difficulty in expanding citizens participation, particularly that of
lower-income population' (p. 253). There are several other operational
obstacles to popular participation. One major problem is the
institutional aspect and its relationship with the State. As Wolfe
(1982), claims;
"During the past three decades, the real process of
'development' and modernisation have disrupted
traditional community organisations and sources of
livelihood to such an extent that the original
suppositions behind the programmes have become less
plausible, although in a good many settings
peasants ways of life and local solidarity have
shown unexpected resilience" (p. 99).
Midgley (1986), along the same lines claims;
"There is a wealth of anthropological evidence to
show that elaborate procedures for participation
exist in rural communities throughout the Third
World. But meeting of village elders or gathering
of tribal clans to discuss common problems and find
solutions are seldom regarded as spontaneous
participation. The exclusion of these and other
forms of indigenous involvement reveals that the
definition of spontaneous participation used in
literature is an externally imposed one which is
based on western ideological preconceptions rather
than local practices" (p. 152).
The substitution of these traditional organisations by governments are
found troublesome. 	 For instance, Midgley (1986), writes;
"The conclusion that state sponsorship of community
participation has been largely incremental and
manipulative in character, supports those who
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believe that state involvement in community
participation is a contradiction in terms" (pp.
150-151).
The same author concerning grass-roots and spontaneous participation
claims;
"Although spontaneous participation may appear to
be highly desirable, there are several difficulties
with this idea. Some of these are conceptual
problems revealing wider contradictory elements in
the theory of community participation. For
example, if spontaneous participation is so highly
prized, why do the proponents of community
participation continue to advocate its promotion
through the use of interventionist strategies and
techniques of various kinds" (p. 152).
He also writes;
9 
...United Nations publications have consistently
argued that local communities are apathetic and
indifferent and that they require the stimulus of
external Change agents if they are to participate
meaningfully in social development. It is odd
that the same organisation should at the same time
extol the virtues of spontaneous participation" (p.
152).
So one of the major difficulties in the way of community participation
seems to be the difficulty of substituting the spontaneous local
initiatives with new state controlled and directed institutions. In
addition the United Nations (1975), claims; 'In some countries legal
obstacles still exclude certain groups from political participation...
The removal of legal barriers may not be sufficient for supporting and
encouraging popular participation' (p. 44).
Bugnicourt (1982), also argues that;
9 
...the administrative system is a prolongation of
the anti-participatory attitude of the schools.
326
The hierarchical spirit, bureaucratic tendencies,
preference for written communication and paper work
over direct contact (when, in Africa, many
important problems are settled by oral debates),
the desire for standardisation, insufficient
personal commitment on the part of public servant-
all this contributes to the formation of a real
allergy	 to participation in administrative
circles' (pp. 71-72).
United Nations (1975), points out another difficulty on the way
in participatory initiatives. 	 'Since an official's status in the
community frequently depends on the visible demonstration of his
authority, he will tend to dominate local organisations and resist
effective participation by local groups' (p. 38) Bugnicourt (1982),
makes another observation, claiming; '...the technicians think their
science should provide all the answers and many politicians believe it
is their responsibility to think for others' (p. 72). United Nations
(1975), also points to another major obstacle, that is 'sustaining' the
sprit of participation and co-operation among the communities.
Starting a participatory programme requires some organisation.
This organisation might be either adapting one of the existing local
institutions or establishing a new one. In both cases an agent,'
social worker', 'animator', is necessary to initiate and stimulate the
organisation. This agent could be someone locally selected and known,
or somebody who is trained and prepared for this job by the government
or other intervening agency.	 In both cases there are problems.
Bugnicourt (1982), in relation to this writes;
"This has become the daily reality in a number of
so-called participatory institutions. There is an
institutional model in which the social worker or
moniteur in fact does the deciding for the rest of
the population. Many of the achievements presented
as the result of participation were planned and put
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into effect quite independently of the people
concerned, who were merely asked to contribute a
few days labour" (p. 69).
If the agent is selected from and by the local community there would be
another problem. United Nations (1975), refers to this as follows;
"Numerous studies of community power in all parts
of the world indicate that traditional local
voluntary leaders are relatively privileged members
of a community's socio-economic structure. In
rural areas, traditional local leadership is
frequently vested in relatively large landowners,
storekeepers or religious leaders" (p. 40).
The same document writes;
"As an alternative to reorienting traditional
leaders to meet the increased demands placed on
them by locally focused development institutions,
many countries have sought to broaden the base for
leadership by identifying, promoting and training
new and generally young leaders who can more
quickly learn the skill required for performing new
institutional roles...
There are of course, many difficulties with this
approach: Young people in rural areas are more
likely to migrate, ...youth leadership may be
resisted in societies where age is a traditional
attribute of leadership; or young people may lack
the necessary experience to be able to lead
effectively" (p. 41).
Wolfe's (1982), concluding statement seems useful. 	 He writes;
"The achievement of practically all of the
programmes fell below their initial promise for
many reasons, including the substitution of
bureaucratic compulsion for authentic community
initiative under the pressure of national targets,
the inapplicability of many of the technical
solutions offered to communities, and the inability
of many of community-level workers to transmit them
effectively. The most general shortcoming,
however, seems to have been a failure to recognise
the divisions of interests within communities and
the constraints imposed on their autonomous action
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by local and national power structure" (p. 99).
Remark- The analytical argument we have made so far has assumed
that they were relevant, regardless of any specific context, be it a
rural development project, housing or post-disaster reconstruction.
Now it seems that the phrases 'people's participation', 'community
participation' and their synonyms are misnomers in the contexts where
they are used. In fact our discussion showed that the communities
really have no problems needing to be solved by the 'outsiders', with
their 'spontaneous' participatory initiatives. The difficulty starts
with the arrival of outsiders, the State organisations, the development
agencies or their counterparts.
It is possible to claim that it is the outsiders who have
problems with their participation in the community affairs. One
should look for appropriate ways of 'government participation',
'planners and administrative system's participation' and 'agencies
participation'. The editor's page of Ekistics 251, 1976 reads;
"In a workshop at the UN
Vancouver, Professor Otto
didn't particularly care for
participation', but thought
the other way around:
condescendingly allow the
199).
Habitat Conference in
Koenigsberger said he
the expression 'people
it should actually be
the people sometimes
planner to help" (p.
We would like to claim that what Professor Koenigsberger said in
Vancouver should have been taken seriously. It is also possible to
argue, that the phrase 'people's participation' is wrong also because,
contrary to its goal of involving people in their own affairs and
encouraging 'bottom-up' action, the phrase implies that the initiators
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believe that responsibility of decision-making to be still theirs and
are looking for the 'people' to become involved. This is still a
'top-down' way of thinking.
In the next sections, to put this more into the context of our
present study, on reconstruction of rural areas, we will briefly review
a few of the major observations concerning participation in the context
of rural development. Then we will touch on the practice of community
participation in relation to shelter and finally we move on to see what
the implications of participatory approaches in relation to disasters
are.
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7-8- Rural development and people's partici pation- Oakley and
Marsden's book, 'Approaches to participation in rural development',
1987, is a comprehensive study currently available on this subject.
Concerning the historical background of the theory, they initially
point to development theories and try to identify the place of rural
development within this.
	 They claim;
"This search for a new order which emphasises the
poor and the rural areas is not new.	 It has its
roots	 in	 reaction	 to early	 forms of
industrialisation in the West. What is new is the
centrality that it has been afforded in
international thinking in recent years" (pp. 7-8).
The authors then discuss the historical background of people's
participation in rural development strategies. (p. 14)
"Such a philosophy holds the issue of participation
as central and is primarily associated with the
rural poor, not only because they are the most
disadvantaged within society, but also because the
rural areas in comparison with the urban areas,
which constitute the industrial base, have been
relatively neglected by previous development
strategies. This philosophy of a 'people-based'
development 'from below' assumes that participation
is not only an end in itself but also a fundamental
pre-condition for and a tool of any successful
development strategy.	 The failure of past
development strategy is fundamentally linked to the
absence	 of	 this	 missing	 ingredient	 -
participation" (p. 10).
Concerning the definition of people's participation in rural
development they also give different interrelationships, ranging from
simply 'voluntary contribution', to the full involvement in all stages
of 'decision-making' and 'evaluating' the programmes. (p. 19)
Next they point to the significant role of 'organisation'
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necessary for promotion of 'people's participation' and outline the
stages of action. (p. 70)	 They also raise several obstacles to
implementing 'rural people's participation'. One major obstacle they
discuss is the resistance of subsistence peasants to change. (p. 30)
However, the most significant problem with participation, admitting
that rural development requires fundamental changes in the community,
they claim is;
"The over riding obstacle to meaningful
participation by the rural poor in the development
process lies with the prevailing socio-political
structure. It is folly to ignore this fact, as it
is to propose prescription which implies changes in
the structure which are unrealistic. The dominant
paradigm of development thinking is a powerful
influence on development practice and severely
constrains	 the	 consideration	 of	 radical
alternatives" (p. 32).
After reviewing some implemented participatory rural programmes, they
come to a relatively disappointing conclusion and claim; ' Although
this is the general tenor of the statement made, the reality is that
the rural poor do not as yet have any direct part to play in rural
development projects' (p. 65). They also add; ' We must consider,
therefore, how to bring about effective participation, without waiting
for the structural changes generally indicated as indispensable' (p.
65). Concerning the 'catalyst' or 'agent' they claim;' ... almost
inevitably, will not be from the group, and thus we confront the issue
of the outsider' (p. 75).
What emerges from this brief review of rural participation is
that in practice it is found difficult for several reasons. The
resistance of marginal rural people to change is one difficulty, and
332
the problem of the catalyst or agent needing to be an outsider to the
community is another. It might be acceptable if we claim that the
bulk of rural poverty cannot be tackled simply by prescribing
participation. Those who defined participation as a process of
empowering will face the sad fact that empowering the powerless
requires 'power' in the real world. The development agencies seldom
have sufficient power to interfere in the existing power hierarchy of
the community never mind the country.
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7-9- Shelter and participation- Like development and rural
development, participation has long been recommended in the sphere of
shelter.
	 At present as Sneddon and Theobald (ed), (1987), write;
"Across the world, one hundred million men, women
and children have no shelter whatsoever. They
live in doorways, on vacant land, on rubbish tips
and on pavements.	 30 million children live on the
streets of cities. Half the population of third
world cities live in slum or squatter settlements.
In some cities this rises to over two-thirds" (p.
viii).
It appears that the background of participation in shelter schemes also
dates back to the early 1970s.	 Habitat (1985), reads;
"Until the 1970s, the usual policy of the
authorities towards squatter settlements was to
clear the land by demolishing the structures and
resettling in low-cost housing schemes or in rural
areas.
	
The effect of this slum-clearance was
negative...." (p. 1).
Looking for a convenient approach, people's participation was
introduced.
	 Habitat (1984), reads;
"In the early 1970s, recognition of the positive
potential of squatter settlements and failure of
many low-cost housing schemes eventually convinced
some governments and development agencies that they
should utilise the initiative and resources of the
urban poor more efficiently than was being done.
This change in policy resulted in two types of
low-income housing projects-squatter-settlement
upgrading projects and sites-and-services schemes"
(p. 4).
Not only do these new approaches have their own problems some of which
we will point to later, the reality is that the bulk of the
homelessness problem still remains untouched and ever-rising.
	 For the
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present situation, however, there still seems to be no other option as
Habitat (1987) makes clear;
"The scale of the shelter and services needed is
such that governments, particularly in the
developing countries, can not be expected to
provide all the necessary resources. The most
feasible alternative that most developing countries
have is to maximise the productivity of their
people, particularly the poor by facilitating their
efforts to provide themselves shelter" (p. 7).
The Executive Director of the Commission on Human Settlements in 'A new
oaL.
Agenda For Human Settlements' (1987), claims;
"Community	 participation	 must	 become	 a
high-priority concern in decision-making
procedures, so that the people endorse and take
responsibility for development programmes rather
than accept a passive role as mere recipients of
benefits generated by others" (p. 29).
In another document from the same source, 'Shelter and services for the
poor - a call to action' (1987), the same notion appears again when
reading;
"The energy and ingenuity of the people is a major
untapped resource for shelter and services in many
countries, especially for the major task of
upgrading the existing squatter areas and slum and
poor rural shelter" (p. 11).
Attempting to define community participation in self-help schemes,
Habitat (1984), reads;
"The voluntary and democratic involvement of people
in contributing to the execution of the project, in
sharing in the benefits derived therefrom and in
making decisions with respect to settling goals,
formulating the project and preparing and
implementing the plans" (p. 2).
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It is clear that such an approach has not yet been able to solve the
problem of shelter in the developing world and much hope is pinned on
it and only a little is achieved so far. For instance, Wilkinson
(1986), is critical of the effectiveness of 'participatory approaches
to shelter, such as self-help or site and services. He writes; " The
'self-help' syndrome is highly technical and requires hours of time and
money either building your own house or trying to feel at home on large
'site and service' schemes" (p. 3).
Kessler (1977), writes;
"Arguments against the use of self-help presented
by such countries as Zambia and Cuba in the early
1960s claimed self-help produced government slums,
that the quality of construction was below their
acceptable norms, that the development process was
too protracted and that people's efforts could be
put to more economically productive uses" (p. 203).
However, many of the theoretical arguments we made in the earlier
sections apply also to the shelter schemes. Community organisation is
one of them. The transfer of techniques and knowledge, the difficulty
of contradiction between grass-root motivation and guided organisations
are others.	 In any case as Habitat (1984), reads;
"Of all participatory activities in
site-and-services schemes and squatter-settlement
upgrading projects, participation of beneficiaries
in the financing of the project is probably the
most far-reaching one, since it commits the
low-income families for many years" (p. 24). (see
also Lohman and Muller, 1986, p. 25 and Robson
1986, p. 11)
The application of the participatory approaches is not restricted to
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the developing world. In Britain, for example, we know that the
notion of community participation dates back to the mid 1960s and early
1970s. (see for instance, Wates and Knevitt, 1987 P. 27) However, the
Skeffington Report, 1968 was a turning point in its development. The
first paragraph of the report reads;
"1. We were appointed in March 1968 'to consider
and report the best methods, including publicity,
of securing the participation of the public at the
formative stage in the making of development plans
for their area" (p. 1).
From those days there are several studies available in the literature.
For example, the Journal of the Town Planning Institute, issue no 4,
Volume 57 April 1971 was devoted to participation and contains good
articles on both theoretical and experimental aspects. In the
contemporary situation we know of a new movement in 'community
architecture'. This has been a matter of contradictory debates. But
what is important is that even in the context of Britain, community
participation is approached where the normal technocratic system has
failed to address the needs of specific groups of people. Lord
Scarman, forewording the book 'Community Architecture' by Wates and
Knevitt 1987, merely points to what was the initial message of the
Skeffington report of 1968.	 He writes; ' The theme of the book is
that people must be given more control and more effective choices over
their lives.	 It is a crucial change, if we are to avoid further
social disorder' (p. 10). In fact what Lord Scarman raises is the
problem of the 'inner-cities', that many parts of Britain are facing
nowadays.
Rod Hackney, the flag waiver for community architecture, and the
337
present President of the RIBA, became famous for his 'Black Road'
project of 1972. (For details, see Wates and Knevitt, 1987 pp.
70-73). Although much hope is pinned on the community architecture
movement in Britain, there are nevertheless many critics who are
dubious about its results.	 Graham Ridout for instance in Building, 3
July 1987 reports the idea of different architects about community
architecture.	 The controversial nature of this idea is shown in the
following views; 'Hackney will bring a new degree of realism to the
RIBA...', and ' he's outspoken and hypocritical. He makes a lot of
money out of community architecture and pretends it's very
philanthropic' (p. 29).
With the spread of community architecture, there are now several
publications on this subject and also a centre for dissemination of
information. (see for instance, Wates and Knevitt 1987, p. 159 on the
role of Community Technical Aid Centres) In other words, this is an
example where community initiatives gradually become a directed,
developed, routine process, organisation and eventually a bureaucratic
system.
Remark- Our discussion on participation in shelter provision
revealed that the idea dates back to the mid 1960s and early 1970s.
'Self-help' schemes were initiated in the form of squatter upgrading
and site and services projects. Despite the introduction of such
schemes the present situation of the homeless population of the world,
which shows a dramatic increase and which is out of control, indicate
that even these approaches have failed to facilitate the provision of
shelter for the homeless.
It was also found that self-help schemes illustrate the
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theoretical arguments we made earlier very well. Community
organisation, the problem of financing the project and the fact that
the burden of house building and financing is shifted to poor families,
who probably have problems with employment, food and nutrition, health
and so on. However, community participation is still an indisputable
ingredient of the agenda the United Nations prescribes for homelessness
in the world.
It was pointed out that people's participation also has a
history in Britain. At least one turning point is the publication of
the Skeffington Report in 1968.	 This notion was recently fuelled
under the new title of Community Architecture. 	 The usefulness of this
approach is a matter of debate. 	 It is no surprise if some Community
Architecture private consultants advertise for clients, or the Local
Authority open a special office of community organisations. The
important point in relation to this is, that initially communal
approaches are initiated to solve the shelter problem of those who, by
the existing technocratic system, have no access to shelter.
	 Somehow,
this approach is earmarked for the poor, here in Britain or elsewhere.
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7-10- Disasters and people's participation- It is safe to assume
that most discussions made in the previous sections, are to a large
extent, consistent with and applicable to disaster situations.
Nevertheless there seem to be some discrepancies. One major issue is
that unlike normal development programmes, the some-what restricted
definition of 'community' or 'people' is not often used in disaster
situations.	 It is true however, that communities vulnerable to
disasters are usually poor, but this is not always the case. For
instance, the Armenian earthquake in December 1988 in Russia, destroyed
cities which were built up to earthquake resistant norms and affected a
large proportion of the population of several cities. In such a case
the survivors regardless of their social or economic status have to
participate in rescue and other emergency measures.
The same fact is true in pre-disaster planning and contingency
measures. Certainly an education and training programme has to
encompass the whole population, whether rich or poor. Even in the
reconstruction period it is likely that the unaffected population of
the country wish to contribute to activities, either financially or
even by their presence and man-power.	 In Iran for instance, many
voluntary groups came to the damaged areas of Khuzestan to rebuild
them. Thus, in such a situation it is difficult to pin point the
'target group' of the population as only poor or as any other defined
group.
In this section, to assist in clarifying the matter, it seems
convenient to examine the role of 'the people' in different stages of
disaster, including; pre-disaster planning, relief and rehabilitation
and finally reconstruction phase.
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Pre-disaster planning- In our earlier chapter on pre-disaster
planning the role of the people was discussed. By its very nature,
pre-disaster planning is a training and educational programme as well
as adaptation of bye laws and building codes. As UNDRO (19847),
describes;
"In relation to disaster preparedness, there are
three elements which need to be considered:
(a) Technical training, so that people likely to be
required to participate in emergency relief
activities will be able to utilise enhanced or
specialised skills to greater effect;
(b) Management training and education, for
emergency managers and planners at different
levels; and
(c) Education for general public, by exposure to
purpose-designed public information programmes of
participation in general drills or exercises" (p.
83).
The same document also details the subjects of public education and
training programmes and provides examples of materials useful for this
purpose.	 (p. 88-99).	 Apparently such contingency plans in practice
are more likely to be applicable to the developing world. 	 However,
organising these programmes tends to be an official and administrative
matter, especially because it requires knowledge and skills.
Nevertheless, each small community when endangered by a hazard will
adopt its own organisation to take ad hoc measures to prevent or
mitigate losses.
One major difficulty concerning pre-disaster planning, is to
convince the people to take the risk of future disaster seriously and
to take part in preparation programmes such as training and drills.
In relation to this Drabek (1986), writes;	 . The greater the
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disaster frequency, the greater the proportion of the population who
will have engaged in preparatory actions' (p. 24). The same author
also shows that several studies have concluded that only a small
proportion of the population will take the risk of future probable
disaster seriously and take preparation measures. (P. 27) There is
also evidence that the reaction of people towards the first warning
message issued by the authorities is of 'disbelief'. Drabek (1986),
writes;
"...Where a disaster is unexpected and the level of
emergency preparedness low, most people's immediate
reaction to the first warning received is disbelief
and a continuation of normal routine, whether the
warning comes from an authority or a friend or
neighbour..." (p. 73).
Apparently people's reaction changes after receiving repeated warning
messages and they become active. What can be concluded is that in the
case of pre-disaster planning, community participation in education and
training is very dependent on convincing the people of the risk and
therefore, the usefulness of training programmes. Perhaps in this
respect there are similarities with a development or housing programme,
where the people must first believe in the usefulness of the proposed
programme.	 The difference between the two example is that unlike the
development programmes or housing projects, where the community can
feel the difficulties associated with their present situation. In the
case of disaster preparation, where no one can forecast the need, it is
likely that the people will show less interest in participating in
those programmes.
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Emergency phase- Evidence suggests that the people's behaviour,
when disaster happens, suddenly changes. 	 Drabek (1986), says that;
Disaster victims react in an active manner, not passively as is implied
in the 'dependency image'. They do not wait around for offers of aid
by organisations". (p. 133) Psychologically the survivors may become
brave. Drabek quotes one example from Japan, where a kindergarten
teacher, who was usually afraid of even a slight earthquake, at the
time of one event 'was more concerned about the safety of her small
pupils than of herself' (p. 135). 	 The same author also writes; 'Once
individuals themselves and their families are safe, they form little
groups and try to help as many as possible' (p. 155) As can be seen,
people's instinctive behaviour is to act co-operatively and participate
together in an instinctive humanitarian manner.
There is also evidence that the disaster situation strengthens
the community spirit. Drabek (1986), writes; 'Communities struck by
natural disasters will experience heightened levels of internal
solidarity and intolerance of outsiders...' (p.
	
179).	 He also
reports observations that are promising;
"At the organisational level, the period of
post-disaster utopia is often characterised by the
emergence of ephemeral social organisations which
incorporate utopian values. Sometimes these
appear as completely new organisations; sometimes
they grow within the framework of pre-disaster
organisational structures..." (p. 160).
oc"
UNDRO (1986), also makes similar observations when claiming;
"Contrary to what is often expected, and frequently
to the surprise of disaster relief workers, the
morale of a disaster-affected community is more
likely to be buoyed up by optimism than to be
shattered by despair" (p. 16).
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The same reference also advises; 'Disaster management activities, from
preparedness to reconstruction, require a participatory process' (p.
27). Elsewhere one reads; "The most effective programmes are likely to
be those carried out 'with' the affected population, rather than 'for'
people" (p. 26). There are abundant documents on 'emergency management
after disasters', which concern the participation of the community as
one of the key elements of success in such activities. 4 In brief, the
spontaneous popular organisations are a common feature in the emergency
phase after disasters and they can operate and function effectively5.
Emergency shelter- In the Chapter on Emergency shelter and
temporary accommodation, it was found that in the developing world most
are provided by the survivors themselves. The kind of co-operation
for shelter provision within the community, depends on the
circumstances of each individual case. Most likely the .pre-disaster
form of collaboration in shelter building will function again. In
Khuzestan for instance, we observed that in the case of delay to
reconstruction of permanent houses, the villagers returned to their
familiar way of sheltering, with the same mode and organisations as
before, even on some occasions building a new village as temporary
4.See for instance, 'Emergency Health management after natural disasters, by
Pan American Health Organisation 1981, and "Environmental health Management
after natural disasters' 1982, or Assessment Guidelines, 1983, Office of
United States Foreign Disaster Assistance Agency for International
Development.
5.In some disaster situations these locally initiated organisations may beco
paralysed by the fact that rescue for instance requires facilities which are
not ready at the scene. Mud-slides or volcanic eruptions are examples.
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accommodation. (See for example, the case of Jelizi)
Participation of survivors was also recommended as a major
factor in the success of the any emergency shelter provided for the
survivors, 'survivors' resourcefulness' was a common word. In design,
construction and management of the temporary accommodation, the notion
of survivors' participation was identified as a key factor. For
example, UNHCR (1982), in 'Handbook for Emergencies' in almost all
cases of the establishment of camps, points to the involvement of the
refugees was the critical element in designing and setting up of the
temporary settlements. Perhaps Professor Koenigsberger's short
statement (1982), illustrates the message; ' You can not settle the
people, they must settle themselves' (p. 1).
Reconstruction phase- It can be assumed that participation of
the community in the reconstruction phase bears more similarity to that
of normal times. Like emergency shelter provision, in the
reconstruction phase the participation of the community was identified
as a crucial factor. 	 For example, Van Essche (1984), writes;
"The spontaneous reconstruction of housing begins
extremely rapidly after a disaster, and often
during the emergency phase itself.... The key to
success ultimately lies in the participation of the
local	 community -	 the	 survivors - in
reconstruction. ... The primary resource in the
provision of post-disaster shelter is the
grass-roots motivation of survivors, their friends
and families" (pp. 167-168).
There seem to be three major reasons for recommending survivors'
participation;
1- People are a resource,
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2- people's participation is necessary to guarantee that the shelter
will be built to the right quality; and
3- their participation can eliminate some of the long term side-effects
of intervention.
The first reason is clear, in many developing countries the
reconstruction of shelter is still mainly carried out by the survivors
themselves and since in most cases, particularly in rural areas of
the developing world, the survivors are familiar with some kind of the
traditional building skills, there is less reason not to enrol this
cost-effective work-force with its local knowledge and skill.
Concerning the second reason, we have given abundant examples of
reconstructed settlements that were found not to fit the users' needs
or life style (see for example, the case of Gediz). Survivors'
participation in this sense is a measure to enhance the chance that the
products will be suitable for the needs of the inhabitants.
The third point corresponds to the fact, that since new
materials and techniques are often introduced after disasters, if the
local inhabitants are not taught how to use, maintain and repair these,
or if the same kind of materials and skills are not available within
reasonable access and affordable to the survivors, new long term
problems will be created. While the expectations of survivors may
have been realised initially, their future access to the means to
reproduce their shelter might be worse. 	 Participation of the
survivors in this sense, is a measure to transfer any new construction
techniques for use in the long term. Such schemes are practised in
several ways and we have already discussed them in a previous chapter.
The two most common models are training the builders and masons, and
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training the families, where houses are usually built by family members
without the help of a builder. (see for example, McKay 1981, pp.
97-102 and Dudley 1988, 111-121)
In terms of participation in settlement reconstruction, there
are several concepts which may be left for the community or families to
decide about. Allocation of land for the new site, site selection,
site layout, public services location, design and construction, house
design	 and construction, management and 	 administration of
reconstruction programmes are all possible examples. Also in each of
these areas different levels of participation may occur. (see Arnstein
1971, p. 177)
So far, it seems obvious that the survivor's participation in
reconstruction, as well as in provision of emergency shelter is, good,
useful, necessary and significant. It is important to emphasis that
the quality of reconstruction projects will not be enhanced by merely
saying that, or prescribing the participatory approaches. Our earlier
theoretical study in this chapter, indicated that any participatory
approach involves several operational obstacles. 	 What really is
difficult, is to make this approach work on the site.
We discussed the fact that in relief and rescue or provision of
emergency shelter, as long as survivors are in charge of their own
affairs, there seems to be no serious problem. The spontaneous
systems have their own conflict settling system. In fact the problems
of community participation arrive at the disaster area, with the
arrival of the first helping agency, and is likely to get more
complicated in the reconstruction phase. 	 It is good to remember again
what Professor Koenigsberger said in Vancouver, that in fact it is the
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agencies, planners and administrators who have problems with their
effective intervention, not the people.
Overcoming the weaknesses of intervenor groups does not mean
that the local organisations have no problems in sorting out all the
reconstruction matters.	 In fact on the contrary, the capacity of
these organisations is often very limited. In the village of Sane,
Khuzestan, for example, the restoration and reconstruction of each
individual house was carried out with full co-operation and
participation of the families, in a short time and an effective manner.
However, when the time came to do something about the public spaces
and services it became very difficult. For instance, it was difficult
for a family to accept that even a small area of their courtyard should
be added to the street for the public benefit. The common practice of
compensating the owners in such cases was it seems unacceptable. The
allocation of appropriate time for each family to work on the public
buildings and recruiting enough volunteers became unrealistic. In
such a situation everyone wanted to be sure that their contribution was
not misused by others. Perhaps another factor which discouraged the
villagers to actively co-operate in the installation of their public
services, was their expectation of achieving all that from the
resources and capital to be allocated by the government. The variety
of family size, age structure, income, seasonal work and so forth made
the decision about the work distribution for public affairs very
difficult.
	
In addition the management and control of such methods
added to the difficulties. Generally it seems best to focus the
families' participatory enthusiasm on the construction of their own
houses and in turn outsiders can focus their resources on public
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services.
It seems that the less interference in the existing local
organisations the better. Perhaps the example of reconstruction in
Ecuador, (see Dudley 1988) is relevant since the major part of the work
has been left to the families themselves and for other affairs the
existing local administration system has been respected.
Conclusion- To sum up our observations from this chapter, it was
found that although the disaster literature unanimously agrees with
increasing the survivors' role in disaster activities, this kind of
approach involves many theoretical and operational constraints.
Generally in pre-disaster planning the community may show less interest
in co-operating. On the contrary in the relief phase the spontaneous
community systems usually work effectively. The main problem in fact,
is the participation of outsiders and not the community.
Generally community participation on a local and small scale can
work more effectively than on larger scales. There is no blueprint to
suggest the appropriate structure and organisation of survivors'
participation, rather this matter must be studied separately. It is
even likely that in different regions of the same country different
methods are necessary.
There are usually two options for community organisation, which
are identified to be the first step towards implementation of any
project using this approach; either one of the existing traditional
systems may be extended and employed, or a new organisation
established.
	 However, it seems that there is a greater chance of
success for the first option.
	 The only difficulty might be that
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strengthening the local participation system can contradict other
goals, such as abolition of power concentrated in elites. (see for
example, Dudley 1988, p. 115)
Although there are people who define participation as a process
of empowering, in the case of disaster, it is better to see survivors'
participation as a useful resource and control mechanism, securing the
suitability of the reconstructed settlement. There are many ways in
which community participation can reduce the side effects of
intervention, such as long term dependency on outsiders and it is also
the best approach to facilitate a speedy psychological recovery of the
disaster victims.
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CHAPTER VIII
POST-DISASTER PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RECOVERY1
Introduction: Although 'human loss' is the indisputable
component of any major disaster, there is evidence suggesting that
social and psychological effects of disasters, unlike the material
loss, are often overlooked during the post-disaster period. The
activity of 'reconstruction' usually implies physical reconstruction
(e.g., rebuilding houses and infrastructure), but the psychological
recovery of survivors may need greater resources for reconstruction
from the authorities and aid agencies.
One approach to this multidimensional problem is to consider the
effects of disaster as physical, obvious and tangible or on the other
hand psychological, latent and non-material. The current literature
indicates that physical aspects of disasters have received a great deal
of attention, while the problem of reconstructing psychological damage
have generally been ignored (e.g., the Office of the United Nations
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, UNDRO; 1986). In an UNDRO report (1988),
including a summary of disasters during 1987, the main criteria for
inclusion of a catastrophic event such as a disaster, were 'property
damage in excess of US $ 1 million' and loss of 10 lives.
The validity and consistency of these criteria may be
scrutinised by asking questions such as 'what is so special about
property loss over US $ one million ?' What about those people that
1.This Chapter is an edited version of a paper produced in collaboration wit
my Iranian colleague Bahman Najarian from Psychology Department York
University.
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live but are permanently damaged that may be a greater disaster for the
community ? It can be argued that Human loss and disablement and
associated psychological trauma are the long term consequences and
ultimate economic cost of any major catastrophe. The materialistic
consequences of war are relatively easily and cheaply replaced. Loss
of property has less to do with life-long starvation of a country, it
is the disruption of the systems of food and transport that upset the
market, from where they get their livelihood, that really hurts.
Psychological consequences due to disasters, unlike the physical
losses, are difficult to measure and record and therefore not visible.
It is their quality of 'invisibleness' that lies behind the neglect by
aid agencies and government departments of the long term rehabilitation
of people. It is the same 'blindness' on the part of the planners of
development projects that focuses on the initial cost of the buildings
but often neglects the human needs of the users. The shortcomings of
the current approaches to disasters are more pervasive and extensive
than is admitted because they continue to exist often long after the
post-disaster period.
It is well established that inclusion of psychological aspects
plays an important role in the contingency planning for disasters,
mainly because human responses to disaster are often strong, diverse
and complex. For instance even when the air raid alarm is heard some
people will ignore its warning to take cover because they have survived
on previous occasions.
The present chapter on disaster mitigation focuses on the
associations and interrelations between psychological aspects and
physical reconstruction.
	 The author strongly believes that this
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inter-relationship is often underestimated or ignored altogether. The
proposition that is explored is based on the premise that the complex
mutual effects of psychological well-being greatly impinge on the
success of the processes and practices of physical recovery and
rehabilitation.
A point should be mentioned here, that the words 'survivors' and
'victims' in literature are used as synonymous. It appears that there
is no general tendency to use the word for any special group of
disaster stricken people. It is rather upon the author to select them
as he wishes (Drabek, 1986 p.7). However, we preferred to use the
term 'victim' only when referring to the immediate aftermath of a
disaster.
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8-1- Psychological aspects of disasters: An overview
a- Characteristics of disasters as stressful events- Disasters
clearly differ from one to another on a number of aspects including
their intensity, the degree of physical damage they bring about and the
way people perceive them (Fritz, 1961; Barton, 1962, 1969). Therefore
the selection of a reconstruction strategy and supporting policies
depend upon the type and intensity of each particular event (see
Drabek, 1986).
According to Sarason and Sarason (1987), the parameters which
determine the specific features of a stressful event (such as
disasters) are duration, severity, predictability, degree of loss of
control or perceived control (also Paulhus, 1983), survivors' level of
self-confidence (also Spielberger and Sarason, 1985), and the
suddenness of the onset of the event. It is also confirmed that the
degree to which a disaster affects its victims is based on the
particular characteristics of the disaster, the community and the
victims in each case (Perry and Lindell, 1978).
For our purposes, at this stage and for reasons that will be
made clear, the word 'disaster' is being used interchangeably to mean
both natural and 'man-made' or war as a disaster. War and violent
behaviour have and unfortunately will continue to be a very common
feature of our everyday lives (Fantino and Reynold, 1975) with over 50%
of all nations taking part in at least one war since the turn of the
century (Lefrancois, 1980). According to Kidron and Smith (1983),
'There have been about three hundred wars since 1945. There has been
no single day free of war and few islands of tranquillity (Part One:
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War since 1945)'. The most obvious consequences of war are the human
and property losses suffered by the survivors. However, it is
increasingly being recognised that the survivors may be subject to
lifelong adverse psychological and somatic problems (Lefrancois, 1980;
Sarason and Sarason, 1987).
The prolonged side-effects experienced by people have only
received serious academic and scientific attention since the 1960s
(Drabek, 1986). For example, the psychological after effects of
survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were first investigated 17 years
after the event. There is some evidence to suggest that about half a
million of the Vietnam Veterans still suffer from some post-disaster
symptoms (Orner, 1988). Moreover, the psychological effects of such
disasters are not limited to the victims and survivors, but may also
extend to the rescue staff and workers involved in the relief
operations (Orner, 1988), not to mention the families of those
involved.
It seems surprising, given the magnitude of the lives affected
that no well-established and generally acceptable method of
psychological intervention is available (Baisden and Quarantelli,
1981). Indeed, Kinston and Rosser (1974), who provide comprehensive
coverage of human reactions to disasters, believe that the lack of
information may be in part due to the reluctance of scientists to fully
investigate post-disaster psychological reactions. War can be said to
be a multiple disaster, that generates 'multiple stressors'. Some of
these stressors occur simultaneously (i.e., concurrent stressors), and
some develop in the aftermath (i.e., sequential stressors), when
victims are struggling for survival and eventual recovery (Sarason and
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Sarason, 1987 for a review of literature on multiple stressors).
It is claimed, not unreasonably, given the lack of research,
that human reactions to man-made disasters may be viewed as more or
less similar to those manifest when natural disasters occur (Warheit,
1976). It is highly likely, certainly in early stages that for those
who lose members of their family in a war, the negative impact could be
much worse than for those who only lose property or lands (Drabek,
1986). However, on the other hand it is claimed that psychological
reactions to natural disasters may differ from those to man-made
disasters (e.g., through, for instance being able to attribute blame
and negligence). This latter difference may be expressed in the
anger that survivors feel towards those responsible for the disaster,
and their inability to find meaning in what has happened to them as a
family and community. Feelings of dehumanisation (Sarason and Sarason,
1987) can also play havoc with the survivors inclination to participate
in their recovery.
b- Psychological profile of survivors- It is safe to assume that
traumatic events, whether self induced, 'man-made' or natural will to
some degree cause clinical psychological symptoms (Schwarzwald et al.,
1987). Research shows that the survivors ability to adjust to
disaster-induced changes involves both perceptual and behavioural
aspects (Drabek, 1986).
In general, the more intense the disaster the more serious are
the psychological reactions of survivors to it (Sarason and Sarason,
1987). The factors that determine the extent to which survivors would
emotionally react to a disaster are said to include: the number of
non-fatal casualties, the number of survivors in public shelters or
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homes damaged during an attack, the number of families in which a
fatality has occurred, the number of homeless people, and the number of
visible casualties seen by survivors (Janis, 1974). And presumably the
visual expression of all this damage. The victims' continuous struggle
to survive is claimed to be mediated by factors such as home
attachments, group affiliations, psychological attempts to overcome the
situation by means of cognitive control, temporary denial defence
technique and a persistent sense of hope for the better times to come
(Raphael, 1977; Drabek, 1986).
It is claimed by (Kinston and Rosser, 1974) that 75% of the
people exposed to disasters, irrespective of the type and intensity of
the event, may show the 'disaster syndrome' 2
 and about 12% to 25% may
manifest serious psychological reactions. The psychological responses
that humans show to disasters may include apathy, passivity, or just
pottering around aimlessly, extreme suggestibility, altruism, euphoric
identification with the damaged community, enthusiastic participation
in the clearing up operation (Wallace, 1956; also Mileti et al., 1975;
Thompson, 1985; UNDRO, 1986; Stewart,1988).
Even though the long-term psychological effects of disasters are
less clear and well known than the immediate and short-term ones
(Drabek, 1986), there is no doubt that for many years the side-effects
are likely to persist. For example, two years after the event
survivors of a disaster in USA still show some anxiety, depression,
social isolation, hostility, belligerence, disruption of daily routine
and somatic complaints (Gleser et al., 1978). Five years after a flood
2.Disaster syndrome in fact refers to so called Post-traumatic Stress Disord
and the syndrome related to it.
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in USA, 30% of the survivors still showed symptoms of post-disaster
syndrome, signs of being phobic to cues related to the flood
(Schwarzwald,et al. 1987; also Popovic and Petrovic, 1964). Ploeger
(1974) indicates that 10 years after the occurrence of a disaster in
Germany, its survivors still show symptoms that are aggravated by even
mild provocation, such as talking about the event or the season of the
disaster.
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8-2-
	
	 Associations between physical reconstruction and
psychological recovery
This section is aimed at illustrating the close associations
between the physical reconstruction and the psychological well-being of
the survivor in the post-war reconstruction period. To this end, the
relevant literature as well as some of the observations by the author
will be presented. A brief review, of the conditions of the temporary
accommodation provided for the survivors is necessary for further
discussions on important issues, such as time to return to the old
sites and participation of the survivors in the recovery processes as
well as policies concerned with design, material and technical.
Emergency shelter period- According to Maslow's theory (1954),
refugees may be regarded as having been forced to regress down to the
lower levels of their hierarchy of needs (e.g., physiological and
safety needs). This abrupt and intense change in the life of survivors
along with the adverse conditions, such as over crowd of the temporary
shelters (Loizos, 1977) can be added to their previously
disaster-induced problems. In other words, the problems which victims,
now refugees face during their temporary stay at camps (e.g.,
unemployment), may act as the 'second disaster' and push them to
complete demoralisation and nervous-breakdown (Rossi et al., 1983).
Orner (1988) very nicely and briefly describes conditions of the
survivors in this period as 'living in utter limbo'.
Kinston and Rosser (1974), hold that refugees usually develop a
particular mentality, the 'camp mentality', which can take the form of
a set of personality and behavioural characteristics, such as
'selfishness', 'compassionlessness' and 'egotistical behaviour'. This
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syndrome perhaps applies to war 'concentration' camps for prisoners as
well as other disaster-related temporary shelters, because, it is
claimed, that the negative consequences of life in emergency shelters
are likely to develop, even in the most sophisticated and advanced
camps (Kinston and Rosser, 1974; Orner, 1988). Due to these negative
side-effects, authorities should do their best to make this temporary
settlement as short as possible, in fact, one way to assess the success
of any settlement reconstruction plan may be the brevity of its
emergency shelter period (Orner, 1988).
It should be noted that in some circumstances survivors may be
quite capable of building emergency shelters for themselves using
indigenous techniques and salvaged materials from the ruins. These
kind of shelters are likely to be more efficient and comfortable to
survivors, than the commonly used tents. In fact, most Iranian
refugees preferred to live near the ruins of their demolished houses,
than to be moved to the temporary shelters provided by the government.
This attitude seems to be unrelated to the sophistication of the camps
and the quality of life in them. 	 The survivors try to insist on
remaining in their villages, in order to return to 'normalcy' as soon
as possible. In earlier circumstances, these survivors have
demonstrated remarkable ingenuity and skill in constructing suitable
and cost-effective temporary shelters, while continuing their normal
and routine occupational responsibilities and tasks. It is recommended
to avoid military style designs of camp layout and to give the refugees
an opportunity to establish some form of community similar to their
original homeland (UNDRO, 1977?; Davis, 1978; UNHCR, 1982; MacAdam,
1987).
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Design policy
a- Site selection- Post-disaster housing is one of the main
priorities for all disaster victims (Drabek, 1986). However, selection
of a location for the survivors may be a very painstaking, complex and
delicate process (Davis, 1975; 1977). Even though disaster victims may
resort to different means of recovery from the homelessness, such as
autonomous kinship or institutional approaches (Bolin and Trainer,
1978), the main issue revolves around whether or not they should return
to their original site. According to Drabek (1986), decisions
regarding site selection must be made with respect to the cultural,
ethnic, personal and social needs and interests of the survivors (also
Perry and Mushkatel, 1984).
It is generally noteworthy that survivors are very willing and
persistent in residing in the same site and repairing their own damaged
homes (Nehnevajsa and Wong, 1977; Geipel, 1982). There is strong
evidence that survivors decline to sell their lands to the government
after being moved to safety, even when there is a further potential
threat (Cochrane et al., 1979). Interestingly, in some cases when the
authorities have insisted on disaster victims moving to new sites, they
have ignored official warnings and moved back after a short while
(Mitchel, 1976b; Mitchel, 1977). Relocation can, if too far, change
the surrounding environment of their homes, along with some important
aspects of their social and familial lives (Orner, 1988).
The overwhelming enthusiasm of the survivors to return to their
old locations, their strong resistance to any sort of change and their
insistence upon the 'sameness' of various aspects of their lives after
the disaster, may be beneficial to their psychological well-being.
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Thompson (1985), suggests that 'over-learned familiar routines',
something which results from living in the same or similar environment,
may be regarded as a therapeutically effective means of assisting
people under stress. It is reported that if survivors have an
opportunity to decide about the site of their new homes, they usually
prefer the original site and even the same spots. In fact, they show
considerable	 resistance to suggestions for doing otherwise
(Quarantelli, 1982).
It is claimed that the victims' site-selection tendency may be
associated with their age, sex and occupation (Boileau et al., 1978).
For example, older survivors are more adaptable to new locations, and
generally show better adjustment to relocations and post-disaster
effects than younger victims (Schiff, 1977). Obviously, if there is a
probability of future threats to the old site, it may be sensible to
disregard other factors and attempt to locate survivors elsewhere
(Oliver-Smith, 1977; Boileau et al., 1978). The decision of survivors
regarding the location of their homes, at the original sites, will be
drastically affected by the continuous recurrence of threatening events
(Drabek, 1986). However, White (1974), maintains that reasons, such as
unavailability of any acceptable and satisfactory alternative, may
persuade the disaster victims to reside even in areas where there is a
high risk of recurrent disasters. It is claimed that the probability
of a disaster to reoccur, as one determinant of the intensity of the
disaster (Leik et al., 1982), has to be considered for the site
selection (Goldsteen and Schorr, 1982).
In many cases, unsuitability of land is one of the main
contributors to the occurrence of some disasters. Especially in the
362
major cities of developing countries, Mexico City for example, most
squatter settlers are vulnerable to mud slide, fire and earthquakes.
Also, many villages located in flat areas, close to fertile land for
agriculture, might be at risk from floods. Though it may be necessary
to relocate survivors to lands where risk of future disasters is low,
this change can cause some disruption in the economy of the community.
(UNDRO, 1977?; Davis, 1981a; 1987a).
In	 reality, transferring survivors to other sites (i.e.,
complete relocation) is rarely practised (Drabek, 1986). The
authorities should therefore be aware that the decisions regarding
location, even to temporary settlements must be well planned, as the
greater the number of post-disaster residential moves, the less chance
the survivors have to recuperate and overcome their emotional and
familial problems induced by the disaster itself (Bolin, 1982). Any
sort of transition, such as, moving to a new place of residence, even
under normal conditions, may be a source of stress for people (Sarason
and Sarason, 1987). Perhaps the ultimate stress occurs when survivors
become refugees in other countries far away from their homeland.
Bolin (1976), indicates that 'residential dislocation' could
give rise to some additional adverse effects for the victims. On the
whole, it appears that returning survivors to their original homes
would be considered less 'transitional' and more 'normal'. Since
victims usually assess and compare their losses relative to those of
other victims (Barton, 1969), authorities must act consistently to
avoid discrimination in their dealings with the victims. In this
respect it is well known that survivors usually compare their fate with
that of other victims to assess their conditions (Kilijanek and Drabek,
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1979).
The survivors' preference to return to their original homes may
be related to their desire to 'regain normalcy' and enjoy 'a sense of
closure regarding the dead' (Hershier and Quarantelli, 1976; Drabek,
1986; Orner 1988). However, on the other hand, it is worth mentioning
that environmental stimuli, associated with the catastrophic event, may
trigger the 'original trauma' in some victims when they return home
(Amen, 1985).
b- Population integration- My observation from Khuzestan
strongly supports the proposal that maintaining the pre-disaster
population configuration for each village is welcomed by the survivors.
It seems that survivors prefer the same old community and resent having
to live with 'strangers' in their 'reconstructed villages'. It appears
that they do not want to deal with additional social and inter-personal
relationships and demands. It is not surprising that sticking to 'good
old friends', such as, kin and established neighbours help victims with
their struggle to maintain a normal life after disaster (Drabek, 1986).
In respond to the question ' whether or not they prefer to be
living with other villagers in a new settlement?", majority of the
respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the idea of
integration with other communities in their reconstructed villages. It
may be noted that due to provisional considerations and size of the
villages in Khuzestan, the Iranian authorities had decided, in some
circumstances, to build clusters of villages, where each cluster
consisted of a few small villages built close to one another in a
particular area.
The residences of these close-by villages apparently are doing
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their best to maintain their 'territorial privacy' and to avoid routine
and frequent interactions and communications with the other nearby
villages. It is suggested that the psychological recovery of survivors
may be accelerated under conditions, where they live with people whom
they know and relate to well (Demerath and Wallace, 1957; Warrick et
al., 1981; Golec, 1983; Drabek and Key, 1984). There are reported
cases where simple events, such as finding an 'incompatible' neighbour,
have forced the survivors to abandon their homes and resort to a more
familiar and "friendly site" (see Ciborowski, 1967; Hogg, 1980).
There are also cases where the whole community has evacuated their
reconstructed homes at a new site and moved back to the original site,
because they had been forced to live in a community which they did not
like (Davis, 1977a).
c- Site layout and house design- It appears that more similarity
in the design of the houses would result in less disturbance and stress
for the inhabitants. However, due to the vulnerability of the old
villages and houses, use of new designs may be necessary. When these
are introduced, 'an appropriate design', something not too far from the
previous one may be favoured. Failing to select a proper design may
result in some difficulties in the suitability and maintenance of the
new houses. It is suggested that whenever some technological changes
are to be implemented, the designers and builders must try to come up
with plans which are consistent with the traditional aspects of the
houses (Davis, 1975; Aysan and Oliver 1987). The greater the
similarity between the pre- and post- disaster social and physical
aspects, the fewer are the adaptations required (Mileti et al., 1975).
One advantage of keeping the technology the same (or very
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similar) is that it gives the people a sense of control over their
houses, in terms of understanding and being able to manipulate their
design and structure if necessary (Spielberger and Sarason, 1985). The
need to have actual or perceived control over various aspects of
housing may explain why Morris (1974), claims that humans tend to
'resist change', and that they become 'disoriented' when changes occur.
Furthermore, it is suggested that disaster victims may show less
interest in the materialistic aspects of life after the disasters and
become more spiritual and fate believers (Bolion, 1982; Drabek and Key,
1984). They may feel that the situation could be much worse for them
by being killed or receiving more serious damage.
It seems that in rural areas of Khuzestan a considerable number
of families have experienced dramatic emotional and social upsets as a
result of changes in the design of their houses. For example, due to
significant alteration in some buildings, where a significantly
different design from the original was imposed the occupants frequently
altered the building; the same has been observed with the layout of
villages.
d- Material and technology policy- It is argued that appropriate
material and technology policies of reconstruction may be the final
by-product of the inter-relationships among a number of factors
including stability of the site, the local building patterns,
improvement to buildings aimed at lowering their liability to future
disasters (Bates et al., 1979; Tonkinson, 1979). It is well
documented, that people will do all they can to alter those aspects of
their reconstructed villages, which they do not find consistent with
their needs and taste. This tendency to modify their new homes would
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subside only when victims again felt secure in a 'balanced place'
(Baron et al., 1974; Spielberger and Sarason, 1985).
Snarr and Brown (1978), and Bjorklund (1981), indicate that
victims, in general, receive a more or less improved quality of housing
after disasters. This improvement may be partly because some believe
that post-disaster conditions are good opportunities for introducing
substantial improvements in social systems anyway (Fritz, 1961;
Quarantelli and Dynes, 1972). However, it may be noted that some of
these changes in the design and structure of the original villages may
be based upon the pre-disaster pattern and plans (Bates et al., 1963;
see also Prince, 1920; Lessa, 1964; Oliver-Smith 1979).
Furthermore, some improvements in the technological aspects may
increase survivors' vulnerability by making them more dependent
(Perrow, 1984; Davis, 1981a). 	 Orr (1979), claims that technological
changes (i.e., improvements) may bring about extensive adverse
side-effects and some social disruption (see also Lewis et al., 1977;
Long, 1978). Moreover, using new designs and new materials may impose
additional psychological stress (i.e., pressure), as they may not know
how to use and repair them. It is claimed that homes using new
technology and designs may make the survivors more dependent on
external help, and as a result feel considerable loss of control
(UNDRO, 1977?; Cuny, 1981; Rubin et al., 1985).
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Implementation and construction policy
a- Timing of return home- For families the importance of
returning to their homes becomes evident, when one considers the
unfortunate conditions of life in the emergency shelters. There may
also be the negative effects of losing family members. It is claimed
that survivors may become frustrated and aggressive from long periods
in temporary shelters while waiting to return home, that they may
become hostile towards the very people trying to help them (Lacey,
1972; Milet et al., 1975; Krell, 1978). In general, the decision
regarding the time to return the survivors home may be decided against
four main factors, namely, the completion of the new buildings,
conditions in the emergency shelters, the potential risk of similar
disaster and the psychological recovery of the victims.
b- Completion of the buildings- Since victims could return to
their homes only when the physical reconstruction is completed, the
process of rebuilding damaged homes should be kept as simple and short
as possible. However, it has been found that survivors prefer to
return home even before the completion of the their homes (Drabek,
1986). Our findings are in complete agreement with the latter claim.
More specifically, most Iranian refugees indicated their unequivocal
preference for returning to the ruins of their houses to living in the
confined environment of emergency shelters. The rural people are
usually more familiar with indigenous material and methods of
construction than would be urban survivors who are therefore likely to
be more dependent on 'external' aid.
c- Conditions of the emergency shelter- As mentioned earlier,
the period of temporary shelter should be as short as possible
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(Birnbaum et al., 1973). In fact, the slower the process of
reconstruction and the longer the emergency period, the worse will be
the long-term effects of the disaster on the victims (Erikson, 1976b).
This deteriorating psychological state may be due to a reduction in the
level of the victims' optimism and hopes for betterment as the
emergency shelter period prolongs (Birnbaum et al., 1973).
Drabek (1986) indicates that refugees are usually aware that
they cannot return to their homes overnight and it may take them time
and effort to return in the future. It is suggested that having family
and friends in the same temporary shelter increases the victims'
chances of successfully coping with the stressors (Drabek, 1986).
Regarding the adverse effects of long stays in temporary shelters,
Milne (1979) indicates that some of the survivors may adapt to the new
style of life and become so satisfied that they refuse to return when
the time comes. Interestingly, he adds that remaining in the 'disaster
community' may produce more positive consequences for survivors than
leaving the area after the disaster.
d- Potential threats- The likelihood of the occurrence of
similar disasters in the future over-shadows the original site and the
survivors' perception of post-disaster life. It is best to evaluate
the probability of such future threats before the people are advised to
return home. The validity of the latter proposal may be appreciated by
reminding ourselves of the primary causes of the evacuation after the
impact or perceived threat (Hultaker, 1977). Although some steps are
taken to predict the occurrence of natural disasters, it seems that in
the case of man-made disasters this prediction and risk assessment is
more difficult. In case of war, for example, the front lines may
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change drastically overnight.
e- Psychological recovery of survivors- The timing of the return
to the home may also be influenced by the psychological consequences,
for example, a number of survivors may develop some form of phobic
reaction (Sarason and Sarason, 1987), that keeps them from readily
returning to their original places (i.e., the site of the disaster).
However, the instance just noted seems to be the exception rather than
the rule. After a while, most survivors may be expected to be
psychologically fit and more prepared for this, in fact, they usually
insist on returning to their homes, or at least to have the problems
regarding the site of their new homes settled as soon as possible
(Drabek, 1986). Interestingly, it has been reported that in some cases
survivors of an earthquake may return to their damaged homes within
minutes following the impact (Takuma, 1972; UNDRO, 1986). It is
worth mentioning that different communities show different rates of
recovery. It is claimed that this rate is related to the
characteristics of the society and the type and scale of the impact
(Drabek, 1986). However, it is important to note that the survivors
may undergo some psychological changes during the temporary shelter
period. For example, it is claimed that the altruistic behaviour of
the victims, shown immediately after the disaster, gradually decreases
and returns to the pre-disaster period level, usually within six months
(Fritz, 1961; Barton, 1962, 1969). It is also reported that they may
become very cautious several months after the disaster and seek all
sorts of legal and insurance policies to protect themselves in the
future (Drabek and Key, 1984; Drabek, 1986).
Obviously, the authorities cannot always wait until every member
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of the community has resumed his or her normal psychological state
before advising them to return home, some may still suffer from
severe psycho-pathological problems more than a year after the disaster
(Taylor, 1977). Thompson (1985) suggests that a year may pass before
survivors can integrate into the social system effectively, for those
who have lost family members, this period may even be extended to two
years. On the other hand, Wallace (1956) indicates that the
post-disaster syndrome may only last a few weeks.
Another important issue is the 'time of year' when victims may
be more vulnerable and susceptible to the emotional consequences of a
disaster. Sarason and Sarason (1987) describe a syndrome, known as
'the anniversary syndrome', when displays of depression and anxiety on
the anniversary of the experienced catastrophe. Thus, authorities
should select a time to return that does not coincide with bad memories
of the disaster. Finally, it must be remembered that, decisions about
when to return should also take account of the season and any new
circumstances prevailing on the original site.
f- Participation in the reconstruction
Participation in the decision-making- It is important to note
that victims of war not only mourn for the deceased, but they may also
lose their orientation to life and the sense of meaning and purpose for
continuing to live (Thompson, 1985). Even though survivors require
some time to recuperate (Orner, 1988), they need to be regarded as the
best potential helpers in every step of the reconstruction. Giving the
survivors a chance to have a say about their current and future life
may alleviate their negative attitudes towards the authorities. Horigo
and Qura (1979), report that a significant rise (a major shift) in the
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negative attitudes of the victims, consisting of 'blame assignation'
may prevail in the recovery period.
Therefore, authorities who work with the survivors should be
aware of the possibility that victims may begin to distrust them for
what has happened to them (i.e., the disaster), or for what they have
gone through since the impact (Schorr et al., 1982). One way to deal
with this negative attitude is to avoid 'impersonal' and 'bureaucratic'
approaches to the victims and their affairs and resolve their problems
as urgently and promptly as possible (Taylor et al., 1970; Bolin, 1982)
The way to do this is to give them a chance to take part in
decision-making. However, a reduction of trust in the officials may
not occur at all after some disasters (Rossi et al., 1983).
The question which may be asked at this stage is, when could the
authorities start to count on victims' mental and physical help since
mourners are known to show symptoms such as grief, phobic reactions,
anxiety, depression and lack of concentration (Mawson et al., 1981).
Even though the answer is not clear, it is suggested that within two
weeks the survivors usually come to terms with their conditions
(Drabek, 1986). One activity which may help survivors, is to encourage
them to visit the places associated with the disaster and let them
express their emotional feelings freely and openly (Mawson et al.,
1981, for general information on guided mourning).
According to Mawson et al. (1981), this gradual and selected
approach to the 'avoidance cues' would be psychologically beneficial to
the survivors. However, victims' grief symptoms may temporarily
increase when they are first exposed to the cues associated with the
traumatic event (Sarason and Sarason, 1987). Lack of evidence on this
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topic is not surprising as there appears to be only one study reported
in the literature, that has investigated grief caused by loss of the
home (Fried,1962).
Providing the survivors with social support may play a crucial
role in helping them face their unfortunate ordeal. It has been
demonstrated that vulnerability to physical and psychological breakdown
increases as social support decreases (Thompson, 1985; Sarason and
Sarason, 1987). One way to help survivors is to give them a chance to
partly contribute to events which will effect them in the future,
namely, issues such as the site of the new villages, the time of return
and the type of housing. Obviously, allowing survivors to participate
in major decision-making, increases the probability that they will like
their newly built homes after they move into them (Perry and Mushkatel,
1984).
It is claimed that the ultimate means of assessing the quality
of settlement reconstruction programmes should be based on the degree
to which dwellers after a suitable time, are satisfied with their homes
(Drabek, 1986). The experience of reconstruction in Khuzestan clearly
shows that those villages whose residents were consulted about the
issues regarding their new houses, such as their siting and design,
were more satisfied. Based on what has already been discussed, the
idea of at least, informing the survivors about the progress of the
construction of their new villages seems recommendable. In fact, it
appears that their direct involvement in the construction process is a
useful measure.
People usually cope better when they have plenty of information
and are made aware of the alternatives (Drabek, 1986; Sarason and
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Sarason, 1987). After a disaster authorities may assume it would
better if they keep the survivors away from the area and when houses
reconstruction if completed then ask the people to come back and to
'surprise' them by the new houses and to make them happy and relieved.
However, It may be noted that 'surprise' and 'novelty' appear to be two
elements of 'collative variables' which, according to Berlyne (1971),
elicit excitement and enjoyment in observers. Clearly enjoyment is
unlikely to be the case for distressed people in refugee camps.
Likewise the authorities should not 'surprise' the survivors with the
news that their homes are ready. It is essential to keep the
survivors well informed at all times and to let them take part in every
step of planning and construction. In addition, such an approach may
well stop the adverse effects of rumours which arise about their
conditions and future. It is suggested that victims' suggestibility
increases in the recovery period and they typically accept the rumours
that they hear, a tendency which is regarded as a means of decreasing
uncertainty about their fate (see Thompson, 1985).
Participation in the physical work- The long period of temporary
settlement may be substantially eased shortened if the survivors are
given a chance to take part in some sort of training which could help
them cope with their existing distress and their future
responsibilities (Leslie, 1980). Even under normal conditions, people
need some mastery over their surroundings in order to produce effective
changes in their environment (White, 1959). Cox (1978), indicates that
training and educating people, who are under stress, is a beneficial
psychological technique for helping them. Obviously, the type of
skills needed are specific issues that have to be resolved in each
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particular case (Sarason and Sarason, 1987).
Therefore, available skills of the disaster stricken villagers
may be used in respect of their post-disaster contribution to
reconstruction. Intervenors should discuss with the survivors how they
can undertake some effective part and play a valuable role in the
recovery process (Hewitt and Burton, 1971; McComb, 1980; Syren, 1981).
Since social support is meant to increase the chance of psychological
recovery in the pre-settlement period (Fields, 1980; Henderson, 1977),
So it would seem an equally good tactic to enable survivors to organise
themselves to make the most appropriate contribution to reconstruction
of their settlement.
Moreover, damage to ones house by an enemy will cause great
anxiety and this reduces the perceived degree of control over our
environment (Thompson, 1985). Therefore, to mitigate these feelings by
official encouragement to join in the work of reconstruction will
hopefully give a sense of regained control over events. By giving the
survivors a chance to establish social and personal bonds , through
working together helps to keep the victims from being constantly
preoccupied with memories of the past and change in the level of
aspiration. (see Sarason and Sarason, 1987).
The changes in the level of aspiration of the survivors after
they had returned home, was expressed by many of them who thought the
government should rebuild their houses if the disaster occurred again.
But the most people said that they were prepared to co-operate with the
government and take part in rebuilding their houses. This change of
attitude is important because these villagers are quite capable of
rebuilding their houses. It can be suggested that their attitude to
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reconstruction, if they had taken part, might encourage them to take an
even greater part in the physical work.
Conclusion- The following tentative conclusions may be derived
from the foregoing discussions:
1-Post-disaster physical reconstruction can contribute to or
negatively affect, the psychological recovery of the survivors. At
each stage of the post-disaster period, the different physical
reconstruction activities should be co-ordinated and harmonised with
the survivors' psychological recovery (e.g., mood) to ensure a speedy
recovery to normalcy.
2-Since survivors long to return to their homes, authorities
should do their best to make the emergency shelter period as short as
possible. The shorter the period of post-disaster temporary
settlement, the faster and more successful the victims' psychological
recovery and the restoration of their means of livelihood the more
effective their ability to cope with their ordeal. In many cases
temporary settlement on the original site is better than the distant
refugee camps.
3-The new settlement site layout, housing design, technology and
use of materials should be as similar to the old ones as possible.
When changes are inevitable, however, alterations should be consistent
with the survivors' expressed needs and priorities. Such an approach
should better ensure that survivors will be better content with their
rebuilt homes and so not feel the need to undertake major alterations
to them, or even to abandon them after a short while. It is crucial
that the survivors be able to repair and maintain the new houses
themselves.
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4-Survivors should be given every chance to take part in the
decision-making processes concerning life in the emergency shelter and
their future well being in their prospective homes. This 'procedure of
involvement' should be institute to them during the early stages of the
emergency shelter period, to help overcome their misery and to
encourage them to look forward to the future.
5-Survivors' participation in the actual process of the physical
reconstruction appears to be psychologically helpful to them as well as
possibly economically beneficial to the authorities. To achieve this
objective, however, the agencies involved should organise training and
employment programmes. This claim contradicts the allegation that
surprising the survivors by giving them a prepared building would help
them with their psychological recovery.
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CHAPTER IX
WAR AS A DISASTER
Introduction: The aim of this chapter is to explore the notion
of 'war as a disaster' and to sketch out some of the major
characteristics of war. Comparison between war and natural disasters
is helpful and for the time being the conventional themes and phases of
natural disasters will be employed as a framework. The general
characteristics of war as a hazard, mechanisms of destruction, civil
defence and the particular circumstances of post-war relief will be
discussed.	 Since our emphasis is on 'reconstruction after war', that
issue will be discussed in a separate Chapter.
9-1- General characteristics of war as a disaster
a- The origin- Warheit (1972 and 1976) has studied the
similarities and differences between natural disasters and civil
disturbances. He argues that in many respects such as; 'origin,
warning, duration, community context, organisational response' there
are significant differences between the two. He also suggests that
another category of disasters, such as, explosions and transport
accidents are by their very nature different from the two previous
groups. However, it seems that civil disturbances are significantly
different in their characteristics from classical warfare.
Natural disasters, it was argued, occur when a natural hazard
strikes a vulnerable human settlement. Most man-made disasters,
although they share man as their agent, transport crashes for instance,
are somehow unintended, accidental events.	 (with exception of
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hijacking) 1 In the case of war on the other hand, the event is
initiated, continued and finished by man's' decision; an intentional
action. War is therefore a totally man-made phenomenon. Thus man
himself is the source of hazard. Is it jealousy, superiority,
development or betterment, survival, defence and many other forces that
cause conflicts? Blackaby (1987), for instance, has attempted to
analyse the causes of war in the narrow context of NATO and the WARSAW
Pact. (pp. 13-18)
b- History and magnitude- The history of war is as old as the
human race. War became associated with human society as it developed
towards civilised urban settlements and with progress so the means and
scale have escalated accordingly. 	 From recent history we refer to a
few examples. Lefrancois (1980), claims that over 50% of all nations
have taken part in at least one war since the turn of the century and
Kirdon and Smith (1983), say there have been about three hundred wars
since 1945. Urban Edge (December 1988) writes; '...33 nations have
been affected [by war] since the Algerian War, which ended in 1960'.
United Nations (1988), has said that; 'More wars (22) were being fought
in 1987 than in any previous year. ...In the 1960s, civilians
accounted for 52 per cent of the deaths; in the 1980s, for 85 per
cent' (p. 2). In brief, war does not belong only to history, rather,
it is a miserable reality of our present era.
United Nations (1988), reveals that; 'Research on AIDS is to
1.The driver of a train which crashes is likely to have made a mistake since
the accident endangers his own life. There is a very little chance that the
man attempting is suicide.
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receive $344m in US public funds in 1988, about 9 per cent of the
amount to be spent on Star Wars research.... the destructive forces of
today's nuclear stockpile 'provides the equivalent of 3.2 tons of TNT
for every person on the earth' (p. 2). [3.2 grams of TNT inside a
bullet is enough to kill one person] The same reference also reads;
'Saudi Arabia, for example, spends $434,038 per soldier, which ranks it
first.	 The country ranks 122nd in literacy, with only a third of the
population able to read' (p. 2).
According to the 'World Development Report 1986', all nations of
the world spend at least 10 per cent of their expenditures on defence.
This percentage is higher in developing countries. The percentage of
defence in the total expenditures of the United Arab Emirate in 1983,
for example, was 43.3 percent. The same country's expenditures on
education and health were 9.8 and 7.7 percent respectively. (p. 223)
Arms production is a large business for the industrialised
countries.	 As Turner (1985), claims; ' One out of every four
specialists in the world are working on military matters'. As the
United Nations in 1988 concluded; 'The world may be moving towards
disarmament, but crossing the frontier does pose hazards' (p. 8). In
other words the industrial nations have to lose part of their economic
interests and gradually replace them with other civilised productions.
(see also Thee 1987, pp. 1-11)
c- Hope of stalemate? For whatever reasons, most likely
economic, some signs of a decline in wars were observed during the year
1988, and are continuing now. During the year 1988, of the 26 wars
in progress '12 have stopped, or stand a good chance of stopping'. The
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criteria for these wars are those where more than 1,000 people have
been killed. (Economist, December 1988). Signs of hope appeared with
the ceasefire in the Gulf, the withdrawal of the Russians from
Afghanistan2 , the Cubans from Angola and the promises South Africa have
made to pull their forces out of Namibia. However, a glance at the
map reveals that the world, particularly the developing world, is
everywhere still distracted by violence.
Despite the continuation of so much loss of life since the
Second World War when some 40 million died, there seems to be a
deliberate and conscious reluctance on the part of international
agencies and national governments to accept this situation as
inevitable. There are indisputably more lobbyists involved in the
prosecution of war, than there are those concerned with the aftermath
of recovery. And they appear to be increasingly effective in spreading
their products. The other difference between war and natural disasters
is this fact, that nobody looks to create more earthquakes or floods, 
or even transport accidents, but in the heart of Developed countries, 
specialists work to discover how more destructive wars can be
perpetrated. Their institutions of course have misused misnomer of
being concerned with 'defence' or 'Strategic Studies'. Vast sums of 
public money for research and political manoeuvring made available to
create and support in effect more and more serious wars (disasters).
d- Ignoring the aftermath - Every day the media report some
casualties from countries engaged in conflict and the situation looks
2.The war with Russians ended, civil war started and is still continuing.
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likely to continue in one way or another. But at the same time
disaster concerned agencies and scholars are reluctant to include war
in the 'list of disasters'. It is surprising that, for instance, the
The United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator in his 'Disaster News
in Brief 1987', while recording losses of so called natural disasters,
writes without any explanation '...losses arising from armed conflict
are excluded.' This is in spite of the fact that UNDRO itself, during
the year, has been involved in providing relief to many war victims.
From UNDRO NEWS (September/October 1988), we learn that they have been
involved in providing relief and aid in Algeria to persons displaced by
war from Mali and Niger, in Ethiopia to Somali refugees, in Lebanon for
relief and reconstruction during its '...continuous war', in Mozambique
to '...some 273,000 people, displaced as a result of guerrilla
attacks', in Rwanda to refugees from Burundi and in Sudan to an
'estimated two million' displaced persons most due to the civil war.
Reviewing the losses of some recent natural disasters, the Sudan
flood of 1988 for example, reveals that many of those affected were war
refugees. The report says that, 'Most of the homeless ...had fled from
civil strife in the south ...and settled in a series of shanty towns
ringing the capital.' (UNDRO News. Sep/Oct 1988)
As the much trumpeted news of cease fires in some countries, is
overshadowed by the reality of so many still engaged in war of one kind
or another, so the politics of suing for peace, seems to dominate the
worlds leaders, as against the far more prolonged and complex task of
reconstruction. In brief reconstruction after war unlike natural 
disasters is often undermined or ignored by politicians, agencies and
scholars.
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e- Variety of wars- Several kinds are identified; World war,
civil war, cold war, chemical war, conventional war, guerrilla war,...
and now world wide terrorism. A variety of definitions is used,
depending on the following five factors;
1- who are the two or more sides in the conflict?
2- where (geographically) is the conflict going on?
3- what are the goals of the war?
4- how serious is the fight?
5- what kind of armaments and or weapons are used?
It is obvious that each kind of war leads to some general and specific
effects and destruction in the communities. We attempt to outline
those that are more or less general in conventional wars between
nations.
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9-2- Damage- Like other disasters the consequences of war can be
classified under superficial groups of;
1- economic,
2- medical and psychological,
3- physical and environmental, and
4- social and cultural.
In comparison with all other disasters, war seems to be more
destructive in that it is perpetrated by the State and thus affects the
very way of life of most communities. Most natural and man-made
disasters are selective in their damage. Earthquakes for example,
destroy or damage buildings and infrastructure but have no direct
effect on agriculture. Floods on the other hand, may destroy crops and
cause food shortages, but do not necessarily destroy the social system.
(see Cuny 1983, pp. 48-49) It is war alone that can cause such a
combination of death and destruction; to people, to buildings, to
communications and the whole way of life of a community or even a
nation. Kreimer (1988), for instance points out that, ' after
prolonged wars, there is greater disruption to the entire society, and
institutions are apt to function poorly. ...so along with physical
reconstruction, you have to deal with the rebuilding of various
agencies.' (Urban Edge, December, 1988).
a- Casualty- Human fatalities can be considered as a good
indicator for comparison between damage from natural disasters and war.
A study by Shah (1983) revealed that the occurrence of natural
disasters were almost regular in the period 1947-1980. (p. 205) In
this respect, war casualties are usually concentrated in certain years.
For instance we know that most casualties of the Iraq-Iran war were the
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result of operations conducted in the first two years.	 Shah also
reports that for the period mentioned earlier, a total of 1,222,298
lives were lost due to natural disasters. (p. 207) This figure is
still smaller than the 1,300,000 claimed in Warsaw during World War II
alone. (see Lewis, 1988).
Davis (1978), also summarises the major disasters since 1923
among them the 40 million casualties of the Second World War and the
1,800,000 of Vietnam with the 1,100,000 of the Biafran war, can well
illustrate that human fatality from war is several times greater than
all natural and other man-made disasters together.
b- Psychological effects- Physicians can tell us whether the
medical consequences of war are much different to natural disasters.
(see Cuny, 1983, p. 47) 3 However, we understand from psychologists that
one of the major consequences of war are the psychological effects on
people, both combatants and civilians. As we argued in our Chapter on
Psychological aspects of disasters, it seems that in comparison with
natural disasters war may create more severe and long-term symptoms.
Raphael (1986), argues that, 'Much of our understanding of
psychological response to disaster has evolved from the need to
understand and manage the response to war' (p. 18).	 The same author
then writes; ' There can be little doubt that war is a disaster on a
large scale
	
 The Vietnam veterans have been considered one of the
major disaster victims of war in recent years..' (p. 218). It is
3.In Vietnam, cancer is common and deformed and mentally and physically
disabled children are borne, which are the consequence of toxics the
Americans violently used during the war against the civilians. [The Four
Horses, Channel 4 TV Britain, 1985]
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claimed that half a million American Vietnam veterans struggle with
psychological symptoms in general terms. It is said that some 60,0004
of them committed suicide so far, more than the number of Americans
killed in Vietnam. This is the price they pay for killing 1,800,000
people. (see also, Perry, 1982; Amen, 1985) In brief, concerning
psychological consequences there is evidence that war, in comparison
with natural disasters, can create more serious and prolonged mental 
disorders. The socio-psychological consequences of nuclear attack as
part of the general research on the subject is currently on the agenda
of European studies. (see for example Thompson, 1985)
c- Mechanism of physical destruction- In the First Chapter it
was mentioned that the war damage in Khuzestan had several agents and
unlike what might be thought initially, it is not only the use of
artillery that damages. The natural environment, deliberate flooding,
looting, levelling by machinery are some other examples of destruction
caused by war. In the same Chapter a classification of weapons was
also provided and a partial discussion of the effects of different
weapons was undertaken. In this section, we explore the effects of
different weapons in more depth. It should be remembered again that
with the exception of incendiary weapons 5 chemical and biological
weapons usually have no direct effect on buildings or settlements.
However, protection against them is much more difficult to achieve than
against conventional blasting weapons.
4.This figure was announced in a TV programme, 'Every Man', on BBC 1, in the
last week of March 1989.
5.See for example, 'Incendiary Weapons', A SIPRI publication, 1975.
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Conventional weapons- A knowledge of the principals of damage by
conventional weapons is necessary for an understanding of the strategy,
design and construction of civilian shelter policies practised in a war
situation.	 There are three means of damage; first, by direct strike
of the projectile that acts like a thrown stone. 	 Secondly, the
explosion which could release two other destructive processes; air
pressure (blast) and flying fragments. The flight of hot, sharp,
twisting fragments is lethal for man but has little impact on
buildings. (e.g. masonry wall) In this cases the main cause of damage
is the explosion and the consequent tremor created by the sharp change
of air pressure. Incendiary weapons of course create extreme heat,
with less powerful blast. The third action comes from the collapse of
buildings not able to resist the effects of explosion and this kills,
injures and buries the inhabitants under rubble.
Most projectiles are designed to explode on impact with the
target, like the roofs or walls of a building or other structure.
However, there are bombs particularly designed for killing people, they
explode before touching the ground and let fly thousands of small metal
fragments over a vast area, each of which can kill.
One major factor in identifying the possible damage of a bomb or
mortar is to know where it hits the building. In this respect three
groups can be identified; First, bombs dropped by aeroplanes hit the
roofs or surrounding ground (coming down almost vertically, with some
angle). Mortars or bombs launched by artillery or mortar launchers
fall on almost vertically. And third, there are the flat-trajectories
(e.g.	 the 106 mm rifle and tank mounted guns trying over a in short
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distance 6 ) which shoots horizontally and will most likely strike the
walls. Rocket launchers directed at the target hit either roof or
facade. The long range missiles also fall almost vertically. The
important point is that in conventional war the weapons are trained
against buildings civilians use for shelter and these it seems mostly
strike the roofs or upper parts of the structure.
The implication of these details was observed in Khuzestan.
Since the earth roofs offered little or no resistance, the bomb or
mortar penetrated the building before exploding and thus created even
more damage. It is obvious that if a bomb or mortar explodes in the
air or above the roof the damage will be much less than if it does so
inside the building. The observation was that when the roof was
strong, particularly with a tough finish such as cement tiles, the
small mortars (60 mm for instance) hardly penetrated the roof, so the
explosion happened mainly on the roof with only minor damage.
Another interesting observation was that usually the horizontal
projectiles are less destructive over a short distance. There was a
case in a village near Susangerd, where a small horizontal missile from
a tank was shot, but because of the high speed and short distance, it
passed straight through four mud walls before it exploded beyond the
building. In another case a bullet fired by a tank at short range
passed through the brick wall, and the corrugated iron sheet roof and
left the building before it exploded.
In brief, conventional weapons can be fatal for man in several
ways; direct strike, explosion and shock, flying fragments, throwing
6.Tank guns can fire both horizontal shots for short distances and vertical
shots like mortars for long distances.
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the person around and building collapse.
Nuclear weapons- Nuclear bombs have three basic effects on
people and shelters; first, the blast and shock waves such as with a
conventional weapon which creates a sudden change of air pressure that
causes a vacuum. The explosion also creates a tremor in the ground,
which shakes like an earthquake. Thus far, the buildings that are not
strong enough will collapse due to the strong wind created or the
tremor in the ground. The magnitude of these and the possible damage
is determined by the size of the device as well as the strength of the
structure concerned. (see, The Nuclear Advisory Group, 1983, P. 79)
Secondly, 'the explosion is accompanied by the emission of
extremely intense heat and light, lasting a second or so and the
primary nuclear radiation begins immediately.' (ibid, p. 79) From this
primary radiation particularly, the two 'gamma and the neutron rays'
are dangerous for people. They propagate in a similar fashion to
light. In addition there is the risk from fire due to the very high
temperature.
Thirdly, nuclear radiation (fall-out) follows the first one 7 . A
cloud of dust contaminated by radioactivity spreads over a large area
and may penetrate into houses. This contaminated dust has no direct
effect on the structures. In summary if a structure is intended to
protect people in the case of nuclear explosion, it should withstand
the hurricane-like air pressure, earthquake-like tremors, should be be
fire proof and obstruct the penetration of radiation and fall-out.
7.If the bomb explodes in the air there would be little fall out.
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(see for example, 'The Effects of Nuclear War', Congress of The United
States p. 16) It seems useful to refer to a 'Home Office Guide,
Domestic Nuclear Shelters' (1982), which reads;
"Injuries or death from air blast can be caused in
four ways:
By direct effect of pressure on the body; lung
rupture would be the determining injury.
Indirectly, by the body being thrown against hard
objects.
Indirectly, by the body being hit by pieces of
flying debris.
Indirectly, by the collapse of buildings on to the
occupants" (p. 8).
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9-3- Civil Defence (Precautionary measures)- The main preventive
measure which can be taken by politicians is to avoid any conflict. If
that fails, the second measure is to stop the bombers or other enemy
groups from penetrating and shelling the civilian areas. This of
course is not easy, and is hard to guarantee. If the risk is serious,
then there remain two main approaches; construction of shelters and
evacuation.
a- Specific character of war- One of the differences between
natural disaster and war concerns the dissemination of information.
Civil defence requires the data and analyses of the enemy and home army
equipment and capabilities, to assess the severity and magnitude of the
threat. Obviously the general public must be trained and educated for
such situations. This requires disclosing secret information. These
data and analyses are mainly possessed by armies and governments and
are confidential. Furthermore as Perry (1982), in relation to nuclear
attacks argues, the more the military generals feel confident about the
safety of their own civilians in the case of attack, the more likely
they are to become involved in a conflict. (p. 1) The same reasoning
has also been made in Britain by supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament. It is peculiar to war that mitigation measures can
increase the risk of hazard. To penetrate the defence of one side, the
other side must use the preventive strike and more destructive weapons.
Thus leading to escalation of the arms race.
An extra difficulty is the ever-changing military capacity of
the enemy. The phenomenon of the 'arms race' is common everywhere and
those who do not produce the weapons purchase them.
	 In a few days
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with the arrival of new fighters for instance, the range of access for
bombardment will change. During the recent Gulf War, in 1988 Iraq
received long range missiles, which could be launched from inside their
own territory to hit Tehran and Isfahan, cities, which until then could
only be raided by bombers. This brought a new dimension to the Civil
Defence. Tens of missiles a day during a few weeks in March 1988,
created a situation whereby millions of people fled from Tehran. This
is another difference between natural hazards and war. The source of
natural hazards seems more or less static, while in case of war it is 
always progressing and moreover, its magnitude can change overnight.
b- Defence and architecture- The defence of settlement has a
long history. As Davis (1983), claims; ' Throughout history, castles,
fortifications, and entire towns and cities have been sited to serve
military purposes. These have normally been defensive but they have
also been built to aid attacking troops' (p. 300). He then introduces
some examples in history.
As far as our experience in Iran is concerned, settlement
defence had different priorities in different regions of the country.
Often settlements located at the periphery of the desert, where nomads
lived were more at risk from looting. This was common behaviour in the
past and the nomads often attacked villages for grain and other
commodities.
In urban areas, which were also at risk from external enemy, not
local looters, the fortifications were stronger. Many of the old
cities like Kashan, were surrounded by strong walls and bastions.
Inside the city the governor's residence or other important buildings
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were also surrounded by extra walls. One of the most spectacular
examples is the 'Ark-e 8 Barn', in Kerman Province, an abandoned city
with seven fortress all made with mud, as was the city itself. The
design of this Ark is very important, because it is built on a hill
with the governor's building at the heart and on top of the hill.
Furthermore a secret well was dug, with an escape tunnel going to the
desert.
In the villages,	 defence considerations affected the
architecture by several means. First was the location, it was
necessary to build on the top of a hill or on the edge of rock cliffs
to reduce the chance of being invaded. After that the construction of
high walls and bastions were necessary. The weak points were often the
gateways. That was cured by making them very small, covering them with
metal sheets to protect them from enemy fire and more than that;
installing holes above the doors to enable the inhabitants to throw
boiling water on the enemy, to extinguish fires and also to shoot from.
Another major consideration was to have access to drinking water from
inside the castle in case of siege 9 . The defence of each house was
also considered. One necessary measure was to store grain inside
secret stores, in the wall or very often between two vaults in the roof
and covering the entrance.
The same concept in recent history has been undertaken in
different ways. Davis (1983), for instance argues that the
construction of the 'autobahn network' in Germany in the 1930s, was
8.The word Ark in Farsi means fortress, castle etc.
9.The village 'Hanjan', near the city 'Natanz', Iran is an illustrative
example for all what discussed.
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partly 'to aid the rapid deployment of troops. This is clear from the
location of the initial network and the road thickness, clearly
designed to take the weight of tanks.' (p. 301) Davis then argues that
the building of 'Interstate Expressways' in 1950 in the USA, was
partially promoted to evacuate the population in case of nuclear
attack10. Another similar measure taken in Switzerland is the
consideration of temporary runways on the ordinary roads, in case
airports and airfields were damaged. (see, Defence of Japan 1982, pp.
62-63) Davis also argues that advocating 'urban decentralisation'
after bombing and the spread of 'Garden Cities' in Britain, was also
another example. One of the major factors of vulnerability in war-time
is population density. In contrast to natural hazards small villages
are often more secure than large urban population centres. (p. 301)
Civilian defence in war time is more than an engineering task.
From our experience during the recent war with Iraq we can remember how
people's responses substantially changed after repeated air raids.
During the first few days, the families were alert and therefore
responding actively to the warning signals. Gradually the warnings
became routine and you could often observe normal life continuing,
without any interruption during the warning phase. The same notion
must be also considered in case of nuclear attack. It is not enough to
have the shelters but to convince people to use and stay in them.
In summary, the location and design of settlements and their
shelters can all contribute to increasing the protection of civilians
should war occur. Factories, power stations, fuel storages, government
10.See also, The Effects of Nuclear War, Congress of The United States, PP.
51-53
394
headquarters and barracks are most at risk and therefore it is better
to avoid to locate them in highly populated areas. Two basic measures 
which can be taken are evacuation and shelters. 
c- Protection against conventional weapons- In this section some
observations from Iran will be described and a review of the shelter
approaches implemented in Britain during World War II will be made.
Despite the 40 years which elapsed between the two wars (i.e. WW II
and the Gulf war) in many respects the concept of shelter and the
problems faced by the civilian population are similar.
First it must be remembered that the ultimate goal of bombing
and shelling is not necessarily damage to buildings or even killing
people. It is not these damages and casualties, but the havoc of the
strike, and the consequential psychological impact on the people, which
may lead to disruption of routine life that seems to be the 'object of
these attacks'. This will create more internal pressure, both economic
and political chaos and pressure on the State. That is why sometimes
fighter planes invade enemy's territory without dropping any bombs,
just crossing the sound barrier and making a great noise to terrify the
people.
Second, the defence against conventional explosives is not to
protect ordinary civic buildings, but lives. Only particular buildings
and equipment, such as military and government headquarters or
ammunition stores, might be protected against the direct strike of
weapons.
Third, in theory if we assume each person to be staying in a
very strong shelter, or if all civilians are evacuated there would be
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few casualties. The major problem is how to sustain normal active life
during the war. The major difficulty of shelter provision is that it
is impossible to have both normal life and protection simultaneously.
Fourth, one difficulty with bombing is that its occurrence is
often not known in advance. 	 But the worst time can be used for the
maximum disruption and mental pressure.	 For instance, we could
remember that one year during Ramandan11 the Iraqis bombed Tehran every
night, right at the time when families were awake for their early
morning breakfast at the start of their fasting.
Fifth, another major difficulty with protecting civilians is
convincing them to continually take refuge in shelters when the warning
is issued. Psychologically after some time they will get used to the
warning and start to take more risks and be more careless about their
lives. (see our chapter on Psychology)
Sixth, the technical guidelines based on engineering
calculations for building shelters against the blitz, that were done at
the time of WW II might still be useful. One of the main difficulties
is to produce shelters in large enough numbers and close at hand to be
effective and at a cost affordable by the people and the government.
One extreme dilemma is to convert cement, sand and steel into 'blitz
shelters' for poor families, when they would prefer to make another
'permanent room' for their houses out of those materials.
Seventh, nowadays, unlike the time of World War II, when bombs
were dropped from the air with varying degrees of accuracy, there are
much more sophisticated weapons, that can be directed to hit the target
11.The month when Muslims go on fast from dawn until sunset.
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with a great accuracy. In addition, there are missiles that move so
fast that do not allow a warning to be issued beforehand. At least
every country may not have such technically advanced warning systems
installed.
Eighth, the protection a shelter needs to give is relative. The
damage from bombs, at various distances from the building, are quite
different. For instance, constructing any shelter, which could resist
the heavy long range missiles the Iranians experienced late on in the
war, seems unrealistic. The missiles were so devastating that from a
distance of 40 to 50 metres around the strike point, nothing would be
left and everything would disintegrate. Buildings fall to pieces, but
in the same situation the inhabitants of houses 50 metres away could
survive if they could be protected from;
1- direct air pressures, (blast)
2- flying fragments,
3- collapse of their building, fire, etc...,
4- burial under rubble.
d- Shelter in Iran- During the recent war in Iran at a very
early stage graphic guidelines were published by the Government for
the construction of shelters. This has been repeated since. People's
reaction however, was of little concern and few families took any
serious steps towards building shelters themselves.
With the continuation of attacks on cities which intensified in
the last three years of the conflict, the use of shelter was taken more
seriously. One major step was to convert and prepare the basements of
public buildings, such as those of the ministries, for accommodating
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people in case of bombing. Another kind of shelter was built with
pre-cast reinforced concrete in the form of an arch. Often these were
surface shelters. It was recommended to schools however, as well as
for households, to dig a trench and to cover it. The real performance
of this type of approach remains one of the important subjects to be
studied.
Basically two kinds of shelters are necessary; private and
public. The first for those members of the family staying at home and
at night time and the second for the daytime in crowded public places.
There were families, whose houses were so crowded or old and weak that
there was no possibility of strengthening any part as a shelter. In
that case the government had to constructed public shelters, the first
were down town, where these families lived.	 In a country like Iran,
the long term use of public shelters is a complex matter. In an
Islamic community, where family privacy is so significant, living in a
public shelter is very difficult.
In addition, if shelters are quickly provided by people
themselves the quality of construction might be dubious. Perhaps
shelters provide more psychological support than physical protection
against a blitz. These constructions may add to environmental
problems because eventually they become garbage pits and latrines.
There is a dilemma that if they are locked, in the emergency period
opening them might be impossible since the key holder might be away.
If they are left open nobody has the management and control of them.
They might even become dangerous in terms of hygiene, not to speak of
unsightly structures created around the city.
There are in any case moments in Iran when protection in
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shelters becomes impossible. The Friday sermon is one of them. Often
half a million people attend the congregation. Where can they be
sheltered? In fact the Iraqis often raided Tehran during Friday prayer
time. Demonstrations are another case, on a few occasions Iraqis
bombed public demonstrations apparently killing hundreds12.
Whenever the bombing intensified people from some cities went to
the surrounding villages. The government also set up temporary camps
for a few nights. The trouble with this arrangement is that large
temporary population need servicing.
e- Civil defence in Britain- We know of at least three
outstanding references studying the history of civil defence and more
specifically shelter design and construction in Britain, they are:
'Civil Defence' by O'Brien, (1955);'Enterprise Versus Bureaucracy', by
Baker, (1978) and 'Architecture of Aggression' by Mallory and Ottar
( 1 973) . Beside these references the technical journals, such as 'The
Architects' Journal' (AJ), were all published during the war and
closely linked to shelter and camps and later reconstruction matters.
For instance we understand that the AJ had an 'Information Centre' to
advise the public on their shelter problems, as well as other technical
services. (see for example, AJ, November 9, 1939, p. 570)
Mallory and Ottar (1973), write; 'The bombing of London in 1915
had established that war no longer had boundaries. Post- 1918 Europe
was consequently air-raid conscious' (p. 215). 	 Baker (1978), writes;
12.The worst case when this occurred was in one of the cities in West Iran
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"Britain was first bombed from the air during the
1914-18 War. No attempt was made to provide
anything more than emergency shelters then but the
attacks were sharp enough to be remembered and as
early as May 1924 an Air Raid Precautions Committee
was set up by the Government" (p. 1).
Since then several research groups and committees have been involved in
studying the task of shelter provision. One of the very early
approaches as Baker, (1978) writes was;
"Quite early in the 'phoney-war' period, soon after
the wattle and earth designs were produced,...
attention was turned to providing shelter in the
home. The most effective proposal came from D. C.
Burn. It was a propping system for use in a ground
floor room of a dwelling house, a stout frame made
of timber, with four posts, one in each corner of
the room, supporting four beams just below the
ceiling, to which the posts were braced by diagonal
members, all being bolted rigidly together. ...
Since timber, in short supply, was needed for the
frame they could not be provided in great numbers
but there are records of 1365 rooms being
strengthened in this way, of which 218 were
destroyed mostly by fire" (p. 42).
Baker (1978), also claims;
"The most revolutionary move was the decision to
issue free to each poorer household, to be placed
in its garden, a steel trench shelter, popularly
known as the 'Anderson', or where a suitable
basement existed, steel props for strengthening the
floor above" (p. 4).
Mallory and Ottar, (1973) write;
"Structurally the Anderson shelters had stood up
well to the small, quick raids of the summer of
1940 and thus already justified the public's
confidence in them. Their tensile properties
allowed them to spring back into shape easily and
they had a good impact resistance against blast for
this reason. They proved to be usually undamaged
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by 50-kg bombs dropping up to 2 meters away and
250- kg bombs dropping 6 metres away, although
unprotected exits in some cases proved lethal" (p.
227).
They also claim that by 1939 when War was declared, 1,500,000
Anderson shelters had been delivered.
	 In 1940 the production of
Andersons was suspended due to steel shortages. 	 By then 2,300,000 of
them had been produced. The same year the government shifted to
production of concrete and brick shelters for domestic use. 	 In 1941
the Government announced 'Morrison' shelters. In the same year some
amenities were provided in shelters while also in the same year, the
Blitz ended with 40,000 being killed due to bombing. From 1942 Shelter
funds were cut almost completely. (p. 215)
Mallory and Ottar (1973), also explain how the surface shelters
and trench shelters strengthened with timber or pre-cast concrete
lining also proved to be vulnerable. In some vulnerable areas such as
..." Hull, Merseyside, Clydebank... people took to 'trekking' to the
surrounding countryside for the night. In London people flocked into
the tubes like they had in the First World War, despite Government
instructions to the contrary" (p. 229).
In brick and cement shelters in 1940, due to the shortage of
cement lime mortar was used which caused several problems. The tensile
strength of lime mortar could not resist the horizontal pressure of
blast. (see Mallory and Ottar, 1973, p. 227)
One major problem with the public shelters was access to basic
amenities. Initially they were safe but the people had no privacy and
had to go to their homes for washing etc. As the same authors claim;
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"The authorities had been so preoccupied with the
primary task of making shelters safe that they had
paid little attention to amenities.... Not
surprisingly between 1939 and 1941 there was a 10
per cent rise in tuberculosis..." (p. 229).
The situation was noticed and the new public shelters that were built
included amenities.
The Architects Journal for September 24, 1942 shows a picture of
one of the public shelters built in London, saying that eight of them
were built, four to the north of the river and four to the south. Each
could host 8,000 occupants and all together 64,000 could be
accommodated. It also says that 'The shelters will not be open to the
public except in the event of heavy raids.' (p. 194 and also pp.
207-208)
Mallory and Ottar write;
"In January 1941 the Government was able to approve
a shelter design which fulfilled the requirements,
the 'Morrison' shelter, and an order for 400,000
was placed... The Morrison was a steel framework
with mesh sides, steel mattress base, and 3 mm
steel plate top. The main variety used was 1.98 m
long, by 1.22 m wide and 840 mm high, which could
be conventionally used as a table as well as a
shelter. A further contract for another million of
these Morrisons was made later in 1941. but none
of them were available in any number before the
Blitz ended." (p. 229)
Heal's shelter bed, is a cheaper version of a Morrison shelter. It is
a bed with arch form structure that was partly covered with a metal
shield. This could presumably provide protection against debris or
collapse of the building. (see Mallory and Ottar, p. 229)
As the same authors claim despite all efforts made to protect
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civilians and design and supply various shelters, 'In November 1940, at
the height of the London Blitz, it was shown by a shelter census that
only 40 per cent of the city's population were using any form of
shelter' (p. 229). The same authors also add;
"Churchill himself said in August 1940, to the
cries of 'Hear, hear', that 'Dispersal is the
sovereign remedy against heavy casualties'. On
October 10th, 1940, when the Blitz was well under
way, the Home Secretary put similar faith in the
principle: 'Dispersal and smaller domestic shelters
are still the best safe-guard against heavy
casualties" (p. 237).
The doubt about the usefulness of shelters might be reinforced by the
bombardment of Dresden city in Germany. As Mallory and Ottar say;
'Dresden, with ARP measures and shelter provision much better than an
equivalent British city, suffered 135,000 deaths in 24 hours of bombing
in 1945... twice the total number killed over the entire period of war
in Britain, Britain was lucky' (p. 237).
Not only houses and offices but factories also need protection
against raiding. This task also was developed during WW II in Britain.
Construction of 'protection walls' and dividing the large areas of
factories into smaller spaces, could help to avoid large numbers of
losses. Baker (1978), for instance explains how the protection of
factories was advised during the war. (see Chapter 10, pp. 90-100)
The spurious concept of 'Shelter today- home tomorrow' was
brought about during the War. The heart of the matter was that a
structure can have temporary functions and passes a transitional phase
of adaptation to a new use in future.
	
(see for example, AJ, July 10,
1941, p. 36-37)
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Another task in war time is sheltering valuable items such as
museums and monuments. Although the first priority must be people's
lives, the preservation of unique cultural heritage, buildings and
works of art, becomes important. During World War II in Europe,
various techniques were practised. Nobelcourt (1958), has a valuable
study on this subject. In his book, 'Protection of cultural property
in the event of armed conflict', he first attempts to identify the
variety of weapons used in the war and the possible damage they may
create. Thus he shows the need to know the hazardous forces before
planning against them. Particularly his third Chapter deals with
Shelter, where he shows a variety of shelters designed and built as
well as technical details. His book contains also some photographs
showing how temporary structures and sand bags were used to protect
facades and statues in the event of war. As an example of an 'Arts
Bunker' see Campbell (1983), Plate. 17.
Remark- In Britain several approaches have been implemented to
provide shelter for civilians during the war. Among them Anderson and
Morrison are the two most famous shelters designed, each with relative
degrees of comfort and problems. There were also surface shelters
built in bricks and concrete, and designs were proposed for public deep
shelters in crowded areas. The tube station became the place for
people to stay over-night at the period of intense air raids. The lack
of amenities in public shelters created other problems such as spread
of disease. At the end of the day despite the availability of
technical guidelines for different kinds of shelters, no more than 40
per cent of those at risk had any shelter at all.
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f- Protection against nuclear attack- Since World War II, the
superpowers have entered the race to produce more and more nuclear
bombs. The policy they advocate is intended to deter any real attack.
A report from Hiroshima and Nagasaki l3 reads;
"Those who dropped the first atomic bomb worked
thereafter to demonstrate its destructive powers
and to justify its use as a way of ending the war
quickly so as to limit the number of combat
casualties. Nuclear bombs have thus become
generally accepted" (p. 3).
During this year (1988), however, the Russians have started to change
their policy by reducing their nuclear warheads unilaterally.
Although currently only a few countries 14 in the world hold
nuclear bombs or the knowledge to produce them, the targets in the case
of a real war would not be limited to those countries with a nuclear
capacity, rather hundreds of targets in other countries of the world
are at the moment targeted by ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.
What may happen in future is that as in the case of conventional
weapons the superpowers select a third party to sharpen their teeth on,
somewhere in the developing world far from both of them. This is not
all speculation since AJ April 1984, writes that British companies have
received orders from some of the middle East countries to build nuclear
shelters for them. (p. 30)
Moore (1980), explains that the first atomic bomb dropped on
Hiroshima had an explosive force equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT, and
13.'Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the physical, Medical, and Social effects of the
Atomic bombing', Basic Books, New York, 1981.
14.U.S.A, USSR, U.K., France, China, India. It is also believed that Israel
developing or perhaps has already developed a Nuclear bomb.
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killed half of the population of 300,000 outright. (p. 35) The second
bomb dropped on Nagasaki with a power of 20,000 tons of TNT and killed
or seriously injured three quarter of that city's population of 87,000.
He also explains that the first hydrogen bomb had a force equivalent
to '10 million tons of TNT'. (p. 35) A comparison between the power of
these bombs will reveal the magnitude of death and destruction which
will be faced.
Ikle' (1958), and Perry (1982), attempted to study the social
and psychological implications of bombs. Thompson (1985), in
particular focuses on psychological aspects of nuclear war. One major
difficulty all these studies confess is the lack of ample and reliable
data.	 Since the only case of using atomic bombs against civilians was
in 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, little data is available. They
often have to speculate from human response in other emergencies such
as natural and man-made disasters. (see for example, Perry, p. 3)
The intensity and spread of destruction in the case of a nuclear
war is so extensive and the opportunity to eliminate it so slight and
costly, that currently even countries like Britain are unable to
provide adequate civil defence should such an attack occur. Campbell
(1983), extensively reviews the present civil defence plans in Britain
and reveals how the general public are abandoned, helpless and without
any protection. Unlike Switzerland where for the last thirty years
every house has had to install a shelter (see, Building Design,
February 18, 1983, p. 6), in Britain such activities were highlighted
only recently and then faded. Here the plan is to have secure bunkers
for the government and some authorities and no specific measures are
taken for the general public. That is estimated to involve a figure of
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£50 to £80 billion (ibid) which the government is not in a position to
provide.
Moore (1980), in relation to this writes; 'In Britain there is
probably already adequate provision made for the protection of central
and local government, but protection for the public is minimal' (p. 35)
He then reviews some of the designs of domestic shelters to be produced
by families. Quarmby (1983), claims that; "Besides, they also had
their own cosy nuclear shelters to run to: in Britain we have nuclear
shelters for the military, the Government, county councils and district
councils, with a total capacity for around 60,000 people. (p. 40) (see
also, New statesman & Society, 26 May 1989, pp. 10-11)
The only government step so far have been publication of some
survival guidelines. Justifying the fact that the government is not in
a position to provide enough shelter, they suggest some simple measures
which can be taken by the families to protect themselves in case of an
attack. The publications, 'Protect and Survive' and 'Domestic Nuclear
Shelters 1982, Technical Guidance' are among them. See also Makeshift
Shelters 1983.
The debate around nuclear shelters was also extended to the
architectural journals. Some architects argue that participating in
the design and construction of shelters is supporting, although
indirectly, the existence of nuclear weapons and reducing the chance of
total disarmament. Others claim that it is better to do something for
the people while the campaign against nuclear weapons continues.
Quarmby (1983), reviewing Ormerod's book, 'Nuclear Shelters',
writes; '...an attack on the U.K. would result in 34 per cent
immediate deaths, rising to 73 per cent (42 million people) killed by
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direct or indirect causes' (p. 40). Steadman (1983), argues against
the use of any nuclear shelter because they would not help many to
survive or help long-term survival, but will only postponed death. He
looks at the aftermath of the strike showing that the survivors need
food and that very few non-contaminated area would be found. (pp.
24-25) Ormeod in the AJ April 1983, in a letter to the Editor explains
that the survivor will need to be fed for a year by food stockpiled
beforehand. At the moment he claims that there is only food stored
'...for 5 million people at starving level' (p. 42) which is still
vulnerable to attack. He also writes that in the aftermath of attack
The survivor would have to create a low technology agricultural
society' (p. 42).
There are reports on the shelters constructed by the government
and also on a few of the shelters provided. Quarmby (1981) in AJ 28
January, referring to the Government Published Guide, 'Construction of
Domestic nuclear shelters' writes that shelters ....as described by one
press man are 'old Bill's trench from World War One, modified Anderson
Shelters and a pill box from World War Two.' (p. 142)
Quarmby (1981), in the AJ 18 March 1981. p. 481, reports from
his visit to a demonstration site at Heslington near York, of the Home
Office approved domestic shelters. He is mainly concerned with the
efficiency of shelters without power and heat and says that the people
would not really survive. He points to the psychological state of
people, who want to know what is happening outside, while the
recommendation is to stay indoors. He suggests that it would be
possible to add something like a periscope, so as to be able to see
what is going on outside.
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One of the non-engineering aspects of nuclear shelter which in
our view must be very important is what Quarmby (1981) in AJ 18
November 1981, reports; 'A Code of Practice for design and construction
of nuclear shelters has recently been issued by the Federation of
Master Builders (FMB)' (p. 980). He also writes that 'Item 25' of the
Code recommends that the builders should not advertise that they are
constructing a shelter because if the neighbours realise this, in the
case of a warning people may forcibly attempt take over other people's
shelters.
There are several designs for shelters currently available.
Pearman (1981), writes; ' The most expensive - a buried concrete box
design - could cost up to £10,000. But the types most likely to be
used are [believe it or not], based on the Second World War Morrison
and Anderson shelters, designed for use in the Blitz' (p. 5).
Building shelters is currently pursued as a business. In
Building Design, February 4, 1983, p.3 reads; 'Architects for Peace,
the disarmaments campaign, has hit out at plans by Peterborough
businessmen to build a £2 million nuclear shelter for 1,000 people'.
Around 250 families are being sought for the enterprise at a
reservation fee of just under £2,000 a head - the company has made it
clear it is looking for people with professional skills' (p. 3).
B.D. April 19, 1985, p. 4. reports that ; 'Glanford council
in south Humberside is planning to use £1.2 million of its hard-pressed
capital receipts budget to build a nuclear bunker and an office
extension for itself.' B.D. October 11, 1985, p. 7 reads; ' Carmarthen
council is taking legal action against anti-nuclear protesters who have
set up a 'peace camp' inside excavations for an extension to the
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council's offices' (p. 7).
The defencelessness of the civilian in Britain in the face of
nuclear attack has stimulated some artists and became a theme for
making fun of government policy. (see for instance, AJ 18 March 1981,
p. 482, or the book 'When the Wind Blows' by Briggs, 1982).
Remark- The following important observations can be made;
-The Americans are the only government to have dropped Nuclear bombs,
in 1945 in Japan, causing the end of World War II.
-The power of each of the existing nuclear bombs is a thousand times
larger than the Hiroshima bomb.
-In Britain it is estimated that with the present civil defence
situation more than 70% of the population would perish in a nuclear
strike.
-There are hundreds of targets spotted by nuclear warhead missiles in
the developing world, countries that have no nuclear weapons at all.
-Having many more acute necessities, nuclear defence in the developing
world is irrelevant, but the risk of attack is not. Both superpowers
may decide to test their nuclear power in the third world.
-The destruction by Nuclear bombs involves: an effect like ordinary
explosive weapons, creating tremors like earthquakes; high winds like
hurricanes; plus radiation, and fall-out of contaminated debris.
-Little data is available on the human response and behaviour, social,
psychological and physical consequences of nuclear attack. Researchers
use data on conventional war and more frequently natural disasters.
-Only a few of the European countries; Switzerland and Sweden, have
developed nuclear shelters in every house, over the last thirty years,
410
even so not every body has one.
-In Britain, the Government has developed special bunkers for
controlling authorities, and the military, but the civilians have no
protection. It is estimated that some £50 to £80 billion is necessary
to provide all with shelters.
-There are two groups arguing for and against nuclear shelter, both
hoping for total disarmament. One group assumes that building shelters
will not help survival and will only postpone the death of the majority
for a relatively short time. The other group think something is better
than nothing and this will not discourage the disarmament process.
-It must be one of the peculiar characteristics of war that the
mitigation and prevention measures, (i.e. civil defence) may in turn
increase the risk of hazard. (the war).
-There are two approaches pursued by the Government for nuclear
shelter. Makeshift shelter recommended to the people, and specialist
bunkers, usually modified versions of Anderson or Morrison shelters.
g- Evacuation- Often the next option to save lives in a conflict
zone is escape. The areas which become the battle zone naturally, must
be evacuated or the people will flee anyway. This was the case in the
recent war in Iran, with the approach of Iraqi troops, villagers
escaped to safer areas. The same has happened in the cities, with the
difference that some people remained to protect the city. In other
cities, the people often remained while the danger was from shelling,
but as the bombing intensified two other approaches were practised;
either to move for a few weeks or days to other cities or nearby
villages or to leave the city at night for instance and remain in the
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suburbs in temporary camps provided.
The problems of evacuation are several. Traffic jams are
common features in a mass evacuation. Administration and control of
the families becomes a complicated task, often impossible. Immigrants
we must remember are not only concerned with their lives. That is
apparently the first priority but after that they start worrying about
their property and possessions left behind. A vacated region provides
a good environment for looters, as was reported from the December 1988
Armenian earthquake in Russia.
However, it is not the evacuation itself, being a matter of a
few hours or days, but the temporary accommodation of refugees or
immigrants which is of major concern.
h- Camps- In one of our earlier chapters, where the subject of
emergency shelter was discussed, some of the themes relating to camps
were argued. In this section our aim is to sketch out some of the
significant differences between camps after natural disasters and those
of armed conflicts. We will also review the subject in the context of
WW II.
In case of war one major factor is, that the end of the conflict
can not be predicted.	 In Lebanon it has now been going on for 15
years. In the case of natural disasters, predictions of when to
return home can be more reliable. This uncertainty will influence the
psychological status of the refugees in terms of their intention to
build or permanently settle down. However, in practice the temporary
settlements of war refugees may become their home for generations. The
following cases are illustrative.
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Hirschon and Thakurdesai (1979), write about the Asia Minor
refugees who settled in Greece.
"Following the disastrous campaign of the Greek
Army in Asia Minor, a flood of destitute persons
arrived in Greece in the last months of 1922,
followed gradually by thousands of families who
left their homes under the term 1923 Exchange of
Populations between Greece and Turkey" (p. 247).
They revealed that the prefabricated German buildings provided as
temporary accommodation were still occupied after 50 years. In
conclusion they write;
"These prefabricated houses, provided in 1928 as
temporary shelters, are now inhabited by several
generations of the same family, or have been
subdivided between unrelated families. Today,
over-crowding, a marked decrease in open space and
inadequate public facilities characterise the
area" (p. 249).
Robert McAdam, an engineer member of REDR (Register of Engineers
for Disaster Relief), was seconded for three month in 1986 to a refugee
camp in Sudan. Three years before that he went on a mission to Lebanon
working in Palestinian refugee camps. From these two missions he has
published a few articles.15
McAdam (1987), in relation to working in refugee camps writes;
"The engineer is therefore particularly faced with
the dilemma of temporary aid v. permanent
development. ... most refugee camps last only a
year or two. Some, such as in Lebanon, last for
decades" (p. 297).
15.In 'Disasters'/11/2/1987, in 'The Structural Engineer'/Volume/65A/No.8/
August 1987 in the report of the 'First Workshop on Settlement
Reconstruction Post-War', IAAS York University, 1988 and the Second York
Workshop, IAAS, 1989.
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From his experience in Lebanon he writes;
"Over the years ...the camps had developed into
small towns, often within a large town. Usually,
the Palestinians had not integrated with the
surrounding population. They were determined to
liberate their country and return to Palestine-in
due course-an aspiration that had held them apart
from every one else" (p. 298).
The second difference between refugees after natural disasters and war
can be seen in the Editorial of Disaster Vol. 4 No. 2. (pp. 127-128).
It reads;
"A natural catastrophe is a better bet than fleeing
from warfare. You will at least remain on or near
your home ground, a great advantage for your
emotional and economic rehabilitation" (p. 127).
The third difference is in the attention of the international and
national bodies. The same article also points to the fact that in the
case of war the political situation is significant in the supply of aid
from donor countries.
	
However, the same article argues that;
"The chief problem is that there is as yet no basic
standard which you can expect all relief agencies
to aim at, whether in camp layout and
administration,	 sanitation, general medication,
nutritional	 screening	 and	 therapeutic or
supplementary feeding,	 or for that matter,
education for your children" (p. 127).
The fourth difference is the risk of military attack for the war
refugee camps and settlements. UNHCR (1982), refers to the security
matter of refugees of armed conflicts, suggesting they should be
settled far from the frontiers to avoid risk of attack. (p. 59)
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However, this has not been necessarily practised. Moodie R., Hagos F.
and Trigg P. (1981) report from a refugee camp in Sudan accommodating
Eritrean and Tigrean political refugees. They write; ' In October
1979, fighting broke out between Ethiopia and Sudan ...This left at
least 3,000 refugees homeless, many of whom had also lost their
possessions' (p. 89).
McAdam (1987), also writes;
"As a result of harassment over the years, and
especially once the civil war had started, the
camps became armed fortresses. The public
buildings were strengthened, the hospitals were
extended underground, and the schools, which were
made of reinforced concrete, were converted into
tank emplacements. Underground shelters sprang up
everywhere. The entrances were in streets,
playgrounds, sides of buildings, and in gardens"
(p. 298).
McAdam also confesses that in Lebanon '...personal security was a
problem'. He also observed that; 'Mosques had vanished, although the
people knew exactly where they had been and how far they had extended.
Fortunately for the people, in most places the shelters survived, and
so did the population' (p. 298).
Other examples exist of attacks on refugee camps. The Israelis
used incendiary weapons against the Palestinians, even their hospitals
(see, SIPRI, 1975, p. 63). Grove-Hills also claims that 'Intensive
bombardment of the camps in the south forced a large number of refugees
into a small area in the central part of the city, [Beirut] which
itself was continually subject to bombing raids' (p. 242).
The fifth difference is the difficulty with war refugees that
their numbers, unlike those after natural catastrophes', fluctuate with
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periods of peace and war. This can affect decision making about the
capacity of the camp and its services.
The types of camps and the space required for families are other
areas of difference. Cuny (1977), writes about 'Refugee Camps and
Camp Planning'. The article contains reports of visits to several
•
camps. The main theme Cuny is trying to argue is the importance of
considering community behaviour and to avoid building regimental and
graded pattern type military camps. That he argues, can have a
decisively positive effects on other aspects of the refugees' life,
such as health.
Visiting Bengali Camps in India where some '...10-12 million
Bengalis fled to India for sanctuary from the fighting' (p. 125). Cuny
writes; ' Camps in this area ranged in size from a minimum of 3000
persons to several which had a population of over 250,000' (p. 126).
Cuny writes;
"The first conclusion of our study of the Indian
camps was the realisation that, where there is a
constant influx of refugees, three distinct classes
of camps emerge. Each type can be identified or
classified according to the stage of crisis during
which it was erected, and to the extent of prior
planning which was undertaken" (p. 126).
He then describes three identifiable phases. The Phase I camp, Cuny
argues, 'Is set up immediately following a disaster or during the
initial influx of refugees across a boarder' (p. 126). The Phase II
camps are those located relatively near to main transport access
points, such as railway stations or air ports. They are semi-planned.
And the Phase III are those for which a considerable amount of planning
and construction has been done prior to the arrival of refugees and are
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for long term use or permanent camps. (pp. 126-127)
Cuny then highlights the concept of layout and design and
suggests that the communities should be settled in similar layouts as
their original settlements.	 He also compares the refugee camps of
natural disaster refugees with those of war.	 He claims that some
significant differences are identified as;
"First, in the former case there is only one type
of camp; there are no phases as in the latter.
Second, the government, for political reasons, must
respond itself to the needs of the refugees; thus a
camp will receive more consideration by local
authorities, and more government resources will be
available to camp builders. ....A third difference
relating to camps is that the number of refugees
following a natural disaster is constant....
Finally, and significant to the per family space
allocation in the layout, is that following a
natural disaster, refugees usually have more
possessions than do escapees or evacuees from war
zones..." (p. 129).
For a review on refugee problems see also Disasters/9/4/1985.
	
i- Camps in WW	 It appears that camps were familiar notions
before WW II started. In fact a variety of camps existed and the
issue of layout, size and management of them were subject to argument
before the War. For example AJ (July, 13, 1939) reads; 'At present we
have Holiday Camps, Evacuation Camps, School Camps and several other
main types,..."(p. 43).
The same reference also reads;
"From the point of view of layout and siting these
camps appear to fall into four main groups: the
large closely-grouped seaside holiday camp which
would not be well suited for any other purpose;
similar smaller camps, not necessarily at the
seaside,	 which could	 be	 used both as
Lin
holiday-with-pay camps and as evacuation camps
(which could also be used by scouts and similar
associations); and, lastly, informally planned
camps of national park type for those families,
individuals and hikers who like every thing about
old-style camping except the tents and Primus
stoves" (p. 43).
The same document also illustrates examples of camps in several
countries such as Sweden, USSR, Denmark, USA, Canada and U.K..
Generally since camps are characterised by temporary
buildings it seems they can accommodate the war evacuees for a while.
It is worth noting that those countries affected by wars often have no
acquaintance with refugee camps, that are in fact a common European
phenomenon.
AJ, February 22, 1940 reads;
"At the end of August there were about 1,600,000
children in the dangerous evacuation areas. Of
these, only 700,000 were evacuated, of whom about
300,000 have since returned. There are thus 1,25
million school-children in dangerous areas, of whom
half have had no care or schooling at all for five
months and the other half cannot have had much of
the consistent and continuous quiet guidance which
is the major part of education" (p. 201).
Even then in England, when children separated from their families and
moved to the school camps, it was not sure that the parents would like
the long separation or the long term consequences this isolation could
have for both parents and children.
Many current world refugees are rural people. This is true in
Africa and in Afghanistan. The background of refugees has an important
role in their temporary settlement. Urban populations are shown not
to be so easily able, to adapt to the life of temporary camp sites. On
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the contrary villagers seem more easily to adjust to camp conditions.
Often they are more acquainted with the natural environment and know
better how to exploit it for their personal comfort. For the
inhabitants of large urban centres one option was to move temporarily
to villages not far away. They could have access to their homes in a
few hours and enjoy the services without being totally disconnected.
In our view this method should be considered for any long term
situation.
Those who had to emigrate because their area was occupied often
had to live in temporary accommodation, such as hotels or other
buildings converted for this purpose, or alternatively, particularly
rural people, had to live in barrack style camps established for this
purpose. Neldner (1979), in the context of Africa claims there are
differences between rural and urban refugees. He says that
"Generally, rural refugees move in groups as
compared with urban refugees who are more likely to
move as individuals... It can therefore be said
that rural refugees may be dealt with on a group or
community basis as distinct from urban refugees who
frequently or in most instances require individual
processing,	 counselling	 and	 solutions...
Frequently rural refugee situations have resulted
in	 permanent solutions through
	 settlement
schemes, 	  A significant aspect in a number of
situations is that rural refugees who cross
boarders to seek asylum find themselves in, or know
in advance that they will be entering an area
populated by people with tribal kinship..." (p.
393)
Concerning the 'type of settlement', Neldner argues that there are two
options; first; 'Spontaneous settlement where refugees so-to-speak
merge with the rural host community. ....The other possibility,...
was pursue a policy where government designated specific areas for
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settlement ...' (p. 394).
That author also identifies three phases of settlement; ' I.
Emergency, II. Self-support and III. Integrated settlement phase.'
(p. 396) In terms of housing the same author claims that the most
convenient approach in his view, is encouraging the construction of
shelters by the refugees using local materials and techniques. (p. 398)
Jawad (1985), writes;
"Within Afghanistan, fighting, heavy bombardment
and reprisals against civilians persist. There is
no sign of political change in the near future.
Therefore the continuation of relief aid is vitally
important. The Afghan refugee problem will be long
term and therefore long term programmes are
necessary for a solution, besides relief assistance
on a daily basis" (p. 235).
Christensen (1984), in relation to Afghan refugees writes;
"The Government of Pakistan has granted refugees
status to the massive in-flow of refugees from
Afghanistan resulting from conflict and warfare
which has been developing in that country from 1978
onwards.... The refugees are physically located in
special refugee villages which, in some areas, are
directly adjacent to the Pakistan - Afghan
frontier,...	 They are free to find employment,
move around,...
	 The refugee have no right to
purchase land or other property..." (p. 2).
McAdam (1987), writes about the Palestinian camp that the families
refused to accept tents as their accommodation and burnt them, claiming
'we are not Bedouin'. The agencies were forced to supply building
materials only to those families who would accept a free tent, in order
to use the store of tents. (p. 299) However, although initially the
Israelis were against construction of any permanent buildings, after a
few weeks they changed their minds, suggesting the use of their
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expensive prefabricated houses. (p. 299)
McAdam (1987), also discusses his experience in Sudan, where he
worked in a camp of refugees from Chad, mainly tribesmen and nomads.
In this case materials were scarce and had to come from a great
distance. The place was '...politically a short-lived camp.' In terms
of design and housing, he writes that the site has been divided to
large squares and each family or group was permitted to settle in one
of them. The construction of houses was left up to the refugees, using
traditional or local materials and techniques. (pp. 299-302)
Remark- So far some of the major differences between war
refugees and those of natural disasters have been explored. It was
found that during WW II in Europe, camps in several shapes and
functions already existed; School camps, Holiday camps, Evacuation
camps etc. Generally because camps are designed as 'temporary'
settlements, they could suit an emergency situation like that of
refugees. However it is common that in many cases the camps for war
refugees camps lasted too long, even for generations, some becoming
small towns.
Unlike most natural disasters, refugees from war are uncertain
about when they are likely to return home. Their camps are often at
risk from military attack. It is necessary for them to be located away
from the war zones. These camps may take at least three forms
depending on the extent of the original design and the time they have
been established. Furthermore war refugees often require less space
than those from natural disasters. Camps need not necessarily be
barrack like cities, the Afghan refugees, for instance have recreated
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camps like their villages. This policy is one way to help to mitigate
the stresses of camps life and refugee status. Finally it was argued
that often rural refugees are more able to exploit the environment of
camps than urban refugees.
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9-4- Relief for war victims- One of the characters of the
immediate period after disasters is the existence of a utopian
community. The rescue and relief of casualties, it is observed, often
in the early stages creates friendly and humanitarian relationship
between all members of the community. This often does not last long
and gradually, in some cases, measures must be taken to prevent
looting. However, natural catastrophes often provide an atmosphere for
co-operation within the international community. The case of war must
be different since aid would serve as support for the recipients.
This has political consequences for the donor country as well. During
the recent war in Iran, Arab countries particularly wealthy
Oil-Exporters gave their unlimited economic support to Iraq, while not
being directly involved in the conflict. Jordan for instance provided
port facilities at Aghaba.
The next difference between relief in a war situation and in
that of a natural disaster, is the risk of casualties and loss of life.
An UNDRO News Editorial, (1987, Nov/Dec) reveals that 'The attack, on
23 October, destroyed a 23-truck convoy, transporting 450 tones of food
aid from Asmara to drought victims in Tigray province, where over half
a million people are in need of urgent relief assistance.... One
relief worker died in the attack and thousands of people were deprived
of the sorely-needed food' (p. 2). In Lebanon also Peter Colleridge,
Co-ordinator of the Middle East Department of Oxfam U.K. was kidnapped
in 1988 and then shortly released. Generally in the case of war
firstly relief is a political matter and secondly there is risk to
workers of kidnapping or death. (see also McAdam, 1987).
The other difference is the duration for which relief may be
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needed. Unlike with natural disasters this is much less easy to
predict and it can change at short notice. For example, UNDRO (1985
Nov/Dec), reports on a mission to Lebanon, where half a million
Lebanese are displaced, to assess the situation for reconstruction.
They admit it is virtually impossible to foresee the end of the war.
(pp. 14-15) (see also Jawad, 1985)
An additional difference is that 'relief of the deprived' may
strengthen a brutal regime or the regime may take advantage of the
relief items. For instance, The Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Fund, Canadian Council for International Co-operation, (1986) reads
"The first and most fundamental point that most
Salvadorians made about the earthquake was that it
was by no means the main problem facing the
Salvadorian people. They defined the most serious
problem as the unjust socio-economic system which
is at the root of the seven year civil war" (p. 1).
The same report also reads;
"UTR	 has major implications	 for funding
organisations. In July 1986, General Blandon of
the Salvadorian army invited national and
international NGOs to join the programme and
implied that agencies working outside UTR would be
suspected of aiding the guerrillas" (p. 2).
In post-war reconstruction the risk of fatalities also exists. In Iran
for instance, some volunteers were killed during reconstruction by
Iraqi bombs. Undetected artillery, mines and ammunition are also other
damages jeopardising the lives of the people. No such risk exists
after natural disasters.
Finally, war damage seems to be more complicated and confused
than the scene after a natural catastrophe. The following example
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illustrates this point. UNDRO News (1985 Nov/Dec) reads; ' Drought
and civil strife have seriously affected Mozambique's agricultural
output and have disrupted the lives of many of its people' (p. 16).
UNDRO NEWS (1987, March/April) reads;
"An international donors Conference, attended' by
representatives of over 40 governments, discussed
an effective programme of emergency relief
assistance to an estimated 4.5 million victims of
externally induced armed insurgency in the People's
Republic of Mozambique, on 31 March" (p. 4).
The same report reveals that;
” ...damage to the economy totalled more than US $5
billion. 'Attacks on the civilian population, the
forced exodus from South Africa of thousands of
workers, the large scale destruction of major
economic and social infrastructure in villages and
towns, economic sabotage and cruel and inhuman acts
of terrorism by externally-supported armed groups -
the cumulative effects of all these had been
devastating', the message said" (p. 4).
In brief relief and recovery from , war is different from natural
disasters because of the political dimension of donations, the risks of
to officials, ambush of aid convoys.
Conclusion- In this chapter several aspects of war as a disaster
were explored. It was revealed that although in some respects the
consequences of war show similarities with natural catastrophes,
nevertheless significant differences also exist. For instance the
source of war is unlimited. The tools of destruction are constantly
being improved to increase their destructive impact. Precautionary
measures for civilians are too costly and difficult to manage. In this
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sense even European civilians are exposed to similar risks as their
counterparts in the Third World. It was also argued that relief in
war-time has political implications. Generally it was found that war
situations requires a much more sophisticated approach in terms of the
means and purposes of intervention.
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